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Seeing Emotionally: An Investigation of the Role of Emotion in 
the Rhetorical Discourse of 1 Peter 
Katherine M. Hockey 
Abstract: 
This thesis is an investigation of the role of emotion in the rhetorical discourse of 1 
Peter. It argues that taking a more theoretically and historically informed approach 
to emotions in a New Testament epistle, in this case 1 Peter, can open up new 
avenues for discussion, provide corrective tools, and aid us in our interpretation 
and understanding of an ancient text. Emotions have hitherto generally been 
neglected in New Testament studies, and so this thesis provides the first full-scale 
attempt to analyse the rhetorical use of emotions in a New Testament epistle. It 
demonstrates that the author of 1 Peter uses the logic of each emotion to value 
and position objects within the audience’s worldview, including the self and the 
other. Cumulatively, the emotions are used by the author to build an alternate view 
of reality. For the believers, this leads to a new understanding of the structuring of 
their world, encourages a reassessment of personal goals, and it ultimately aims to 
affect their identity and behaviour. 
The introduction details previous work on emotions in New Testament studies and 
1 Peter. Then, using developments in modern emotion theory, it proceeds to 
establish the theoretical foundations and methodological approach of the 
investigation. The thesis then continues in three parts. Part 1 (chapters 2-3) focuses 
on ‘Emotions in Antiquity.’ Parts 2-3 (chapters 4-7) are exegetical, focusing on the 
‘Present Experience’ and ‘Future Expectation’ of the audience respectively.   
Part 1 demonstrates that there is a close fit between ancient theories and recent 
developments in emotion studies and thus proves that the exploratory approach of 
this thesis is not anachronistic. Chapter 2 details Stoic philosophical theory of 
emotion and chapter 3 the rhetorical use of emotion. These both work at the level 
of a general theory of emotion.  
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Parts 2-3, firstly, using primarily Stoic theory, define each emotion and thus identify 
the core characteristics of each emotion. Secondly, they seek to understand the 
contextualisation of emotion and accompanying rationale in both Stoicism and the 
LXX. Thirdly, using these insights, the use of emotions in 1 Peter is then explored 
comparatively. Chapters 4-5 investigate joy (χαρά) and distress (λύπη), with chapter 
4 focusing on joy despite distress and chapter 5 examining joy in suffering.  Chapter 
6 looks at fear (φόβος) and hope (ἐλπίς); chapter 7 investigates shame (αἰσχύνη). In 
each of the exegetical chapters, the exegetical discussion is directed by key 
questions about emotions which were highlighted by modern emotion theory. The 
answers to these questions reveal which objects are being evaluated and how, and, 
therefore, what the author is communicating to the believers about the object and 
their own positioning in relation to it. The ethical, sociological, and therapeutic 
implications of this for the believers are then explored. 
The conclusion pulls together the findings of the exegetical chapters into a 
composite picture. It concludes that, consistently, the author promotes allegiance 
to God and Christ, fosters emotional distancing from the hostile other, and 
engenders a positive assessment of the Christian self. Figures of power within the 
audience’s worldview are repositioned and their relationship to essential goods is 
reinterpreted. This seeks to alter the audience’s goals and subsequent behaviour so 
that a Christian ethic is promoted and the believers are encouraged that they are 
on the path to flourishing. This aims to produce confidence in the believer, and 
reduce the inner turmoil created by persecution. Finally, the implications of these 
findings for our understanding of 1 Peter’s rhetorical and social strategy are 
explained. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Emotion Studies and the New Testament 
This thesis aims to explore how emotions, specifically emotion terms, function in 
the discourse of 1 Peter. Therefore, it can be categorised as a type of rhetorical 
analysis. However, it will not apply ancient rhetorical categories to the letter, nor 
identify topoi or figures used.1 It is rhetorical as far as it will investigate how the 
author is seeking to persuade his audience towards a particular viewpoint in order 
to alter its behaviour. Emotions, which are often overlooked, play a vital role in 
achieving this end. Emotions are not a manipulative moving force which is separate 
from logical argument, but in themselves communicate logically and can be 
deployed to alter an audience’s interpretation of events, and, consequently, shape 
behaviour. This thesis will not address the audience’s own emotions other than as 
they are idealised in the text. Therefore, its focus is on emotion terms that appear 
in the letter, specifically, joy (χαρά), distress (λύπη), fear (φόβος), hope (ἐλπίς), and 
shame (αἰσχύνη). 
Recent progress in the study of emotions, notably in philosophy, psychology, 
sociology and anthropology, has generated greater understanding about what 
constitutes an emotion, and revealed their interpretive and directive role. Scholars 
in these fields have argued persuasively that emotions are culturally constructed 
and can be used to shape worldview and therefore affect our understanding of our 
place in the world. Subsequently, emotions influence one’s conception of reality, 
including social structure and self-identity. To date, there has been no attempt to 
use these insights to explore how emotions function in 1 Peter’s persuasive 
communication. In fact, such a thoroughgoing investigation of emotions has not 
been undertaken for any New Testament epistle. 
 
                                                     
1
 For an example of this type of approach see B. L. Campbell, Honor, Shame, and the Rhetoric of 1 
Peter (SBLDS 160; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998).  
Introduction 
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1.1.1 The Wider New Testament 
In recent years, there have been only a few scholars who have analysed emotions in 
the New Testament.2 One notable example is Matthew Elliott.3 Elliott demonstrates 
awareness of modern and ancient theories of emotion. He outlines cognitive and 
non-cognitive theories of emotion; emotion in the Greco-Roman world and Jewish 
culture;4 and then discusses love, joy, hope, jealousy, sorrow, fear and anger in the 
New Testament. Elliott promotes a cognitive approach to emotions, and reveals 
that cognitive perspectives on emotion were present in the ancient world. Elliott 
seeks to determine whether the New Testament has a cognitive view of emotions 
by examining whether the authors command emotion, categorise emotions as right 
and wrong, and hold their audiences responsible for their emotions. Where these 
are demonstrated, as they are in the New Testament, a cognitive understanding of 
emotions is present.5 The problem with Elliott’s work is its superficiality. Despite 
making important observations about emotions – assertions this thesis will echo – 
he does not utilise these fully in his exegesis.6 For each emotion analysed he gives a 
general explanation of the emotion and its occasion; highlights the range of 
relevant Greek terms; and then surveys the occurrence of the emotion in groups of 
New Testament texts such as the gospels; ‘Pauline Literature’; and the ‘general 
                                                     
2
 Certain emotions have been acknowledged in the scope of other arguments, but emotions 
themselves have not been the primary focus. Older works that address individual emotions include, 
J. Moffatt, Love in the New Testament (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929) and W. G. Morrice, Joy 
in the New Testament (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1984). In both of these, 1 Peter receives only a 
brief mention. 
3
 M. Elliott, Faithful Feelings: Emotions in the New Testament (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 2005). 
Another example is S. Voorwinde, Jesus' Emotions in the Gospels (London: T&T Clark, 2011). 
Voorwinde does address the question ‘what is an emotion?’ However, his discussion is brief and 
results in the vague definition that emotions are feelings that motivate action (3). In his exegesis he 
gives a basic understanding of each emotion investigated by translating the Greek word to English 
equivalents which shows a historical and cultural naivety towards emotions. Voorwinde does 
recognise that emotions are situational and implicitly assumes that they have some reasoning .But, 
he does not reveal how emotions are functioning as part of the discourse of the gospels other than 
to detail what they reveal about Jesus’ own character and identity. Thus, Voorwinde’s study it is not 
comparable to this investigation. Though it addresses emotions, it has a different type of text in view 
and asks different questions. In fact, it demonstrates that even Voorwinde, who seeks to take 
seriously emotions in the NT, provides only a surface-level examination with little theoretical or 
analytical sharpness. 
4
 Though his discussion is thin, having only a few references to the ancient primary texts and relying 
on secondary scholarship (see 56-79). Furthermore, he gives little or no recourse to Greco-Roman 
views on emotion in his analysis of the New Testament. Thus, he does not show historical and 
cultural awareness of the emotion he is investigating. 
5
 Elliott, Faithful Feelings, 54. 
6
 See particularly Elliott, Faithful Feelings, 53-5. 
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epistles and Revelation.’ His approach tends towards the general and gives little 
detailed investigation of the role of the emotions in the discourse of the New 
Testament letters. Instead, the thrust of his work is to show that emotions are 
treated as cognitive in the New Testament and therefore are linked to ethics. This is 
a foundational concept for this present study, but the limitations of Elliott’s 
exegesis show that there is still work to be done. It is not sufficient to note 
emotions and recognise that the author gives them importance; we need to 
understand why the author is using an emotion in a given context and what the 
implications of this are. 
Most attention has been paid to the emotions within the field of Rhetorical 
Criticism. But, still, few works have centred on the emotions. The most prominent 
volume is Paul and Pathos.7 This essay collection uses ancient rhetorical theory to 
assess how Paul sought to move his audience. Section one outlines the background 
and method for analysing Paul in this manner. Section two addresses πάθος in 
particular Pauline letters. The introductory essays helpfully highlight the 
importance of πάθος in ancient rhetoric, and rightly call for more attention to be 
paid to pathetic persuasion. However, this collection does little to utilise conceptual 
insights from modern theory when approaching the idea of πάθος (equated by the 
authors with ‘emotion’). It is evident that some baggage carried by the English 
concept of emotion (see 1.2-3) is absorbed into a number of essays which persist in 
distinguishing between head and heart, emotion and reason. There are exceptions, 
for example, Steven J. Kraftchick acknowledges that ‘emotions are part of the 
rational process.’8 But, this does not equate to recognising that emotions are 
themselves cognitive: a key tenet of this study. The generally non-cognitive 
                                                     
7
 T. H. Olbricht and J. L. Sumney, eds., Paul and Pathos (SBLSymS  16; Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2001). Another example is A. Harker, 'The Affective Directives of the Book of Revelation,'  
Tyndale Bulletin 63 (2012): 115-30 . Harker’s short article highlights the importance of the affective 
aspects of Revelation’s directives. Theoretically, it relies on Jonathan Edwards (1746) conception of 
affections. Its main point is to acknowledge that the author aimed at affecting his audience in order 
that they might have the appropriate attraction to and repulsion from the right things. See also P. 
von Gemünden, Affekt und Glaube: Studien zur historischen Psychologie des Frühjudentums und 
Urchristentums (StUNT 73; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), which is not strictly 
interested in rhetoric, but emotion in discourse more generally.  
8
 S. J. Kraftchick, 'Πάθη in Paul: The Emotional Logic of "Original Argument",' in Paul and Pathos (eds. 
Thomas H. Olbricht and Jerry L. Sumney; SBLSymS 16; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001), 
39-68, 45. 
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standpoint pushes this collection in a certain theoretical direction.9 Thus, the 
majority of exegetical essays approach emotions by looking at the relationship 
between author and audience, frequently exploring how the author moves the 
audience by arousing its emotion. This is generally considered a persuasive 
manoeuvre separate to the λόγος of the argument. Most essays take the same 
approach: they examine a passage that they think exhibits πάθος; suggest which 
emotion they think the author is exciting in his audience; then, give their reasoning 
for why Paul would want to arouse this emotion. The last stage requires relating the 
emotion to the behavioural outcome Paul must have desired. The problem with this 
approach is that it becomes conjectural, being based on the scholar’s own 
understanding of emotions and opinion of what is most fitting. The cultural 
boundedness of emotions is not appreciated, and therefore, emotions are analysed 
through English-speaking conceptual frameworks.10 Furthermore, despite the 
wealth of material in ancient rhetorical handbooks that could have been accessed, 
the discussion linking epistolary content to emotional arousal remains basic.11 
Furthermore, no essay focuses on the emotion terms in the actual text, but instead 
on the projected emotions of the audience. Contrastingly, this study will start from 
the emotions present in the text. It will not suggest which emotions the audience 
might be caused to feel, but how 1 Peter directly addresses and uses certain 
emotions to communicate. 
                                                     
9
 Sumney’s essay is more insightful. It does acknowledge the dynamic relationship between 
emotions and perspective, and recognises that emotions are not irrational and are ‘based to some 
degree on beliefs arrived at through reason.’ He notes that emotions are interpretive, and that they 
signify the meaning of an event, but he does not utilise these insights to their full extent in his 
discussion. For example, the link between emotions and values or goals is never made, though this 
would be an obvious outcome of the statement that emotions make events meaningful; See J. L. 
Sumney, 'Paul's Use of Πάθος in His Argument against the Opponents of 2 Corinthians,' in Paul and 
Pathos (eds. Thomas H. Olbricht and Jerry L. Sumney; SBLSymS 16; Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2001), 147-60, 147-9.  
10
 For another example of this see P. Lampe, 'Affects and Emotions in the Rhetoric of Paul's Letter to 
Philemon: A Rhetorical-Psychological Interpretation,' in Philemon in Perspective: Interpreting a 
Pauline Letter (ed. D. François Tolmie; BZNW 169; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 61-77. 
11
 Martin more successfully mines Aristotle’s comments in On Rhetoric and consequently provides a 
fuller and more convincing discussion of πάθος in Galatians; see T. W. Martin, 'The Voice of Emotion: 
Paul's Pathetic Persuasion (Gal 4:12-20),' in Paul and Pathos (eds. Thomas H. Olbricht and Jerry L. 
Sumney; SBLSymS 16; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001), 181-202 . 
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There are other short works that approach emotions in the New Testament from a 
therapeutic angle. The best example is Welborn’s article ‘Paul and Pain.’12 Welborn 
examines Paul’s innovative stance towards constructive pain in 2 Corinthians. He 
highlights that Paul speaks of emotions in a manner that does not map neatly onto 
contemporaneous philosophical opinions but is shaped by Paul’s view of God’s 
action in Christ. Consequently, Paul posits a different relationship between 
emotions, here pain (or distress), and the moral life. Subsequently, he suggests an 
alternate emotional therapy. Welborn’s essay, which uses Greco-Roman 
philosophical theories of emotion throughout, is an excellent example of how a 
historical and cultural awareness of emotions can shed fresh light on New 
Testament texts. Welborn also rightly highlights that ancient discussion about 
emotions is necessarily linked to ethics, and so is not an abstract but a practical 
concern.13 This study aims to follow Welborn by having the same level of cultural 
and historical sensitivity. Welborn’s article achieves a number of important steps 
for the analysis of emotions in New Testament texts, but these are mostly at the 
level of general philosophical/theoretical views of the emotions. There are still 
advances that need to be made in the analysis of particular emotions, and in the 
understanding of the argumentative function of emotions in New Testament 
epistles. 
One scholar who has made notable progress in studying emotion in the New 
Testament is Stephen Barton. In 2011 Barton published an article ‘Eschatology and 
the Emotions in Early Christianity.’14 Barton comments, the ‘study of the emotions 
has attracted relatively little attention in studies of early Christianity.’15 He states: 
Arguably, this neglect reflects a scholarly preoccupation in academic 
theology with matters of doctrinal, historical, and textual reconstruction. 
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Arguably also, however, it reflects a certain myopia with respect to 
approaches to human perception and cognition that take seriously the 
expressive and cognitive resources of the emotions and the realm of the 
experiential.16 
Since 2011, New Testament scholarship has not taken up Barton’s challenge to 
extend its vision to encompass the emotions. Barton’s approach is the only attempt 
I have discovered that takes account of the Greco-Roman historical cultural setting 
of the emotions and is analytically informed by modern emotion theory. He adopts 
a cognitive view of emotions stating that ‘emotions communicate culturally 
mediated moral judgements.’17  Barton goes on to say: 
That is to say, emotions are cognitive and evaluative. This implies that study 
of early Christian emotions offers a window on the ethos, ethics, and 
identity of Christianity in a crucial formative period in a way that 
supplements traditional approaches. To put it another way, emotions as a 
form of rationality offer another avenue toward understanding early 
Christian rationality as a whole.18 
This crucial insight has been overlooked in New Testament studies to date. Barton 
also recognises that emotions ‘arise in the course of social relations and 
interactions’ and therefore ‘emotions are integral to personal engagements in 
social processes.’ Thus, ‘the study of emotions offers additional insight into the 
tenor and character of early Christian social life and action.’ 19 He goes on to 
explore grief in 1 Thessalonians, acknowledging that his essay does not answer 
every question raised by investigating emotions.  
A second article by Barton assesses the role of emotions in moral-theology.20 This 
time, using Greco-Roman moral philosophy comparatively, Barton reveals how 
Christian stances towards emotions can be at variance to surrounding society and, 
thus, emotions are integrated into Christian moral life differently.21 He shows that 
Christian emotions are shaped by the ‘salvific narrative of divine grace’ in Christ. 
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Therefore, emotions ‘as a form of cognition’ have the potential to ‘be in alignment 
with, and an expression of, the truth.’22 For the early Christians, having the 
appropriate moral emotions involved a process of learning, instructed by both 
biblical traditions and the New Testament authors themselves.23 Hence, Barton 
demonstrates that investigating emotions gives insight into the moral-theology of 
New Testament authors and New Testament therapeutic education. 
Barton has argued strongly that much can be gained by analysing the place and use 
of emotions in the New Testament. Thus, Barton’s work has been a springboard for 
my own. This study will build on Barton’s by presenting the first full-length 
exploration of the role of emotions in a New Testament epistle that uses analytical 
tools from modern emotion theory, the cultural and historical insights gained by 
Greco-Roman philosophy, and the theological background of biblical tradition. In 
doing so, it will, to quote Barton, engage with early Christian emotions with ‘greater 
depth and with greater analytical sophistication than has been the case hitherto.’24 
1.1.2 1 Peter 
Where emotion terms appear in 1 Peter they have been noted, but they have not 
received an informed analytical treatment. For example, in most major 
commentaries, e.g. Michaels’, Achtemeier’s and Elliott’s, emotions such as shame 
are given a sideways glance, whereas others like fear receive more attention. 
However, the comments are often thin and not thoroughly worked through with 
the consequence that the specific communication contained in the emotion term is 
missed and, therefore, its influence on interpretation is not recognised. 
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There have been three notable examinations of joy in 1 Peter, specifically its 
relation to suffering.25 Both Nauck and de Villiers provide short treatments, 
whereas Millhauer’s analysis is part of his larger work Leiden als Gnade. Millhauer’s 
study does not investigate the rhetorical function of joy rather it is a tradition-
historical investigation of the Leidenstheologie of 1 Peter. Likewise, Nauck’s article 
focuses on tradition-historical questions. de Villiers’ essay provides some useful 
comment on the contextualisation of joy, e.g. its object in 1.6, and links joy to the 
argument and purpose of 1 Peter.26 He also comments that the Christians, through 
1 Peter’s address, have ‘obtained the proper perspective on their sufferings.’27 
However, he does not provide a full examination of how the author by utilising the 
emotion of joy has sought to achieve this, nor suggest the implications of employing 
joy in this context. It is unfair to expect these authors to give a full treatment of 
emotions given that the developments in emotions studies, on which my work 
relies, postdate them. Thus, in light of progress in other fields, a fresh reading of 
emotions in 1 Peter is needed. 
Even in Paul Holloway’s Coping with Prejudice, a thematic approach which utilises 
psychological theory, discussion of emotions is surprisingly scant.28  Holloway does 
acknowledge that the fears and anxieties produced by prejudice occasioned 1 
Peter, but, where such themes are encountered in the text, Holloway gives little 
discussion on the emotions themselves.29 Holloway highlights ‘emotion-focused’ 
strategies as a means of coping with prejudice. This includes ‘social comparisons,’ 
‘attribution of negative outcomes,’ and ‘a restructuring of one’s self concept.’ 30 
But, Holloway does not evaluate the rhetorical function of emotions that leads the 
audience to these outcomes. Consequently, Holloway’s work will be a useful 
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discussion partner when exploring the impact on the audience of the emotional 
content of 1 Peter; but, his work shows that a full analysis of the function of 
emotions in 1 Peter’s rhetorical discourse is still necessary.  
One scholar who starts to expound the role of emotions in 1 Peter’s persuasion is 
Lauri Thurén. Thurén aims to explain the motivation of the paraenesis and 
acknowledges that fear and hope are part of this.31 Thus, he does perceive the 
motivating function of emotions and when they occur in the text he addresses 
them, often indicating in a propositional format the link between certain emotions 
and the direction of their motivation.32 As such, Thurén does identify the logic of 
emotions, which is a point central to my thesis. However, his analysis is very 
simplistic. He does not acknowledge that the understanding and use of emotions is 
culturally influenced, nor does Thurén reveal how the emotions used are engaging 
the audience’s understanding of value, or the implications of this for its perception 
of reality and personal goals. Thus, this thesis will address this gap in scholarship 
and provide pioneering work on the use of emotions in 1 Peter. In doing so, it will 
reveal the benefits of exploring emotions for our understanding of the text, and it 
will give a template for studying emotions in other New Testament epistles. 
Before outlining the methodological approach, the definitional and theoretical 
aspects of my study must be delineated. To this we will now turn. 
1.2 ‘Emotion’: an Initial Problem 
First it is necessary to explain why I will use the word ‘emotion.’ Mulligan and 
Scherer note that ordinary language words for emotions or other affective 
phenomena such as appetite, disgust, hope, and pain are often grouped under 
various classificatory terms including ‘affect, affection, emotion, feeling (the noun), 
mood, passion, and sentiment.’33 So, given this range, is the term emotion the most 
appropriate? It is generally acknowledged that there has been a failure to reach an 
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agreed definition of emotion within or across disciplines. Thus, as Dixon comments, 
‘some are beginning to wonder whether it is the very category of “emotion” that is 
the problem.’34  For Dixon, the term emotion ‘has been in crisis, from a definitional 
and conceptual point of view, ever since its adoption as a psychological category in 
the 19th century.’35  The term, adopted from the French émotion, came into English 
in the 17-18th centuries, but it was in the mid-19th century that it became an 
established term for psychological states.36 Tracking the historical course of the 
term ‘emotion’ will help us to understand the definitional issues and why today the 
term has a broad meaning. 
Dixon outlines the history of the term ‘emotion.’37 His main thesis is that the 
emergence of the term caused other more specific terms to be replaced in common 
and scientific language. Dixon’s discussion focuses on ‘categories’ and ‘concepts.’ 
Under categories, he explains that until the 1830’s philosophers, physicians and 
theologians separated ‘passions’ and ‘affections.’ Passions were considered 
troubling, whereas affections were milder and could be viewed positively. This 
distinction traces back to debates between Stoicism and Christianity. Christian 
thinkers (e.g. Aquinas) needed a system that allowed negative passions (e.g. lust) to 
be differentiated from positive affections (e.g. love) to avoid labelling all such 
phenomena negatively.38 So, should emotion be dispensed in order to return to 
terms such as passion or affection, particularly because we are exploring an ancient 
text? I suggest this is not necessary, and could in fact be unhelpful. The 
categorisation of experiences such as lust or love under passion or affection results 
in moralising psychological states. Thus, ‘passion’ and ‘affection’ will be useful when 
describing ancient viewpoints in order to remain faithful to different thinkers’ 
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philosophical and moral positions. However, to use one of these terms for 1 Peter 
imposes unnecessarily an ethical standpoint onto the letter, whereas using 
‘emotion,’ a more general term, allows the psychological states represented in 1 
Peter to speak for themselves in their own context. Furthermore, using ‘passion’ or 
‘affection’ is confusing for the modern reader as the everyday use of ‘passion’ and 
‘affection’ (or ‘affect’) has lost these historic connotations. Moreover, the term 
‘affect’ in psychology can be used broadly. For example, psychologists speak of 
‘affective states’ which includes emotions but also moods, and even personality 
traits. Thus, for labelling purposes, ‘emotion‘ is to be preferred. 
However, the problem of the conceptual meaning of ‘emotion’ remains. With the 
adoption of emotion from the French émotion came the associated idea of ‘physical 
disturbance and bodily movement.’39 In French, émotion was a descriptive idea 
encompassing even crowd commotion. Thus, as Dixon explains, ‘[i]ncreasingly, 
during the 18th century, “emotion” came to refer to the bodily stirrings 
accompanying mental feelings.’40 Consequently, over time an emphasis on the 
visible effects and bodily manifestations accompanying mental states emerged. It 
was Thomas Brown, a 19th century Scottish philosopher, who solidified emotion as 
a category of mental science. Brown defined emotions ‘as noncognitive “vivid 
feelings” rather than as forms of thought.’41 Consequently, emotional feelings were 
separated from cognitive thoughts. Many psychologists after him upheld this 
distinction.42 Another 19th century physician and philosopher, Charles Bell, was also 
influential. Through Bell bodily movements became a significant part of emotions, 
not just as outwards expressions of mental states but as causes themselves. William 
James’ and Charles Darwin’s influential theories of emotion were subsequently 
influenced by Brown and Bell’s ideas.43 Additionally, Wassmann sees in James’ 
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theory the influence of German psychology which used Gefühl for emotion that had 
an intellectual content and Empfindung for feelings relating to sensation. However, 
despite adopting the German idea of Gefühl from Wunt, James made the semantic 
move of dissolving the distinction between Gefühl and Empfindung.44 In fact, he 
‘asserted that the feeling of the bodily changes is the emotion’ and thus, ‘equated 
the meaning of the words feeling and emotion.’45 This led, particularly in the mental 
sciences, to a privileging of the physical aspect of emotion and the downgrading of 
philosophical psychology. 46  Dixon comments: 
The founders of the discipline of psychology in the late 19th century 
bequeathed to their successors a usage of “emotion” in which the 
relationship between mind and body and between thought and feeling were 
confused and unresolved, and which named a category of feelings and 
behaviours so broad as to cover almost all of human mental life including, as 
Bain (1859) had put it, all that was previously understood by the terms 
“feelings, states of feeling, pleasures, pains, passions, sentiments, 
affections”.47 
It is important to understand this 19th century movement of separating emotional 
feeling from thought because it will enable us to identify some of our modern 
Western assumptions that are unconsciously carried into New Testament study. 
However, despite this conceptual confusion, continuing to use the term ‘emotion’ is 
best precisely because it has room for a range of ideas from bodily feelings to the 
more cognitive. To choose another term means that one’s discussion is pushed 
towards certain aspects of emotional experience; for example, ‘feeling’ tends 
towards the physical and ‘sentiment’ to the cognitive. This becomes problematic 
when talking about ancient rhetorical or philosophical views in which attendant 
physical feelings, bodily expression, and cognition are all part of a πάθος (often 
translated emotion). To prefer ‘emotion’ means that aspects of affective experience 
are not unduly cut off. However, it does mean we must be clear what ‘emotion’ 
means. Thus, two tasks must be tackled: firstly to reveal certain unhelpful 
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assumptions about emotions, and, secondly, to outline this investigation’s 
theoretical position on emotions. 
1.3 Understanding Western Anglo-American Historical Biases 
First, we must identify some potential biases that have undoubtedly influenced our 
approach to emotions in biblical texts and contributed to the large-scale neglect of 
taking seriously the role of emotions in biblical discourse. In Unnatural Emotions 
Catherine Lutz has identified a number of unspoken, embedded assumptions that 
Western Anglo-American approaches to emotions have, often unconsciously, 
held.48 Lutz warns about allowing these ‘Western value orientations towards 
emotions’ to be normative for our appreciation of emotions in other cultural 
contexts.49 Though Lutz is talking about first hand fieldwork with the Ifaluk people, 
her admonitions should be heard by those approaching the cross-cultural task of 
exploring the thought-world and communication of an ancient author. She 
summarises the Western Euramerican50 standpoint as: 
… identifying emotions primarily with irrationality, subjectivity, the chaotic 
and other negative characteristics … .51  
This understanding is exhibited in both quotidian and academic uses of the word 
emotion. Lutz discusses each of these characteristics in detail. However, to 
summarise her comments, emotions are viewed negatively in comparison ‘to the 
positively evaluated process of thought.’52 This is evident in the psychological 
opposition of ‘affect’ and ‘cognition’ and the philosophical distinction between 
‘passion’ and ‘reason.’53 For Lutz ‘[e]ncoded in or related to that contrast is an 
immense portion of the Western worldview of the person, of social life, and of 
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morality.’54 This separation of emotions and thoughts along with their embedding 
in the conceptualisation of the person leads to further dichotomies. Emotion 
indicates irrationality, impulse, vulnerability, chaos, and is subjective, physical, 
natural, morally suspect, feminine, and childish, whereas thoughts display 
rationality, intention, control, order, and are objective, cultural, ethically mature, 
masculine, and adult.55 Thus, emotion is seen as inferior and negative in 
comparison to thought.56  
Viewing emotions as irrational means that they are considered to hamper ‘sensible, 
or intelligent, action.’57 Thus, ‘[p]eople tend to see emotions as a disruption of, or 
barrier to, the rational understanding of events. To label someone “emotional” is 
often to question the validity, and more, the very sense of what they are saying.’58 
This leads to emotions being viewed as chaotic, and, subsequently, dangerous and 
weakening to the self.59 Thus, when emotion is devalued and rationality is 
ideologically esteemed, any occasion or person in which emotion is evident can be 
easily disregarded because it ‘is the “weak” who are emotional.’60  Moreover, the 
physicality of emotions is deemed more animalistic and therefore less valued than 
the advanced mental processing of humans. From the view of emotions as physical 
comes the idea that they are natural: they are not part of cultural processes but are 
‘aboriginally untouched by the cooking, taming, and civilizing of culture.’ 
Subsequently, this produces the assumption that emotions are consistent across 
cultures i.e. are universal.61 
                                                     
54
 Lutz, Unnatural, 55-6. 
55
 For more on emotions as female see Lutz, Unnatural, 73-6. 
56
 Lutz, Unnatural, 57. Solomon highlights how English language idioms reveal that emotions are 
generally understood to happen to us, for example ‘we “fall in” love’ are ‘“paralysed” by fear’ and 
‘“struck” with jealousy’, showing an assumption that emotions are separate to rational, volitional 
thoughts; Solomon, Passions, xv-i, 67-8. 
57
 Lutz, Unnatural, 70-1. 
58
 Lutz, Unnatural, 60. 
59
 Cf. Wierzbicka who also identifies this assumption, noting that for Anglo-Americans ‘composure’ is 
seen as the normal state and emotion is a negative deviation from normal; A. Wierzbicka, Emotions 
Across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 17-8. 
60
 Lutz, Unnatural, 62-5. 
61
 Lutz, Unnatural, 65-70. 
Introduction 
29 
 
Given these ‘embedded’ assumptions, it is not surprising that the role of emotions 
in New Testament discourse has been overlooked or devalued in modern 
scholarship. The privileging of rationality has led to a focus on the λόγος of the 
argument, with the emotional dimension seen as either superfluous to the 
discovery of truth, or at worst detrimental to it. Emotions may be discussed in 
rhetorical approaches, but they are still distinguished from the reasoning of the text 
and therefore appear as thin manipulative constructs. Understanding emotions to 
be universal has reduced the need to investigate emotions thoroughly as it assumes 
that the reader will automatically know what an emotion term means from their 
own experience. The emotions in the text can then be assessed on these terms. 
Lastly, overemphasising the physicality of emotion means that emotions become of 
little interest to those studying ancient texts. For, how can you get any reliable data 
about the visceral responses of the writer or audience from a textual artefact? 
However, many anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and philosophers have 
moved beyond these stunting views of emotion. By looking at their corrective 
insights we can understand that there is a great deal that investigating emotions in 
New Testament texts can reveal. Thus, we must proceed to outlining ‘emotions’ as 
they will be understood by this thesis. 
1.4 A Working Definition of ‘Emotion’ 
We noted above that there is no one standard definition of emotion.62 However, it 
is generally agreed among psychologists that emotions contain a number of 
elements. The definitional problems centre around which component parts should 
be included and what weighting each should be given. Therefore, I will present a 
‘working’ definition of emotion. The aim is to clarify the standpoint of this 
investigation rather than to delineate debates surrounding each element.  
1.4.1 What is an Emotion? 
In this thesis, ‘emotion’ refers to a ‘class of affective processes’ and ‘emotions’ 
indicates that there are ‘specific types or instantiations of that class.’63 Thus, ‘an 
emotion’ is one type of that class. More specifically, ‘emotion’ does not mean 
                                                     
62
 For a number of articles discussing the definition of emotion see Emotion Review 4 (2012) and 
Social Science Information 46 (2012): 381-443. 
63
 Mulligan and Scherer, 'Working Definition,' 345. 
Introduction 
30 
 
simply a feeling,64 though this is certainly part of emotion, but a mental and 
physiological change that someone experiences which encompasses the whole 
process of an emotion.65 Thus emotion includes, as Moors delineates: 
(a) a cognitive component; (b) a feeling component, referring to emotional 
experience; (c) a motivational component, consisting of action tendencies or 
states of action readiness (e.g., tendencies to flee or fight); (d) a somatic 
component, consisting of central and peripheral physiological responses; (e) 
a motor component, consisting of expressive behaviour (e.g., fight and flight 
and facial and vocal expressions). These components correspond to 
functions such as: (a) stimulus evaluation or appraisal; (b) monitoring (which 
may serve the further function of control or regulation); (c) preparation and 
support of action; and (d) action.66  
Having said this, when working with an ancient text, certain components are 
inaccessible. For example, we cannot ask the audience what they were physically 
feeling, nor observe the audience’s physical expressions. Moreover, we cannot say 
how 1 Peter in actuality impacted its audience, only what the text idealises about 
its emotions. Furthermore, our starting point is not the audience itself but an 
emotion term that has been solidified into a literary context. Consequently, our 
discussion of emotion will be constrained to stimulus (object); appraisal 
(evaluation); and action-tendency. We will now outline each of these in more 
detail. 
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1.4.2 Elements of an Emotion 
1.4.2.1 Relational and Object-directed 
Emotions are about something; put differently, they are object-directed.67  As 
Solomon states: 
One is never simply angry; he/she is angry at someone for something. … One 
is not simply afraid, but afraid of something, even if the object of fear is 
something unknown.68   
Fundamentally, emotions are elicited by and are responses to a stimulus. However, 
philosophers such as Nussbaum expand this to say that an emotion’s identity 
depends on it having an object. If the object is removed, an emotion becomes 
senseless physiological movements.69 Solomon further elucidates that an emotion’s 
object is a subjective object i.e. the object as we experience it.70 Put differently, the 
object is imbued with the qualities one perceives it to have which may or may not 
have basis in objective fact. Consequently, emotions have an ‘intentional’ object. 
The object is intentional because ‘it figures in the emotion as it is seen or 
interpreted by the person whose emotion it is.’ Thus, emotions embody ‘a way of 
seeing.’71 Furthermore, that a certain object instigates an emotion indicates that, to 
the person, the object is of importance. In emotion, the object is ‘experienced 
through our concerns and values.’72 This suggests, as Lazarus asserts, that emotions 
are relational: ‘they are about person—environment relationships.’73 More 
specifically, emotions make the person aware of the object in their environment in 
relation to ‘harms (for the negative emotions) and benefits (for the positive 
emotions).’74 Therefore, emotions are not just object-directed, but they also say 
something about that object. This has led emotion theorists to suggest that 
emotions have a cognitive component. 
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1.4.2.2 Cognitive Appraisal 
From the late 1960’s psychologists such as Richard Lazarus have argued that 
emotions contain a cognitive component.75 In a recent review by Agnes Moors, it is 
notable that in majority opinion emotion is thought to contain cognition. What is 
debated is the definition of cognition (automatic or conscious) and at what stage in 
the emotion episode the cognitive aspect occurs.76 This study sides with appraisal 
theorists (e.g. Arnold, Lazarus) and ‘philosophical cognitivists’ (e.g. Nussbaum, 
Solomon) who see cognition as an indispensable component of emotion.77 For 
Lazarus, cognition occurs at the outset of an emotion when the object itself is 
appraised or evaluated.78 Appraisal can be described as: 
… a process that detects and assesses the significance of the environment 
for well-being. Significance for well-being is best conceptualized as the 
satisfaction or obstruction of concerns … . “Concerns” include the 
individual’s needs, attachments, values, current goals, and beliefs … ; they 
include everything that an individual cares about … .79 
We can simplify this to say that the object is evaluated in terms of whether it is 
(potentially or presently) harmful or beneficial to the person in terms of their 
personal goals. In addition, for appraisal theorists, emotions can include evaluations 
about certainty, agency (cause), and control (coping potential, power).80 Similarly, 
for philosophical cognitivists emotion is a form of judgement about an object, 
assessing its salience for well-being.81 Thus, the judgement is an evaluative 
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judgement.82 For Nussbaum, the judgement is propositional i.e. contains a belief 
about the object.83 If the belief about the object changes, then so will the emotion. 
Therefore, we can see that both appraisal theorists and philosophical cognitivists 
see emotions as cognitive in the sense that they receive and process information; 
emotions do not necessarily have to include more complex cognition such as 
‘elaborate calculation,’ ‘computation, or even reflexive self-awareness.’84  
Though a number of emotion theories recognise that emotion includes appraisal, 
appraisal theorists give the evaluative component a defining role. The appraisal 
causes emotion and influences the ‘intensity and quality’ of the other components 
of an emotion episode.85 Thus, different appraisals (or judgements) lead to 
different, distinct emotions. 86  Hence, the same object could be the cause of 
different emotions; it depends on how the object is being viewed. Moreover, the 
same appraisal will always produce the same emotion. So, the relationship between 
appraisal and emotion is stable, but the connection between stimuli and emotion is 
variable because it depends on the individual’s evaluation of the object which is 
affected by their own concerns.87 Furthermore, the appraisal concerns a specific 
object and occurs in a given context. Therefore, emotions reveal how the situation 
is being interpreted. For example, one may be startled by a gunshot; if the gunshot 
is interpreted as dangerous it will elicit fear; if it is seen as unjustifiable and 
offensive it may produce anger.88 Consequently, this suggests that emotions have a 
coherent rationale in a given narrative context. Put differently, emotions have a 
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inner logic, even if one is not aware of it or only appreciates it upon reflection.89 If 
we can understand the qualities of an emotion and the person’s goals we can 
comprehend a given emotion occurrence. 
That emotions contain appraisals about an object’s potential to harm or benefit a 
person’s goals indicates that emotions operate in a larger framework of norms and 
values.90 Firstly, by highlighting a particular object, emotions invest that object with 
value and importance. This value is specific to the object’s connection with the 
person’s flourishing.91 Secondly, the appraisal of harm or benefit is dependent on a 
person’s goals, which, in turn, are based on one’s values and expectations. For, one 
cannot determine what is harmful or beneficial without some concept of what is 
important or unimportant. Therefore, an emotion’s evaluation of an object is 
‘predicated on complex social structures and meanings.’ 92 Nussbaum distinguishes 
between background and situational judgements. The former are ‘judgements that 
persist through situations of numerous kinds’; the latter are ‘judgements that arise 
in the context of some particular situation.’93 In her explanation, her ‘background 
judgements’ sound like either dispositional states or a worldview that has a system 
of values and core beliefs.94 In fact, Nussbaum even describes the background 
judgements as ‘background judgements of value’, and that they are ‘closely 
associated with a whole network of beliefs and expectations.’95 The ‘situational 
judgement’ tells one how ‘the world is’ in relation to ‘what one values, thus 
combining one’s ongoing goals and attachments with perceived reality.’96 Though I 
would prefer worldview to ‘background judgement’, I think Nussbaum’s distinction 
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is helpful for revealing that an emotion occurrence does not stand as an isolated 
event, but draws on an already established system of values that a person carries 
into each new context. Subsequently, it also shows that the cognitive aspect of 
emotion requires an understanding of the environment, both ‘how things work’ 
generally and specific information about the ‘demands, constraints, and resources’ 
of the space in which the encounter with the object happens.97 Such understanding 
of the world will vary from person to person and from one culture to another. 
Reflexively, when we appreciate a person’s values and goals we can understand 
why a particular emotion is fitting in a given context. If we cannot understand the 
person’s larger motivation then an emotion occurrence can remain perplexing. 
1.4.2.3 Action-Tendency 
Lastly, emotion’s evaluative judgement leads to a disposition (tendency) to act in a 
certain way. In simplistic terms, because the emotion evaluates the object as 
harmful or beneficial it also carries the idea that one should move towards or away 
from an object. Thus, emotions not only interpret the environment, they suggest 
how one should respond to it; they make one ready for action. Some such as Nico 
Frijda make action readiness a central aspect of emotions, with different action-
tendencies defining each emotion.98 However, Frijda does not divorce action 
readiness from appraisal, commenting that action readiness is ‘elicited by events 
appraised as emotionally relevant; different states of action readiness are elicited 
by different appraisals.’99 Though Lazarus would not define the emotion by the 
action-tendency, he would agree that each emotion ‘involves its own innate action 
tendency.’100 Thus, action readiness (or tendency) is considered a component of 
emotion which is linked to appraisal and as such is influenced by one’s values and 
goals. The direction of motivation depends on a person’s ‘goal hierarchies’ that she 
brings to the situation.101 Though I do not want to reduce emotions to being 
primarily action readiness, the following investigation will take seriously the idea 
that emotions are drivers for action. Moreover, if emotions impact actions, we 
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must recognise, like the ancient philosophers do, that emotions are important for 
shaping ethical behaviour. Thus, to have appropriate or inappropriate emotions in a 
certain context becomes a moral issue. In the moralising of emotions and the 
awareness that emotions are dependent on worldview we encounter the cultural 
nature of emotions. 
1.5 Emotions as Cultural Constructs 
For some, even if all emotions are not universal, some ‘basic’ emotions such as fear 
must be. However, if we are right that emotions involve an evaluative judgement 
about an object which is influenced by one’s goals and values, which, in turn, 
depend on one’s worldview, then there is scope for emotions to be shaped 
differently across individuals and cultures. 
A number of anthropologists, linguists, and sociologists have successfully 
challenged universalistic assumptions about emotions. For example, Catherine Lutz, 
from her anthropological work with the Ifaluk people, concluded that emotions 
cannot be universal, but that ‘emotion experience … is more aptly viewed as the 
outcome of social relations and their corollary worldviews than as universal 
psychobiological entities.’102 To quote Lutz at length: 
The claim is made [in her work] that emotional experience is not precultural 
but preeminently cultural. … As I listened to people speak the language of 
emotion in everyday encounters with each other on Ifaluk atoll, it became 
clear to me that the concepts of emotion can more profitably be viewed as 
serving complex communicative, moral, and cultural purposes rather than 
simply as labels for internal states whose nature or essence is presumed to 
be universal. The pragmatic and associative networks of meaning in which 
each emotion word is embedded are extremely rich ones. The complex 
meaning of each emotion word is the result of the important role those 
words play in articulating the full range of a people’s cultural values, social 
relations, and economic circumstances. Talk about emotions is 
simultaneously talk about society – about power and politics, about kinship 
and marriage, about normality and deviance … .103 
Wierzbicka, argues along similar lines: 
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Although human emotional endowment is no doubt largely innate and 
universal, people's emotional lives are shaped, to a considerable extent, by 
their culture. Every culture offers not only a linguistically embodied grid for 
the conceptualization of emotions, but also a set of "scripts" suggesting to 
people how to feel, how to express their feelings, how to think about their 
own and other people's feelings, and so on.104 
Thus, both Lutz and Wierzbicka’s studies assert with convincing evidence that 
emotional understanding and emotional repertoires are culturally constructed.105 
This call to recognise the variances in emotional repertoires and emotion rules 
across cultures is easy to reconcile with an appraisal view of emotion. As Nussbaum 
states: 
If we hold that beliefs about what is important and valuable play a central 
role in emotions, we can easily see how those beliefs can be powerfully 
shaped by social norms as well as by an individual history; and we can also 
see how changing social norms can change emotional life.106 
As biblical scholars we must take these insights seriously. The New Testament texts 
are clearly embedded in historical, cultural, and social settings. Thus, we must 
expect that their use of emotion terms also is. We cannot presume our 
understanding of emotions is universal and consequently impose our cultural 
understanding of emotions onto the text, nor evaluate the validity of the emotions 
in the text through our cultural framework. We must attempt to understand the 
conceptualisation of an emotion term in its own setting, including the wider cultural 
framework of norms and values in which it makes sense. 
We also need to understand in our interpretation of emotions, that emotions 
themselves are interpretative. Lutz argues that emotions are not caused by 
situations, but the situation is interpreted by the emotion. In this interpretive 
function, it is evident that emotions contain ‘cultural premises.’ Moreover, 
emotions are based on culturally established prototypical scenarios. The ‘discrete 
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emotion concepts … have nested within them a cluster of images and propositions.’ 
These emotional scenarios allow people of the same culture to make sense of the 
occurrence of an emotion in a given context, and, subsequently, the interpretation 
of events communicated by the emotion.107 Therefore, an emotion’s 
communication is only comprehensible when an emotion is legitimately attributed 
to one of the culturally understood scenarios. These ‘scenes’ are generally social. 
Thus, emotions also highlight the value given to certain relationships and, 
depending on the emotion, interpret the social relationship in a particular way.108 
Therefore, reflexively, if we grasp how an emotion is being used in a particular 
context we gain insight into the culture of that group, particularly its values and 
expectations. 
On a secondary level, a person’s emotional life is continually shaped by social 
interaction. For, an emotion’s ‘existence and meaning are also negotiated, ignored, 
or validated by people in social relationships.’109 The social moulding of emotions 
gives people a … 
… sense of how they ought to or must behave and in that way help to 
structure people’s social behavior. The force of emotion … is to a great 
extent the sense of moral or pragmatic compulsion, the sense that one must 
do what the emotion “says” one will do. … Conversely, particular moral 
ideas take what force they have from the commitment people learn to feel 
to them.110 
Hence, people are taught socially that certain emotions are appropriate in given 
situations and that the moral person will feel the right thing at the right time 
leading to doing the right thing on the right occasion.111 Riis and Woodhead have 
labelled these emotion rules an ‘emotional regime.’ They explain: 
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Like with the wider social ordering with which it is bound up, an emotion 
regime has an internal coherence and boundedness … . Regimes persist over 
time, and transcend individuals, shaping what they can feel, how they can 
feel it, the way they can express their feelings, and hence the forms of social 
relationship and courses of actions that are open to them.112 
Thus, we might expect that in 1 Peter, which exhorts people towards particular 
behaviour and is concerned about social relationships, both using and shaping 
emotions will be of importance. This can occur through which emotions are 
encouraged or discouraged and the context in which emotion terms are used. If we 
are to understand why and how the author is using emotion, we need to be aware 
of emotion’s cultural boundedness and sociological function. 
1.5.1 ‘Translating’ the Emotion 
The above discussion has implications for our understanding of the task of 
translation. We must move beyond translating one word to another and expecting 
that in this process we have comprehended the emotion. As Wierzbicka highlights, 
all cultures classify their emotions but not in the same way, and, therefore, labels 
cannot simply be imported across cultures.113 When this is done, it usually results in 
a procrustean forcing of emotions from another culture into the English 
conceptualisation carried by the English term.114 Lutz proposes that if emotion: 
… is seen as woven in complex ways into cultural meaning systems and 
social interaction, and if emotion is used to talk about what is culturally 
defined and experienced as “intensely meaningful,” then the problem 
becomes one of translating between two different cultural views and 
enactments of that which is real and good and proper.115 
Thus, it is not enough to translate one emotion term into another; we need to 
understand the worldview in which the emotion makes sense in order to translate 
the emotion in this broader conceptual sense. This means taking account of the 
‘scenarios’ which are invoked in the hearer by the use of an emotion term. As Lutz 
explains:  
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To understand the meaning of an emotion word is to be able to envisage … a 
complicated scene with actors, actions, interpersonal relationships in a 
particular state of repair, moral points of view, facial expressions, personal 
and social goals, and sequences of events.116  
Wierzbicka adds: 
‘‘Emotion words’’ such as anger reflect, and pass on, certain cultural models; 
and these models, in turn, reflect and pass on values, preoccupations, and 
frames of reference of the society (or speech community) within which they 
have evolved.117 
Thus the labelling of an emotion is part of a larger process of the social construction 
and use of emotions.118 Therefore, this study will seek to be sensitive to the larger 
task of translation by identifying the meaning and place of an emotion term in its 
historical context. This will foster a deeper sense of what the author is 
communicating via the emotion. This investigation will move beyond exchanging a 
Greek word for an English term towards identifying the values, prototypical 
scenarios, and concerns brought to the context by the emotion.  
We must now complete our discussion of emotion’s socio-cultural setting and 
function by examining emotion’s relationship to world construction and 
maintenance. 
1.6 Emotions and World Construction and Maintenance 
Berger and Luckmann have revealed how one’s knowledge of reality is socially 
constructed.119 Though reality appears to the individual as objectively ordered and 
is usually ‘taken for granted,’ it has, in fact, occurred through the group’s 
institutionalization of knowledge.120 Similarly, as part of this reality, the identity of 
the self is formed in relationship with significant others and thus is a social 
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product.121 At the maximum level this becomes a whole symbolic universe in which 
all other realities are encompassed.122 The symbolic universe enables one to name, 
order, and make sense of objects and occurrences in one’s world. This reality has to 
be continually maintained from one generation to the next. Furthermore, every 
event that a person encounters must be comprehensible to them within their given 
perspective of realty. When conflict arises between experience and perception the 
worldview needs to be legitimised if it is to remain accepted and not be 
problematic.123 We have argued above that emotions are interpretative; they 
evaluate objects and circumstances as we encounter them. Thus, it follows that if 
emotions evaluate our world, particularly our relationship to other objects, they 
can be useful tools for shaping perceptions of reality. Put differently, they can be 
used to construct or enforce a symbolic universe.  
So, how do emotions help to configure reality? Firstly, we must remember that 
each culture has a particular emotional repertoire. This emotional repertoire orders 
reality through naming and conceptualising affective experience i.e. the linking of 
emotion terms to prototypical emotion scenarios give the person information 
about how to interpret the world, particularly relational encounters. Here, we can 
also recall, as Riis and Woodhouse reveal, that groups have particular emotional 
regimes. In these regimes certain emotions are promoted in certain contexts and 
others discouraged. From this contextualisation of the emotional repertoire a 
person learns about how they should view and ultimately experience their world.124 
She learns what appropriate objects of fear, love, anger etc are. When this 
information is combined with the accepted norms, values, and goals of society, a 
person is informed about what to view positively and negatively, what to value, 
what to seek, and what to avoid.125 Importantly, in combination, the emotions 
create a sense of the person’s own identity and place in the world by defining her 
relationship to the acceptable objects of emotions. Thus, in essence emotions 
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enforce a map of reality. Each emotional experience highlights an object in the 
landscape and evaluates it in a particular way. Whether this emotional encounter is 
promoted as legitimate or prohibited as inappropriate places that object in a 
certain position with regard to the self. Together, the whole repertoire of emotions 
cumulatively builds a picture until the person has a cohesive view of reality. Such 
emotional mapping is essential for making sense of one’s place within the 
structures of a given society. Thus, if a person has the same worldview as her fellow 
group member, it is likely that she will share a similar emotional understanding of 
the world. Consequently, if a person is to be part of a new social group and take on 
its worldview then her emotional orientation will also have to be altered.126 This 
means not only will she see reality differently, but she will experience it differently. 
We have noted that an emotional regime is learned, and that emotions are 
constructed within cultural systems. As such, emotional judgments are dependent 
on worldview. However, this begs the question, can the process work dynamically? 
Is it possible for current emotions to be used to create or legitimise a new view of 
reality? I would suggest that it is. Lutz recognises that emotions can be used in 
discourse to ‘theorize about events, to moralize about or judge them, and to 
advance one’s interests by defining the situation in a particular way.’127 I agree with 
this, but want to take this a stage further and propose that if an individual 
understands another person’s emotional logic from familiarity with the culture’s 
emotional repertoire, they can use that emotional logic to argue for a new 
reality.128 This does not necessarily require changing the make-up of an emotion 
itself, but simply applying it differently i.e. changing the ‘scenarios’ in which it 
should occur and altering the objects for which it is appropriate. In doing so, this 
new application of the emotion’s logic has the capacity also to give new information 
to the person about what should be valued, pursued, avoided etc. Moreover, it 
provides a new positioning of the self. If this is done cumulatively with a group of 
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emotions it can give to the person a new view of reality. Objectively, to an outsider, 
no change has been made to the world of the person, but, subjectively, a dramatic 
shift has taken place. Furthermore, new emotions (if by new we mean newly 
applied) provide new evaluations and have the potential to lead to different 
actions. This is particularly the case if other legitimising arguments can add weight 
to the new emotionally shaped reality. It is my intention to show that this is exactly 
what is taking place in 1 Peter. Through his use of emotions, the author is showing 
the audience how to perceive reality and therefore also how to position others and 
the self. 
Thus, we can outline our theoretical position on emotions. Emotions are intentional 
and object-directed; they are about something or someone. Emotions are 
evaluative judgements about the importance of the object to our wellbeing. As 
such, they interpret a situation and give information about the object’s impact 
upon personal goals. Consequently, emotions carry an action-tendency which helps 
one to achieve the desired outcome. Subsequently, emotions influence behaviour. 
However, an emotion’s appraisal does not occur in isolation but relies upon a 
person’s norms and values which themselves are supplied by their socially 
constructed worldview. This all combines to mean that emotions have a logic: they 
make sense in a given context and carry a rationale. If we understand the narrative 
in which the emotion occurs we can appreciate both the relevance and the 
communication of the emotion. 
Furthermore, we have argued that emotions are not universal phenomena, but are 
culturally constructed and socially legitimised. Each culture has its own emotional 
repertoire in which certain affective experiences are named and are understood to 
refer to particular typological scenarios. A culture’s repertoire occurs through a 
combination of particular norms and values along with the impact of the demands 
of the environment. Once an emotional repertoire has been established an 
emotional regime can be utilised. This regime dictates a culture’s expectations with 
regard to an individual’s emotional life. In this regime, certain emotions are 
encouraged in given contexts and others discouraged. Thus, because emotions help 
a person navigate her world and understand her place within it, the regime also 
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gives a person a sense of how they should perceive reality and the self. Emotions 
are particularly useful in enforcing social structures as an emotion’s object is 
frequently another person. In addition, because emotions contain an action-
tendency, an emotional regime can provide behavioural expectations and 
boundaries. Lastly, emotions can be seen as a type of discourse in that their 
judgements contain information and interpretations. Consequently, dynamically, 
when their logic is understood, emotions can be used in conversation to shape a 
person’s perspective and provide an alternative view of reality. 
1.7 Methodological Approach 
With this understanding of emotions it is now possible to outline how this 
investigation will approach the use of emotions in 1 Peter. Firstly, if emotions are 
culturally constructed, it will be important to be both historically and culturally 
sensitive. Thus, before exploring individual emotions in the text it will be necessary 
to discover how these emotions were understood in their historical context. This 
will include recognising the range of emotional experiences that an emotion term 
can cover, and seeking to decipher, by outlining a definition, the basic 
characteristics of the emotion. 
In order to do this I will utilise Greco-Roman philosophical theories of emotion. I 
will primarily use Stoic theory, but will also refer to other philosophers such as 
Aristotle when necessary. Stoic theory is the most pertinent for my investigation 
because the Stoics had a highly influential and developed understanding of the 
emotions. The ancient theorists talk about emotions at a number of levels. The first 
level is the larger theoretical level. This level of discussion poses broader questions 
such as ‘What are emotions?’, ‘What do they do?’ The next level of discussion, 
which the Stoics are particularly helpful for, is the definitional level. Here each 
discrete emotion is investigated. At this level, Stoics, and other theorists, are 
seeking to understand emotion terms as they were commonly used. The 
philosophers, like the rhetoricians, in their definitions of emotion terms are not 
creating new terminology but are using terms widely understood in their Greco-
Roman environment. This common Greco-Roman linguistic usage is shared by 1 
Peter by virtue of having a shared language. Lastly, the Stoics, after defining an 
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emotion, also have a particular take on emotion. This is the third level at which 
their conversation takes place. This third level is influenced by the Stoic worldview 
which includes Stoicism’s notions of value and human flourishing. Thus, Stoic talk of 
emotions is necessarily nuanced. This results in the Stoics having their own 
categorisation of emotions and also a stance on the ethical value of certain 
emotions. So, we can determine three levels of conversation: 1) general theory of 
emotion; 2) definition of each emotion; 3) contextualisation of and rationale given 
to each emotion. 
Level one will be the focus of chapters 2-3 which will reveal how emotions were 
understood in the ancient world. Such an exercise endeavours to ensure that the 
above modern understanding of emotions is not being imposed anachronistically 
onto 1 Peter. What we shall discover is that there is in fact a close historical and 
cultural fit between ancient conceptions and modern theory. Thus, when exploring 
1 Peter we can be assured that the tools we are using are not just modern but were 
recognised and operative in the ancient world. In the following exegetical chapters 
(4-7) levels 2 and 3 will be important. First, definitions of each emotion will be 
outlined. This will give us the key characteristics of an emotion in its most basic 
form. As Nussbaum comments, if we can access their definitions we can 
‘understand how they were individuating the kinds.’129 These definitions are often 
very simple, and are shared by theorists of different schools. Subsequently, the 
definitions will give us the basic tools for assessing emotion terms in 1 Peter. Lastly, 
level 3 will be used as a point of comparison. This thesis will not import a Stoic 
contextualisation of emotions or the supporting Stoic rationale onto 1 Peter. It will 
recognise that Stoic discussion on emotions is influenced by its worldview and that 
this worldview need not be shared by 1 Peter. 1 Peter should be allowed to speak 
for itself, for it may evidence a different stance towards certain emotions and use 
emotions in ways contrary to Stoicism e.g. with different objects or in different 
contexts. However, the Stoic standpoint will provide a useful discussion partner 
that will enable us to outline the contours of 1 Peter’s use of emotion more clearly.   
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Anyone familiar with the text of 1 Peter is confronted with 1 Peter’s citations of, 
allusions to, and reliance on biblical material and themes. Thus, one might rightly 
ask, how will my exploration of emotions in 1 Peter take account of biblical 
influence? The outline above of the three levels of discussion is helpful for clarifying 
this. Firstly, there is no unique Jewish philosophical discussion at the first 
theoretical level. In fact, where we do find philosophical discussion of emotions, for 
example in authors such as Philo or 4 Maccabees, the language, emotional 
categorisation and definitions are borrowed from Stoicism. At the second level, the 
Septuagint, from which 1 Peter draws, shares the common understanding of basic 
emotion definitions detailed by philosophers. These basic ideas are encoded in the 
language terms which are used by the Septuagint and Greek theorist alike. Thus, 
what is most important is the third level. We need to discover how the Septuagint 
uses the emotion terms. In what contexts do they appear? Are there new or altered 
scenarios in which the emotion is used? If so, is there a rationale that allows it, 
given its definitional logic, to make sense in this context? It is at this level of 
contextualisation and rationale, which relies on worldview, that we discover the 
influence of the Septuagint on 1 Peter’s use of emotion. 
Therefore, the exegetical chapters will proceed in the following manner. They will 
first try to ‘locate’ and outline each emotion by recourse to Stoic philosophical 
material and the LXX. After doing so, they will proceed to an analysis of the use of 
that emotion in 1 Peter. Consequently, the exegetical work will focus on the parts 
of the text where specific emotion terms appear. The first part (chapters 4-5) will 
look at joy and distress; the second part (chapters 6-7) will investigate fear, hope, 
and shame.130 Regrettably, due to constraints, I cannot cover every emotion 
present in 1 Peter. So, even though this thesis will provide an in-depth analysis of 
the above emotions, it is still only a partial analysis of 1 Peter. The exegetical 
discussion will aim to determine how the emotion is being used and therefore what 
information is being communicated through this contextualisation to the audience. 
In this way, the whole investigation can be seen as a kind of rhetorical analysis. It is 
interested in how the emotion terms are functioning in the argumentation and 
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 The reasoning for the grouping of these emotions will be presented in the chapters themselves. 
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persuasion of the letter. To explicate what is being communicated by the emotion it 
will be necessary to ask certain questions, for example, what is the object? What 
evaluation does the emotion communicate? Is the emotion being encouraged or 
discouraged? What does the emotion’s contextualisation reveal about how the 
author is presenting reality? What does this indicate about the values and 
worldview of the text? How might this affirm or alter the audience’s understanding 
of human flourishing? How does this use of emotion influence action? Lastly, what 
are the implications of the author’s use of emotion for the audience ethically, 
sociologically, and therapeutically? After the separate exegetical chapters, the 
conclusion will provide a synthesis of the individual findings. In doing so, it will 
piece together from each emotion a combined view of the emotional reality 
presented by 1 Peter. By this approach, this thesis will demonstrate how 
investigation of the emotions can open up new avenues for discussion and give 
crucial insights into the author’s persuasive discourse, worldview, and ethics. 
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2. Stoic Philosophy of Emotion 
The introduction has established a theoretical framework by which we can 
investigate the role of emotions in 1 Peter. However, it was noted that in order not 
to impose anachronistically modern theory onto an ancient text, we need to 
discover whether our main premises are compatible with ancient views on 
emotions. This chapter and the next will demonstrate that there is a substantial fit 
between the modern theory outlined and certain ancient views. Our exploration 
will centre on ideas about emotions found in the disciplines of both philosophy and 
rhetoric.  Stoicism will be the focus of this philosophical chapter. However, for 
reasons explained in the next chapter, a broader approach will be taken when 
looking at the rhetoricians in chapter three.  
Why choose the Stoics? As Sandbach notes, by ‘the end of the first century BC 
Stoicism was without doubt the predominant philosophy among the Romans.’ He 
goes on to say ‘in the Greek world of the first two centuries of our era Stoicism 
clearly remained a lively influence.’131 Long agrees, that, particularly with regard to 
ethics (a category under which the emotions fall), by 100 BCE the philosophical 
landscape was dominated by Stoicism and Epicureanism.132 However, it is Stoicism 
that provides the most comprehensive discussion of emotions. Therefore, the Stoic 
understanding of emotions will be central and other philosophical schools will be 
used comparatively.133  As discussed in the above (§1.7), this chapter will work at 
the general level of the theory of emotion. It will not discuss specific emotions in 
detail. For now, it is the larger questions that are of interest, such as, what is an 
emotion and how does it work? This will lead on to an examination of the 
importance of emotions for the individual and society, particularly with regard to 
ethics and agency. As we look at the Stoic theory of emotion we will discover the 
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 F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics (2nd ed.; Bristol: Bristol Press, 1989), 16. 
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 A. A. Long, 'The Socratic Legacy,' in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (eds. Keimpe 
Algra, et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 617-641, 617. 
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 This is done with an awareness that Stoicism was not a uniform entity. Where there are apparent 
differences within the school, these will be noted. It is also worth recognising that sources for early 
Stoicism are fragmentary.  We are often dependent on later authors, which makes piecing together 
Stoic thought difficult. Thus, the following will sketch the orthodox Stoic view as it is generally 
agreed upon. For the names and dates of the leading Stoics see Appendix 1. 
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‘spin’ that the Stoics give the emotions through their positioning of emotions within 
the larger philosophical landscape and their categorisation of emotions.  
Excursus: A Note on Terminology 
Before outlining the Stoic philosophical theory of emotions, it is worth noting some 
points about terminology. In the introduction I explained why I have chosen to use 
the English term emotion instead of other possible terms such as sentiment or 
affect. However, when approaching the ancient authors it is important to be 
sensitive with terminology. For example, the Greek term πάθος is used by Stoicism 
as a loaded, negative term. Because πάθος does not cover all emotions (the Stoics 
do have other ‘good’ emotions – εὐπαθεῖαι) it would be amiss to translate it simply 
as ‘emotion.’ Therefore, in the following discussion, I will follow convention by 
translating πάθος as ‘passion’ which means a negative mental disturbance.134 
However, ordinary usage and other Greek schools do not necessarily follow 
Stoicism’s nuanced understanding of πάθος. For example, in general usage it covers 
the idea of something happening to you, of being affected in some way. Aristotle’s 
usage seems to carry this general sense. In Epicurean usage πάθος can be akin to 
sensation.135 Additionally, in Rhetorical discussion πάθος becomes a technical term 
for a mode of argumentation. Consequently, on each occasion I will allow the 
context and the standpoint of the philosopher to guide the translation of their 
technical terms in order to represent them faithfully. ‘Emotion’, in this chapter, will 
remain a broad term that does not infer any positive or negative assessment. 
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 Sandbach, The Stoics, 59-60. Long and Sedley agree, commenting that, for the Stoic, πάθος is ‘an 
unhealthy state of mind, not synonymous with emotion in ordinary language’; A. A. Long and D. N. 
Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Volume 1. Translations of the Principal Sources with 
Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 420. 
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2.1 Stoic Theory of Emotion 136 
The Stoic discussion of emotions is not isolated, but occurs within wider debates 
about the nature, capacities and functions of the soul (ψυχή). Consequently, in 
order to understand their arguments about the emotions we first need to 
investigate briefly Stoic conceptions of the soul. 
2.1.1 The Anthropology of Emotion 
For Stoicism, according to Diogenes Laertius, the soul is an ‘offshoot’ of the world -
soul (7.134 = SVF 2.633).137 The world-soul is completely rational (cf. Cicero Nat. d. 
2.29-30).138 Therefore, on account of the soul’s relationship to the world-soul, it is 
necessary that one acts according to nature by perfecting the soul’s rationality.139 
For Stoicism, the soul is ‘the seat of all mental states, including emotion’ and is 
therefore the ‘centre of consciousness’ (sometimes referred to as νοῦς), and is 
located in the heart.140 It is unified and rational. However, though seen as a unified 
whole, the soul has parts: sight, smell, hearing, taste, touch, seed and utterance. 
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 The following is an outline of the salient ideas. It cannot be entirely comprehensive due to the 
constraints of space. For more thorough treatments see  T. Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, 
and Fate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); M. R. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007); M. C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory ad Practice in 
Hellenistic Ethics (Martin Classical Lectures, New Series 2; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994); J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen, eds., The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy (The New 
Synthese Historical Library  46; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998). 
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 Diogenes Laertius was a ‘compiler of lives and doctrines of Greek philosophers’ thought to be 
early 3
rd
 century CE. Book 7 is ‘an extensive survey of Stoicism’. The idea of a ‘world-soul’ seems to 
have its forerunner in Plato. See, Long and Sedley, HP1, 319, 494. All English translations of the 
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (SVF) in this chapter are from Long and Sedley, HP1, unless otherwise 
stated. 
138
 For Cicero, this perfect rationality indicates the world-soul’s divinity. 
139
 See Long and Sedley, HP1, 319. The idea of acting ‘according to nature’ is a fundamental Stoic 
doctrine. In advocating living in agreement with nature the Stoics were following Cynic philosophy. 
For a list of other Stoic fundamentals found in Cynicism see Long, 'Socratic Legacy,' 624. Stoicism is 
not alone in highlighting the rationality of the soul. Both Plato and Aristotle are keen to see at least 
some part of the soul as rational. Plato has a tripartite view of the soul; distinguishing reason from 
the spirited and appetitive parts (Resp. 9, 436a-441c). Even Aristotle, who holds a bipartite position, 
still sees both the irrational and rational parts of the soul as having a share in reason: the rational by 
issuing commands, the irrational by obeying them (Eth. eu.2.1.15-16, 1219b25-35; cf. Eth. nic.. 1.13, 
1102a25-30). 
140
 Long and Sedley, HP1, 320. Cf. Lucretius who sees the mind as governing, but via the emotions 
displays itself to be in the chest (Lucr. 3.136-44 = HP14B). (Where the ancient source has been 
accessed via its citation in Long and Sedley’s The Hellenistic Philosophers it will be indicated by ‘=’ 
followed by HP, the section number, and passage letter e.g. = HP14B). See also S. Everson, 
'Epicurean Psychology,' in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (eds. Keimpe Algra, et al.; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 542-559, 544.  
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The parts of the soul are not distinct and divisible as in Platonic theory but stretch 
out from the soul’s commanding faculty (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), which is the command 
centre, equivalent to our conception of mind (Aetius 4.21.1-4141= SVF 2.836).142 The 
Stoics also delineate the soul’s powers: ‘nutrition, growth, locomotion, sensation, 
impulse to action’ (Calcidius143 220 = SVF 2.879).144 Whereas some philosophers, 
like Aristotle, separate the intellect (νόος) and contemplative faculty (θεωρητικός) 
from other non-intellective abilities (De an.2.2, 413b20-25; cf. 429a25-429b5), the 
Stoics, because they have a unified soul, allow impulse to action along with 
impression, cognitive assent and reason to be the commanding-faculty’s 
capabilities (Stobaeus 1.368, 12-20 = SVF 2.826).145 The question remains, where do 
the emotions fit into the soul’s capacities? For Aristotle, the affections (πάθη) are 
one of the three things that take place within the soul, the other two being 
capabilities (δυνάμεις) and character (ἕξεις) (ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία 
ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις; Eth. nic.2.5, 1105b19-21; cf. Eth. eud. 2.2.4-5).146 Yet, in 
Stoic theory the emotions (either passions or good emotions) are not a separate 
capacity of the soul, but occur through its other cognitive capabilities: impression, 
impulse, assent and reason. It is through these capabilities that the commanding-
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 Aetius was a ‘Greek doxographer’ who lived approximately 100 CE. The numbering of his work 
follows Long and Sedley in citing the chapter and sections of H. Diels’ Doxographi Graeci (Berlin: 
1879); see Long and Sedley, HP1, 492. 
142
 Graver, Stoicism, 21-2; T. Brennan, 'The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions,' in The Emotions in 
Hellenistic Philosophy (eds. Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1998), 21-70, 23. Having said this, some have argued that within Stoicism there is 
disagreement: Chrysippus, who is taken to hold the orthodox view, sees the soul as a unified whole; 
Posidonius, according to Galen, returned to a Platonic tripartite view; and Panaetius was closer to an 
Aristotelian bipartite understanding; Long and Sedley, HP1, 321. Aristotle also questions the ability 
to separate parts of the soul, and likewise places faculties of the soul in a hierarchy (see De an. 2.2-
3). Like the Stoics, Epicurus considers the soul responsible for sensation, but only as far as it is 
combined with the body (Ep. Hdt. 63-7 = HP14A). 
143
 Calcidius was a ‘Christian translator and commentator,’ 4
th
 Century CE; Long and Sedley, HP1, 
493. 
144
 In Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle also distinguishes the soul’s different capacities (δυνάμεις) (Eth. 
eu.2.1.15-16, 1219b25-35; cf. De an. 2.2-4).  
145
 Long and Sedley, HP1, 321; For Aristotle, intellect is defined as the action of the soul that ‘thinks 
and supposes’(De an. 3.4, 429a20, trans. Lawson-Tancred). Plato divides the functions of the soul 
into their parts: by the appetite we desire, will and wish, with the rational we learn and calculate, 
and with the spirited we get angry , and each part also has its own particular pleasure: money, 
learning, and honour respectively (Resp. 4, 436a-441c; 9, 580e-581b). 
146
 δυνάμεις and ἕξεις are defined in relation to the affections; cf. Plato (Tim. 42a-b) who sees ‘love 
[ἔρως], mingled with pleasure and pain’ as humanity’s second capacity, followed by fear and 
spiritedness (φόβος and θυμός). 
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faculty passes judgement on information provided by the senses (Calcidius 220 = 
SVF 2.879). Consequently, as we will see, the Stoic view of the emotions is 
essentially cognitive, and emotions become a type of interpretive judgement. In 
preparation for later discussion, it is also necessary to note that for Stoicism, ‘the 
mind [psyche] is necessarily a material thing, and that mental states and events are 
also physical facts or changes in the world.’147 The soul is πνεῦμα, a ‘highly 
energized gaseous material’ which possesses ‘remarkable properties which enable 
it to endow bodies with all the capacities needed for life, perception, and voluntary 
movement.’148  This πνεῦμα consists of heat and air which are hot and cold 
respectively and also cause opposite movements outwards and inwards. The 
dynamic between the two produces the soul’s tension.149  As a physical material, 
the soul’s breath is capable of movement throughout the body, and it can be 
described as stretching towards or contracting from external objects. Further, the 
qualities of an individual, including moral qualities, can be explained by differences 
in the physical tension and structure of the soul.150 Thus, the movement of the soul 
involved in emotion is considered to be a physical movement and the person is 
thought to be self-consciously aware of this alteration.151 However, because the 
Stoics take a highly cognitive view of the emotions they are less concerned with 
outward physical aspects of emotions. Stoicism does note that the passions have 
bodily manifestations but their analysis of the emotions from their constitution to 
their therapy remains centred on the mental.152  
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 Graver, Stoicism, 18. 
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 Graver, Stoicism, 19. 
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 Graver, Stoicism, 19-20. 
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 Graver, Stoicism, 64-5; Long and Sedley, HP1, 320. 
151
 Graver, Stoicism, 23, 8. 
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 Not all Greco-Roman philosophers ignored the physical aspects of emotions. Plato is particularly 
keen to associate the emotional disturbances with the irrational, mortal, physical parts of a human 
(see Tim. 69d). The Epicureans took a physiological view of the soul, with soul and body being 
interdependent. They locate both thought and emotion in the mind, but because the body and soul 
are interdependent, any sensations of the soul including the affections cannot occur without the 
body (Ep. Hdt. 63-7 = HP14A; Lucr. 3.136-76 = HP14B). Hence the Epicurean descriptions of the 
emotions are predominantly physical (Lucr.3.262-322 = HP14D); Long and Sedley, HP1, 70-1; 
Everson, 'Epicurean Psychology,' 553. For a fuller discussion on the Epicurean view of the soul see 
Everson, 'Epicurean Psychology,' 543-6. Aristotle takes an intermediate view. He recognises that the 
affections contain some cognitive elements, but notes that they cannot occur without the body and 
that by them the body is affected in some way. He describes the affections as reason in matter 
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2.1.2 Cognition and Emotion  
We can now turn to the Stoic understanding of emotions, starting with the 
passions. It is necessary for our wider argument to establish that Stoicism took a 
cognitive view of the emotions. 
2.1.2.1. Definition of a Passion 
Stoicism has four primary passions: fear (φόβος), desire (ἐπιθυμία), mental 
pain/distress (λύπη) and mental pleasure (ἡδονή) (Stobaeus 2.88,6 = SVF 3.378).153 
Other emotions are categorised under these. As Stobaeus details: 
Ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπάγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα· ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῆς, … 
ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ καὶ πόθοι καὶ ἵμεροι καὶ φιληδονίαι καὶ φιλοπλουτίαι καὶ 
φιλοδοξίαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαι καὶ ἀσμενισμοὶ καὶ 
γοητεῖαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν φόβον ὄκνοι καὶ ἀγωνίαι καὶ ἔκπληξις καὶ 
αἰσχύναι καὶ θόρυβοι καὶ δεισιδαιμονίαι καὶ δέος καὶ δείματα· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν λύπην 
φθόνος, ζῆλος, ζηλοτυπία, ἔλεος, πένθος, ἄχθος, ἄχος, ἀνία, ὀδύνη, ἄση. 
The following are classified under appetite [desire]: anger and its species … 
intense sexual desires, cravings and yearnings, love of pleasures and riches 
and honours, and the like. Under pleasure: rejoicing at another’s 
misfortunes, self-gratification, trickery, and the like. Under fear: hesitancy, 
anguish, astonishment, shame, confusion, superstition, dread and terror. 
Under distress: malice, envy, jealousy, pity, grief, worry, sorrow, annoyance, 
mental pain, vexation (ecl. 2.90,19-91,9 = SVF 3.394).154 
As Long and Sedley note, this shows that the term πάθος for the Stoic includes both 
the agitating emotions like sexual desire, as we might expect, but also states of 
mind like hesitancy.155 Some of these groupings, particularly those under ἡδονή 
appear strange to the English vocabulary. However, this again demonstrates that 
emotions and our understanding of them are deeply cultural.  
                                                                                                                                                      
(δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν). Τhey contain both a dialogical element (‘because of one thing 
for the sake of another’) and natural physical symptoms (De an. 1.1, 403a1-30, trans. Lawson-
Tancred). 
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 Sandbach, The Stoics, 60-1. Plato had previously listed pleasure and pain as the first παθήματα, 
after this he also includes fear (φόβος), boldness (θάρρος), anger (θυμός) and expectation (ἐλπίς) (Tim. 
69d). 
154
 This is a fuller list than had previously been given in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, 1105b21-
23: λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θράσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, 
ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· (By the emotions, I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, 
friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity; and generally those states of consciousness which are 
accompanied by pleasure or pain [Rackham, LCL]). 
155
 Long and Sedley, HP1, 419-20. 
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According to Stobaeus: 
Πάθος δ’ εἶναί φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῆ τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ ἢ 
κίνησιν ψυχῆς <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν (εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς 
ψυχῆς), 
They say [the Stoics] that passion is impulse which is excessive and 
disobedient to the dictates of reason, or a movement of the soul which is 
irrational and contrary to nature; and that all passions belong to the soul’s 
commanding-faculty (Stobaeus 2.88, 6 = SVF 3.378). 
We noted that the commanding-faculty refers to the mental centre of 
consciousness. Therefore, from the above definition we can determine that 
Stoicism views all passions as cognitive. Terms such as irrational (ἄλογος) may seem 
to argue against this. However, we need to understand what Stoicism itself 
understands by irrational, and we will discover that it does not mean non-cognitive. 
Yet, designating the passions as ‘contrary to nature’ and ‘irrational’ does reveal that 
the passions are viewed negatively by Stoicism. Consequently, the wise man, who is 
the ideal person with perfected rationality, would not be susceptible to the 
passions.156 
The Stoic definition is highly nuanced and more complex than previous definitions 
like Aristotle’s which simply states that the affections (πάθη) are ‘such things as 
anger [θυμός], fear [φόβος], shame [αἰδώς], desire [ἐπιθυμία], and generally those 
experiences that are in themselves usually accompanied by sensory pleasure 
[ἡδονή] or pain [λύπη]’ (Eth. eu. 2.2.4, 1220b10-15 [Rackham, LCL]). Thus, the Stoic 
definition must be unpacked. To do this we will investigate three of the four 
capabilities of the soul: impression, impulse, and assent. Concurrently, their 
relationship to the fourth capability, reason, will be highlighted. 
2.1.2.2 Impression and Impulse 
A passion starts with an impression (φαντασία). According to Chrysippus: 
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φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγόμενον, ἐνδεικνύνμενον αὑτό τε καὶ 
τὸ πεποιηκός·  
An impression is an affection occurring in the soul, which reveals itself and 
its cause (Aetius 4.12.1-2 = SVF 2.54). 
Here πάθος refers to an alteration of the soul, rather than the negative emotion 
which is designated a passion. Philo, following Stoic thought, reveals how an 
impression occurs: 
ἡ μὲν οὖν φαντασία συνίσταται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐκτὸς πρόσοδον τυποῦντος νοῦν 
δι᾿ αἰσθήσεως. 
An impression is formed by the approach of an external object which strikes 
the mind through sensation (Leg. 1.11.30 = SVF 2.844).157 
Thus, an external object is needed for an impression.158 This external object, via 
sensation, is able to imprint itself on the internal soul and in doing so physically 
changes the soul (cf. Plutarch Comm. not. 1084f-1085a = SVF 2.847; Diogenes 
Laertius 7.49 = SVF 2.52; Aetius 4.12.1-5 = SVF 2.54).159 Further, through the 
impression, a human should have a self-conscious awareness not only that she is 
being affected but also about how she is being altered by the object.160 It is the 
form of the impression that supplies information about the external object.161 Even 
if the object comes to a person through vision, it is the impression on the soul 
which allows us to really perceive the object (Aetius 4.12.1-5 = SVF 2.54; cf. 
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 The mind (νοῦς), as discussed above, is equivalent to the commanding-faculty of the soul. 
158
 Graver has argued that the object can also be a state of affairs which is registered by the mind 
[read soul]; Graver, Stoicism, 24, 6. 
159
 Plato had previously spoken of sense perception occurring through the soul’s disturbance. This 
disturbance would happen when the body moves through the environment; as it does so, the 
environment strikes the soul through the senses (Tim. 43c). Cf. Aristotle De an. 2.2, 413b20. For the 
Epicureans the fact that a soul could be acted upon was evidence for the soul’s materiality; Everson, 
'Epicurean Psychology,' 550 ; see Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 63-7 = HP14A. 
160
 Long and Sedley, HP1, 321. Aristotle had also recognised the need of an external object for sense-
perception, and that the awareness of perception came from the animal being moved or affected 
i.e. altered (De an. 2.5, 416b30-417a5, 417b20-30). Epicureans thought that sensation was an 
‘affection that was common to the mind and the body’ i.e. something that caused a change; 
Everson, 'Epicurean Psychology,' 546. 
161
 Aristotle in his discussion on perception had previously raised the idea that the external object in 
the process of perception has affected the perceiving faculty and altered it to be like itself (De an. 
2.5, 418a1-5); cf. Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 46-53 = HP15A. 
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Aristotle, De an. 1.1, 403a5).162 Therefore, for the Stoic, impressions are vital for 
perceiving the world around us. In some Stoic writers an impression can also arise 
through non-sensory thought such as contemplation of abstract things or other 
objects presented to the soul by reason. According to Aetius, an impression can be 
caused by anything that can activate the soul (Aetius 4.12.1-5; SVF 2.54; cf. 
Aristotle, De an.3.3, 427b15-20). For the Stoics, an impression is the first step for all 
subsequent thought (cf. Cicero Acad. 2.21). It is only after the impression that a 
person can have an opinion about the state of affairs.163 In fact, Diogenes Laertius, 
goes on to assert that rational impressions, which occur in rational animals, are 
thought processes (Diogenes Laertius 7.49-51; = SVF 2.52, 55, 61). 
The form of the impression can be understood as propositional; what they reveal 
about the object behaves like a statement e.g. ‘this is white’ or ‘this is large.’ In such 
a way, impressions have intentional objects.164 For the Epicureans, the impression is 
always true. It is when we add our own opinion that falsehood and error occur (Ep. 
Hdt. 46-53 = HP15A). However, for the Stoic an impression ‘is not a belief.’ ‘To have 
an impression is simply to entertain an idea, without any implication of 
commitment to it.’165 Belief in the impression of something requires the positive 
acceptance of the impression.166 Thus, impressions can be convincing or 
unconvincing due to the proposition they present versus experience, and can 
contain varying degrees of truth (see Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.242-6 = SVF 2.65).167  
Aristotle too noted the distinction between impression and belief. According to 
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 An impression can then become a memory, and a number of like impressions become 
experience. This can occur without the design of the person or can be as a result of a person’s 
particular action (Aetius 4.11.1-4 = SVF 2.83). The latter from design are conceptions (ἔννοια) and can 
become stored thoughts by which further impressions are interpreted (Plutarch, Comm. not. 1084f-
1085a =SVF 2.847). This means that an expert can interpret impressions differently to the layman; 
Long and Sedley, HP1, 240. 
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 Graver, Stoicism, 24. 
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 Long and Sedley, HP1, 240; Graver, Stoicism, 24. Cf. Brennan, 'Old Stoic,' 22-3, who argues that 
humans are considered ‘rational’ by Stoicism in virtue of the fact that the ‘thoughts, perceptions, 
beliefs, preferences, memories, dreams,’ in fact ‘all mental contents’ of the mature human are 
propositional. For more on impressions and their propositional content see Brennan, Stoic Life, 52-8. 
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 Long and Sedley, HP1, 239. 
166
 Long and Sedley, HP1, 239-40. 
167
 True impressions for Stoicism can be of two types: ‘kataleptic’ or ‘merely true’. Kataleptic means 
that its truth is guaranteed. For more see Brennan, 'Old Stoic,' 26-7; cf. Aristotle, De an. 3.3, 428a-b 
who notes that φαντασία can be true or false. 
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Aristotle, belief requires a conviction of the content of belief, therefore, an act of 
reason beyond the impression (De an. 3.3, 428a15-25). According to Diogenes 
Laertius, in Stoic theory, the impression will arise first and then assent, cognition 
and thinking will not occur without it (Diogenes Laertius 7.49 = SVF 2.52). The 
priority of the impression is both a temporal and a logical priority.168 So, impression 
is primarily perception; it occurs within the soul; and it is a necessary first step for 
further cognitive activities. 
Having outlined an impression, we can move to discuss ‘impulse’ which, according 
to the above definition, is central to understanding a passion. Philo explains that 
impression and impulse are related: 
Thus the mind and the object of sense are always practising a reciprocity of 
giving, the one lying ready for sense-perception as its material, the other, 
like a craftsman, moving sense-perception [αἴσθησις] in the direction of the 
external object, to produce an impulse [ὁρμή] towards it. … The impression 
[φαντασία] is produced by the drawing nigh of the external object, as it 
stamps the mind through sense-perception; while the active impulse … 
comes about by way of the mind’s power of self-extension, which it 
exercises through sense-perception, and so comes into touch with the 
object presented to it, and goes towards it, striving to reach and seize it 
(Leg. 1.29-31 [Colson and Whitaker, LCL]). 
An impulse (ὁρμή) is possible because of the breath-like nature of the soul. For 
humans the ‘psychic breath’ ‘makes animals capable of sensation and of moving in 
every way’ (Galen, Intr. 14.726,7-11 = SVF 2.716). After the impression has 
occurred, the soul which has been affected seeks to reach out towards it; though 
Philo does not state this, one can also be repelled from the object. What is moved 
towards is, strictly speaking, not the object but the action contained in the 
proposition the impression provides (cf. Stobaeus 2.86,17-87,6 = SVF 3.169).169  The 
impulse therefore becomes a movement of the soul described in physical terms of 
expansions and contractions.170 Consequently, impulse is understood as the 
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 Graver, Stoicism, 27; Brennan, Stoic Life, 87.  
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 Other terms used for the movement of the soul are elation and deflation. The Stoic ‘impulse’ is 
akin to what other philosophers term appetite or desire. Cf. Plato Resp. 4, 437b-c, 439d; for Plato, 
non-rational desires are the result of the παθήματα. 
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impetus for action.171 In fact, ‘every intentional action stems from an impulse.’172 
The Stoics were not the first to link the idea of the movements of the soul to 
physical movement. Aristotle sees movement as coming from φαντασία and ὄρεξις 
(desire). Furthermore, seeking/desiring (ὀρέγω; and pursuing διώκω) is contrasted 
with avoiding (φεύγω). It is in virtue of this desire or avoidance that the being 
moves itself (De an.3.9, 432b15-30; cf. 3.10, 433a15).173 However, for Plato it is 
simply pleasure or pain themselves that cause someone to be lured towards or flee 
something (Tim. 69d).174 From this we can see that desires or impulses set goals for 
action. The Stoics equated the purposeful nature of the movement with an opinion 
that the action is appropriate in a given situation. Thus, Brennan provides the 
following definition of impulse: 
An impulse is an assent to an impression of a certain kind, i.e. an impression 
that attributes a certain kind of value to the agent’s own potential action. 
Or, more succinctly: 
Impulse is an assent to an evaluative impression. 175 
Therefore, as an impulse, an emotion is ‘a motion of the psyche towards some 
predicate’ and the belief that this motion is the right thing to do.176 
Even though for the Stoic a passion is described as contrary to nature and irrational, 
certain impulses can be according to nature, and, as an activity of the commanding-
faculty, can be rational.177 These are natural impulses because they drive one 
toward what nature deems fitting and necessary, but, they occur within boundaries 
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 Epicureans also see images as the producers of volition and then movement occurs through the 
spirit entwined with the body, but these images appear to be projected images of what one wants to 
do, such as envisioning walking, rather than impressions of external objects to which one responds; 
See Lucr. 4.877-91= HP14E. 
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 Brennan, Stoic Life, 86. Cf. Cicero, who differentiates two movements of the rational soul: 
thought (cogitatio) and impulse (appetitus). It is specifically impulse that stimulates action (appetitus 
impellit ad agendum), whereas thought is to investigate truth (cogitatio in vero exquirendo), 
therefore impulse should be obedient to reason (Off. 1.132). 
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Aristotle in describing the locomotion of the soul talks about it being a push or pull from the 
central point of the soul. This seems like an alternative way of expressing the same ideas of tension, 
expansion and contraction (De an. 3.10, 433b20-25). 
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 Cf. Aristotle De an. 3.7, 431a5. 
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 Brennan, Stoic Life, 86-7. 
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 Graver, Stoicism, 28. 
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 Long and Sedley, HP1, 420. 
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of ‘appropriateness.’178  Stobaeus tries to define the difference between an impulse 
that occurs in non-rational animals, and the impulse that occurs in rational humans. 
The rational impulse is specifically a ‘movement of thought towards something in 
the sphere of action’, whereas irrational impulse is desire (ὄρεξις) (Stobaeus 2.86, 
17-87,6 = SVF 3.169).179 Desire means desire to act, and, because there is no 
rationality to hold this desire in check, it will inevitably result in action. This is what 
one sees in children and animals.180 Despite the Stoics allowing for natural 
impulses, the impulses involved in passions are not of the natural or rational variety 
but excessive and out of control. Aristotle before the Stoics noted that natural 
drives and emotions can be wrongly taken to excess e.g. fearing what one should 
not in a way one should not (Eth. nic. 3.7, 1115b30-35; 3.11, 1118b15).181 For the 
Stoic, in a rational adult, an impulse, whether excessive or natural, can only exist if 
a person gives assent to the impression (see Plutarch St. rep.1057A; SVF 3.177).182 
2.1.2.3 Assent 
Assent (συγκατάθεσις) means agreeing with and committing to the validity of the 
content of an impression, and the ability not to do so.183 Thus, assent ‘mediates 
between impressions and impulses.’184 This goes beyond Aristotle, who sees simply 
the pursuit or the avoidance as analogous to assent and denial (De an. 3.7, 431a5-
15; cf. Eth. nic. 6.2, 1139a20). The ability to choose whether to assent to something 
reveals that, for the Stoic, humans have the capacity to analyse the legitimacy of 
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 Cf. Plato Resp. 8, 558d-559b. Similarly Epicurus thought that some desires are natural, and of 
those that are natural only some are necessary either for happiness, for life, or to keep the body free 
from stress. According to Epicurus, nature has shown which are the necessary desires and which are 
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University Press, 2005), 642-674, 659. 
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 Sandbach, The Stoics, 64. 
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 Sandbach, The Stoics, 60. 
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the impression. One does not have to go along with impressions but can judge what 
is being reported including any inference about the value of the object. According 
to Long and Sedley, this is a Stoic innovation which ‘is of cardinal importance to 
their epistemology and ethics.’185 This capacity is founded on the assumption that 
nature has provided the rational person with the faculty of judgement so that she 
can live in accordance with nature.186 This mental process – impression on the soul; 
assent to the impression’s proposition; psychic impulse to action – is why passions 
can be deemed as cognitive and as a product of the commanding-faculty (see 
Aetius 4.21.1-4 = SVF 2.836; cf. Stobaeus 1.368, 12-20 = SVF 2.826). Furthermore, 
the commanding-faculty is the reasoning faculty. So, we can understand that for 
Stoicism, the whole process of a passion is bound up with cognition and rationality. 
This allows the possibility that one does not need to have a passion, for, if no 
cognitive assent is given, there will be no impulse and consequently no passion. For 
the Stoic, this halting of the impulse via assent happens within the one entity that is 
the commanding-faculty. Other philosophers like Plato did agree that one could 
resist impulses (appetites) through reason. The difference is that, for Plato, there 
are two antagonistic powers working – the rational part can decide whether or not 
to follow the appetitive part (Resp. 4, 439c-d) – whereas, for the Stoic, the process 
happens within the unified soul.  It is worth noting, in order to understand the 
relationship between a passion and ethical behaviour, that, in Stoic theory, there 
appears an implicit assumption that assent to the impression will necessarily end in 
action: the judgement (assent) and decision to act are equated.187  
It has previously been stated that impression, assent, and impulse constitute the 
process of a passion (and good emotion). However, according to Galen there was 
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 Long and Sedley, HP1, 322. 
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 The Epicureans regarded all impressions as true and thought that reason did not have the power 
to contradict impressions because reason itself ‘is in its entirety the product of the senses’ (Lucr. 
4.469-521 = HP16A). This does not mean that the sensations themselves were rational; they were 
still classified as irrational. 
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 Brennan, 'Old Stoic,' 28. For Aristotle, the judgement relates to value and therefore sets the ends. 
Deliberation questions how to obtain those ends and so is accompanied by reasoning and thought. 
After this comes decision, which is the choice of how to act (Eth. nic. 6.2, 1139a20; 3.2, 1111b25-
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disagreement within Stoicism on what constituted the passion, was it the impulse, 
or the judgement and the impulse? According to Galen, Zeno saw the passions to 
be the ‘irrational contractions, lowering abasements and pangs, the rising elations 
and relaxed diffusions’ that follow on (ἐπιγίγνομαι) the judgement, but not the 
judgement itself (Posidonius fr. 34A, trans. Kidd). Conversely, Chrysippus thought 
that the passion is the judgement, including both the ὁρμή and the λόγος that tells a 
person to act.188 Graver has argued that Galen is wrong in presenting Zeno and 
Chrysippus as having different views, as she explains: 
Both clearly hold that having an emotion involves both the psychophysical 
change and the judgement, and both describe the relation between the two 
in very much the same way. For Zeno, the change supervenes on the 
judgement and would not be an emotion if it did not supervene on a 
judgement of this sort (i.e. an irrational judgement). For Chrysippus, the 
change is reliably produced by the judgement, which would not be an 
emotion if it did not produce a movement of this sort. … In reformulating 
the definition, Chrysippus seeks to bring out more clearly what was already 
implied in Zeno’s version: that it is the nature of the judgement that defines 
what sort of impulse has occurred.189 
Cicero, seems to uphold that a passion includes both a judgement and impulse 
(Tusc. 4.6.11-7.15).190  Furthermore, if we look in detail at the definitions of 
particular passions, reported by Adronicus (1st Century BCE), we see that both the 
movement of the soul (the impulse) and the accompanying opinion (the judgement 
or reasoning) form part of the definition (cf. Tusc. 4.7.14-15). For example: 
ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄλογος ἔπαρσις· ἢ δόξα πρόσφατος ἀγαθοῦ παρουσίας, ἐφ’ ᾧ οἴονται 
δεῖν ἐπαίρεσθαι. 
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 Sandbach, The Stoics, 64; Long and Sedley, HP1, 422. Posidonius, says Galen, disagreed with both 
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Pleasure is an irrational swelling, or a fresh opinion that something good is 
present, at which people think it right to be swollen (Andronicus [Pass.] 1.1 
= SVF 3.391). 
So, it appears that it is difficult when describing a passion to separate the 
judgement and the impulse.191 It is not necessary for us to go into this further, only 
to note that in Stoicism an emotion clearly contains a judgement about an object 
and as a consequence has an action-tendency. Thus, it is not anachronistic to use 
such ideas, which are also present in modern theory, to investigate emotions in 1 
Peter. 
We have been able to determine what an impulse is, and how it relates to 
impression and assent. What we have not yet uncovered is how, for Stoicism, a 
passion’s impulse is contrary to nature and irrational. 
2.1.2.4. Contrary to Nature and Irrational 
Before exploring the irrationality of the passions, which appears to argue against 
their coherent cognitive content, we need to investigate the view that the passions 
were excessive impulses and contrary to nature. According to Chrysippus, a rational 
animal is naturally guided by reason. However, a rational animal can be caused to 
move towards and away from objects in an alternative manner, ‘pushed to excess 
in disobedience to reason’ (Galen, PHP, 4.2.10-18 = SVF 3.462). As noted above, 
impulses are natural and should encourage a person to go in search of what is 
appropriate to her natural constitution (Diogenes Laertius 7.85-6; SVF 3.178). But 
the natural impulse should be what ‘accords with reason and goes only so far as 
reason itself thinks right’ (Galen, PHP, 4.2.10-18 = SVF 3.462; cf. Stobaeus 2.89,4-
90,6 = SVF 3.389; Diogenes Laertius, 7.85-6 = SVF 3.178). 192 Aristotle likewise 
thought that desire should act ‘in accordance with what reason prescribes,’ 
resulting in desire being in harmony with reason and leading to appropriateness 
(Eth. nic. 3.12, 1119b5-15, trans. Rowe).193 In describing an excessive impulse 
Chrysippus uses a now well-known example of a person’s action of walking in 
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contrast to running. In walking one is moved by impulse but is in complete control 
and can stop or change direction whenever one wants. However, when a person 
runs, the movement exceeds the impulse and she can no longer immediately stop 
or change direction when she wills. The inability of the person to be in control of 
her action when running parallels the person in a passionate state who is carried 
away and is no longer following reason.194 The passion, which is an excessive 
impulse that is going beyond the limits of reason, is therefore ‘irrational’.195  
So, does this description of passions as ‘irrational’ mean that the Stoics are in 
contradiction with themselves? Are the passions without reason and therefore not 
a cognitive judgment after all? For Chrysippus, the passions are ‘irrational’ because 
they do not carry correct reasoning, rather than because they are devoid of any 
cognitive reasoning element.196 Because the passions are not based on true 
reasoning, they distort a person’s ability to judge correctly.197 This judgement is an 
assessment of value, i.e. whether it is right to pursue something or avoid 
something, or whether one should be elated or deflated. The person who is in a 
passionate state wrongly judges what is good and bad, and therefore what should 
be pursued or avoided. This faulty judgement takes reason to excess because it 
causes one to perceive things to be of greater worth than reason would determine 
them to be, and therefore to pursue or avoid them excessively.198 
 
 
 
                                                     
194
 Aristotle too notes that desire can be so strong and vigorous that it removes the ability to think 
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2.1.2.5 Appearances, Indifferents and Opinion 
As discussed above, the judgement involved in a passion relates to what is seen as 
valuable, in other words, what is evaluated as good (ἀγαθός) and bad (κακός).199 
Epictetus reveals how the soul’s movement is affected by the good and the bad: 
… οὕτως πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀρεκτικῶς κινεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἐκκλιτικῶς, 
πρὸς δὲ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτ᾿ ἀγαθὸν οὐδετέρως. 
… it is its [the soul’s] nature to be moved with desire toward the good, with 
aversion toward the evil, and feel neutral toward what is neither evil nor 
good (Diatr. 3.3.2-3 [Oldfather, LCL] ).  
This is natural, but the problem occurs if one has a warped perception of what is 
good and bad. Other philosophers had previously noted how the affections could 
distort and pervert reason (Eth. eu. 8.1.5, 1246b15), but this was a symptom of the 
power struggle between appetite and reason.200 The Stoic viewpoint, instead, 
makes the person’s entire faculty of judgement corrupted (cf. Plutarch, Virt. mor. 
446f-447a = SVF 3.459). A warped capacity to judge will result in faulty assent, 
wrong impulses, and ultimately wrong actions. This is the situation of the inferior 
man, who cannot evaluate correctly.201 The Stoics introduce the term ‘opinion’ 
(δόξα) to label judgements arising from faulty perception.202 As Plutarch, in 
discussing the Stoics, summarises: ‘for appetite and anger and fear and all such 
things are corrupt opinions and judgements [δόξας εἶναι καὶ κρίσεις πονηράς]’ (Virt. 
mor. 446f-447a = SVF 3.459). Such opinions are therefore described as ‘weak’ and 
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 The Stoic viewpoint sits in a vast ancient philosophical discussion about what is a good; there is 
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 Because Plato locates the passions in the body, he sees all information that is provided by the 
body, including the senses, as not productive of true knowledge. Only reason can provide the soul 
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and weakness of character’; Long, 'Socratic Legacy,' 624.  
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opinions. Epicurus also talks of opinions as mistaken beliefs about how to achieve absence of pain 
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souls; see Ep. Men 132 cited in Erler and Schofield, 'Epicurean Ethics,' 651-652. 
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based on misguided assent (Sextus Empiricus, Math 7.151-7 = HP41C).203 For 
example, fear contains the belief that something ‘bad’ is about to happen such as 
death or pain and therefore results in the opinion that it is right to avoid it. Yet, for 
the Stoic, death and pain are really ‘indifferents’ (not morally good or bad); 
therefore, any belief that they can bring real harm is false; subsequently, so is the 
opinion concerning appropriate action.204 Thus, the problem with the passions is 
that they are mistaken opinions about what is truly valuable, and result in excessive 
behaviour. Therefore, ‘as false beliefs … they are all imperfections of our reason, 
and so directly deleterious to our end as the Stoics conceive it.’205 Contrastingly, the 
wise man would not have ‘opinions’ because he would not give assent to 
incognitive impressions (impression that are not certainly true) and therefore is 
incapable of ‘being deceived and of erring.’ He would, subsequently, ‘live worthily 
and do everything well’ (Anonymous Stoic Treatise = SVF 2.131; cf. Stobaeus 
2.111,18-112,8 = SVF 3.548). 206  
Because a person is incapable of making a correct judgement, the Stoics define the 
passions in terms of ‘appearances’: something that seems to be so, but in reality is 
not. As Stobaeus comments regarding Stoic thought: 
Ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν οὖν καὶ φόβον προηγεῖσθαι, τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, 
τὸν δὲ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον κακόν. 
Appetite and fear come first, the former in relation to what appears good, 
and the latter in relation to what appears bad (2.88,8-90,6 = SVF 3.378; 
italics added). 
However, the wise man knows that: 
                                                     
203
 Opinion becomes a technical term relating to wrong perception. An inferior man will opine, a 
wise man will not (cf. Cicero, Acad. 2.145 = SVF 1.66); Long and Sedley, HP1, 250, 420-1. 
204
 Sandbach, The Stoics, 61. 
205
 Brennan, 'Old Stoic,' 31. 
206
 The Stoics also spoke of the wise man suspending judgement if the impression was not clear 
enough to be judged correctly, therefore again avoiding false opinion (Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1056e-f = 
SVF 2.993); Long and Sedley, HP1, 258. Aristotle too allows that there can be ‘apparent’ goods which 
are perceived as good by an individual, yet are not truly good and so they result in the person being 
deceived. But, the ‘good person discriminates correctly in every set of circumstances, and in every 
set of circumstances what is true is apparent to him’ (Eth. nic.3.4, 1113a30, trans. Rowe). 
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Ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν τάς τ’ ἀρετάς, φρόνησιν, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, σωφροσύνην καὶ 
τὰ λοιπά· κακὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, ἀφροσύνην, ἀδικίαν καὶ τὰ λοιπά. οὐδέτερα δὲ 
ὅσα μήτ’ ὠφελεῖ μήτε βλάπτει, οἷον ζωή, ὑγίεια, ἡδονή, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, 
πλοῦτος, εὐδοξία, εὐγένεια· καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία, θάνατος, νόσος, πόνος, 
αἶσχος, ἀσθένεια, πενία, ἀδοξία, δυσγένεια καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια … μὴ γὰρ εἶναι 
ταῦτ’ ἀγαθά, ἀλλ’ ἀδιάφορα κατ’ εἶδος προηγμένα. 
[T]he virtues – prudence, justice, courage, moderation and the rest – are 
good. The opposites of these – foolishness, injustice and the rest – are bad. 
Everything which neither does benefit nor harms is neither of these: for 
instance, life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, noble 
birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, 
low repute, ignoble birth and the like…For these things are not goods but 
indifferents of the species ‘preferred’ (Diogenes Laertius 7.102 [Long and 
Sedley, HP1]).207 
Thus, only the virtues are really good, and these virtues are integral to the 
person.208 Even what might normally be considered good (e.g. health) are in fact 
indifferents (ἀδιάφορα).209 Hence, the Stoics have a normative schema of what 
should and should not be valued.210 The Epicureans also thought that correct 
perspective is fundamental, noting that to achieve happiness required the removal 
of illusions about the divine and a correct understanding of death which would 
subsequently eliminate misguided anxieties and fears.211 However, the Stoic 
perception of the good sits in opposition to the Epicurean viewpoint which saw 
pleasure as the ultimate good and pain as the ultimate evil (Cicero, Fin. 1.29-32). 212  
For the Stoic, pleasure and pain are merely indifferents. 213 Consequently, the 
passions are problematic because they cause the person to wrongly seek what 
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 Cleanthes gives a slightly different listing of the good which includes being fearless (ἄφοβος) and 
‘un-distressed’ (ἄλυπος) (Clement, Protr. 6.72.2 = SVF 1.557). 
208
 The four listed virtues are similar to Plato’s four virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation and 
justice (Resp. 4, 427e) and are likewise endorsed by Aristotle as excellences, though Aristotle 
includes more than the Platonic four (See Eth. nic. 3.6-12, 4.5, 5.1). Epicurus linked the virtues, 
particularly prudence and justice, to living pleasurably (Ep. Men. 132 = HP21B). For discussion on 
how the Epicurean views of virtue relate to ἀταραξία see Erler and Schofield, 'Epicurean Ethics,' 666-
9.  
209
 Cf. Aristotle Eth. nic. 1.4, 1095a15-20 and 7.13, 1153b1 for comments on what ordinary people 
normally pursue and avoid.  
210
 Graver, Stoicism, 37. 
211
 Erler and Schofield, 'Epicurean Ethics,' 645-6 
212
 Erler and Schofield, 'Epicurean Ethics,' 647-8 
213
 Having said this, pain here is πόνος which refers to physical pain especially. Cf. Aristotle who 
seems to represent the common view, that one’s desire is always for the pleasant, and the painful is 
contrary to desire (Eth. eu.2.7.4-5, 1223a25-35; cf. 7.2.2, 1235b20). 
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appears to be good and avoid what appears to be bad, whereas these objects are 
really indifferents.214 However, to pursue virtue is always correct, as is to be 
repelled by vice. In addition to this, as Graver helpfully delineates, the opinions of 
value evident in emotions are not formed in the moment, but are based on already 
held beliefs about value. It is on account of this framework of belief that 
appropriateness to act is judged (cf. Tusc. 3.11.24-5, 3.26.62).215 Therefore, we can 
understand that for Stoicism, passions are not a momentary issue, but arise 
because of a problem with a person’s entire belief system. 
Before moving on it is worth noting one last thing regarding the attribution of value 
present in emotions. Stobaeus (cited above), goes on to say: 
Ἐπιγίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτοις ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, ἡδονὴν μὲν ὅταν τυγχάνωμεν ὧν 
ἐπεθυμοῦμεν ἢ ἐκφύγωμεν ἃ ἐφοβούμεθα· λύπην δέ, ὅταν ἀποτυγχάνωμεν ὧν 
ἐπεθυμοῦμεν ἢ περιπέσωμεν οἷς ἐφοβούμεθα. 
Pleasure and distress result from these [appetite and fear]: pleasure, 
whenever we get the objects of our appetite or avoid the objects of our 
fear; distress, whenever we fail to get the objects of our appetite or 
experience the objects of our fear (SVF 3.378). 
From this we can see a clear link between the perception of the good and bad, and 
the attainment or non-attainment of a goal. One’s perception of the good and the 
bad places a value on the object and determines whether it is something to be 
attained or avoided. Put differently, a goal based on these values is established. The 
person, because of their perception, is then driven to act in line with that goal, 
either toward or away from the object, and, consequently, experiences pleasure or 
distress at the realisation/non-realisation of the goal.216 In general, this idea of the 
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 Indifferent can be used in two ways: firstly, to mean things which lead neither to happiness nor 
unhappiness; secondly, to refer to things that activate neither impulse nor repulsion (Diogenes 
Laertius, 7.104-5 = SVF 3.119). Even though things such as health and wealth can be indifferent, 
there are some which are according to nature, and therefore some which have value and should be 
selected as ‘preferred’ e.g. reason in certain circumstances would select health over disease. A good 
would not be ‘preferred’ as it inherently possesses the greatest value (cf. Stobaeus, 2.79,18-80,13; 
82,20-1 = HP58C; 83,10-84,2 = SVF 3.124; 84,18-85,11 = SVF 3.128). 
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 Graver, Stoicism, 39-43. 
216
 Epicurus recognised this, noting that, if pleasure was the ultimate good and goal, then pleasure 
would determine choice and avoidance, and, in complete contrast to the Stoics, feelings (πάθος) 
become the way to judge the good (Ep. Men. 128-9). Sensation and feeling are made the primary 
criterion of truth, meaning that an understanding of good and evil is readily accessible to all; Ep. 
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establishment of value is important because it means that someone may choose to 
act against what might be seen as the normal state of affairs because of working 
from a different value system e.g. a person is willing to suffer pain for a particular 
virtuous end (Eth. nic. 3.9, 1117b1; cf. Epicurus, Ep.Men. 129-30 = HP21B). 
Now we have a better understanding of impression, assent, impulse, and their 
relationship to evaluation of the good and bad, we will be in a position to 
appreciate the Stoic nuances that are present in their definition of emotions 
generally (passions and εὐπαθεῖαι) and individually, which we will need in the 
coming exegetical chapters. The above discussion has also been able to 
demonstrate that a number of elements present in modern theory can also be 
found among the ancients. Firstly, emotions were thought to be cognitive and 
object-directed in that they contain a propositional judgement about the object. 
The judgement is an evaluative judgement based on one’s understanding of good 
and bad. Acceptance of this proposition (assent / judgement) leads to an impulse, 
which is a drive towards action (i.e. an action-tendency), generally to pursue or 
avoid something. Further, we have seen that the ancients recognised that the 
evaluations of emotions are based on beliefs, and therefore that emotional life is 
not deterministically universal but can be changed by what one holds to be true. 
2.1.2.6 The εὐπαθεῖαι  
Before discussing how the Stoic view of the passions influences Stoic ethics, we 
must first complete the picture. It would be wrong to say that Stoicism saw all 
emotions as problematic. They did allow certain emotions, seeing them as ‘natural 
and proper,’ e.g. the love of a parent for their child. Further, particular dispositions 
were appropriate in given relational contexts. For example, the ‘appropriate 
disposition to oneself is benevolence [εὐνοητικός]’ and to one’s kindred and children 
is affection (στερτικός i.e. disposed towards love) (Hierocles 9.3-10 = HP57B).217 
                                                                                                                                                      
Men. 128-9 cited in Erler and Schofield, 'Epicurean Ethics,' 649-50; cf. Cicero, Fin. 1.29-32, 37-39. It 
must be noted that λύπη and ἡδονή for Stoicism refers to mental pain and pleasure rather than a 
bodily sensation; see Sandbach, The Stoics, 62-3; Long and Sedley, HP1, 421; cf. Diogenes Laertius 
7.85-6 = SVF 3.178; Eth. nic. 6.1, 1120a25-30. 
217
 Hierocles was a Stoic philosopher, who flourished approximately 100-120 CE; Long and Sedley, 
HP1, 496. 
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These are proper dispositions because they are innate and natural, being exhibited 
in the social behaviour of animals (Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1038B = SVF 3.179, 2.724). 
For a Stoic such as Marcus Aurelius, it is possible to be ‘entirely passionless yet full 
of affection.’218 Consequently, in conjunction with the passions, the Stoics 
developed the idea of the εὐπαθεῖαι, the good emotions, which were stable and 
well-reasoned. The Roman Stoics termed the εὐπαθεῖαι constantiae on account of 
their stability.219 There were three εὐπαθεῖαι: βούλησις (volition/wish/correct 
appetite), εὐλάβεια (caution/watchfulness/correct avoidance), and χαρά 
(joy/correct elation). These εὐπαθεῖαι were the good counter-parts of the passions: 
βούλησις instead of ἐπιθυμία; χαρά for ἡδονή; and εὐλάβεια rather than φόβος. There 
was no equivalent to λύπη because this would simply be the natural healthy 
state.220 If it were to occur it would indicate the presence of evil, which for the wise 
man is only vice, and because the perfect wise man does not have internal vice he 
cannot be distressed.221 The εὐπαθεῖαι were acceptable because they arose from 
assent to correct reasoning. For example, according to Diogenes Laertius: 
καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ, οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν· 
 Joy, they say, is the opposite of pleasure, consisting in well-reasoned 
swelling [elation] (7.116; SVF 3.431, [Long and Sedley, HP1]).  
We can see in this definition that some of the same elements detailed in the 
passions are present, such as a form of belief, indicated by the term reasoning, and 
also an impulse, here seen as swelling. Furthermore, εὔλογος means that the 
evaluation of a εὐπάθεια is true and the objects are necessarily appropriate (cf. 
Seneca, Ep. 59.2-4).222 Yet, this puts the εὐπαθεῖαι beyond the grasp of most people 
because only the wise man can consistently reason correctly. Like the passions, 
other emotions fall under these primary categories, as Diogenes Laertius details: 
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 Sandbach, The Stoics, 59-60. 
219
 Graver has argued that stability in εὐπαθεῖαι indicates lack of internal inconsistency in the state of 
mind underpinning the emotion, not absence of depth of feeling; Graver, Stoicism, 51. 
220
 This is different to the Epicurean viewpoint that one’s ability to acknowledge the complete 
absence of pain was in fact to experience the greatest pleasure (see Cicero, Fin. 1..29-32, 37-39). 
Further, for the Stoic, a wise man would never experience mental pain, because he would willingly 
accept all that happened to him, knowing that it was divinely ordained; Sandbach, The Stoics, 67. 
221
 Graver, Stoicism, 54-5. 
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 Graver, Stoicism, 51-2. 
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καθάπερ οὖν ὑπὸ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη πίπτει τινά, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς 
πρώτας εὐπαθείας· καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν βούλησιν εὔνοιαν, εὐμένειαν, ἀσπασμόν, 
ἀγάπησιν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν εὐλάβειαν αἰδῶ, ἁγνείαν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν χαρὰν τέρψιν, 
εὐφροσύνην, εὐθυμίαν. 
Just as certain passions fall under the primary ones, so too with the primary 
good feelings. Under wishing: kindness, generosity, warmth, affection. 
Under watchfulness: respect, cleanliness. Under joy: delight, sociability, 
cheerfulness (7.116 = SVF 3.431).  
Therefore, we can see that the Stoics had a definite systemisation of the emotions, 
labelling some as problematic and others as good. As Graver highlights, the 
εὐπαθεῖαι become ‘normative affect.’223 We might say that, within the school, they 
have an established emotional regime. This regime is rooted in their whole 
philosophical system of thought, but also, as we might expect, given that emotions 
drive actions, feeds into their ethics. 
2.2. Emotions and Stoic Ethics 
The passions are important for Stoic ethics because a passion ‘is not an idle and 
innocuous false belief, but a false belief taking effect in the agent’s behavior’ and 
this false belief ‘is the only and sole cause of wrong action.’224 It is this attribution of 
agency to the person that is central.  
2.2.1 Assent and Agency 
The passions result in action through assent and impulse. Therefore, because the 
human has the capacity to assent or disagree with the impression, the human is 
given complete agency over her emotions and is consequently responsible for her 
own actions (cf. Seneca, Ira 2.3.1-2.4 = HP65X; Plutarch Stoic. rep. 1057A = SVF 
3.177).225 This differentiates an adult from an animal or a child who have no 
cognitive ability to assent but inevitably follow the impulse stimulated by the 
impression.226  Having said this, the human is not born fully rational; one’s 
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 Graver, Stoicism, 51. 
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 Brennan, 'Old Stoic,' 32. 
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 The ultimate display of the person’s control over action is the Stoic support for the wise man’s 
appropriate suicide; see Diogenes Laertius 7.310 = SVF 3.757; Long and Sedley, HP1, 320, 429.   
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 Sandbach, The Stoics, 60; cf. Aristotle Eth. nic. 3.2, 1111b5-25; Eth. eu. 2.7.4-8.3, 1223a25-
1224a10. 
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rationality grows over time.227 Being able to master the self through assent sits in 
contrast to the inability to have control over external circumstances. For the Stoic, 
one cannot control what happens to you i.e. what nature dictates, but one can 
control the inner attitude toward the circumstances.228 
The Stoic philosophers, like others, had to wrestle over questions about which 
movements and actions are voluntary, and which are involuntary. Are the passions 
ever instinctual, automatic reactions? For the Stoic, the answer is no; every thought 
and movement should be under the power of the person’s rational commanding-
faculty (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν). Therefore, the person remains, at least theoretically, 
capable of having complete agency at all times. Consequently, all movements and 
actions are voluntary, including the passionate impulses.229 Thus, despite the 
person once in a passionate state being out of control, it is in her power whether 
she has a passion in the first place due to the necessity of assent.230 Subsequently, 
we must go one step backwards; as Graver states, ‘the real cause or reason for the 
assent is to be found in the agent’s own mental character, where by “mental 
character” is meant simply the structure and content of one’s own belief set.’ Those 
with a weak tension, i.e. incoherent internal belief, will easily assent to false 
impressions and therefore experience the passions.231  Furthermore, because the 
passions result in actions and have bodily manifestations, from viewing one’s 
actions, the quality of a person’s soul can be seen.232 For example, to display fear 
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 Long and Sedley, HP1, 321; Epicureans also thought that the person’s ability to judge increased as 
they grew older. However, because this ability was linked to the body it also had the ability to 
degenerate in old age (Lucr. 3.417-62 = HP14F). 
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 The Epicureans took a similar view that we should only concern ourselves with what was in our 
power, which is our inner attitude; Erler and Schofield, 'Epicurean Ethics,' 644. 
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 Aristotle had various categories of agency (see Eth. nic. 3.1, 1110b15-30; 1111a20-1111b1).  
Similar to the Stoics, voluntary action is based on thought (Eth. eu. 2.8.2, 1224a5). Therefore, for 
Aristotle it is only those actions that are under a person’s control, the one’s ‘decided-for’ that we 
praise or blame, or can categorise as virtue and vice (Eth. eu. 2.6.10, 1223a10). See Aristotle, 
Nichomachean Ethics. Translation (with Historical Introduction) by Christopher Rowe, Philosophical 
Introduction and Commentary by Sarah Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 43. 
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 Graver, Stoicism, 62-3. 
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 Graver, Stoicism, 63-5; cf. Seneca, Ep. 102.8-10 = HP60E; Epictetus, Diatr. 3.3.2-4 = HP60F. 
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 Cf. Aristotle, who is clear that ‘virtue belongs to the soul’ (Eth. eu.2.1.15, 1219b25, trans. Rowe), 
and asserts that by seeing someone’s responses to pleasure and pain their disposition and character 
can be seen (Eth. nic.2.3, 1104b1-1104b5; cf. Resp. 4, 441d-e, 442e-444; 9, 581c; Phaed. 83d, Tim. 
42b). 
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which results in cowardice shows that the person has a weak soul that has been 
carried along by the passion to the point of disobedience to reason, leading to vice. 
It is the commanding faculty that is responsible for the judgement, assent, and 
ultimately actions.  Thus, a soul (the whole person) can be categorised as noble / 
good (καλός) or shameful (αἰσχρός) depending on the quality of her ἡγεμονικόν 
(Galen PHP 5.2.49 = SVF 2.841). Aristotle agrees that ‘one judges the quality of a 
person from their deeds’ (Eth. eu. 2.1.11, 1219b10). However, Aristotle also adds 
the further dimension that someone’s actions reveal what they see as the right 
goal. So, when we judge someone’s character from an action, we are really judging 
the rationale behind their action and whether this is virtuous; because excellence of 
character necessarily makes the goal correct and stops one being deceived as to 
what the right course of action is (Eth. eu. 2.11.7-9, 1227b35-1228a1; Eth. nic. 6.12, 
1144a5, 30 ). In Stoic terms, this would mean assessing from a person’s actions 
whether they have really understood virtue or vice, or have allowed the passions to 
make them wrongly pursue indifferents to excess.  
Conversely, the wise man, because he perceives virtue and vice correctly, has the 
ability to judge impressions correctly, and will have well-reasoned assent leading to 
appropriate impulses. Thus, he will always behave appropriately i.e. according to 
nature. It could be argued that the wise man’s quality of soul gives him an 
emotional disposition. As Stobaeus comments: 
They [the Stoics] say that a good man experiences nothing contrary to his 
desire or impulse or purpose on account of the fact that in all such cases he 
acts with reserve and encounters no obstacles which are unanticipated. He 
is also gentle, his gentleness being a tenor by which he is gently disposed in 
acting always appropriately and in not being moved to anger against 
anyone. He is also calm and orderly, this orderliness being knowledge of 
fitting activities, and his calm the proper regulation of his soul and body’s 
natural activities and rests. The opposites of these occur in all inferior men 
(Stobaeus 2.115,5-17 = SVF 3.564, 632).  
The result, indicated by this excerpt, is that the wise man will always undertake 
fitting and natural activities, which the Stoics called ‘proper functions’. 
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2.2.2 Proper Functions, Nature and Virtue 
The idea of a proper function (τὸ καθῆκον) is fundamental to Stoic ethics.233 Seneca 
comments that no one ‘will be able to perform what he should do unless he has 
acquired the system of being able to execute all the measure of proper functions in 
every matter’ (Ep. 95.10-12 = HP66J).234 This includes in emotional matters also. As 
Diogenes Laertius comments:  
τῶν γὰρ καθ’ ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ 
καθῆκον, τὰ δ’ οὔτε καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι 
ὅσα λόγος αἱρεῖ ποιεῖν …  
Of activities in accordance with impulse, some are proper functions, others 
are contrary to proper function, and others belong to neither type. Proper 
functions are ones which reason dictates our doing … (7.108 = SVF 3.495). 
Thus, if emotions are judgements leading to impulse, then it is important that one’s 
emotional life is oriented aright if one is to perform proper functions.235 
Consequently, Seneca reveals that part of virtue is ‘curbing desires’ and ‘checking 
fears’ along with doing the correct thing (Ep. 120.11 = HP60E]). Proper functions 
involve both the selection of things (the good) according to nature and continuous 
appropriate selection (Cicero, Fin. 3. 20-2). The task of the moral agent is to choose 
which action is appropriate in each situation in order to live virtuously. This may 
mean choosing something such as death or disease – indifferents which one would 
not naturally prefer, but which, in certain situations, judgement and reason dictate 
are to be selected.236 These indifferents thus become ‘preferred’ in the given 
situation.237 For the Stoic, some proper functions are always correct – those clearly 
linked to virtue – others can depend on circumstances (Diogenes Laertius, 7.109 = 
                                                     
233
 ‘Proper function’ describes an action that is appropriate to nature (therefore to perfect reason). 
Examples include acting justly or prudently (Stobaeus 2.85,13-86,4 = SVF 3.494; Diogenes Laertius 
7.107 = SVF 3.493). 
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 Seneca uses the Latin officium here as the equivalent of the Greek τὸ καθῆκον for ‘proper 
function’; cf. Cicero Fin. 3.20-22. 
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 Aristotle likewise links virtue with the best movements of the soul, which produce the best 
functions and affections (Eth. eu. 2.1.24, 1220a30; cf. Eth. nic. 1.7, 1098a5.). 
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 Long and Sedley, HP1, 358. 
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 The selection of the preferred equates to Aristotle’s ‘decision’ which is a calculated choice of one 
thing over another (Eth. eu. 2.10.15, 1226b5). Cf. Epicurus’ comments about whether to choose 
pleasure and avoid pain depending on judgement of advantages or disadvantages in Ep. Men. 129-
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SVF 3.496). It is obvious that being under the sway of the passions would be 
detrimental to selecting the right action because, as discussed above, they drive 
one to pursue the wrong things because of a warped judgement about value. 
Consequently, passions are necessarily contrary to proper functions.238 Given that 
the passions prevent one from living as nature intended, it is not surprising that the 
topic of how to avoid the passions becomes vital for Stoic ethics. 
It is also worth noting at this point that to select a seemingly negative thing such as 
death or disease as ‘preferred’ and according to nature is only comprehensible 
when we recall the deterministic Stoic perspective that the divine will may allot to 
the human what it wills. Virtuous action therefore has to be in line not just with 
human nature but the whole of nature’s cosmic reason.239 What constitutes a good 
or bad, virtue or happiness is determined by the nature of the universe and its 
administration in the world (Plutarch, St. rep. 1035c-d = SVF 3.68). This means that 
one should not partake in an activity that would contravene nature’s laws, and in 
such a way one can live in line with the gods (Diogenes Laertius 7.87-9 = SVF 3.178). 
What this reveals is that the control of the passions has to be understood in relation 
to the ordering of the universe. To be disturbed inwardly by passions means that 
one is living outside of the created order as nature intended. Instead, it is the ability 
to live virtuously according to nature that produces happiness. Consequently, one’s 
emotional life affects one’s ability to achieve this end.240 Here we can see, once 
again, how the Stoics’ positioning of emotions is influenced by their larger 
worldview. 
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 Cf. Stobaeus 2.96,18-97,5 = SVF 3.501. Panaetius linked proper functions to emotions via his 
conception of roles (persona). Two of the roles a person has to be aware of are their mental nature 
and temperament. Given the above discussion one would assume the passions would need to be 
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individuals to discover how to act in line with their personality, but brought this within boundaries of 
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2.3 The Therapy of Emotions 
We have just discussed how the passions because of being excessive, contrary to 
nature and irrational, were seen as the root of unhappiness, vice, and problems of 
character that result in wrongdoing.241 Consequently, the passions were 
undesirable and the aim was to be entirely without them. This was termed ἀπάθεια. 
The Stoics were not the only school who discussed the place of the emotions. 
Aristotle, not seeing the emotions as inherently negative, advocated the 
intermediate way of moderation (Eth. nic. 2.6, 1106a25-1106b25; cf. Eth. eu. 3.7.1-
10, 1233b15-1234a25).242 For Aristotle, excellence with regard to the affections was 
‘to be affected when one should, at the things one should, in the relation to the 
people one should, for the reasons one should, and in the way one should’ (Eth. nic. 
2.6, 1106b20, trans. Rowe). However, Aristotle does think that some affections such 
as rejoicing over someone’s misfortune (ἐπιχαιρεκακία), shamelessness 
(ἀναισχυντία), and grudging ill-will (φθόνος) do not allow the intermediate way but 
are necessarily ‘combined with badness’ (Eth. nic. 2.6, 1107a5-10). Plato, on the 
other hand, despite thinking that it is impossible to destroy the passions, does think 
that the reason should rule the body and its affections, in this way, one can ‘achieve 
calm from such emotions’ (Phaed. 84a, 94b-c, trans. Grube).243 The general 
acceptance of self-control as a virtue suggests that many schools recognised the 
need to master the affections (Eth. nic. 7.1, 1145b10; Resp. 4, 430a, 442c). Even the 
Epicureans, for whom pleasure was the goal of life, thought that the pursuit of 
pleasure should be limited by the dictates of reason and that the greatest good was 
prudence (Ep. Men. 132). Pleasure was defined as ‘quiet of mind’ and the ‘absence 
of bodily pain.’244 Quiet of mind here is ἀταραξία (absence of mental disturbance), 
suggesting a lack of disturbing passions. In fact, the Epicureans thought that 
philosophy was empty if it did not offer a therapy for the passions.245 Due to their 
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differing assessments of the nature and quality of emotions the various 
philosophical schools advocated diverse therapies for the emotions. We will focus 
on the Stoic therapy. 
2.3.1 A Simple Therapy?  
If we start with the Stoic view that the passions are a faulty judgement, then the 
therapy is simple: correct the judgement. At its root, this means altering the 
perception of the good and the bad. For the Stoic, nature has deposited the seeds 
of the knowledge of good by what naturally accords to man (i.e. the good that is 
appropriate to him), but to perceive the truly good requires learning and 
experience.246 Thus, being able to recognise the truly good advances alongside the 
perfection of rationality.247 With this understanding, the eradication of the passions 
is at least theoretically possible, because if one can always follow reason in one’s 
judgements then the passion will not exist.248 As noted above, whether an 
impression ever ends up in a fully-fledged passion is under the power of the person. 
But what about instances where a person seems to cry for no reason, or reacts to a 
snake in the grass? The Stoics would argue that, in the latter case, the impression 
necessarily produces certain sensations, but this reaction is not based on an opinion 
(i.e. a faulty judgement) and thus occurs before mind and reason can act. The wise 
man, when he has had time to recognise the impression, will not assent to it, so 
stops fear before it develops (Gellius249 19.1.17-18 = HP65Y).250 Hence, he is never 
really in a passionate state.251 For the former, according to Graver, the ‘category of 
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inconsequential feelings not dependent on assent was identified quite early in the 
Hellenistic school, perhaps under the term ‘pre-emotions’ (προπάθεια), and this is 
how feelings that occur without judgement, such as inexplicable tears, could be 
labelled.252 Seneca develops this concept most comprehensively (see Ira 2.1.3-5; 
2.2.1-2.3.3-5).253 The ‘first movements’ exist before the act of assent, so cannot be 
classed as a full passion, but may exhibit some of the bodily manifestations 
commonly associated with the passion.254 
Even though the extirpation of the passions is theoretically possible, for Stoicism, 
the perfection of rationality can only be attained by the wise man. Subsequently, 
the normal man will not achieve ἀπάθεια, but could make steps towards it.255  The 
Stoics thought, like other philosophical schools, that the way of progression was 
good upbringing, education, and entering the path of philosophy.256  In the ancient 
world, this type of education was only available to a few male elite. Groups of the 
population such as women, children, and slaves were bound to remain as inferior 
people who exhibited all kinds of ‘diverse desires, pleasures and pains’ (Resp. 4, 
431b-c, trans. Grube and Reeve).257 In the promotion of education, particularly for 
the young, we can see an awareness that emotional life required social conditioning 
if the individual was to be formed correctly.258 Emotions are particularly important 
in this moral training, because emotions are object directed. For the ancient mind, 
the object is more often than not another human. So, control of the emotions 
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affects how one acts towards another and will have consequences for society as a 
whole. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The above discussion has shown that the emotions are a significant topic for Greco-
Roman philosophy: from where they sit within the person, to what they are, and 
how they occur. By the time we reach the later Stoics, highly developed and 
sophisticated descriptions of the passions have been produced. It is evident that 
the philosophers recognised, as do modern theorists, that the emotions are 
cognitive processes which include recognising an object, judging value, evaluating 
goal congruence, and providing impetus for action. Despite this, the ancients were 
cautious of the passions and their drives. The Stoics also recognised the 
fundamental link between perception of the good and bad and the emotion’s 
judgement. Correct judgement, based on a truthful perspective, would lead to a 
εὐπάθεια, an appropriate impulse resulting in virtuous behaviour. The misguided 
passions would produce the opposite. In general the ancients warn against excess 
and promote the limitation of emotions by reason. Τhe Stoics sought to eradicate 
the passions. The main therapy was cognitive: simply change the judgement. 
Others, such as Aristotle did not think that the emotions were inherently bad but 
advocated the intermediate way, avoiding excess and deficiency. The general 
acceptance that reason was to be preeminent over the affections led to a valuing of 
philosophical education as a means of correcting false judgements about the good 
and bad and therefore changing opinions about what should be pursued or 
avoided; this would then lead to right actions. If one was able to have self-mastery 
over the passions via assent and, consequently, live in line with nature, then one 
would have consistently appropriate ethical behaviour and achieve a virtuous 
happy life.  
Thus, we can conclude, given these findings, that it is not anachronistic to 
investigate emotions in 1 Peter in terms of object-directedness, evaluative 
judgements, and action-tendencies. We can also see that the ancient themselves 
recognised that this opened up wider discussion about worldview, most notably 
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systems of value, and attainment or non-attainment of personal goals. Thus these 
are also legitimate areas of discussion for our investigation of 1 Peter. Further, the 
ancients knew that a person’s emotional life directly influences her ethical life, 
which in turn influences her ability to achieve happiness, and has implications for 
society as a whole. Likewise, we can explore the influence of 1 Peter’s emotional 
strategy on his ethics and the therapeutic and social consequences of this for the 
audience. Before we turn to 1 Peter, for the sake of completeness, and because the 
aim of this thesis is to investigate the role of emotions in 1 Peter’s persuasive 
discourse, we must briefly outline how the emotions are understood within the 
rhetorical handbooks.
Part 1: Emotions in Antiquity 
81 
3. The Rhetorical Use of Emotion 
Having looked at the philosophy of emotion, we now turn to rhetorical theory. In 
doing so we are changing gears: where philosophy is interested in virtue and the 
ideal, rhetorical theory is concerned with pragmatics. Rhetorical theorists are less 
worried about the proper bounds of emotion and more attentive to how emotions, 
both the speaker’s and the audience’s, are used in persuasion.259 Hence, they may 
choose to arouse emotions that the philosopher would caution against (see Cicero’s 
De or. 1.220-222). This does not preclude a philosophy of emotion lying beneath 
their use.260 In fact, in Aristotle’s On Rhetoric we encounter one of the most 
thought-through psychologies of emotions in the ancient world. 261  However, more 
commonly, the rhetoricians’ discussion of emotions starts from what they observe 
in society. Put differently, they produced a formalised system based on what 
people ordinarily knew and used (Rhet. 1.1.1-2, 1354a1-11; cf. Cicero De or. 1.146; 
Quintilian Inst. 3.2). Despite the rhetorical handbooks being less philosophical, we 
can still glean insights into how emotions were conceptualised. Yet, as we will see, 
what the rhetoricians illuminate more than the philosophers is the cultural 
contextualisation and social reasoning present in emotions. 
Excursus: The Failure of Stoic Rhetoric 
Whereas Stoic sources were the focus for our philosophical enquiry, they cannot be 
when it comes to rhetoric simply because there are none we have access to. Stoics 
such as Chrysippus did write on rhetoric, but no full works have survived, and, 
where we do have limited evidence, it is under the genre of dialectic, not 
rhetoric.262 Catherine Atherton argues that Stoic rhetorical theory would have 
resembled other professional rhetorical theories. However, they would have been 
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unorthodox within the area of style because the Stoics thought that good rhetorical 
style was no different to good dialectical discourse. This is due to the fact that the 
most important thing for Stoic discourse was correctness.263 Consequently, 
rhetoricians like Cicero considered Stoic rhetorical theory a failure because it 
produced ‘bald, unfamiliar, jarring’ oratory which was ‘devoid of clarity, fullness 
and spirit’ (De or. 3.18.66, [Rackham, LCL]). 264 Appropriate style was important to 
all theorists and this included varying the style depending on the goal of persuasion. 
It was this ability to alter style appropriately, particularly with regard to the 
emotions, that brought success in persuasion.265 Subsequently, this meant that 
applying the Stoic philosophical tenets to rhetoric was bound to fail. 
Fundamentally, if emotions such as passions are a vice, then it is not appropriate to 
use them in persuasion or induce them in an audience. Consequently, one of the 
main weapons of the orator is removed. Secondly, the Stoics’ understanding of 
virtues and indifferents meant that many of the standard topics used by most 
orators in persuasion were not compatible with Stoicism because their underlying 
value system of good and bad did not correlate (De or. 3.18.66).266 Having said this, 
Quintilian states in Institutio Oratoria during a section speaking about those who do 
not advocate emotional appeal: 
I am less surprised by the philosophers, in whose minds emotion is a vice, 
and it seems immoral for a judge to be distracted from the truth, and 
inappropriate for a good man to take advantage of vices. None the less, they 
will admit that emotional appeals are necessary if truth, justice, and the 
common good cannot be secured by other means (Inst. 6.1.7, [Russell, 
LCL]).267  
Here a small window is left which allows the Stoic orator to use emotion in his 
speeches if the end goal of truth and virtue, which is acceptable, requires it. Despite 
this, the range of appropriate emotions available to the Stoic orator would be 
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limited.268 Furthermore, for the Stoic orator, the content of the discourse should 
not be determined by the audience or occasion, but by the subject matter. They 
thought that if the subject matter is presented with clarity then the impression it 
linguistically creates may also cause the audience to respond emotionally to the 
object. This is permissible because it is based on a correct representation of the 
object. Thus, emotional responses to natural preferences may also be allowed 
within this scheme.269 However, in general, the Stoic position on emotion was not 
practicable for orators as Atherton explains: 
It seems he cannot appeal to what Stoicism regarded as the bad emotions, 
the πάθη, grief, fear, pleasure, and desire, or to the intricate moral 
pathology of anger, pity, hatred, jealousy, Schadenfreude, and so on (cf. e.g. 
Diogenes 7.110ff.), which are his unphilosophical rival's bread and 
butter…The only good emotions (varieties of εὐπάθεια) are those which the 
sage feels (Diogenes 7.116), joy, watchfulness, and wishing, with an 
understandably limited appeal to the ordinary public: a far cry indeed from 
Quintilian's remark that the defendant will make his hearers weep with pity, 
and the prosecutor make them shed tears of indignation (6.1.9).270 
Atherton goes on to assert, it ‘is impossible to pretend that what is known of Stoic 
stylistics looks satisfactory, even by ancient standards. It appears rigid at best and 
unworkable at worst.’271 Yet, Stoic philosophy of the passions could have had some 
influence over rhetoric as a whole. Wisse, following Solmsen, though not certain, 
does comment that the lack of discussion about πάθος in the post-Aristotelian 
rhetorical handbooks until Cicero could be because of the influence of Stoic 
philosophy and their system of rhetoric.272  
So, despite the Stoics being dominant philosophically, when it comes to rhetoric we 
have to turn to specific rhetoricians. From the Greek side this is Aristotle273 and 
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Dionysius of Halicarnassus (f. 20 BCE); from the Roman it is Cicero (106-43 BCE) and 
Quintilian (c. 35 – died after 96 CE). 274 There are differences between the Greek 
and Roman schools particularly with the Romans exhibiting more willingness to use 
overt, often ethically questionable, emotion to persuade. 
Thus, having established which sources we will be referring to and why, it is time to 
explore what they say, starting with πάθος as a type of persuasion. We will then go 
on to determine how the rhetoricians speak about the relationship between 
pathetic persuasion and audience judgement, rhetorical style, and speech content. 
Finally we will look at the rhetorician’s approach to understanding emotions. 
3.1 Πάθος as Πίστις  
In his On Rhetoric Aristotle introduces the three modes of persuasion (πίστεις):  
ἦθος, λόγος, and πάθος (cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Lys. 19.2-4).275  The first, ἦθος, 
is persuasion through the character of the speaker: we are persuaded because we 
believe the speaker to be trustworthy and what he says to have ‘credence’ (Rhet. 
1.2.4, 1356a4-6; cf. De or. 2.43.182-3; Inst. 6.2.13-19). The second, λόγος, is 
persuasion through the argument itself and its apparent truth (Rhet. 1.2.6, 
1356a19-20). The last, πάθος, is described as persuasion: 
διὰ … τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν· 
… by means of his hearers, when they are roused to emotion by his speech 
(Rhet. 1.2.5, 1356a14-15, [Freese, LCL]; cf. De or. 2.44.185). 
Quintilian, however, lists both ἦθος and πάθος as species of emotional persuasion 
whilst still maintaining that ἦθος relates to the character of the speaker. He 
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translates πάθος as adfectus, but does not think there is a good translation for ἦθος. 
For Quintilian, following Cicero, πάθος relates to more violent emotions, strong 
passions which command the person through disturbance; ἦθος on the other hand 
can cover a variety of mental states and relates to gentler and steady emotions 
which persuade through good will (Inst. 6.2.9-10). Wisse comments concerning 
Cicero’s distinction between ἦθος and πάθος, which Quintillian likely follows, that 
‘there is no overlap between the two concepts: though they are similar in that both 
are aimed at influencing the audience’s minds, their effect on these minds is 
different’, πάθος specifically moves by ‘impulse and perturbation of mind.’ 276   
For the rhetoricians, the πάθη were so vital for persuasion that being able to move 
the audience emotionally became one of the three main aims of the orator (the 
others being to instruct and delight). However, Quintilian notes that persuasion 
through the emotions is not suitable for every topic. There are certain parts of a 
speech to which it is more apposite such as the introduction or epilogue. Yet, when 
emotional persuasion is appropriate, it is very powerful (Inst. 3.5.2-3; 6.1.1, 13-14, 
51-53). Quintilian was not alone in recognising the strength of emotions. For Cicero, 
one’s success in persuasion rests in one’s ability to move the audience (Or. Brut. 
69).277 Dionysius, though noting the value of ἦθος, comments that the orator’s 
strongest weapon is to lead the audience into an ‘emotional state of mind’ (Dem. 
18.25-30 [Usher, LCL]; cf. 58.18-24).278 This suggests that persuading via the 
emotions was not about irrational manipulation, but was thought to engage the 
person’s cognitive faculties. For Cicero, persuasion via the emotions is ‘aimed at 
moving the minds of our audience in the direction we want to’ (De or. 2.27.114, 
trans. Wisse; cf. Inst. 6.2.1).279 Further, for Cicero, to be able to use pathetic 
persuasion requires that one has intimate knowledge of ‘all the mental emotions 
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[animorum motus], with which nature has endowed the human race.’ It is in 
calming or exciting the mens of the hearer that the power of oratory lies (De or. 
1.5.17, [Sutton and Rackham, LCL]; cf. Inst. 6.2.7).280 Quintilian reveals that the 
movement of a person via the emotions (affectus / adfectus) is a movement of the 
animus, which as noted, can refer to the mind specifically, or at the very least the 
rational soul. Therefore, persuasion through the emotions is another way that a 
person’s reasoning can be altered. Lastly, we must note Aristotle’s recognition that 
this mode of persuasion is through the hearer. It requires being able to affect the 
audience internally. Thus, it is personal to the audience, not just asking them to 
agree with logic, but requiring that they be internally shaped. 
We have noted that πάθος is a means of persuasion, and that it was considered to 
be extremely effective. So, it remains to outline why the rhetoricians had this 
stance towards the emotions.  
3.2 Πάθος and Affected Judgement 
Why did the orators put such a premium on persuasion through the emotions? 
Aristotle gives his reasoning as follows:  
οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ 
μισοῦντες· 
… we do not give the same judgement when grieved and rejoicing or when 
being friendly and hostile (Rhet. 1.2.5, 1356a15-16, trans. Kennedy). 
What Aristotle highlights is the link between πάθος and judgement: one’s emotional 
state changes one’s judgement. 281  He does not give a description of why this is the 
case. He simply states that it is so. Aristotle adds later, when defining the πάθη: 
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Ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη, δι᾿ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς 
ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ 
τούτοις ἐναντία. 
The emotions are all those affections which cause men to change their 
opinion in regard to their judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and 
pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar emotions and their contraries 
(Rhet.2.1.8, 1378a19-21, [Freese, LCL]). 282 
Thus, for Aristotle, if your end goal is to change the opinion and subsequent 
judgement of the audience, you need to engage and influence the audience’s 
emotions.283 Yet, still, the specific explanation as to why emotions operate in this 
manner is not given. Perhaps, slightly earlier in Book 2, we get an insight into 
Aristotle’s reasoning. Aristotle is aware that emotions cause the person to be 
disposed (διάκειμαι) to a particular stance, specifically to hold a particular opinion 
(Rhet. 2.1.4, 1377b30-1378a5). Though Aristotle does not state it, his comments 
suggest that this is so because each emotion contains an inherent judgement about 
the object; thus, to have a particular emotion necessarily means to carry a 
particular opinion. For example, if a person has friendly feelings towards another 
then she will judge her wrongdoing as of a lesser offence than if she feels hostile 
towards her. Consequently, emotions do not change judgement in just any way, but 
particular emotions push the judgement in a particular direction.284 It becomes 
clear that different emotional states cause the same facts to be interpreted 
differently, and, as such, can affect beliefs. As Konstan notes, this makes the role of 
evaluation in emotion dynamic: ‘a belief enters into the formation of an emotion 
that in turn contributes to modifying some other belief or, perhaps, intensifying the 
original one.’285  
Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives an example of how emotion can sway judgment 
from his own experience of reading Demosthenes: 
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ὅταν δὲ τῶν Δημοσθένους τινὰ λάβω λόγων, ἐνθουσιῶ τε καὶ δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε 
ἄγομαι, πάθος ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου μεταλαμβάνων, ἀπιστῶν, ἀγωνιῶν, δεδιώς, 
καταφρονῶν, μισῶν, ἐλεῶν, εὐνοῶν, ὀργιζόμενος, φθονῶν, ἅπαντα τὰ πάθη 
μεταλαμβάνων, ὅσα κρατεῖν πέφυκεν ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης· 
But when I pick up one of Demosthenes’s  speeches, I am transported: I am 
led hither and thither, feeling one emotion and another – disbelief, anguish, 
terror, contempt, hatred, pity, goodwill, anger, envy – every emotion in turn 
that can sway the human mind (Dem. 22.5-10, [Usher, LCL]; cf. Or. Brut. 97). 
The word γνώμη, translated ‘mind’, can mean the ‘organ by which one perceives or 
knows’ but it can also cover the idea of judgement and opinion.286 For Quintilian, 
emotions allow the orator to move beyond bare logical arguments. An argument 
may cause the audience to think something to be true, but an emotion will cause 
them to want it to be so, therefore believe it to be, and consequently they will 
judge it to be (Inst. 6.2.5-6). Therefore, it appears that there is a consensus among 
the rhetoricians that if you want to alter someone’s judgment and therefore her 
evaluation of the world, the most effective way to do this is by utilising her 
emotions. This is of course tremendously useful if you are trying to persuade 
someone to see an object from a given perspective and subsequently to act 
towards the object in line with this perspective. Furthermore, if we follow this logic, 
it also allows the relationship between object and emotion to be dynamic, working 
in either direction, so that you could utilise an already present emotion to create a 
new judgement about an object. As we will discover, this is important to 1 Peter’s 
communicative strategy. 
3.3 Argument from Πάθος: Style over Content? 
The ability to move the audience emotionally is also approached in the 
Rhetoricians’ discussion of style and delivery. Emotional appeal was linked to 
amplification, ornamentation and the grand style (Or. Brut. 20, 69).287 Yet, it is 
within the area of delivery that much of the Roman examination of emotions 
occurs. Delivery is defined as ‘the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and 
                                                     
286
 See ‘γνώμη’ in LSJ (354). 
287
 Wisse, Ethos, 216-17. 
Emotions in Antiquity: Rhetorical Use of Emotion 
   
 
89 
 
gesture’ (Rhet. Her. 1.2.3, [Caplan, LCL]).288 Delivery is critical for the emotions, 
because ‘nature has assigned to every emotion a particular look and tone of voice 
and bearing of its own’ (De or. 3.57.216; cf. 3.57.217-59.223; Or. Brut.55, 60).289 
Evidently, perhaps more than the philosophers, the orator was aware of the 
physical manifestations and bodily communication of emotions. For, in delivery the 
orator had to display the emotions that he wanted the audience to have (De or. 
2.45.189-90; cf. Or. Brut. 132; Dem. 22.15-40; Isocr. 13.17-24); this could be his own 
emotions or voicing another’s (Inst. 6.1.26; cf. Rhet. Her. 4.43.55-56). The latter is 
akin to acting, but still has to be believable to be effective. In fact, any display of 
emotion has to be apt otherwise it appears ridiculous and is ineffective (cf. Inst. 
6.1.44-45; Dem. 53.6-21). What this reveals is that the orator must be aware of the 
commonly accepted ‘scripts’ or ‘scenarios’ of an emotion. Emotions have to be 
used in a contextually aware manner. However, for maximum impact, the speaker 
must be really moved by the emotion himself not just feign it (De or. 2.45.189-90, 
46.194-47.195; Inst. 6.2.26-28).290 In fact, from Cicero’s and Quintilian’s 
perspectives it is impossible to incite an emotion in your audience if you are not 
displaying the emotion yourself.291 
So, does all this suggest that the use of πάθος in persuasion is simply emotional 
manipulation as some such a Wisse come close to suggesting?292 Here we find an 
old argument enters the picture: that of whether rhetoricians were more 
concerned with style and delivery over content. In a sense, the modern dismissal of 
emotions in favour of reason could be seen to be analogous. Argument from πάθος, 
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then, is simply whipping up the audience into a particular state in order to cloud 
judgement. Yet, this view does disservice to the complexity of emotions, and to the 
astuteness of an audience. As Cicero comments, ‘eloquence of orators has always 
been controlled by the good sense of the audience’ (Or. Brut. 24, [Hubbell, LCL]). He 
goes on to say about someone that uses the grand emotive style without thought 
to content: 
For a man who can say nothing mildly, who pays no attention to 
arrangement, precision, clarity or pleasantry...if without first preparing the 
ears of his audience he begins trying to work them up to a fiery passion, he 
seem to be a raving madman among the sane, like a drunken reveller in the 
midst of sober men (Or. Brut. 99, [Hubbell, LCL]). 
This excerpt shows that it is clear to an audience when emotions appear out of 
place. As noted above, this suggests that the audience requires emotions to make 
sense contextually. They cannot just appear, but need to be appropriate to the 
situation and subject matter.293  In fact, we find in Cicero an assertion that style is 
of no account if the underlying subject matter has not been mastered by the 
speaker (De or.1.12.50-51; cf. 3.5.19-6.24; cf. Rhet. Her. 3.11.19; Or. Brut. 20, 
119).294 This is particularly the case when it comes to the emotions, as Cicero states: 
Who indeed does not know that the orator’s virtue is pre-eminently 
manifested either in rousing men’s hearts to anger, hatred, or indignation, 
or in recalling them from the same passions to mildness and mercy? 
Wherefore the speaker will not be able to achieve what he wants by his 
words, unless he has gained profound insight into the characters of men, 
and the whole range of human nature, and those motives whereby our souls 
are spurred on or turned back (De or. 1.12.53; cf. Lys. 7.10-12). 
So, for the rhetorician, the ability to move a person is more than getting the 
audience to mirror emotion; it is a matter of intricate psychology and sociology.295 
If an emotion is to be fittingly accepted by an audience, then the whole cognitive 
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content and contextual position of the emotion presented has to be appropriate. 
There is clearly some cognitive processing taking place in the reception of the 
orator’s emotional delivery, whether the audience is aware of it or not.  
Consequently, the propositional content of emotions is of interest to the 
philosopher and orator alike. For, the orator needs to be able to distinguish 
between how different emotions, because of their individual specificities, can 
impact his cause (cf. Inst. 6.2.15-16). He has to be able to ‘track down the thoughts, 
feelings, beliefs and hopes of his fellow-citizens’ (De or. 1.51.223 [Sutton, LCL]) and 
‘scent out’ his audience’s ‘thoughts, judgements, anticipations and wishes’ (De or. 
2.44.186 [Sutton, LCL]) if he is to win them over. This requires an in depth 
awareness of the link between emotions, psychological state, evaluations, and 
goals. It is this entwining of emotions and motive that the orator must master if he 
is to move an audience towards a particular action. He has to know which emotion 
to arouse if persuasion towards a particular goal in a particular circumstance is to 
be effective (cf. De or. 1.46.202; 2.9.35; Inst. 6.1.9). From Cicero’s comments we 
can appreciate how complex emotional interaction is between author and 
audience, or between any humans for that matter. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the rhetoricians, like the philosophers, took steps to understand and master 
the emotions. 
3.4 Understanding the Emotions 
Like Cicero (see above), Aristotle is clear that in order to use emotions in persuasion 
one needs to understand what each πάθος is, ‘the nature and character of each, its 
origin, and the manner in which it is produced’ (Rhet. 1.2.7, 1356a23-25 [Freese, 
LCL]; cf. De or. 1.51.220).296 Similarly, Quintilian warns that trying to understand 
emotion is complex and should not be treated superficially (Inst. 6.2.2). However, 
unlike the philosophers, Aristotle in his On Rhetoric does not detail the internal 
processes of the πάθη such as impressions or impulses. Instead, he is more 
interested in the common external objects of distinct emotions and the rationale 
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that an emotion displays.297 As Wisse asserts, Aristotle is not interested in either 
the causa materialis or the causa formalis but is interested in the causa finalis and 
the causa efficiens.298 In Book 2 of his On Rhetoric Aristotle elaborates on what 
areas should be discussed, these are: the state of mind of the emotionally affected 
person (or how the person is disposed – διάκειμαι);  towards whom the emotion is 
customarily directed; and for what reasons the emotion is directed at them (Rhet. 
2.1.9, 1378a22-23; cf. De or. 2.51.206-52.211). Unless one can understand these 
elements one cannot create or dispel a πάθος in someone (Rhet. 2.1.9, 1378a25-26). 
Quintilian adds that one must know the natural duration of certain emotions, and 
therefore be careful not to try to get the audience to be affected by an emotion 
beyond its normal limits (Inst. 6.1.27-29; cf. Rhet. Her. 2.31.50).  
There are a few things that these comments highlight. Again, emotion is linked with 
reasoning by the assumption that it has a rationale that can be articulated. 
Secondly, an emotion is object-directed. In the majority of Aristotle’s examples the 
object is another person. Hence, if the object is a person, the rationale behind the 
emotion will typically require, often complex, social evaluations including 
judgments about the person’s motives and intentions.299 This therefore means that 
one has to appreciate detailed dynamics of human social relations such as a 
person’s norms and values. Thirdly, Aristotle seems to assume a shared cultural 
understanding of emotions by the fact that they can have customary or ‘usual’ 
objects. Fourthly, pulling the last three points together, as Konstan highlights, 
Aristotle’s view of emotion requires a narrative understanding of emotion.300 One 
has to know the context, i.e. the story, to make sense of the emotion and why it is 
apposite in a given situation.301 Therefore, if an emotion occurs in a particular 
context it causes one to ask certain questions in order to understand why it is 
appropriate. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for persuasion, it is taken for 
granted that it is possible to create an emotion in another, or remove it, even 
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change it, most likely by altering the narrative so that a new interpretation is 
possible, which in turn can give rise to an a new emotion.  
The combination of the Aristotelian elements discussed shows that ultimately 
emotions reveal a perceived ordering of experience. If one is to arouse a certain 
emotion then the object has to be evaluated correctly within the audience’s own 
ordering (cf. Rhet. Her. 1.5.8; 2.31.50). If the object is wrongly positioned socially, 
and in terms of cultural norms and values, then the emotion will not be aroused 
because it will not correspond to the hearer’s cultural emotional repertoire and will 
not produce the correct interpretation to warrant the emotion. Conversely, this 
leaves open the possibility that if the hearers are encouraged to ascribe certain 
emotions to particular objects, then the speaker is seeking to position objects 
within their cosmic reality and is perhaps addressing their valuing of the object. 
For Quintilian, like Cicero, oratory is only really concerned with a limited sphere of 
strong emotions such as anger (ira), hatred (odium), fear (metus), envy (invidia) and 
pity (miseratio) (Inst.6.2.20).302 This is most likely because his focus is on a judicial 
setting. Aristotle’s range of emotions addressed is broader and encompasses milder 
emotions that the later Roman rhetoricians would put under ἦθος.303 Aristotle 
approaches a number of specific emotions in certain pairings: anger (ὀργή) and 
mildness (πραότης) (2.2-3, 1378a29-1380b33); friendliness (φιλία) and enmity 
(ἔχθρα) (2.4, 1380b34-1382a19); fear (φόβος) and courage (θάρσος) (2.5, 1382a20-
1383b10); shame (αἰσχύνη) and shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία) (2.6, 1383b11-
1385a15); kindliness (χάρις) and unkindliness (ἀχαριστία)304 (2.7, 1385a16-
1385b11); pity (ἔλεος) (2.8, 1385b11-1386b7) and indignation (νέμεσις) (2.9, 1386b7-
1387b21); envy (φθόνος) (2.10, 1387b22-1388a29) and emulation (ζῆλος) (2.11, 
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1388a30-1388b30).305 The first five pairings are obvious opposites. The last two, 
though not opposites, are related to each other, perhaps showing the difference in 
quality between seemingly similar emotions.306 Lists like these from rhetorical 
handbooks are useful in our investigation because they start to build a map of the 
emotional terrain. They also demonstrate that a particular culture can have a 
defined categorisation of emotions which may not be the same as our English 
understanding.307 It is not necessary to work through these groupings now, as 
where relevant they will be highlighted in our analysis of 1 Peter. 
3.5 Rhetorical Theory and 1 Peter 
Before closing this chapter, it seems necessary to delineate the areas of rhetorical 
theory that are useful to the present investigation and those that are not. Despite 
the orators needing to have an intricate awareness of delivery and emotional 
performance, when it comes to 1 Peter, this is an aspect of theory that is irrelevant 
because we are forced to work with a written text, which, though it would have 
been originally performed, has no oral or visual performative aspect that we can 
access. It would be pure conjecture to try and describe what physical movements, 
facial expressions, or tones of voice would be accompanying the content of the 
letter. Instead, it is with the content of the letter that we have to stay. 
Furthermore, as highlighted in the introduction, we will not be looking to see which 
emotions the author is arousing in his audience. We are concerned with the 
emotions as they appear in the text, and therefore the emotions of the audience as 
idealised by the author. However, what the above discussion of rhetoric has 
highlighted is that there are a number of areas of discussion that are still available 
to us. For example, all of what Aristotle highlights about how to understand an 
emotion – its typical objects, the rationale of an emotion, and the disposition it 
creates – can be utilised in our discussion. We can also take into our exploration the 
idea that if an emotion is to be persuasive it has to be fitting to the narrative 
context and therefore, from a particular cultural perspective, comprehensible. 
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Furthermore, this leads towards the recognition that emotions are cultural and 
occur in complex social situations. If we are to grasp fully emotions in 1 Peter, we 
have to be aware of this and seek to understand the cultural and social elements 
revealed by the use of emotions which help explain why they are fitting. Lastly, 
rhetorical theory has also highlighted that it is possible to influence a person’s 
perspective, values, judgements, and actions by using her emotions. We can take 
this knowledge and see that dynamically, by presenting particular emotional 
stances as correct, the author is addressing the audience’s perspective, values, 
judgements and actions. Thus, there is much present in ancient rhetorical theory 
that aids us in our exploration of emotions in 1 Peter.  
Lastly, it is also worth noting that the rhetoricians are trying to arouse an 
immediate emotional response for an instant specific end, e.g. indignation at a 
crime and a consequent guilty verdict. This, however, is not what a letter such as 1 
Peter is aiming at. Instead, it wants to shape the audience to effect more long 
lasting change: changes of perspective and ethical behaviour, perhaps we could say, 
a change of disposition. This does not mean that the insights from rhetorical theory 
cannot be applied, as what they reveal about the content of and use of emotions is 
relevant to both emotions in a moment and longer lasting emotional states. 
However, what it may suggest is that the author of 1 Peter would have to work 
harder to bring about this lasting change by utilising and reshaping the foundational 
values of the audience’s worldview, rather than simply whipping the audience into 
a fleeting emotion.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The above discussion has explained how the emotions were an important topic of 
discussion for ancient rhetoricians. It has established that engaging the audience’s 
emotions was seen as vital for persuading the audience towards a particular course 
of action. This is because the rhetoricians understood that a person’s emotional 
state predisposes them towards a particular judgement about an object. They also 
recognised the complexity of using emotions in communication and that this 
required an in-depth awareness of the qualities of each emotion, its customary 
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objects, rationale, and narrative setting. In their discussion they evidence the social 
situating of emotions and the necessity of a shared cultural understanding of the 
content of emotions for effective communication. Furthermore, they show how 
emotions can be used to shape perception and, reflexively, how a new perspective 
can influence emotion. Thus, the information gleaned from the rhetoricians reveals 
that it is important, as the modern theorists outlined, to understand emotions in 
their cultural context. Therefore, in our approach to 1 Peter we need to endeavour 
to appreciate the positioning of certain emotions within the cultural repertoire, 
and, consequently, use this to help us appreciate the locating of objects of emotion 
within the audience’s perspective. This will also require recognising the narrative 
context of an emotion, which means having an awareness of worldview, norms and 
values.  
Now, with an assurance that we are not being unduly anachronistic in our 
approach, we can move to the exegetical task.
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4. Joy Despite Distress – 1 Peter 1.6-8 
This chapter is the first in a two-part analysis of joy/rejoicing (χαρά, χαίρω, 
ἀγαλλιάω) and distress/being distressed (λύπη, λυπέω) in 1 Peter. First we will focus 
on 1 Peter 1.6-8, leaving 4.12-13 for the next chapter’s analysis. These two 
emotions, joy and distress, have been isolated for concurrent investigation, firstly, 
because of their temporal aspect – both are deemed present emotions – but, 
secondly, and more importantly, because they appear side-by-side in the text itself. 
Thus, in this chapter we will explore the author’s depiction of the audience’s ability 
to rejoice despite distress (1.6) and their glory infused joy (1.8). We will outline 
which objects each emotion relates to, the judgement the emotions make, and the 
action-tendency they carry. We will then be ready to appreciate how the author is 
asking the audience to see their world, and what implications this has for their own 
understanding of their position within it, which will lead on to discussion about 
their social relationships, ethical responsibilities, and own emotional life. In the next 
chapter we will investigate the paradox of joy in suffering. 
However, the first task, in order to be sensitive to the historical and cultural shaping 
of emotions, is to locate χαρά and λύπη within the emotional repertoire of the time. 
We will do this by utilising Stoic discussion. We will move from the general 
understanding of emotions outlined in Part 1 to the definitions of individual 
emotions. At this definitional level the Stoics are seeking to understand emotion 
terms as they were commonly used, and, therefore, it is this second level that will 
give us insights into the key characteristics that mark each emotion as distinct and 
nameable.  However, throughout this process we will need to be aware of the third 
level of discussion – the contextualisation and rationale given to emotions. At the 
third level Stoicism will provide a point of comparison but will not be allowed to be 
prescriptive for 1 Peter. Additionally, at this level, the LXX’s use of emotions will be 
utilised to help us explicate the nuances of 1 Peter’s own use of joy and distress.  
The emotion terms for joy/rejoicing and being distressed that appear in 1 Peter 1.6-
8 are: χαρά, ἀγαλλιάω and λυπέω. For the sake of our examination of the Greco-
Roman and LXX literature the search terms will be broadened to include the noun 
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λύπη and the verb χαίρω (see 4.13). The following attempt to locate these terms 
will inform both this and the following chapter. 
4.1 Locating Joy and Distress 
As noted, we will start with Stoic definitions to outline the key characteristics of 
each emotion. 
4.1.1 χαρά and λύπη in Stoicism.308 
Stoicism highlighted both χαρά and λύπη as primary emotions under which others 
were located.309 Their relationship is depicted in the following table: 
 Object Present Future 
Πάθος 
Perceived Good ἡδονή  (Pleasure) ἐπιθυμία (Desire) 
Perceived Bad λύπη (Distress) φόβος (Fear) 
Εὐπάθεια 
Well-reasoned Good χαρά (Joy) βούλησις (Will) 
Well-reasoned Bad   
εὐλάβεια 
(Caution) 
Table 1: Stoic Primary Emotions 
The first point to note is that λύπη is one of the passions and is therefore 
categorised negatively by Stoicism, whereas χαρά is a εὐπάθεια and thus is 
appropriate even for the wise man (Seneca, Ep. 59.2).310 
Andronicus and Diogenes Laertius provide the following definitions: 
λύπη μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἄλογος συστολή. ἢ δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας, ἐφ’ ᾧ 
οἴονται δεῖν συστέλλεσθαι. 
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Distress is an irrational contraction, or a fresh opinion that something bad is 
present, at which people think it right to be contracted [depressed] 
(Andronicus, [Pass.] 1= SVF 3.391, trans. Long and Sedley). 
 
καὶ τὴν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ, οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν·  
Joy, they say, is the opposite to pleasure, consisting in well-reasoned 
swelling [elation] (Diogenes Laertius, 7.116 = SVF 3.431, trans. Long and 
Sedley).  
 
Given that joy is defined by its relationship to ἡδονή, it is worth detailing its 
definition also: 
ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄλογος ἔπαρσις· ἢ δόξα πρόσφατος ἀγαθοῦ παρουσίας, ἐφ’ ᾧ οἴονται 
δεῖν ἐπαίρεσθαι. 
Pleasure is an irrational swelling, or a fresh opinion that something good is 
present, at which people think it right to be swollen [i.e. elated] 
(Andronicus, [Pass.] 1 = SVF 3.391, trans. Long and Sedley; cf. Tusc. 4.14). 
 
So, we can determine the following characteristics of λύπη and χαρά:  
1. λύπη has as its object the bad. Significantly, for this object to occasion 
distress the evil has to be considered present. 311  For Stoicism, because 
λύπη is a passion, this viewpoint is described as a fresh opinion (δόξα 
πρόσφατος) which indicates that it is a misguided interpretation of the 
object. However, if we put to one side this Stoic colouring of λύπη we are 
still left with a workable definition. We can also appreciate that λύπη 
evaluates the object as an evil (κακός) and therefore, within the person’s 
understanding of reality, as detrimental to her. This leads to the action-
tendency associated with λύπη which is contraction (συστολή) i.e. a 
movement away from the object. 
2. χαρά has as its object the good, and, as with distress, the object has to be 
thought to be present to inspire joy. This is not stated in the definition of 
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joy, but we can piece this together from looking at its counterpart passion, 
ἡδονή, which is the same as χαρά in all respects except for the foundation on 
which it is based – opinion rather than reason. Thus, according to Stoic 
categorisation, joy is marked by being well-reasoned (cf. Seneca, Ep. 23.6; 
59.3-4).312 It is differentiated from pleasure by the surety of the goodness of 
its object. We can also recognise that joy, by evaluating the object as good, 
(ἀγαθός) deems the object to be beneficial to, or at least in accordance with, 
human flourishing. Consequently, we arrive at the action-tendency of χαρά 
which is swelling (ἔπαρσις) i.e. a movement towards the object.313  
 
It is worth reminding ourselves that the movements of the soul were considered to 
result in outward behaviour. Thus, the evaluation of the object as good or bad 
directly impacts one’s response to it, not just emotionally, but practically. To agree 
with the proposition present in each of these emotions is to position oneself to act 
accordingly.  
As noted above, λύπη and χαρά are primary emotions under which other emotions 
are grouped. By looking at the range of affective experiences placed under λύπη 
and χαρά we can get a better understanding of what emotion concepts they can 
cover. According to Diogenes Laertius on λύπη: 
εἴδη δ᾿ αὐτῆς ἔλεον, φθόνον, ζῆλον, ζηλοτυπίαν, ἄχθος, ἐνόχλησιν, ἀνίαν, 
ὀδύνην, σύγχυσιν. 
Its kinds are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness [or vexation], annoyance, 
sorrow, anguish, confusion (7.111; cf. Andronicus, [Pass.] 2 = SVF 414). 
 
Cicero follows Diogenes Laertius, giving a slightly modified list: 
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 Here Stoicism is following Epicureanism in allowing χαρά to contain reasoning. Epicureanism was 
the first school to see χαρά as involving reason. Τhey did not consider it an irrational πάθος but a 
sentiment. However, they did think that χαρά could involve false reasoning; see Ramelli and 
Konstan, 'Use of Χαρα,' 188-91. 
313
 The movements of the soul which could equally be translated as deflation for distress and elation 
for joy are probably a way of describing the physical feeling one has that makes one aware that the 
emotion is taking place. As such, they are similar to the modern notion of an emotion’s positive or 
negative valence. Cf. Graver, Stoicism, 28-30. 
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ut aegritudini invidentia … aemulatio, obtrectatio, misericordia, angor, 
luctus, maeror, aerumna, dolor, lamentatio, sollicitudo, molestia, adflictatio, 
desperatio et si quae sunt de genere eodem. 
under the head of distress come … “envy” … rivalry, jealousy, compassion, 
anxiety, mourning, sadness, troubling, grief, lamenting, depression, 
vexation, pining, despondency and anything of the same kind (Tusc. 4.16 
[King, LCL]).314 
 
What this shows is that λύπη does not narrowly cover grief or pain as it is often 
translated, but can include more complex mental states like vexation, despondency, 
depression, even confusion (cf. Tusc. 4.18-19). 
According to Diogenes Laertius, the Stoics categorised three concepts under χαρά: 
ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν χαρὰν τέρψιν, εὐφροσύνην, εὐθυμίαν. 
Under joy are enjoyment, merriment [or sociability], contentment. 
(7.116).315 
 
Andronicus gives a description of each one: 
Τέρψις μὲν οὖν ἐστι χαρὰ πρέπουσα ταῖς περὶ αὐτὸν ὠφελείαις. 
Εὐφροσύνη δὲ χαρὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοῦ σώφρονος ἔργοις.  
Εὐθυμία δὲ χαρὰ ἐπὶ διαγωγῇ ἢ ἀνεπιζητησίᾳ παντός.  
 
Enjoyment therefore is joy that is appropriately fitting to surrounding 
advantages. 
Merriment is joy at the deeds of the sound mind [self-control]. 
Contentment is joy at course of life or at the absence of enquiry of all 
([Pass.] 6.3.1-4 = SVF 3.432).316 
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 For how each of these is further defined see Tusc. 4.17-19; cf. Stobaeus 2.92.7 = SVF 3.413. 
315
 I have translated τέρψις as enjoyment, but it could also mean delight;  εὐφροσύνη as merriment, 
though Long and Sedley would prefer sociability; and εὐθυμία as contentment, though it also carries 
the idea of cheerfulness more generally; see Long and Sedley, HP1, 412. 
316
 Cf. Graver, Stoicism, 58. 
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There is a distinct lack of exuberance in these further subcategories of joy. Though 
joy is positive, it is not an excessive transport. Even merriment is restrained by self-
control (cf. Seneca, Ep. 59.15). It feels alien to our modern idea of joy to list 
contentment (a stable state that lacks questioning) as one of its species.317 Again, 
this highlights the cultural understanding of emotions. For the Stoics, the joy of the 
wise man is stable, tranquil and exhibits constancy. Constancy by Seneca’s time is 
such a constituent part of joy that he can speak of joy as a sober matter (res severa) 
being able to endure poverty and pain (Ep. 23.4).318 This is because the good to 
which joy relates is virtue (Ep. 27.3) which is always approved by reason and as a 
consequence is solid and eternal (Ep. 66.31). Thus, joy is enduring.319 In the 
manoeuvre of associating joy with one’s possession of virtue (Ep. 59.17), the object 
of joy is made integral to the person, and joy becomes no longer dependent on 
externals i.e. things outside of one’s control.320 
The above has outlined the basic characteristics of χαρά and λύπη and the range of 
emotional experiences that these primary emotions can cover. We will discover 
that some of these groupings are also present in the LXX, however, each emotion is 
not necessarily nuanced in the same way as in Stoicism. 
4.1.2 Joy and Distress in the LXX 321 
There is one text in the LXX that seeks to address the emotions philosophically, this 
is 4 Maccabees. It does so only briefly in chapter 1. It states: 
παθῶν δὲ φύσεις εἰσὶν αἱ περιεκτικώταται δύο ἡδονή τε καὶ πόνος· … πολλαὶ δὲ 
καὶ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν πόνον παθῶν εἰσιν ἀκολουθίαι. πρὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς 
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 The Oxford Dictionary online defines joy as ‘a feeling of great pleasure and happiness’ and lists 
‘delight, great pleasure, joyfulness, jubilation, triumph, exultation, rejoicing, happiness, gladness, 
glee, exhilaration, ebullience, exuberance, elation, euphoria, bliss, ecstasy, transports of delight, 
rapture, radiance’ as synonyms; Cited 26
th
 Nov 2015. Online: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/joy 
318
 Elsewhere Seneca does describe joy as ‘relaxed and cheerful’ (Ep. 66.12-13 [Gummere, LCL]) and 
also links the adjectives hilaris and laetus with joy (Ep. 66.15) which shows that it can still carry a 
positive elative connotation. 
319
 Seneca comments: ‘it is a characteristic of real joy that it never ceases, and never changes into its 
opposite’ (Ep. 59.2 [Gummere, LCL]). He notes that in common language joy is often attributed to 
things such as the birth of a child or a marriage, but that these things are not matters for joy because 
the same things often end up causing sorrow (cf. Ep. 23.6). 
320
 Cf. Ep.56.7-9; 59.2; 92.12; See Graver, Stoicism, 46-50. 
321
 The following references follow LXX nomenclature and numbering.  
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ἡδονῆς ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία, μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν χαρά. πρὸ δὲ τοῦ πόνου ἐστὶν φόβος, 
μετὰ δὲ τὸν πόνον λύπη. 
The two most comprehensive sources of emotions are pleasure and pain … 
The pleasure and pain of emotions have many sequences. Therefore, before 
pleasure is desire, and after pleasure is joy; before pain is fear, and after 
pain is distress (1.20-22). 
 
The basic understanding of emotions involving pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (πόνος) is 
reminiscent of Aristotle’s definition. Yet, we can also see a very similar mapping to 
Stoicism: three of the passions are listed (ἐπιθυμία, φόβος, λύπη) but instead of 
ἡδονή there is χαρά, probably because ἡδονή is already being used within each 
definition. Apart from the different use of ἡδονή, the same temporal aspect of the 
emotions is evident, as too is their relationship to the good and the bad (if we take 
ἡδονή to indicate the feeling of the presence of good, and πόνος the feeling of 
something bad).322 However, there is little said beyond this, other than to accord 
with ancient philosophy in asserting that rational judgement via reason can rule the 
emotions (1.19). Thus, we need to turn to how the emotion terms are being used 
within the LXX. 
We have been investigating χαρά and λύπη as emotion terms specifically. However, 
in 1 Peter the related verb forms χαίρω and λυπέω are used, along with another 
verb for rejoicing:  ἀγαλλιάω. Thus, as we proceed, we will broaden our 
investigation to include these.323 We have also seen that in the Stoic mapping 
τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη, and εὐθυμία are types of χαρά. What we quickly discover in the 
LXX is that χαρά, ἀγαλλίασις/ἀγαλλίαμα, εὐφροσύνη, and their verbal forms (χαίρω, 
                                                     
322
 4 Maccabees does not solely discuss emotions in terms of cognition, but includes bodily feeling 
also; cf. Philo Det. 32.119-21 who mentions that there are four passions, lists λύπη and φόβος as 
among them, and then proceeds to define them in agreement with Stoicism. According to Philo, to 
possess virtue is what produces χαρά. Cf. QG 2.57 where the passions and εὐπαθεῖαι are listed as 
counterparts following Stoic categorisations. 
323
 We could not have investigated ἀγαλλιάω earlier as it does not occur in any Greco-Roman 
classical or early Hellenistic literature, except for one occurrence in Aeilus Herodianus’ (or Pseudo-
Herodianus; 2nd Century CE) Per\i o)rqografi/aj  (Part 3.2 p.462.) in which it is simply listed 
alongside other words that carry similar syllabic qualities. The verb ἀγαλλιάω appears in the LXX 
over 80 times, primarily in the Psalms. In the majority of occurrences it carries a sense of exultant 
rejoicing, often vocalised rejoicing (e.g. Ps. 15.9; 94.1). It has an exuberant, effervescent tone, 
vibrant in emotional colour; cf. Morrice, Joy, 20.   
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ἀγαλλιάω, εὐφραίνω) – along with τέρψις, though much less frequently – are close 
synonyms and at points are interchangeable.324 This is particularly the case with 
εὐφραίνω and ἀγαλλιάω, but is also mirrored by χαρά and εὐφροσύνη which are 
often used in conjunction to convey the idea of ‘rejoice and be glad/ joy and 
gladness.’ 325  A good example of the close connection of these terms is Ps 95.11-12: 
εὐφραινέσθωσαν οἱ οὐρανοί, καὶ ἀγαλλιάσθω ἡ γῆ,  
σαλευθήτω ἡ θάλασσα καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς·  
χαρήσεται τὰ πεδία καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς,  
τότε ἀγαλλιάσονται πάντα τὰ ξύλα τοῦ δρυμοῦ … (cf. Tobit 13.15-16).  
 
Sirach 1.11-12 adds further support for the closeness of these terms: 
Φόβος κυρίου δόξα καὶ καύχημα 
καὶ εὐφροσύνη καὶ στέφανος ἀγαλλιάματος.  
φόβος κυρίου τέρψει καρδίαν  
καὶ δώσει εὐφροσύνην καὶ χαρὰν καὶ μακροημέρευσιν.326 
 
So, we can see that like with Stoic mapping these terms are closely bound. This 
would suggest that the LXX and the Stoic philosophers, because of their shared 
language, demonstrate the general grouping of these ideas together in their 
emotional repertoire. So, what about the emotion terms that joy/rejoicing is 
contrasted with? 
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 εὐθυμία does not appear in the LXX. The noun ἀγαλλίασις, like  ἀγαλλιάω, can express vocalised 
rejoicing (Ps 41.5; 44.8; 46.2; 106.22; 117.15; Tob 13.1; Pss. Sol.5.1), whereas ἀγαλλίαμα is used 
more for joy as an abstract concept and in this is closer to χαρά (Jdt 12.14; Sir 30.22; Ps 118.111; Isa 
61.11). 
325
 For εὐφραίνω and ἀγαλλιάω see 2 Kgdms 1.20; 1 Chr 16.31; Ps 9.3; 15.9; 31.11; 47.12; 66.5; 69.5; 
89.14; 117.24; Isa 12.6; 25.9 etc; cf. Morrice, Joy, 27. Additionally, (ἐν) εὐφροσύνῃ appears with 
ἀγαλλιάω to depict the mode of rejoicing (Ps 67.4; 104.43; Isa 29.19; 41.16; 61.10; 65.14). This 
creates a redundant repetition like 1 Peter 1.8’s ἀγαλλιᾶσθε χαρᾷ. For use of  χαρά/χαίρω with 
synonymous terms see Esth 8.15-17; 9.17-19; Tob 13.11-13; 1 Macc 4.59; 5.54; 2 Macc 3.30; Ps 125; 
Wis 8.16; Sir 30.16-22; Hab 3.18; Zeph 3.14; Zech 8.19; Isa 55.12;  Jer 15.16; 16.9; 25.10; Bar 4.33. 
326
 Here φόβος carries a different nuance to the Stoic passion. We will return to this in Chapter 6.  
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In 2 Macc 3.30 χαρά and εὐφροσύνη are directly contrasted with ταραχή 
(disturbance) and δέος (fear/alarm): the former are depicted as the opposite and 
antidote to the latter (cf. 3 Macc 6.32). Likewise in Isaiah 35.10 we find that 
ἀγαλλίαμα and εὐφροσύνη are present when ὀδύνη (pain/distress), λύπη, and 
στενεαγμός (sighing/groaning) have departed (cf. Prov 10.1; 14.13; Wis 8.16; Sir 
30.5, 21-22; Isa 51.11; 65.13-14; Bar 4.33-34).327 These verses give the impression 
that joy is seen as a good, tranquil state and that distress (ὀδύνη, λύπη, πένθος) is 
negative and troubling. The two states are incompatible: where there is one there is 
absence of the other. 
This leads us on to examine distress briefly.  As these verses have highlighted, like 
with χαρά, λύπη is grouped with or used synonymously with other words that 
transmit similar emotional content such as ὀδύνη and πένθος (cf. Tob 3.1; Lam 1.22; 
Pss. Sol. 4.14-15). It can refer to grief, in the sense of mourning, as it is often 
translated (e.g. Tob 2.5; Sir 38.17-20 cf. Tob 13.16). However, it can also be linked 
with θλῖψις indicating affliction (Sir 30.21-22; cf. Dan 3.50); συγχέω which can be 
used of the mind to mean to trouble/confound (Jonah 4.1; cf. Tob 4.3); πόνος which 
indicates physical distress or toil (Isa 1.5 cf. Gen 3.16-17; Jer 15.18), and the more 
general ταράσσω (Ps 54.3). It can also cover other troubling mental states such 
worry (Tobit 10.3-6; Dan 6.19), despair (Isa 19.10; Tob 3.10) or even indicate angry 
disturbance (1 Kgdms 29.4; Esth 1.12; Ezek 16.43). Thus, we see, as the Stoic 
grouping revealed, that λύπη has a broad application and can cover both mental 
and physical distress. 
It is also worth noting, though rather obvious, that in the above examples joy and 
distress relate to the good and bad respectively. However, what we are yet to do is 
look at the specific contextualisation of these emotions and the rationale they 
reveal. In this way we can see what types of events and objects are seen as 
appropriate occasions for these emotions. 
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 ὀδύνη can mean pain of the body or also of the mind in terms of grief or distress, so is 
synonymous with λύπη ; See ‘ὀδύνη’ in BDAG (692). 
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For the Stoic, joy is the domain of the wise man, but in the LXX joy is predominantly 
the possession of God’s people (Ps 47.12; 52.7; 88.13; 96.8; Isa 12.6). Here, the 
people of God are understood as those who are in a right covenant relationship 
with him; at the eschatological dimension this can include people of all nations. It is 
the righteous, faithful, or upright in heart, and those seeking God who rejoice (Ps 
31.11; 69.5; 96.12; 117.15; 131.9, 16).  This is specifically in contrast to the wicked 
who experience calamity (Ps 5.11-13; 34.1-10, 26-28; 67.1-5; 74.7-11; Isa 16.10; 
65.13-14).  Furthermore, creation can rejoice (1 Chr 16.31; Ps 18.5-6; 64.13; 95.11-
12; 97.4, 8; Isa 35.1-2). Even God himself rejoices (Ps. 59.8; Isa 65.19). From this, we 
can see that joy is presented positively, we might even say as the emotional goal. It 
not only signifies human flourishing but the thriving of creation, suggesting, like 
with Stoicism, that joy is part of aligning oneself with a larger cosmic enterprise.  
Largely, God is the object of rejoicing. One can rejoice in the Lord / God (Ps 9.2; 
31.11; 34.9; 62.12; 69.5; 96.12; Isa 25.19; 41.16; 61.10), in his name (Ps 89.13-17), 
or in his presence (Ps 67.4-5). Where the action infers shouting for joy, this is to the 
Lord / God (Ps 83.3; 94.1; 97.4). At other times the reason for rejoicing is God’s 
action in the world: his salvation (Ps 9.15; 12.6; 20.2; 50.14; 94.1; 117.15; Isa 12.4; 
25.9; 61.10; Hab 3.18), judgements (Ps 47.12; 95.10-13;  96.8; 97.8-9), mercy (Ps 
30.8; 58.7; Isa 49.13), and greatness (Tob 13.9).328  Sometimes it is God’s attributes 
that make him the object of rejoicing: as maker and king (Ps 149.2), or inherently 
righteous (Ps 50.16; 144.7). Thus, we can see that, whereas for the Greco-Roman 
sage virtue is the highest good that occasions joy, for the LXX it is God himself and 
his action. God is rejoiced in because of his goodness towards his covenant people: 
he has revealed himself to be upright, eternally merciful, and true (i.e. faithful) to 
every generation (Ps 32.4-5; 99.5; cf. Ps 31.10-11; 131; Pss. Sol. 5). The covenant 
relationship is even a cause for God to rejoice (Isa 65.19). Subsequently, in this 
relational dynamic there is a coexisting expectation that the person will have joy 
because God’s goodness is assured to them (see Psalm 32.18-22), which in turn 
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 Cf. 1 Chr 16.8-27; Ps 9; 44.7-8; 47.10-12; 88.1-19; God’s judgment is particularly celebrated as 
impartial. 
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brings stability (Ps 15.8-9; 20.7-8; 62.8; Isa 12.6).329 Therefore, it is important to 
recognise that the subject experiences joy through their relationship with God, 
either as his people or as a created being correctly responding to its creator (1 Chr 
16.31; Ps 94.1-7; 96.1-4; 149.2). In fact, joy becomes so fitting that one is 
commanded to serve God in joy (Ps 32.1; 80.2; 99.2). Thus, the people can rejoice in 
God’s law (Ps 118.14-16). The ability to choose to act in joy shows that joy is not 
simply an emotional reaction but a life orientation. As Barton comments, ‘joy 
expresses a deep sense of alignment, both individual and corporate, with the will 
and ways of God.’330 Thus, to rejoice in God becomes an identity marker of his 
people.331  Conversely, if one acts against God then there is no joy or gladness (Isa 
16.10; cf. Jer 16.4-9; 25.10; Joel 1.13-16) but inevitably turbulence, fear, shame and 
distress (see above). 
To rejoice in God is not always contingent on the present experience of the 
speaker. For example in Psalm 67 (LXX), alongside the writer’s cry for deliverance, 
he calls those seeking God to rejoice in him. He does not yet have a tangibly present 
‘good’ to rejoice about, but, instead, looking to God is occasion enough for joy. This 
is based on a belief in God’s justice and mercy which assure that he will ultimately 
bring good to the righteous (see Hab 3.18).332 The deliberate choice of object 
combined with belief about this object allows the psalmist to shape his own 
emotions (cf. Ps 12.5-6; 30.1-9; 58.15-18). In doing so, this causes the person 
perspective on reality to be altered, with God being the dominant object whose 
presence provides the person with their evaluative schema and self-understanding.  
The subjects and objects of distress are more varied. As noted above, distress can 
be mourning occasioned by the death of someone (Gen 42.38; Tob 2.5; Sir 38.17-
20), but it can also be because of the thwarting of plans or desires (1 Kgdms 29.4; 1 
Macc 6.4-13; Jonah 4.1). Distress can occur as part of God’s judgement (Isa 50.10-
11; Bar 4.30-34 cf. Deut 28.58-60; Wis 11.9-13; Amos 8.9-10; Isa 32.11); as a 
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 Cf. Isaiah 35.10; 51.11; Ps 5.12; 74.10. 
330
 Barton, 'Spirituality,' 176-7. 
331
 In some places joy because of right standing with God becomes a prophetic expectation; see Isa 
35.1; 51.3; 65.17-19; cf. Ps 52.7; 125.5-6; Bar 4.36-37. 
332
 Perhaps this is why the poor and downtrodden are able to rejoice in God (Isa 25.17-21). 
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consequence of sin (Gen 3.16-17; 5.29; Tob 2.1-6; Sir 14.1; 36.20; Isa 1.4-5; Lam 
1.22); because of another’s shameful behaviour (Prov 10.1; Sir 22.4; 26.28); or as a 
result of seeking false gods (Isa 8.16-23). Yet, the righteous, though very 
infrequently, can also find themselves in distress (Ps 30.10-12; 54.2-4). However, 
for the righteous, it is more common for God to be depicted as alleviating their 
distress (Tob 7.17; Ps 93.19; Isa 51.11 cf. Esth 9.22; Is 14.3; 35.10; 40.29). It is 
evident that distress is seen as a negative emotion. At points distress is spoken of as 
having destructive qualities (Sir 30.21-23 cf. 38.20-21; Prov 25.20). Therefore, as 
with the Stoic definitions, distress is an indicator that something bad or harmful is 
present. 
We can see from our survey that joy and distress in the LXX exhibit similar qualities 
to those acknowledged by Stoic philosophers. However, the occasions in which 
these emotions are appropriate are different. This is because they are based on a 
different assessment of what is good and bad, detrimental and beneficial to the 
human i.e. a different worldview. Joy comes from right relationship with God that 
recognises his goodness and distress is a consequence of evil, whether your own or 
another’s. Where the righteous are experiencing distress because of others, there is 
a promise that God, who is ever faithful, is able to turn their sorrow into joy. Here, 
there is a difference with Stoicism. For the righteous person, her emotions are not 
shaped by an integral object (one’s own virtue), but by God, who is external to the 
person. 
So, having examined joy and distress in the LXX and Stoic philosophy we can now 
turn to their use in 1 Peter, utilising the above insights to give us greater precision 
in our analysis. 
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4.2 Joy Despite Distress - 1 Peter 1.6-8 
The first mention of rejoicing and being distressed sit side by side in 1.6 which says: 
ἐν ᾧ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε ὀλίγον ἄρτι, εἰ δέον ἐστὶν, λυπηθέντας ἐν ποικίλοις πειρασμοῖς,  
 
in whom you rejoice, even if it is necessary now for a little while for you to 
be distressed by various trials,333    
 
The second occurrence of rejoicing comes in 1.8: 
ὃν οὐκ ἰδόντες ἀγαπᾶτε, εἰς ὃν ἄρτι μὴ ὁρῶντες πιστεύοντες δὲ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε 
χαρᾷ ἀνεκλαλήτῳ καὶ δεδοξασμένῃ,  
… whom, though you have not seen, you love; in whom, though now not 
seeing, you believe and rejoice with joy that is inexpressible and filled with 
glory, 
 
These verses will be the focus of this chapter. We will deal with each emotion term 
sequentially, starting with ἀγαλλιάω in 1.6.  
4.2.1 The Context of ἀγαλλιάω 
Verses 1.3-12 form the opening of the main body of 1 Peter and serve to introduce 
key themes and lay foundations for what follows.334 A number of commentators 
see 1.6 as the beginning of a new sub-unit (1.6-9) indicated by the preposition and 
relative pronoun construction ἐν ᾧ (cf.1.10).335 There is a shift at 1.6, but, if the 
sentence is artificially divided here, we are in danger of missing the flow of ideas. As 
will be demonstrated, ἀγαλλιάω is dependent on the preceding material. The above 
discussion has revealed that ἀγαλλιάω can express exuberant, even vocalised, joy. If 
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 I follow Mark Dubis here in seeing λυπέω as ‘an emotional state of grief or distress’ rather than 
simply physical suffering; M. Dubis, 1 Peter: A Handbook on the Greek Text (BHGNT; Waco, Tex.: 
Baylor University Press, 2010), 11. 
334
 P. J. Achtemeier, 1 Peter: A Commentary on First Peter (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1996), 90; J. H. Elliott, 1 Peter: A New Translation with Commentary (AB 37B; New York: Doubleday, 
2000), 329. For more on the literary relationship between 1.3-12 and 1.13-5.11 see D. W. Kendall, 
'The Literary and Theological Function of 1 Peter 1:3-12,' in Perspectives on First Peter (ed. Charles H. 
Talbert; NABPR Special Studies Series 9; Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1986), 103-20. 
335
 J. R. Michaels, 1 Peter (WBC 49; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1988), 25-7; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 90; J. 
Schlosser, La Première Épître de Pierre (CBNT 21; Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2011), 59, 67-8;  Elliott, 
1 Peter, 338 etc. 
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this is the case, what makes this emotion fitting at this point, especially for an 
audience undergoing persecution?  This contextualisation of and rationale for joy 
needs to be unpacked. We will do this through exploring the wider context of 1.3-9. 
The first thing to establish is who the subject of rejoicing is. The 2nd person plural 
ἀγαλλιᾶσθε (1.6) reveals that the recipients are collectively the subject. This, along 
with the broad recipient list in 1.1, indicates that the author views such rejoicing as 
appropriate for all believers. 1 Peter is replete with LXX quotations and allusions. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that we find ἀγαλλιάω in 1 Peter ascribed to a defined 
group, the believers, and in a similar contextual setting. In the LXX rejoicing was 
oriented towards God (we will return to this below), but was specifically occasioned 
by his just judgements, mercy, and salvation. We find two of these highlighted in 
1.3-9: mercy and salvation.  
Verses 1.3-5 open with praise of God (εὐλογητὸς ὁ θεός) that focuses on his actions 
towards believers. All of these actions are specifically said to be according to his 
great mercy (κατὰ τὸ πολὺ αὐτοῦ ἔλεος).336 Thus, at the outset of the letter, the 
author identifies the believers as those who have experienced God’s mercy. In the 
LXX the term ἔλεος is the word used to convey God’s covenant faithfulness and 
‘goodness towards his people.’337 Consequently, the use of ἔλεος is intended to 
mark this special relationship in 1 Peter too, but this time for the Christian. This will 
be affirmed in 2.10 where receiving God’s mercy is shown to be the definitive 
marker of his people.338 Thus, the letter opens with a tone of intimacy between God 
and the believer, and the presence of the idea of covenant relationship is 
glimpsed.339 That rejoicing is ascribed to the believers, who have received of God’s 
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 Elliott, 1 Peter, 329. It is worth noting that for God to have, and be led, by an emotion was not a 
Hellenistic way of thinking, but is distinctly biblical; see R. Feldmeier, The First Letter of Peter: A 
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338
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ἔλεος, suggests that, like in the LXX, the author sees rejoicing as the possession of 
God’s people. The second theme of salvation is tied to the first, being one of the 
actions arising from God’s mercy: the believer is delivered to salvation (1.5). At this 
point the covenant relationship reveals itself again, for it is through the believers’ 
faith (or faithfulness) that they are in this favourable position.340 Faith here means 
belief but also trust and ‘exclusive commitment to God’.341 Consequently, in 1.3-5 
we have two sides of a special relationship established. It is in this context that the 
believers’ joy is deemed fitting. 342 
There are, however, some Christian aspects to these familiar themes. Firstly, God is 
the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ (1.3). Therefore God’s relationship with the 
believer is shaped by reference to Christ, and Christ is made central to the special 
relationship (cf. 1.21).343 It is those under Christ’s lordship that have God as 
father.344 Thus, the relationship between God and the believer is described in 
familial terms.345 Added to this is the believers’ new begetting, which comes 
through the resurrection of Jesus Christ and ‘implies God as progenitor’. So, we can 
appreciate that the relationship is understood not only as covenant obligation but 
as one between newly begotten believers and their heavenly Father.346 God’s role 
as father implies his ‘authority over them … his paternal affection, protection, and 
care for them.’347 Secondly, God’s merciful action of salvation is through Christ’s 
                                                                                                                                                      
was the type of public praise expected from the client in a patron-client relationship, then it could be 
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341
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in view is the mention of inheritance (1.4). Inheritance of the land of Israel was a significant aspect 
of the covenant relationship, and was often lost or gained depending on fidelity to the covenant. 
Here, however, the inheritance is not territorial but is a ‘transcendent reality’. Cf. Dan 12.13; Pss. 
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death and resurrection. It is this one act that displays God’s mercy and becomes the 
essential basis of the Christian’s faith in God (1.21). Thus, the believers’ relationship 
to God, and therefore their understanding of their own identity and existence, 
cannot be understood apart from Christ, or separately from his death and 
resurrection.348  
So, we can see that ἀγαλλιάω is being used in a context which follows the LXX but is 
also different because of the place given to Christ. Thus, in 1 Peter the believers’ 
rejoicing occurs within the context of God’s relationship with his people and his 
deeds for the believer. Consequently, in the following discussion of joy, this 
relational focus that the author has deliberately established must be kept in mind. 
Excursus: The Force of ἀγαλλιᾶσθε 
Before discussing the object of rejoicing we need to determine the time component 
and force of ἀγαλλιᾶσθε. There are three options: 1) present indicative – ‘you are 
rejoicing’; 2) present imperative – ‘rejoice’; 3) a present indicative with future 
meaning – ‘you will rejoice’. Martin prefers the third option.349 For Martin the aorist 
participle λυπηθέντες indicates that distress occurs before rejoicing.350 Furthermore, 
the application of ἄρτι to λυπηθέντες suggests that persecution is happening now in 
the present. Therefore ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, which comes second sequentially, must be 
understood as future.351  In this reading, not only are joy and distress contrasted 
but they are differentiated by the time periods in which they exist, with the present 
being marked only by distress.352 However, the close repetition of ἀγαλλιᾶσθε in 1.8 
which is also combined with ἄρτι and other present verbs causes problems for 
reading ἀγαλλιᾶσθε in 1.6 as future. Thus, in order for ἀγαλλιᾶσθε to be 
symmetrically future in 1.8, Martin has to force the present participles ὁρῶντες and 
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πιστεύοντες to be ’participles of the imperfect.’353 However, such squeezing of 
ὁρῶντες and πιστεύοντες into an antecedent time frame both ignores the presence 
of ἄρτι and is completely unnecessary if ἀγαλλιᾶσθε is allowed to retain its typical 
present force.  So, how should we understand the aorist participle λυπηθέντας? It is 
not a problem to see distress as occurring before ἀγαλλιᾶσθε if we take a more 
expansive view of what can be classed as ‘present.’ Present could refer to the 
whole time-frame in which the believer currently sits – the current epoch before 
the eschaton. Present does not have to refer to a specific punctiliar moment. 
Within this specific epoch, which is ‘now,’ they have experienced trials (and are 
likely to continue experiencing them); but, also now in the same timeframe, and 
perhaps more presently, they rejoice. Both occur in the present epoch, but 
suffering can have occurred prior to this current reference to rejoicing.354 
Moreover, if joy is a more stable state indicating permanent orientation, then it is 
closer to a disposition, and, as such, it could have an overarching quality. To rejoice 
remains present despite changing circumstances that at points may be distressing. 
Given the potential benefits of asking the audience to see rejoicing now as fitting 
despite distress (discussed below), it seems that option one is preferable to option 
three and so ἀγαλλιᾶσθε should be read as retaining its present force.355 The 
majority of scholars dismiss option two because it is generally agreed that the 
exhortative content of the letter begins at 1.13. At 1.6 we are still firmly within the 
initial blessing material in which declarations rather than imperatives are more 
appropriate.356 Therefore, the following discussion will read ἀγαλλιᾶσθε in 1.6 and 8 
as present indicatives with present force. 
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4.2.2 Deciphering the Object 
Having explored the general context of rejoicing and that rejoicing is part of the 
audience’s present experience, we now need to answer another question: what or 
who is the object of the believers’ joy? Syntactically, the answer is simple: the 
relative pronoun ᾧ which precedes ἀγαλλιάω indicates the object of the emotion. 
Τhe problem is that the antecedent of the relative pronoun is uncertain.357 The 
phrase ἐν ᾧ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε (1.6) is commonly rendered with the demonstrative: ‘in (all) 
this you (greatly) rejoice’ (see ESVUK; NIV; NKJV; NRSVA).358 Thus ᾧ refers to 
something from the previous material, though it is not clear what. It could be any of 
the clauses introduced by εἰς which detail the benefits of the believers’ new 
begetting: their salvation which will be revealed in the last time (1.5); their 
protection by God’s power (1.4-5); their inheritance which is being kept for them 
(1.4); their living hope (1.3); or perhaps, as many commentator think, all of these.359 
Elliott translates ἐν ᾧ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε as ‘Consequently you exult with joy’ and thus sees 
the entire thought expressed in 1.3-5 as the antecedent. Elliott reads ἐν ᾧ as a 
‘temporal or circumstantial conjunction’ which he argues is used elsewhere in the 
letter (2.12; 3.16, 19; 4.4) to mean ‘“in this connection,” “in which case or 
circumstance when,”.’ Hence, he thinks it is used similarly here.360  Achtemeier 
likewise cites 4.4 as evidence to support his view that ἐν ᾧ refers to the material in 
the preceding verses. For Achtemeier the ἐν ᾧ in 4.4 proleptically anticipates ‘the 
cause for offence on the part of the unbelievers’ and so means ‘therefore’ or ‘for 
that reason,’ which favours the same meaning here in 1.6.361 The result of 
Achtemeier and Elliott’s reading is that joy is a response to God’s action. In view of 
the LXX usage, this is certainly a plausible option. 
However, the other instances of ἐν ᾧ cited by Elliott and Achtemeier are not exactly 
the same as in 1.6. In 2.12 and 3.16 ἐν ᾧ is introduced by ἵνα so that the whole 
phrase operates as a consequence clause. This does not occur in 1.6 where ἐν ᾧ 
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stands alone. This suggests that when the author wants to speak about the 
consequence of something he does not do this by ἐν ᾧ alone but adds to it the 
conjunction ἵνα. Further, as Martin comments, in these verses and in 4.4 ‘it is 
impossible to relate the relative pronoun to a preceding noun.’ In 1.6 it is possible 
to do this, even if we are not sure which noun it should be! Martin also rightly 
notices that in 3.19 we find the construction ἐν ᾧ but, because an obvious 
antecedent noun (πνεῦμα) is present, few argue for a consequential reading. 
Instead, ‘in which’ or ‘in whom’ is preferred.362 Thus, 3.19 and the variances in 
other uses of ἐν ᾧ provide evidence that ἐν ᾧ in 1.6 does not have to carry a 
consequential meaning. Rather, ἐν ᾧ could refer to a specific object. In this context, 
this could be καιρός (1.5), θεός (1.3) or Ἰησοῦς Χριστός (1.3).363 In the following, I 
want to argue that θεός is a plausible option and should not be dismissed too 
readily. 
As far as I know only Hort argues for Χριστός or θεός.364 Most scholars fail to 
mention Χριστός or disregard it with no real reasoning given. Achtemeier discounts 
Χριστός (like θεός) on the basis that Χριστός is too far away from the relative 
pronoun.365 We will focus on θεός and καιρός as the stronger options, mentioning 
Χριστός only briefly. Troy Martin, in line with his future reading of ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, 
concludes that ἐν ᾧ refers to καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ, which turns ἐν ᾧ into a temporal 
adverbial expression meaning ‘at which time.’366 So, the whole phrase becomes ‘at 
that time you will rejoice.’ 367 καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ does immediately precede ἐν ᾧ and is 
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itself introduced by ἐν; such repetition could stylistically indicate that the two are to 
be linked. Luke 6.22-23 provides a parallel example and could be cited to support 
rejoicing at a future given time (χάρητε ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμερᾳ). However, contextually, 
Luke 6.22-23 locates the rejoicing in the time of persecution. The future time of 
Luke’s Gospel is the present experience of 1 Peter and so Luke 6.22-23 actually 
supports the idea that the author of 1 Peter can expect rejoicing despite present 
persecution. To agree with Achtemeier, it would be better to find an alternative 
that allows ἀγαλλιᾶσθε to retain its present force.368 Moreover, as Jobes notes, the 
syntax of the LXX, which frequently has rejoicing in (ἐν) something, argues against 
the adverbial sense of the prepositional phrase because in the LXX the ἐν indicates 
the reason for rejoicing.369 
An alternative option is to take θεός (1.3) as the antecedent. The resulting 
translation would be ‘in whom.’ Many scholars dismiss this option quickly, usually 
due to the distance between the relative pronoun and its antecedent which is 
thought to be θεός in 1.3, though θεός does in fact occur again in 1.5. 370 However, I 
find this alternative a strong possibility for a number of reasons. Firstly, God is 
introduced as the subject in 1.3 and remains the focus throughout. All of 1.3-5 from 
ὁ κατὰ τὸ πολὺ αὐτοῦ ἔλεος onwards continues to refer to and expand the 
description of θεός.371  Furthermore, every verb in 1.3-5 indicates the presence of 
another agent, which is clearly God: he has begotten the believer; keeps their 
inheritance; guards the believers; and will reveal Christ.372 Thus, it is evident that 
God has been established as the focus and throughout 1.3-5 it is God who is 
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intended to remain the focus.373  This is not surprising if De Waal Dryden is correct 
that the purpose of 1.3-12 is to realign ‘affective commitments by eliciting gratitude 
and strengthening allegiance’ to God.374 Given this intent and focus, it is not 
implausible that the author sees the object of, and basis for, rejoicing as θεός in 1.6 
because it continues the line of thought from 1.3-5.375 Furthermore, this centring 
on God and his action suggests that θεός is a more likely antecedent than Χριστός. 
Secondly, ἀγαλλιάω is being used in a context of giving praise to God (εὐλογητὸς ὁ 
θεός). This is in line with LXX usage in which, overwhelmingly, ἀγαλλιάω occurs in a 
context of praise. Within these biblical contexts the object of ἀγαλλιάω is 
predominantly God (see above). du Toit rightly recognises this when he comments 
that if ἐν ᾧ does refer to θεός then this is ‘completely in the spirit of numerous 
analogous expressions in the Old Testament, especially in the Psalms, where we 
continually read that the faithful rejoice "in the Lord".376 This common use and 
plausible background suggests that if ἐν ᾧ is to refer to a specific object, it is more 
likely to be God than καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ.  
Thirdly, the author’s next use of ἀγαλλιάω in 1.8 seems to have as its occasion 
another object, Jesus Christ. We find ἀγαλλιάω appears again in a clause introduced 
by a preposition plus pronoun construction (εἰς ὃν) whose antecedent is clearly 
Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1.7). Achtemeier argues that εἰς ὃν should be directly linked to 
ἀγαλλιᾶσθε making the phrase between - ἄρτι μὴ ὁρῶντες πιστεύοντες δέ - an 
apposition. In this reading, δέ emphasises the contrast between not seeing but 
believing, rather than acting as a conjunction between believing and rejoicing (cf. 
οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς ὑμῖν δέ 1.12). Thus, εἰς ὃν ... ἀγαλλιᾶσθε should be translated ‘in whom 
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you rejoice.’377 Though Achtemeier’s reading would be beneficial to my argument, 
it has a couple of problems. Firstly, εἰς standardly governs πιστεύοντες, and, 
secondly, there are no examples in the LXX of ἀγαλλιάω preceding εἰς (ἐν or ἐπι are 
preferred). But, this does leave ἀγαλλιᾶσθε without an explicit object. However, 
that the preceding verbs in the clause (ἰδόντες, ἀγαπᾶτε, ὁρῶντες, πιστεύοντες) 
clearly relate to Jesus, it suggests that ἀγαλλιᾶσθε should be read this way too, and 
so infers rejoicing in Christ. Consequently, this would allow the author to be 
consistent in his usage: the first rejoicing is in God, the second in Christ. Therefore, 
for these three reasons, I think the strongest antecedent and therefore the object 
of the emotion is θέος. Thus ἐν ᾧ can be translated as ‘in whom’. Having said this, I 
do not want to discount the entirety of 1.3-5 as a viable option for being the cause 
of rejoicing, so long as we do not lose sight of the particular relationship the author 
has established. The benefits the believers have received are not to be rejoiced in 
as isolated items in themselves; they are their possession only because of God’s 
mercy towards them and through Christ. Thus, it is this relationship that is central 
to joy.378 Like in the LXX, ‘joy expresses a profound sense of connectedness’ that 
joins ‘God and God’s elect people.’379  If such rejoicing is dependent on one’s 
intimacy with God, then it becomes a distinctive marker of the believers and is 
exclusive to them. The audience are those who rejoice in God. 
Having established that the audience are being presented as those who presently 
rejoice in God, we are still to determine what this emotional presentation 
communicates to the audience and what the implications of this are. 
4.2.3 Presenting What Should Be Valued 
The first thing that we can say is that by presenting the believers as those that 
rejoice in God, the author creates a dividing line between believer and nonbeliever. 
Consequently, this presentation brings with it an expectation about the accepted 
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emotional orientation of the believer which is different from his non-Christian 
neighbour. In order to understand more about this orientation, we need to 
investigate further the evaluative function of emotions. 
We have established that each emotion makes a particular evaluative judgement 
about its object. For joy, the object is evaluated as good and beneficial to the 
flourishing of the person. Thus, the author declares that the only legitimate 
perspective for the believers is to recognise that God, and his actions, are good and 
beneficial for them. 380  This is a simple point, but it is important because it is the 
first step in creating a system of value which will inevitably affect the believers’ 
goals and actions. As the ancient rhetoricians recognised, if the author wants to be 
able to move people to act in a certain manner, he has to get them to see things a 
particular way, and the use of rejoicing reveals that the first task at hand is to 
persuade (or remind) the audience to value God. The later ethical commands will 
make sense only in relation to the system of value that is being established here.381 
To use joy to focus on God also has the additional effect of making God ‘the central 
character of the meta-narrative.’382 De Waal Dryden rightly highlights with this 
comment that the author’s system of value sits within a larger worldview that has 
its own narrative in which God is indispensable. 383  The author has reminded his 
hearers that in this narrative God has acted favourably towards them in Christ and 
has bestowed on them numerous goods (1.3-5). These goods are now a present 
reality for the believers, and so they can rightly rejoice in God. 384 
We saw in our introductory discussion that emotions evaluate a situation in relation 
to a person’s goals. Thus, here, we can understand reflexively, that to provide an 
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 Cf. 2.9; James 1.17. 
381
 Kendall notes the foundational role of 1.3-12 in establishing the shape of the Christian life which 
makes coherent the exhortations that follow; Kendall, 'Theological Function,' 104. 
382
 De Waal Dryden, Theology, 85. Barton, following philosopher David Kangas, recognises that 
emotions acquire significance form their ‘metaphysical horizons.’ However, here the emotion is 
working reflexively to direct the audience towards a metaphysical reality; Barton, 'Spirituality,' 172.  
383
 This requires the audience accept the narrative that the author is establishing. As De Waal 
Dryden notes the narrative provides the framework for the lives of the audience through which they 
can interpret their experiences; De Waal Dryden, Theology, 39, 44. 
384
 Given this reality, even exuberant rejoicing would be fitting here. Contra Michaels who does not 
think that the author would expect all believers to be rejoicing given their current situation; 
Michaels, 1 Peter, 27. 
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evaluation about God by utilising joy is to tell the believers what their goal should 
be. If joy presents God as good and beneficial to flourishing, then one should aim to 
be in favourable standing with God, which is what the believer because of Christ is 
currently experiencing. This goal and the goods associated with it become the 
reference point by which all other objects and goods should be evaluated. We will 
discover that the author’s use of other emotions such as fear, hope, and shame 
work from the reality that joy reveals. The evaluation of God as good and beneficial 
leads us finally to joy’s action-tendency. Psychologically, joy puts one in a 
favourable state of mind towards the object, and, through its positive presentation, 
encourages behaviour that pursues the object. Thus, we can see that, if the 
audience take on this emotional stance, they are disposed towards behaviour that 
will maintain their good standing with God. Therefore, evoking the audience’s joy is 
rhetorically powerful for the author. It is important that the author is able to help 
the audience see their Christianity positively, particularly as it is their Christianity 
that is currently the cause of their suffering.  By presenting the Christian life as one 
of joy it colours it positively and reminds the audience of the good that as Christians 
they have accessed and can continue to know. 
Following on from this are sociological and therapeutic implications of the author’s 
use of joy. Setting God as the object of joy means that the cause of rejoicing is 
external to the individual, and therefore joy is dependent on another. The added 
implication is that one’s ability to have joy is released from the relational dynamic 
of human with human. This is a similar outcome to Stoicism’s stance, where virtue, 
which is integral to the person, produces joy.385 According to Seneca self-sufficiency 
enables enduring joy because it is ‘not borrowed from without;’ if it were, it would 
cease. But, ‘because it is not in the power of another to bestow, neither is it subject 
to another’s whims’ (Ep. 59.18 [Gummere, LCL]; cf. Ep. 23.6; 72.4-5; 98.1-2). Thus, 
in both systems of thought, one’s positive emotional life can be achieved regardless 
of the present sociological and material circumstances. The result for both the Stoic 
and the Christian is that one will evaluate one’s relationship to the other differently, 
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with the other becoming less significant to one’s goals. For neither Stoicism nor 
Christianity does this infer solitariness, but it does suggest detachment. 386 One 
difference between Stoic and Christian joy is that, though both depend on a cosmic 
perspective, Christian joy is based on the concrete historical reality of what God has 
done in Christ. It is this historical event alone which has proved God’s character, 
allows present access to goods, and frames future expectations, thus, enabling joy. 
Furthermore, not only is the cause of joy outside of the person, but the goods to 
which it looks are beyond temporal constraints, being eternal in nature.387 
Consequently, the cause of rejoicing is moved both beyond the control of the 
recipients and outside of their temporal space.388 Moreover, joy’s evaluation is also 
mapped onto and highlights a much larger eternal cosmic reality. Thus, importantly 
for what is to follow, the goods which occasion joy are not contingent on the 
believer or her present temporal situation and therefore neither is her ability to 
rejoice. Perhaps terms like παρεπίδημος (1.1; 2.11) and πάροικος (2.11) indicate that 
the author desires the audience’s primary values, from which the emotion of joy 
works, to come from outside of its present temporal and spatial location. This 
would support Achtemeier’s inclination that the author is working from an 
apocalyptic framework in which a transcendent reality has been revealed.389  Here, 
joy asks the believers to orient themselves around this reality.390 The consequence 
of this is that the believer’s joy can have a stable quality. Because the goods that 
occasion joy are stable, so is the believers’ emotional state. The believers know the 
goodness of God in the present and can expect this to continue for eternity. 
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 Cf. Marcus Aurelius, Med. 5.16, 30. 
387
 See the adjectives used of their inheritance: ἄφθαρτος, ἀμίαντος, ἀμάραντος (1.4). 
388
 Like Barton says of Paul’s views in Philippians, joy despite distress reflects ‘the vivid, felt horizon 
of participation in the life of heaven’; Barton, 'Spirituality,' 185. 
389
 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 106-7; cf. M. Dubis, Messianic Woes in First Peter: Suffering and Eschatology 
in 1 Peter 4:12-19 (Studies in Biblical Literature 33; New York: Peter Lang, 2002), 39-42 for more on 
the apocalyptic spatial and temporal dimensions of 1 Peter. 
390
 We might see this as in-line with Holloway’s demarcation of emotion focused coping strategies, in 
which in order to make sense of the current situation one’s self concept is restructured by valuing 
certain domains above others. Here it would be eternal over temporal; Holloway, Coping, 122-7. 
Similarly, for Seneca, because the person’s emotional life is moulded by being in line with nature, 
the mind of the wise man can be pervaded by eternal calm like the ‘ultra-lunar firmament.’ He goes 
on to emphasise the enduring quality of joy (Ep. 23.4-6 [Gummere, LCL]); cf. Ep. 59.16. 
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Therefore, their joy in God can become a permanent emotional disposition.391 The 
author’s expectation of the perpetual joyous state of the believer is even more 
extraordinary when it is coupled with the next phrase – ὀλίγον ἄρτι, εἰ δέον ἐστὶν, 
λυπηθέντας ἐν ποικίλοις πειρασμοῖς. Thus, it is to the audience’s distress that we 
must now turn. 
4.2.4 Concurrent Distress 
Alongside joy we encounter the first reference to the audience’s suffering which 
will soon pervade the letter. Here, the suffering is inferred by reference to various 
trials (ποικίλοι πειρασμοί). These trials are described as distressing (λυπηθέντας) the 
believers.392  As demonstrated above, λύπη and λυπέω do not only pertain to 
physical suffering but cover mental distress including anxiety, despondency, and 
confusion. In addition to this, the fact that in 4.12 the audience are exhorted not to 
be surprised (μὴ ξενίζεσθε) by the trial (πειρασμός) suggests that these trials are 
particularly troubling mentally. Perhaps the audience are having difficulty with 
reconciling their present experience of persecution with their expectations. 
Whereas the object of joy was a matter of debate, the cause of distress is clear: 
ποικίλοι πειρασμοί. Commentators agree that ποικίλοι πειρασμοί refers to the 
audience’s persecution. Yet, this persecution does not happen without an agent. 
Therefore, though the trials are the cause of distress, the object of distress is the 
agent. There are three possible agents: 1) God, 2) hostile people, or 3) the devil (cf. 
5.8). In support of option one, some argue that εἰ δέον suggests divine will and thus 
God is the source of the trials.393 However, the remaining presentation of the letter 
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 For the emotional stability of the Stoic wise man see Epictetus, Diatr. 4.4.36-37; Seneca, Ep.59.14; 
71.27-29. 
392
 There is a difference in manuscript evidence for whether the text should read λυπηθέντες or 
λυπηθέντας. Elliott asserts that λυπηθέντες, though perhaps more grammatically difficult, is the best 
reading (Elliott, 1 Peter, 339). However, the NA28 prefers λυπηθέντας. The accusative reading aims to 
ease the problem that one would expect to find εἰ δέον followed by an infinitive verb with an 
accusative noun as the subject. Either way, there is little difference in meaning between the two; 
λυπέω is clearly being applied to the audience; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 99, 101; cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 
25. 
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 In the NT Jesus’ suffering is particularly portrayed as a divine necessity: Matt 16.21; Mark 8.31; 
Luke 17.25; 24.7; John 3.14; Acts 17.3 etc.; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 101; Elliott, 1 Peter, 339-40; cf. Brox, 
Petrusbrief, 64-5; Schlosser, Pierre, 69; de Villiers, 'Joy,' 73. For Dubis this phrase indicates the need 
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argues against God as agent and object. God is depicted as the one who is the just 
judge and saviour of those who suffer (1.5; 2.23; 3.12; 4.16-19; 5.5, 10-11) and 
cares for them (2.25; 5.6). He is also the one who is able to preserve them through 
the current time.394 Furthermore, to have God as object would be difficult because 
it would make God simultaneously the object of joy and distress. In the LXX it is 
possible for God to be the object of two seemingly different emotions e.g. joy and 
fear (Ps 2.11). However, the above historical discussion of λύπη, and by extension 
λυπέω, revealed that in both Greco-Roman sources and the LXX distress is opposed 
to joy, thus it would be somewhat awkward to have both relating to God here. It is 
more plausible to see the hostile human other as the agent given the rest of the 
letter which consistently depicts the other as the cause of suffering, whether this is 
masters (2.18-19), unbelieving husbands (3.1) or the generic other (2.12, 15; 3.9, 
13-14, 16; 4.14).395 The only other reference to λύπη (2.19), which occurs in the 
context of unjust suffering at the hands of a human master, supports option two. 
Option three, the devil (διάβολος) is made a possibility by 5.8. However, that the 
devil is only mentioned once reduces its prominence in the letter. It could be that 
the hostility of the other is understood by the author to be part of the cosmic battle 
of evil forces against God and his people.396 But, despite this cosmic framework, the 
actual physical agent would still be the human other. Thus, it is most plausible to 
see the hostile other as the agent of the trials and therefore the object of distress. 
Having established the subject, object, and cause of the emotion, we can now 
outline the evaluation that distress would make of the situation. Distress occurs 
when one experiences in the present something judged as bad and detrimental to 
one’s goals. Therefore, the believers are distressed because they see their trials as 
something bad that is having a negative impact on them. For the Stoic, this would 
be due to false opinion and therefore a misguided interpretation of events (cf. 
                                                                                                                                                      
God’s eschatological plan because through them he tests his people; Dubis, Messianic Woes, 69-70, 
8.  
394
 Feldmeier, Peter, 81. 
395
 Feldmeier’s comments that the believers’ sorrow is based on alienation from the world around 
them would support my reading, though Feldmeier himself leaves the source of trials open; 
Feldmeier, Peter, 80-1. 
396
 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 106. 
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Cicero, Tusc. 4.14 [King, LCL] ). But, 1 Peter does not chastise his audience for this 
reaction, or say that it is illegitimate.397  By recognising this emotion the author 
demonstrates that he is able to appreciate the negative impact of persecution on 
the audience. He does not ask for it to be apathetically accepted.  However, this 
presents the author with a problem not encountered by the impassive Stoic sage: 
the emotion’s action-tendency. The action-tendency of distress is avoidance. Thus, 
it is likely that if this emotion dominates, then the audience would seek to avoid 
this negative scenario. This would involve either evading the harmful agents, or 
changing the dynamic of one’s encounter with the agents so that their desire or 
ability to harm is altered. For the believers, the former would require becoming an 
isolated community away from contact with hostile individuals; the latter would 
require appeasement or gaining power. Since gaining power is improbable for the 
audience who is likely composed of the poor, slaves and women, appeasement is 
the most feasible. Consequently, if persecution is on account of their Christian life, 
then, to appease the hostile other, the audience would have to behave more 
acceptably (as defined by the hostile party), which would require acculturation and, 
in the extreme case, defection from the faith.398 Some have argued that 
acculturation is in fact 1 Peter’s social strategy for dealing with persecution.399 
However, this thesis does not take this stance for reasons that will become clear 
throughout the course of discussion. Instead, I take the position that the author 
desires none of the above outcomes. If this is the case, then the author needs to 
rhetorically deal with the emotion of distress so that it is not the dominant 
emotional state that influences the believers’ actions. 
4.2.4.1 Re-evaluating the Present Situation 
If emotions are a judgment, then to alter the emotion in order to affect the action-
tendency one needs to amend the audience’s evaluation of events. In this context, 
this means altering the audience’s perspective about the harmful status of the 
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 Jobes, 1 Peter, 93-4; Holloway, Coping, 148.  
398
 These would be included under Holloway’s ‘problem-focused’ strategies of dealing with 
prejudice; see Holloway, Coping, 117-22 . 
399
 This of course brings us into the famous Balch-Elliott debate. I will deal with this debate in the 
conclusion once we have a fuller picture from the investigation of all the emotions. 
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πειρασμοί. This is precisely what the author does. Firstly, he comments that they are 
only for a short time (ὀλίγον), thus aiming to reduce their magnitude. 400  Secondly, 
and more significantly, he goes on to declare that they have a purpose: 
ἵνα τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως πολυτιμότερον χρυσίου τοῦ ἀπολλυμένου, διὰ 
πυρὸς δὲ δοκιμαζομένου, εὑρεθῇ εἰς ἔπαινον καὶ δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν ἐν ἀποκαλύψει 
Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. 
… so that the genuineness of your faith, which is of greater worth than gold 
(which though perishing is tested by fire), may be found to result in praise, 
glory, and honour at the revelation of Jesus Christ (1.7). 
 
These comments work at the level of evaluation. The author demonstrates that, 
instead of being detrimental, a good can actually come from the trials: the 
genuineness of their faith can be proved which will lead to more benefits – praise, 
glory and honour.401 
In line with interpreting εἰ δέον as divine will, some scholars read 1.7 as indicating 
that God is testing the believer. Knowing that this testing comes from God should 
provide an encouragement for the believer.  Added to this is the further consolation 
that they should not see themselves as victims but those who are being refined.402 
Thus, the comparison with gold is read as indicating the purification of the 
believers’ faith. 403 In arguing for this, commentators draw on LXX background (e.g.  
Zech 13.9; Wis Sol 3.5-6; Sirach 2.1-6). This may be the case in the LXX where 
suffering often occurs due to disobedience, and purification generally works at a 
community level, but it is not the situation here. 404  The audience are those in right 
                                                     
400
 As Achtemeier comments, ὀλίγον indicates a short time rather than the unimportance of the 
suffering; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 101; cf. Schlosser, Pierre, 69. 
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 Thurén notes this reading, but provides two other alternative interpretations in which the 
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Schlosser, Pierre, 70. 
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relationship with God who have already been purified (1.2; cf. 1.14). Instead, the 
author acknowledges that trials test faith.405 For the author, it is faith (or 
faithfulness) that is important, as demonstrated by the value explicitly given to its 
genuineness (πολυτιμότερον χρυσίου).406 To agree with Michaels, it seems that the 
author’s point ‘is not so much to assert directly that the reader’s faith is proved 
genuine by a process of testing … as to extol the value, in God’s sight, of this 
“genuine faith” and to affirm its ultimate (i.e., eschatological) significance.’ 407 Thus, 
to return to the matter of distress, instead of being problematic, the trials can be 
seen as having a positive outcome because they show the quality of the believer’s 
much valued faith. 408  
We can see in this argumentation that the author is trying to reconfigure what the 
audience sees as important. By introducing faith into the picture we find that the 
believers’ relationship with God, which was so important in 1.3-5, is again 
highlighted. In this instance, πίστις does not simply mean belief but carries a sense 
of ‘faithfulness’ and ‘reliability’. It infers a commitment to stay loyal to a party, 
                                                                                                                                                      
suffering is not problematic as it sits in a commonly accepted Jewish tradition of describing 
persecution as purifying fire; Brox, Petrusbrief, 65. See K. D. Liebengood, The Eschatology of 1 Peter: 
Considering the Influence of Zechariah 9-14 (SNTSMS 157; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 107-16 who rightly points out that texts like Wisdom and Sirach are concerned with the 
training of wayward community members. This is not the case with 1 Peter. The believers do not 
suffer because they have strayed and need correction, but because they are faithful to God. For 
Liebengood, instead, it is a marker of the eschatological period in which the believer lives. 
Liebengood prefers Zech 13.8-9 as the background to the fiery trials imagery. 
405
 To agree with Elliott, the author is not saying here that trials are a necessity to prove faith, but a 
possibility; Elliott, 1 Peter, 339-40. Contra Brox, Petrusbrief, 65. This is not to say that one should not 
realistically expect persecution because of their allegiance to Christ (see Jobes, 1 Peter, 95). But it 
does argue against those who see suffering as an obligatory part of the Christian life. See Kendall, 
'Theological Function,' 108; Michaels, 1 Peter, 28-9. 
406
 Cf. S. R. Bechtler, Following in His Steps: Suffering, Community, and Christology in 1 Peter (SBLDS 
162; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 181-2. Achtemeier comments, highlighting gold as perishable 
‘implies an argument from the lesser to the greater: if perishable, and hence less valuable, gold must 
be tested, how much more must faith, which is imperishable and hence of greater value’; 
Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 102. I agree with Achtemeier that it is an argument from lesser to greater, but 
it is the eternal value of faith that is being emphasised over the temporal quality of gold, not the 
greater need for faith to be tested. 
407
 Michaels, 1 Peter, 30. This makes sense of the comparison with gold which when it goes through 
fire proves its nature. See Selwyn, St. Peter, 129 who agrees that this reading gives a straightforward 
analogy between metal refining and character proving; cf. Bigg, Epistles of St. Peter, 104; Kelly, 
Epistles of Peter, 54; Liebengood, Eschatology, 134. 
408
 Contra Goppelt, who thinks that faith needs to be purified; Goppelt, I Peter, 90-1. Cf. Sir 2.1-9 
which shares the motif of testing in fire alongside an exhortation towards trust in God and 
faithfulness. 
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demonstrated by external behaviour.409 Thus, if the audience are to accept the 
argument that trials prove faithfulness and that this is positive, they first have to 
agree that faithfulness is valuable. 1.3-5 has established why this is so, but just in 
case the audience have forgotten the benefits of their relationship with God, the 
author gives them an added affirmation: their genuine faith will result in praise, 
glory, and honour.410 Like with 1.3-5, this aims to help the audience reassess their 
goals. According to 1.7, worthwhile praise, glory and honour come only via 
faithfulness to God, not from other social relationships. Thus, whereas distress 
would cause one to focus on the hostile other, the author’s rhetorical manoeuvre 
has reinterpreted the trials so that the audience’s focus has been moved to their 
standing with God. Thus, again God becomes the primary object in their outlook, 
and, in presenting how to achieve praise, glory, and honour, the author has made 
remaining faithful to God the highest goal. Other goals such as physical well-being, 
public honour, or social acceptance become less important and therefore the loss 
of them is less distressing. Consequently, if faith is valuable and trials prove faith, 
then trials can be re-evaluated because at the very least they cannot inhibit one 
from obtaining the highest goal, and at the best they highlight that one possesses 
the valued faithfulness. The fact that the phrase ends with ‘at the revelation of 
Christ’ reminds the audience of the larger cosmic narrative in which the 
interpretation of this situation sits. It is not a matter of temporary personal comfort 
but of aligning oneself with an overarching cosmic reality, and with an 
eschatological expectation.  
So, we can see that by changing the evaluation of the trials the author can reduce 
the appropriateness of distress by bringing in the good. Consequently, he can 
achieve his primary aim, which is to show that persecution is not something that 
has on all accounts to be avoided. Furthermore, the displacement of the object of 
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 Elliott argues that belief here is not primarily cognitive assent. However, I do not think this is a 
helpful distinction; one has to have a belief about the truth of a situation in order to act in line with 
it faithfully. As Achtemeier comments, Christian faith is ‘the visible evidence of the unseen reality 
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 Cf. Jas 1.12. These terms are used throughout the letter of God and Christ (1.11, 21; 2.6-7, 12; 
4.11; 5.1), thus demonstrating here the positive position of the audience; Elliott, 1 Peter, 342; cf. 
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distress by the insertion of the theme of faith/faithfulness means that the 
audience’s relational dynamic with the hostile human object is made less 
significant. The re-evaluation of trials declares that the hostile other’s actions 
cannot really do lasting damage to the believer’s primary goals. Thus, one does not 
need to be distressed by them. In this case, one’s behaviour should not be a 
response to the hostile individual but instead should be shaped by one’s desire to 
remain faithful to God because only he secures the good. Subsequently, the author 
leads the audience towards the desired end of having a dispositional outlook that 
will promote maintaining their Christian conduct in the face of hostility. The likely, 
added effect of this is that, through the re-evaluation of the significance of the 
hostile other, the author is able also to reconfigure the believers’ emotional ties, 
asking them to prefer their new life in God over their old social bonds.411  
One added benefit of the above reading is that it prevents one from falling into the 
trap of seeing trials as the thing to be rejoiced in, as some have argued.412 It is clear 
from the above argument that trials are not the focus but faith. As Feldmeier rightly 
notes, at this point in the letter the emphasis is on joy despite suffering.413 The 
author does not depict his audience as rejoicing in trials. The trials are not the 
object of joy, only the cause of distress which is precisely what necessitates the 
need for them to be reinterpreted. Joy however, is distinctly focussed on God and 
the benefits he has bestowed. The believers are not encouraged to be elated and 
shout for joy because they are being afflicted. It is the faithfulness and commitment 
to God that is commendable and important, not the suffering itself.  
With the author’s emphasis on the eschatological value of faith he returns to more 
naturally positive themes. It is with his transition that we can turn to the final 
subject of this chapter: rejoicing in Christ. 
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 This, as De Waal Dryden notes, is important in the conversion and re-socialisation process; De 
Waal Dryden, Theology, 24-5. 
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 Elliott argues 1 Peter is following ‘Israelite and Christian tradition in which adversity is portrayed 
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4.2.5 Unspeakable and Glorified Joy 
The author uses the mention of Christ’s eschatological revelation to transform the 
tenor and focus swiftly away from distress and trials. Instead Christ becomes the 
primary object. Because the object has changed so does the emotional tone to love 
and joy (1.7-8). Christ as object is introduced in both clauses of 1.8 by the relative 
pronoun (εἰς) ὅν. It is agreed that the antecedent in both instances is Ἰησοῦς Χριστός 
(1.7).414 Thus, we can understand that the cause, and most likely object, of rejoicing 
is Christ. 415 The author is clearly drawing on the audience’s perspective of their 
relationship with Christ, as he evokes alongside their joy their love for Christ.  Both 
of these emotion terms (ἀγαπᾶτε and ἀγαλλιᾶσθε) should be read as present 
indicatives: ‘their joy is present just as are their love and their faith.’416 Amazingly, 
the believers can rejoice in Christ even though they have not seen him.417 This is 
important for the second generation of believers who did not have direct physical 
access to Christ. Yet, through these positive emotions, the author depicts the 
believer in a close relationship with Christ. As Feldmeier comments, ‘[i]n faith and 
love, the (yet) absent one is (already) present to them – and therefore their present 
is filled with joy.’418 Again there is juxtaposition between present states. In the 
previous verses the contrast is between present suffering and the ability to rejoice 
in God. In 1.8, not being able to see Christ, which could be disheartening, is 
contrasted with the ability to still love and rejoice in him. 
If we work from the evaluation present in the emotion of joy, we discover that 
Christ, like the Father, is being presented as good and beneficial to the believers’ 
flourishing. This is not surprising, given that all the benefits given to the believer in 
1.3-5 were only available through the resurrection of Christ.419 Here in 1.8-9 the 
relationship between Christ and the believers’ salvation is made more prominent: 
                                                     
414
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by their faith in Christ they are obtaining the salvation of their souls. 420 Thus, 
according to the author, the believers can rejoice because of their relationship to 
Christ and their coming salvation.421  Pertinent to our discussion on emotions is that 
the salvation of their souls is named as their goal (τὸ τέλος). We established at the 
outset that emotions are evaluations of a situation in view of a person’s goals. Here 
the author makes explicit what the audience’s ultimate goal is (or should be): 
salvation. We also noted that joy is appropriate when one has a good in the 
present. Thus, the author spells out for the audience why, in view of Christ, an 
emotion of joy is most fitting: through their faith in Christ there are receiving their 
desired goal.422  The present participle κομιζόμενοι suggest that they should see 
their salvation as present, occurring concurrently with their belief and rejoicing. 423  
Perhaps this reveals that the audience has already set a high priority on salvation, 
or that the author is encouraging them to do so.424 We can also see that through joy 
the author is asking the audience to value Christ, but, once again, he is also 
promoting the value of their faith(fulness). For it is through their faith in and fidelity 
to Christ that their salvation is accessed. Consequently, their emotional outlook and 
their priorities should be shaped by the ‘future goal that has already broken into 
present reality.’425 Subsequently, the believers can justifiably rejoice despite 
distressing trials.426 Moreover, the implication is that the audience’s behaviour will 
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 Souls here is not an entity within a human being, but, following biblical tradition, it means the 
whole human being; Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 58; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 104; Elliott, 1 Peter, 344; 
contra, Feldmeier, Peter, 87-92. 
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 Elliott, 1 Peter, 343; cf. Kendall, '1 Peter 1:3-9,' 69; Thurén, Argument, 100-1; Schlosser, Pierre, 71. 
422
 The verb κομίζω carries a sense of acquiring, or coming into possession of something (see BDAG, 
557). Ιn the NT it often relates to eschatological reward (cf. 5.4). What is obtained is not always 
positive and can depend on one’s deeds; See 2 Cor 5.10; Eph 6.8; Col 3.25; Heb 11.39; Elliott, 1 
Peter, 344. We find in other NT texts that joy, like here in 1 Peter, is linked to the possession of an 
eternal good; cf. Matt 5.11-12; Heb 10.32-26. 
423
 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 104, 107; Feldmeier, Peter, 87; Contra Elliott who sees rejoicing in 1.8 as 
looking towards future salvation; Elliott, 1 Peter, 339. Even though they are already obtaining their 
salvation, the rest of the letter does suggest that they await the fullness of their salvation when 
Christ is revealed. Therefore, the full realisation of their goal will not occur until Christ’s final glorious 
revelation (1.6-7, 13; 4.13, 5.1, 4, 6, 10).  
424
 The author does not specify here what salvation is from, but we must take it, in view of general 
Christian tradition, to mean eternal salvation. In line with OT and Jewish sources this salvation 
probably infers escape from divine judgement and involves new creation rather than escape from 
the body; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 97, 104. 
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 Kendall, 'Theological Function,' 108; cf. Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 57-8; Feldmeier, Peter, 87. 
426
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be ordered around these values and goals. 427 Thus, if the believers take on the 
author’s presentation of reality as displayed by his use of emotions then he can 
successfully motivate them towards particular behaviour which in this instance, as 
with 1.6, is to pursue fidelity.  
The description of rejoicing in 1.8 is more heightened than in 1.6. In 1.8 the phrase 
ἀγαλλιᾶσθε χαρᾷ produces a redundant repetition: ‘rejoicing with joy’. χαρά is 
further described as ἀνεκλάλητος (unspeakable) and δεδοξαμένῃ (glorified). If 
ἀγαλλιάω does have a vocalised element then this creates an interesting paradox: 
they are shouting for joy because they have a joy which is beyond words. This 
implies that the joy that the believer has in Christ is somehow beyond human 
capacity to explain, but is present and real enough for the person to rejoice. Not 
only is the joy unspeakable, but it has been glorified. Against Selwyn, this is more 
than feelings of happiness that come after conversion.428 Glory suggests divine and 
heavenly attributes. Thus, this description indicates the relationship between their 
joy and the divine. Firstly, joy in both 1.6 and 8 has heavenly beings, God and Christ, 
as its object. Thus, it points the believer towards this realm. Secondly, all the goods 
that the believer obtains through their relationship to God through Christ, which 
enforce their reason to rejoice, are present though also eternal. In this way, the 
good to which joy points is unchanging. Hence, their rejoicing, which is a response 
to these goods, can be stable and continue into eternity. Consequently, by this 
emotion, the audience are firmly incorporated into the divine realm. In a sense, 
they are already participating in the glorious joy they will experience in full when 
Christ is revealed. 429  Thus, their joy can be seen as presently glorified.430 The 
emotion is lifted beyond any temporal or situational constraints and as such 
resembles the divine on which it focuses. As Kendall rightly asserts, ‘neither 
affliction nor insecurity can quench it.’431 The therapeutic upshot of this is 
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 Cf. De Waal Dryden, who comments that within the larger cosmic narrative the τέλος ‘of that 
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emotional stability for the believer and the potential to have a permanently positive 
outlook, resulting in confidence.432 
4.3 Conclusion 
In the above exploration of joy and distress in 1 Peter 1.6-8 we have seen how the 
emotion terms have been used to highlight particular objects and thus also to 
promote an evaluation of that object. We discovered that the emotion of distress 
occurs briefly in a paragraph whose overwhelming tone is one of rejoicing. Clearly, 
the author wants to emphasise the reality that joy points towards and to minimise 
the impact of the judgement given by distress. The use of joy in these verses directs 
the audience towards their relationship with God and Christ. Its promotion asks the 
audience to see God and Christ as good and beneficial to their flourishing. Further, 
it asks the audience to internalise the value system on which this judgement is 
based, with fidelity to God and Christ becoming the highest goal. Therefore, joy 
empowers the believers through ‘the felt knowledge of what really matters.’433 
Addressing the audience’s emotions in this way is immensely powerful because it 
does not ask them merely to accept statements about God, but to be internally 
shaped by them. This outlook, with its values and goals, will have ethical 
implications because it affects the believers’ drive towards action.  
Whereas joy highlighted the good, distress focused on the negative impact of the 
audience’s persecution. The judgement of distress is that trials are only negative 
and therefore should be avoided, consequently encouraging behaviour that could 
effect this avoidance. However, the author does not desire this behavioural 
outcome, so works hard to help the audience re-evaluate the situation in order to 
alter the judgement and thus reduce the desire for avoidance. In his argumentation 
he turns the cause of distress into another occasion to promote the value of faith 
and faithfulness. Elliott comments regarding the reality of distress that it tempers 
the believer’s joy.434 However, I would argue the exact opposite. The above has 
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The Present Experience: Joy Despite Distress 
   
 
134 
 
shown that the reality that joy points towards actually tempers the distress.435 
Through promoting joy and minimising distress the author is using the emotions to 
direct the audience towards a particular cosmic reality. By presenting this 
emotional stance as the norm for the believer, he is asking the audience to accept 
this cosmic reality which inevitably impinges on their present, gives meaning to it, 
and directs their evaluation of events. 
We noted some sociological implications of the author’s use of these emotions, 
most notably the reduction in significance of the hostile other for attaining 
necessary goals. Instead, the primary relationship that is espoused is that of the 
faithful believer with their merciful God through Christ. It is faithfulness to this 
relationship that is held up as the path to joy and therefore flourishing. For the 
believer, all other objects and events are to be evaluated in relation to this primary 
relationship and chief goal. Establishing this framework sets the foundation for later 
ethical commands and will also be beneficial for helping us to understand the 
author’s presentation of the believer’s relationship to the nonbeliever as we 
progress through our investigation. 
It is apparent that the author opens the letter on an intensely positive note. His use 
of joy reminds the audience of their present favourable position. Furthermore, his 
positioning of joy in relation to eternal goods suggests that this positive emotional 
stance has the potential to become a stable and enduring outlook. Consequently, at 
the outset of the letter, the author is able to establish the tenor of the audience’s 
perspective which will be carried through into the more difficult areas of discussion 
tackled in the letter. From this overwhelmingly positive tone, we see that the 
author wants to inspire the audience’s confidence and encourage them that their 
choice to align themselves with Christ, which is currently bringing affliction, is 
indeed the best decision they could make. Thus, finally, we can affirm, as a number 
of scholars note, that the author of 1 Peter does indeed present the possibility that 
the Christian can rejoice despite suffering.436 With this, we must now turn to the 
                                                     
435
 Cf. Holloway, Coping, 148. 
436
 Elliott, 1 Peter, 339; It must be noted that rejoicing despite suffering is not unique to 1 Peter, it 
can be found in other NT texts (Heb 10.32-36) and particularly in the sayings of Jesus (Matt 5.11-12; 
The Present Experience: Joy Despite Distress 
   
 
135 
 
next use of joy in 1 Peter and to the more troubling paradox of rejoicing in 
suffering. 
                                                                                                                                                      
Luke 6.22-23) which seem to foretell the type of persecution that the audience are undergoing. 
There are also some Jewish parallels in Wis 3.4-6, 2 Bar 52.6-7, and Sibylline Oracles 5.269-70. 
Achtemeier notes Romans 5.3-5 and James 1.2 as parallels. However, Romans 5.3-5 does not form 
an exact parallel, because it shows boasting in suffering, which is not the same as rejoicing despite 
suffering. Likewise, James asks his audience to consider their trials pure joy, thus equating trials with 
joy; again, this is different to what we find here in 1 Peter 1.6-8; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 99-100. 
Part 2: The Present Experience 
136 
5. Joy in Suffering – 1 Peter 4.12-13 
In the previous chapter we investigated the author’s presentation of joy despite 
distress. In this chapter our attention will turn to 4.12-13 in which we discover that 
the author goes one stage further and asks his audience to rejoice in suffering. This 
chapter will work from the same understanding of joy presented at the outset of 
the previous chapter. The progress of our discussion will follow a simple trajectory: 
it will first outline what the author is asking the audience to rejoice in; then it will 
seek to decipher the rationale for this; and, in doing so, it will highlight the 
implications for the audience. In order to understand the rationale behind the 
author’s depiction of joy, we will spend the majority of the discussion unpacking the 
author’s presentation of suffering. This will involve significant engagement with the 
imitatio Christi sections of the letter (2.18-25; 3.17-18; 4.1-2). 
Despite joy being pivotal at the outset of the letter for setting the audience’s 
orientation and establishing values, there is no further reference to rejoicing until 
4.13, in which the author says: 
ἀλλὰ καθὸ κοινωνεῖτε τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασιν χαίρετε, ἵνα καὶ ἐν τῇ 
ἀποκαλύψει τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ χαρῆτε ἀγαλλιώμενοι. 
But as far as you participate in the sufferings of Christ, rejoice, so that also 
at the revelation of his glory you may rejoice exceedingly. 
 
From 4.12’s repetition of fire imagery (πύρωσις) and testing (πειρασμός) we can 
understand that the same situation of persecution present in 1.6 is the context for 
4.13 also.437 Thus, this new section of the letter (4.12-19) returns to the issue of the 
audience’s relationship with their hostile community.438 However, in the new call to 
rejoice, the emotional challenge for the audience reaches new levels. 
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 Some scholars have argued that 1.6-7 and 4.12-13 refer to different situations, the first potential, 
the second actual; Windisch, katholischen Briefe, 76; See Goppelt, I Peter, 310. However, I agree 
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5.1 The Occasion for Joy 
In 4.13 there are two occasions for joy: participating in Christ’s suffering and at the 
revelation of his glory. Thus, rejoicing exists in two different timeframes and with 
different actualities. The first is in the present. The mood of χαίρετε could be either 
indicative or imperative. Given that χαίρετε is being compared with μὴ ξενίζεσθε, the 
best reading is imperative.439 Therefore, the author is exhorting the audience to 
have a particular emotional response to their situation, indicating that rejoicing 
should be a present reality for the believer. The second occasion for joy is less 
definite; it exists in the future but is dependent on the previous clause as a 
prerequisite. 440  The consequence of rejoicing in the present is that they will also be 
able to rejoice in the future.441 Τhe occurrence of ξενίζω and ξένος reveals that the 
believers are astonished by what they are experiencing and suggests inner distress 
and turmoil, even cognitive confusion about events that feel incongruous to their 
new Christian status.442 As Schlosser comments, ‘[o]n souffre plus quand les 
événements pénibles sont inattendus et incompréhensibles’.443 Yet, in the face of 
this understandable reaction, the author declares that, instead, joy is the right 
response to persecution.444  
In the previous chapter we determined that joy is appropriate when something 
evaluated as good and beneficial is present. We must, therefore, conclude that the 
author is asking the audience to see their present suffering as a good to be rejoiced 
in and evaluated positively.445 Relying on the Jewish tradition that suffering can be 
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 Michaels, 1 Peter, 262; Schlosser, Pierre, 259. 
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 I read χαρῆτε ἀγαλλιώμενοι with a future sense as indicated by the context of Christ’s coming 
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 Brox, Petrusbrief, 215; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 307; Schlosser, Pierre, 260. 
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welcomed as a test of faithfulness, or a disciplining of the righteous,446 some 
commentators misread the text and conclude, similar to 1.6-7, that the reason for 
rejoicing is the testing mentioned in 4.12.447 Others, like Bechtler, argue that 
suffering in 1 Peter sits in a framework of God’s final judgement. Persecution 
indicates that judgement has started and therefore is a reason to rejoice because it 
marks the beginning of the end and reveals the believers’ election.448 But the clear 
reason for rejoicing is given in 4.13 not 4.12. Thus, as other scholars rightly 
conclude, it is sharing in Christ’s suffering that is the reason for joy, not the trials.449 
The basis for joy is fundamentally Christological because the phrase καθὸ κοινωνεῖτε 
τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασιν reveals that it is not any suffering that should produce 
joy, only suffering that can be deemed to be sharing in Christ’s.450 Therefore, in 
order to understand the rationale for how suffering can be seen as an occasion for 
rejoicing, firstly we need to qualify what the author means by τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ 
παθήμασιν. Then, secondly, we must determine the significance of the participatory 
language used (καθὸ κοινωνεῖτε). 
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 See Elliott n. 577 for a list of Jewish texts that exhibit this tradition and NT echoes;  Elliott, 1 
Peter, 776. 
447
 Selwyn, St. Peter, 127, 222; Nauck has argued that a joy in persecution tradition underlies 1 Peter 
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meaning for suffering; Millauer, Leiden, 127-9, 33. 
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5.1.1 The Sufferings of Christ 
A number of scholars note the use of the definite article before Χριστός which is an 
unusual way for the author to refer to Christ.451 Nevertheless, the majority translate 
τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασιν as ‘the sufferings of Christ’ or ‘Christ’s sufferings,’  
making no real distinction between this reference to ‘the’ Christ and other uses of 
Χριστός in the letter.452 Elliott does recognise the definite article in his translation 
‘the sufferings of the Christ,’ but for Elliott, the definite article ‘reflects an older 
stratum of tradition in which the Christ still functioned as a title for Jesus as the 
Messiah.’ Consequently, he sees Χριστός and ὁ Χριστός as equivalent.453 However, 
for Dubis, the definite article reveals a specific emphasis on Christ as the Messiah. 
In Dubis’ interpretation the genitive is not subjective but descriptive. Consequently, 
‘[t]hese sufferings are “messianic” because they are associated with the advent of 
the Messiah.’454 So, τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασιν indicates a specific period of 
suffering called the ‘messianic woes.’455 According to Dubis, the cross inaugurated 
these woes. Therefore, here the author ‘views the readers as undergoing that 
period of eschatological distress that early Judaism anticipated as occurring 
immediately prior to the Messiah’s advent [parousia].’456 In such a reading, the 
stress is placed on the current experience of the believer and the apparent 
reference to the Christ-event is reduced. Dubis argues that this does not have to be 
so because the messiah ‘also underwent the messianic woes at the cross.’ He 
prefers the ambiguity of the genitive because it can refer to both Christ’s historical 
suffering and the messianic woes.457 However, it is possible to maintain an 
understanding that the Christian is likely to suffer before the parousia from 4.12’s 
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claim that they should not be surprised at their trials, without making τοῖς τοῦ 
Χριστοῦ παθήμασιν a technical reference to ‘the messianic woes.’458 Dubis’ reading 
loses the significance of the Christ-event and gives the audience’s suffering too 
much weight. The audience’s suffering is the topic of 4.12-16, but in 4.13 it is being 
specifically interpreted through its relation to the Christ-event. I therefore prefer 
the translation ‘the suffering of Christ.’459 
So, having established that τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασιν refers to Jesus’ sufferings on 
the cross, we need to outline the characteristics of Christ’s suffering as depicted by 
the author. According to 1 Peter, Christ in his suffering was blameless/sinless (1.19; 
2.22), righteous (3.18), did not unduly retaliate (2.22-23), but trusted God, who 
foreknew his suffering (1.3, 11, 18-21; 2.4), to judge (2.23; cf. 2.4, 7).460 Thus, his 
suffering was unjust. Christ’s suffering was also vicarious, it happened for them 
(1.18-19; 2.21, 24-25; 3.18). Moreover, Christ’s suffering and his subsequent 
glorification by God are bound together (1.11, 21; 3.22; 4.13; 5.1).461 We must keep 
all these elements in mind when we come to interpreting what sharing in Christ’s 
suffering means in 4.13. 
This trope of innocent, righteous, non-violent suffering becomes the benchmark for 
the believers’ suffering. However, unlike Christ, when the author speaks of the 
believers’ suffering he is not referring to one historical event but an ongoing 
issue.462 They experience various difficulties: accusation (2.12), threats (3.16), 
reproach (4.14), and reviling (3.9).463 3.18-19 and 4.1 could indicate that they are 
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suffering physically.464 In conformity to Christ, the believers’ suffering should be 
unjust/righteous and not due to wrongdoing (2.19; 3.14, 17; 4.15); and, like Christ, 
they should entrust themselves to their faithful creator by continuing to do good 
(4.19; cf. 2.23).465 It appears that the principal cause for their suffering is their 
Christian identity and ‘good’ Christian behaviour (2.20; 3.13-14, 17; 4.14-16). Thus, 
Christian suffering has an added dimension: it is for Christ, on account of being a 
Christian. 
However, in 4.12 is seems that, despite being aware of Christ’s suffering, the 
audience are surprised at their own.  Verse 4.12’s negative command (μὴ ξενίζεσθε) 
tells the audience that they should expect their present difficulties, presumably as a 
logical consequence of their relationship to Christ and perhaps because of their 
eschatological understanding.466 For the believers, the narrative of Christ’s death 
and resurrection, which shapes their worldview, should also form their expectation 
of the present and the future. 467 This verse draws on wider tradition, evident 
elsewhere in the NT, that the followers of Christ will suffer as their Lord did (see 
Matt 5.11-12; 10.25; Mark 13.9-13; John 15.18-20; 16.1-4).468 Some have seen 
behind this expectation a Jewish understanding that the righteous follower of God 
will suffer, particularly in the last days.469 Brox, though he recognises the underlying 
Jewish tradition of persecution, rightly stresses that it is also distinctively Christian 
in finding its meaning and motivation in the passion of Christ.470 The passion 
viewpoint and Christian expectation mean that a life of suffering becomes the 
Christian norm.471 This does not mean, contra Dubis, that suffering is a necessity in 
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techniques; see Holloway, Coping, 214-20. 
468
 Cf. 1 Thess 3.3; 2 Tim 3.12; 1 John 3.13;  Acts 14.22; 16.22; Phil 1.27-30; Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 
184; Michaels, 1 Peter, 260; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 304-5. This does not mean that similarities 
between 1 Peter, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, and James were due to a common ‘persecution source’ as 
Selwyn hypothesises; Selwyn, St. Peter, 443, 50-2. 
469
 See 2 Esdr 13.16-19; 2 Bar 25; Jub 23.12-15; 1QH 2.23-22; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 306; cf. Elliott, 1 
Peter, 774. 
470
 Brox, Petrusbrief, 214; cf. Millauer, Leiden, 76-7. 
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 Schlosser, Pierre, 258; cf. Selwyn, St. Peter, 450; Brox, Petrusbrief, 215. 
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1 Peter, but, because of the pattern of Christ, it is a realistic expectation.472 So, 
what does it mean for the suffering believer to participate in Christ’s suffering? 
5.1.2 Participation in 1 Peter 
Having established what is meant by τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασιν in 4.13, we now 
need to examine κοινωνέω. Though there has been discussion recently that has 
challenged assumptions about the meaning of κοινωνέω, in line with Ogereau, I take 
it to have the sense of: 
“to have” or “to do something in common with someone,” and, by 
implication, as “to share, to take part/participate in something in common 
with someone” … . 473 
 
Therefore, the believer rejoices because they participate in suffering in common 
with Christ.474 But, how is the audience to understand their participation? Dubis has 
identified three ways of interpreting participating in Christ’s suffering: ‘(1) imitation 
of Christ; (2) mystical union with Christ; or (3) messianic woes.’475 I will utilise these 
categories and add a fourth: union as solidarity with Christ. 
5.1.2.1 Imitation of Christ 
Ιt is evident that the believers are to imitate Christ. Τhere are three ways in which 
this happens: by their behaviour, thinking, and the reason for suffering.476 The 
behavioural aspect is clear in 2.21, where Christ leaves the believers a pattern 
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 Dubis, Messianic Woes, 63-4. 
473
 J. M. Ogereau, 'A Survey of Κοινωνία and Its Cognates in Documentary Sources,'  NovT 53 (2015): 
275-94, 277. Ogereau’s article is in response to Norbert Baumert who has argued against assuming 
κοινωνέω and μετέχειν are synonyms and therefore that κοινωνέω necessarily means to ‘participate 
in’ or ‘to have a share in’. He prefers the notion of commonality or association; see N. Baumert, 
Koinonein und Metechein - synonym? Ein umfassende semantische Untersuchung (SBB 51; Stuttgart: 
Katholisches Bibelwerk GmbH, 2003). However, Ogereau’s article has demonstrated, using other 
documentary sources not accessed by Baumert, that κοινωνέω and its cognates have to be taken 
contextually. To associate or partner with someone in the majority of cases also involves the activity 
of sharing or participating in something. Having said this, it is not detrimental to my proceeding 
argument if association or partnership is, as Baumert suggests, the overriding force of κοινωνέω. For 
a summary of Baumert’s views and some implications for New Testament studies see A. T. Lincoln, 
'Communion: Some Pauline Foundations,'  Ecclesiology 5 (2009): 135-60. 
474
 Scholars note the parallels with Pauline ideas found in Phil 3.10-11; 2 Cor 1.5-7; Rom 8.17; cf. 2 
Tim 2.11-12; Selwyn, St. Peter, 221; Feldmeier, Peter, 224. Schelkle sees direct influence of Pauline 
theology here; Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 123. 
475
 Dubis, Messianic Woes, 96. 
476
 Dubis, Messianic Woes, 97. 
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(ὑπογραμμός) that they might follow in his footsteps. This is elucidated through 
listing Christ’s behaviour (2.22-23): he did not sin, speak deceitfully, retaliate or 
threaten, but trusted God. Imitating Christ’s thinking occurs in 4.1, where the 
believers are asked to arm themselves with the same ἔννοια as Christ. Lastly, in 
2.20-21 and 3.17-18 where the call to imitate Christ is present, suffering is qualified 
as suffering for doing good, which infers that the believers are only imitating Christ 
if they suffer for the right reasons. Some scholars interpret sharing in Christ’s 
suffering as imitation only.477 However, I would agree with Dubis that, though 
imitation is present in the letter, the use of κοινωνέω suggests more than similarity, 
it speaks of sharing in something, and so there must be a further understanding of 
4.13.478 
5.1.2.2 Mystical Union with Christ 
Dubis explains mystical union with Christ: 
… to suffer in Christ rather than simply like Christ. Here the notion is that 
believers are incorporated into Christ so that they participate in Christ’s 
historical sufferings. And Christ likewise participates in the sufferings of his 
body, the church.479 
 
At points in 1 Peter the believers appear to be in union with Christ. One indication 
of spiritual union is 2.24. Here Christ bears the believers’ sin on the cross (cf. 3.18) 
so that they can die to sins and live for righteousness. 480 Thus, if this depicts union, 
the believer is spiritually incorporated into Christ’s death and, given the notion of 
living to righteousness, also his resurrection.481 However, there is no expansion 
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 Selwyn, St. Peter, 221; Michaels, 1 Peter, 262. 
478
 Dubis, Messianic Woes, 97; cf. Millauer, who also considers following in Christ’s footsteps as 
more than imitation; instead it means walking in obedience to God’s ways; Millauer, Leiden, 68-9, 
84. 
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 Dubis, Messianic Woes, 98. 
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 Here I read ἀπογίνομαι metaphorically as to die because it is paralleled with ζάω. Cf. Windisch, 
katholischen Briefe, 66; Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 85; Goppelt, I Peter, 214; Feldmeier, Peter, 175-6. 
Others prefer the idea of separation from sin; see Selwyn, St. Peter, 181; Bigg, Epistles of St. Peter, 
148-9; Michaels, 1 Peter, 148; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 202-3; Elliott, 1 Peter, 535. 
481
 Selwyn argues that there is no mystical-union here, but the thought is ethical and psychological 
indicating abandonment of sin; Selwyn, St. Peter, 181. I agree with Selwyn (cf. Goppelt, I Peter, 214; 
Feldmeier, Peter, 176) that sins here are practical deeds rather than a particular power, but this does 
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here; unlike in Romans 6.1-11, union is not explicitly linked to baptism, though 
some read 2.24 this way.482 Further, 1 Peter uses the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ (3.16; 5.10, 
14) which in the Pauline corpus has been interpreted by some as spiritual union; 
but does it mean that here? 483  In order to discover this, we will investigate 5.10 
and 5.14 but leave 3.16 until later. In 5.10 the author says that God has called them 
‘in Christ’ into his eternal glory. This could be saying that their incorporation into 
Christ enables their entry into eternal glory.484 But, Feldmeier offers an alternative. 
He reads ‘in Christ’ in 5.10 as meaning the born anew people who belong to God.485 
In this case, ἐν Χριστῷ in 5.10 refers more to incorporation into a group of people 
than spiritual union. 5.14 supports Feldemeier’s reading. It closes the letter by 
wishing Εἰρήνη ὑμῖν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ. Here ἐν Χριστῷ functions in a similar way 
to λαὸς θεοῦ in 2.10 in that it distinguishes the believers from others and so 
designates a particular group of people.486 Consequently, in 5.14, ἐν Χριστῷ does 
not have to mean mystical union but could refer to a body of people. But, equally 
this corporate usage could be a consequence of a union idea: spiritual union with 
Christ is what brings one into a defined body of people distinguished by their 
incorporation into Christ.487 Other examples in 1 Peter that could infer spiritual 
union are the stone imagery of 2.4-6; the offering of sacrifices to God διὰ Ἰησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ (2.5); and the adaptation of Isa 11.2 in 4.14. For Dubis, 4.14 is ‘suggestive 
of an incorporation theology’ because the Spirit which rests on the Messiah in 
Isaiah now rests upon the believers.488 From this survey, it does appear that the 
                                                                                                                                                      
because of the empowerment that identifying with Christ’s death brings; see Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 
85-6; Brox, Petrusbrief, 138. 
482
 See Windisch, katholischen Briefe, 66; Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 86; Elliott, 1 Peter, 536.  
483
 The phrase ἐν Χριστῷ is found in the New Testament only in 1 Peter outside of Paul; Feldmeier, 
Peter, 196. For Kelly, this is evidence of Pauline influence; Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 145. 
484
 Elliott, 1 Peter, 865; Here I read ἐν Χριστῷ as referring to the whole phrase, both καλέσας and 
δόξαν, thus the whole Christian life is in Christ, rather than Christ being the instrument of calling, 
contra Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 345; cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 302. 
485
 Feldmeier, Peter, 251. 
486
 Cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 313. 
487
 Brox, Petrusbrief, 248. Cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 892 for whom ‘in Christ’ expresses ‘the union of all 
those enjoying personal fellowship with Christ.’ Kelly reads ἐν Χριστῷ as implying the baptismal 
regeneration of the believer which has moved him ‘into a new sphere of existence: he is united with 
Christ and shares his risen life’; Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 221; Bigg follows von Soden in seeing no 
reference to mystical union here, instead ‘in Christ’ is simply another name for Christian; Bigg, 
Epistles of St. Peter, 198 ; cf. Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 136; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 356. 
488
 Dubis, Messianic Woes, 103. 
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idea of spiritual union with Christ is potentially present in the letter, but the 
examples are not explicit and some could imply simply being part of a body of 
people. Regardless, I do not think that mystical union is what is being referred to by 
κοινωνέω in 4.13, though it is potentially related to it. 
5.1.2.3 Messianic Woes 
Having discussed above that I do not consider τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασιν to be a 
technical designation for the ‘messianic woes,’ subsequently, I do not think 
participation here is primarily participation in the messianic woes, as Dubis 
argues.489 I do not deny that an idea of a period of eschatological suffering 
preceding the eschaton could have influenced the eschatological perspective of the 
letter, but it is not in the foreground here. The focus in 4.13 is the believer’s 
relationship with Christ and the nature and significance of Christ’s suffering which 
has wider implications than just the messianic woes. I therefore want to argue for 
κοινωνέω as indicating union with Christ, but not spiritual union, rather union as a 
chosen social identification with Christ i.e. as solidarity. 
5.1.2.4 Union as Solidarity with Christ 
By focussing on Christ’s suffering, the author is really asking the audience to 
evaluate their own suffering. In 4.12 the audience’s persecution is in view, but then, 
immediately, Christ’s suffering enters the frame. The adverb καθό links the two 
verses and directs the audience towards this comparison.490 Thus, the picture of 
Christ’s suffering previously established in the letter becomes the reference point 
by which the believers can evaluate their own.491 Christ’s suffering exhibited a 
number of qualities: it was innocent, unjustified, non-retaliatory; it was followed by 
glorification; it was based on a particular mind-set; and it revealed trust in God. 
Therefore, the believers in 4.13 are asked to consider whether their suffering is like 
this. They only participate in Christ’s suffering if their suffering is unjust (is a 
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 Dubis, Messianic Woes, 99-104. 
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 See Michaels, 1 Peter, 262. 
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 As Bechtler rightly notes, the Christ who suffered and was glorified is used to ‘legitimate the 
symbolic universe of its addressees … The letter in effect superimposes Christ’s experience onto that 
of his followers so that Christ’s experience becomes the interpretive lens thought [sic] which 
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consequence of doing good) and if they continue to do good even under conditions 
of suffering.492  
If we were to stop here then κοινωνέω would be imitation. However, 3.16 is 
illuminative for 4.13. In 3.16 the author speaks about the recipients’ good conduct 
‘in Christ’ (τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστροφήν). Thus, doing good comes from their 
relationship to Christ and demonstrates that they are in Christ. Put differently, their 
outward behaviour exhibits both their identity and allegiance i.e. their solidarity. 
The comparison between suffering as a thief or murderer and as Christian (4.14-16) 
indicates that good behaviour is a fundamental aspect of Christian identity.493 If 
doing good is so important, we are led to ask, what does doing good mean, and 
who determines it?  What constitutes ‘good’ is determined by three things: God’s 
character and will – they are to be holy as God is holy (1.14-15); God’s action in 
Christ; and the model of Christ’s life. 494 This awareness of God and his action in 
Christ provides a framework for their behaviour (cf. 2.19; 4.19).495 If the audience 
do good in line with this framework they align themselves with God and Christ i.e. 
choose to live out of their union with Christ. At a secondary level, this worldview 
determines the believers’ norms and values. In solidarity with Christ they live these 
values.  As Bechtler comments, the letter ‘contrasts two competing realities’: 1) the 
believers’ – one of truth and 2) non-Christians’ – one of ignorance. 496  To which 
reality the believers subscribe is shown by their behaviour. It is this acceptance of 
the reality of, and subsequent allegiance to, Christ, demonstrated in doing good, 
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 Feldmeier, Peter, 226. The need for suffering to be on account of doing good is emphasised 
throughout the letter (2.20; 3.13-14, 17; 4.14-16). 
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 Cf. Brox, Petrusbrief, 161. 
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 Thus, to agree with Williams, contra Winter, I cannot see that ‘good works’ implies euergetism 
here or elsewhere in 1 Peter; Williams, Persecution, 258-69; see also fuller discussion in T. B. 
Williams, Good Works in 1 Peter: Negotiating Social Conflict and Christian Identity in the Greco-
Roman World. (WUNT 337; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 68-104, 249-50. 
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Williams, Good Works, 107-62. 
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that brings them into conflict with their surrounding society through a clash of 
enacted values, and results in suffering (cf. 4.2-4).497  Thus, at the meta-level their 
suffering occurs because of, and highlights, a clash of worldviews. 4.14 and 4.16 
reinforce that the cause of suffering is identifying with Christ when they declare 
that the audience suffers ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ and ὡς Χριστιανός.498 Furthermore, this 
makes sense of why suffering can be expected, because choosing solidarity with 
Christ necessarily puts you in opposition to outside society which does not 
recognise Christ and is opposed to God’s ways.499 Thus, the descriptions of Christ’s 
and the believers’ suffering throughout the letter, along with 3.16, point towards 
understanding participation as solidarity with Christ.500  Furthermore, the believers’ 
solidarity with Christ is rooted in and reveals an agreement with the cosmic reality 
manifested in Christ’s life, death, resurrection, and glorification.501 As Jobes 
comments, ‘The Christian who stands fast and suffers for the gospel is responding 
to an eternal reality that will outlast death and even history itself.’502 
I want to clarify the difference between participation as solidarity, mystical union, 
and imitation. Over against mystical union, participation as solidarity emphasises 
that participation in 1 Peter is socio-religious rather than an inner ontological 
alteration of the individual.503 It relates to social commitments and allegiances. It is 
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 Brox, Petrusbrief, 161-2, 214; Feldmeier, Peter, 224. Cf. 2 Tim 3.12 for another example of ‘in 
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Waal Dryden, Theology, 67. 
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 Jobes, 1 Peter, 287. 
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about to whom one belongs and to what truth and values one subscribes.504 
Solidarity is distinguished from imitation because in the solidarity reading Christ is 
not just a prescriptive model but instead allegiance to Christ is the whole basis of 
behaviour. It does not require the believers to imitate Christ’s suffering but instead 
to adopt and align themselves with the cosmic truth Christ reveals. Therefore, to 
participate in Christ’s sufferings is to suffer because of solidarity with Christ which 
results in experiencing innocent suffering  because of unbending good behaviour 
arising from allegiance to God. 
Now we have outlined what participating in Christ’s sufferings means we can return 
to our main theme, which is to identify why such participation is an occasion for 
rejoicing.  
5.2 Christian Suffering and the Good 
The result of the participatory language in 4.13 is that the interpretation of their 
experiences and their subsequent emotion becomes bound up with the person of 
Christ and his story. By seeing suffering as the result of being united with Christ it 
means that suffering no longer needs to be evaluated negatively, because being 
united with Christ and God is good and secures the good (cf. 1.3-9).505 This aligning 
of oneself with God, means, as Mary Douglas says of Jewish religion, that the 
believer can ‘rejoice in living the sacred order.’ Barton rightly adds that this is 
especially evident ‘when the existential stakes for the individual or the community 
are highest, as in matters considered worth living and dying for.’506  Therefore, 
suffering for solidarity with Christ can be an occasion for joy.507 Furthermore, being 
united with Christ now also promises that, like Christ, one’s unjust suffering will 
ultimately be vindicated. Additionally, to see suffering as unjust and on account of 
                                                                                                                                                      
best understood in terms of being partners of or associating with a particular group’; Liebengood, 
Eschatology, 142.  
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 Cf. Goppelt, I Peter, 245-6; Elliott, 1 Peter, 632. 
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doing good means that suffering can be seen as a positive legitimisation of Christian 
behaviour. These evaluations allow joy to be an appropriate emotion.  
There are some obvious consequences of this understanding for the audience’s 
sense of identity and their role in society. The self is understood in relation to 
Christ, and as such suffering is a marker that positively affirms identity rather than 
causing shame.508  The primary concern becomes one’s position with Christ not 
one’s standing in the community. One’s relationship with Christ may result in being 
shunned by society, but this does not have to affect self-esteem, because the root 
of one’s identity is not one’s association with the outside community but one’s 
solidarity with Christ and God’s people.509 Thus, joy, like in 1.6-8, is reminding the 
audience to focus on the significance of their relationship with Christ.  Rhetorically, 
using joy here is seeking to reinforce internally a worldview and sense of Christian 
self that could otherwise be deconstructed by the experience of reproach. If Berger 
and Luckmann are right that one’s understanding of the world is mediated by our 
relationship with a significant other, then here, joy is asserting the significance of 
Christ as the primary reference point through whom all other meaning is made 
meaningful.510 This is likely to change how the believers value the hostile others 
and, consequently, will shape their emotional interactions with them. Again, a 
therapeutic consequence of seeing suffering as occurring because of identification 
with Christ is stability. One’s relationship with Christ, which is a cause for rejoicing, 
cannot be negatively affected by suffering. Suffering for doing good can only reveal 
that you are ‘in Christ’ and therefore reaffirm that relationship. Thus, one does not 
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 We will return to the discussion of shame in chapter 7. See Bechtler, who acknowledges that 
God’s action of creating a new community in Christ has given this new community a symbolic 
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need to be distressed but can have a positive outlook, and, more importantly, 
Christian behaviour and witness are maintained. 
We mentioned at the outset that for joy to be appropriate, sharing in Christ’s 
suffering has to be evaluated as good. The above discussion has laid out a rationale 
for why this is possible. However, there are wider implications of both aligning 
oneself with Christ and therefore continuing to do good in the face of opposition. 
We will now investigate these, which will include recognising the witnessing (or 
transformational) possibility of suffering for doing good; that suffering reveals sin-
free living; and that it results in blessing and glory.  
5.2.1 The Witness of Strange Suffering  
One significant good of Christian suffering is its witnessing potential. Despite some 
like Bechtler and Holloway declaring that 1 Peter has virtually no evangelistic 
emphasis, I would argue that it is actually full of the potential of Christian 
witness.511 2.9 makes it clear that the primary purpose of God’s new people is to 
proclaim (ἐξαγγέλλω) the virtues (ἀρεταί) of God who has called them out of 
darkness into his light. The language of darkness to light signifies conversion,512 and 
the word ἀρετή does not mean moral virtue, but the ‘manifestations of his power,’ 
which ‘in a Jewish-Christian setting must be God’s saving acts.’513 Thus, 2.9 is a call 
to Christian witness.514 It is highly likely that those who had themselves been 
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 Bechtler, Following, 114; Holloway, Coping, 176 
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 Cf. 1 Thess 5.4-9; Eph 5.8-11; Elliott, 1 Peter, 441 
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converted through the proclaiming (εὐαγγελίζομαι)515 of the gospel (1.12) would 
recognise the relevance of proclamation for others.516  
However, in 1 Peter the mode of proclamation is not preaching but good conduct. 
This is most strongly identified in 2.12 and 3.1-2. In 2.12 the believers are exhorted 
to have good conduct among their hostile neighbours so that those speaking 
against them might glorify (δοξάζω) God on the day of visitation (ἐν ἡμέρᾳ 
ἐπισκοπῆς).517 There is disagreement as to whether this verse indicates conversion 
of nonbelievers, and, if it does, at what point does this take place? The majority 
interpret ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπισκοπῆς, I think rightly, as referring to the final judgment.518 
Therefore, for Achtemeier, this verse says that, at the final judgement, the 
nonbeliever will recognise that Christians were acting in line with God, and so will 
be led to glorify God at this point.519 But others, like Bigg, prefer the idea of 
conversion because ‘the heathen could not be said to glorify God in the Revelation, 
unless they had already been converted.’ 520 I agree with Bigg’s logic, and therefore 
side with those who read δοξάζω as indicating that good conduct is aiming at 
present conversion of the nonbeliever.521 As Feldmeier comments: 
… the author directs the interest of his addressees to the winning of others. 
To some degree boldly, but absolutely not without an instinct for its effect 
on the general public, the offence is interpreted as an opportunity for 
recruitment and thereby the possibility is open to transform the destructive 
pressure of suffering into an opportunity to actively take advantage of.522  
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517
 For possible background to the unique Petrine phrase ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπισκοπῆς see Elliott, 1 Peter, 470-
1. 
518
 The other alternative is the present confronting of the nonbeliever. For Schückler this means 
God’s gracious visitation that brings his salvation and enlightening; see Elliott, 1 Peter, 471; cf. 
Selwyn, St. Peter, 171; Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 106; G. Schlückler, 'Wandel im Glauben als 
missionarisches Zeugnis,'  ZMR 51 (1967): 289-99, 293. 
519
 Achtemeier does not state whether judgement will end positively or negatively for the 
nonbeliever; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 178; cf. Holloway, Coping, 176-7. 
520
 Bigg, Epistles of St. Peter, 138-9 
521
 Selwyn, St. Peter, 170; Brox, Petrusbrief, 113; Michaels, 1 Peter, 118; Elliott, 1 Peter, 465, 70. 
522
 Feldmeier, Peter, 150. 
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Thus, doing good presents an evangelistic possibility.523 1 Peter is not alone in this, 
as Elliott comments, ‘[s]uch sensitivity concerning the positive impact of behaviour 
on outsiders is typical of the early Christian movement.’524 This reading of 1 Peter 
2.12 is strengthened by 3.1-2 in which it is categorically stated that the non-
believing husband might be gained (κερδαίνω), without a word, by the wife’s pure 
conduct (ἁγνὴ ἀναστροφή), i.e. the husband is won to the faith.525 
But, how does this good conduct bear witness? Achtemeier argues that good 
behaviour is conduct that ‘will also be recognized as appropriate by nonbelievers.’ 
The aim of having such conduct is ‘to blunt harassment and persecution but also to 
win over some of those who oppose them.’526 Why should the nonbeliever be won 
over by this good conduct? For those who see witness in 2.12, Michaels summarises 
the majority view well: 
The scenario was not that Christians would proclaim to them [nonbelievers] 
the gospel of Christ, like those who first brought the Christian message to 
the provinces of Asia … but that simply by observing the “good conduct” or 
“good works” of those who believed in Christ, the accusers would see that 
their charges were false. Acknowledging the faith of the Christians as true 
and the God of the Christians as worthy of their worship, they would “glorify 
God on the day of visitation” … 527 
 
Yet, this argument does not seem particularly convincing. It is based on the idea 
that all humans can recognise good. But, Achtemeier himself notes that not all 
people have the same idea of ‘good.’528 ‘Good’ is not a universal concept; it is 
                                                     
523
 Matthew 5.11-16 provides a useful parallel to 1 Peter. The same context of being persecuted for 
Christ is evident. The Christian is described as the light of the world (5.13-14) intended to shine 
before men by their good works (τὰ καλὰ ἔργα) so that the people who see will glorify (δοξάζω) their 
father in heaven (5.15-16). The close parallels suggest that 1 Peter is aware of Jesus traditions here. 
524
 Cf. 1 Cor 10.31-33; Phil 2.15; Col 4.5-6; 1 Thess 4.11-12; Elliott, 1 Peter, 469 
525
 Many agree that κερδαίνω is a distinctly missionary term. See Matt 18.15; 1 Cor 9.22; Michaels, 1 
Peter, 157; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 210; Elliott, 1 Peter, 558 etc. See also D. Daube, 'κερδαίνω as a 
Missionary Term,'  HTR 40 (1947): 109-20. 
526
 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 172; A number of other scholars also recognise this as 1 Peter’s strategy 
against abuse. See Selwyn, St. Peter, 170; Michaels, 1 Peter, 118; Elliott, 1 Peter, 466-70; Jobes, 1 
Peter, 170-2. If this were the case, this would be an example of a ‘problem focussed’ coping strategy 
which seeks to change the attitude of the other by altering the opinion about the prejudiced person 
through disconfirming stereotypes. See  Holloway, Coping, 117-9, 174-5. 
527
 Michaels, 1 Peter, 118; cf. Goppelt, I Peter, 158-60. 
528
 See Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 176-7. 
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determined by society and culture. Thus, if good conduct is recognised as such by 
the hostile neighbour, it is unlikely to win someone over to another view of reality 
i.e. to Christ or the Christian God, because such ‘good’ would be in-line with the 
other’s current worldview. It would not cause them to recognise Christ, but would 
reinforce the norms they already hold.529 If this is the case, then perhaps good 
conduct is not intended to be a witness and is simply a way of minimising distress 
by acculturation.530 The problem is that 1 Peter distinguishes sharply between the 
believers’ ‘in Christ’ life and their previous cultural identity (1.14-15). The letter 
does not describe Greco-Roman society’s behaviour or culture in positive terms 
(1.18; 4.3-4).531 Instead, good conduct is linked to God’s character and will (1.15-
16).532 Doing good within this framework is a fundamental part of their Christian 
identity (cf. 4.18-19). As Bechtler comments, the idea of ‘doing good’ may be a 
widely accepted value.  But it is likely that the Christian and nonbeliever will 
disagree on what ‘good’ is, due to their different norms.533 In fact, it appears their 
doing good (ἀγαθοποιέω) is being labelled as doing evil (κακοποιέω; 2.12).534  This is 
not just a mismatch, but an opposition of values. Furthermore, our discussion on 
joy has revealed that the author is working to establish a change of primary 
reference group in the mind of the audience (cf. 1.22-23; 2.9-10). Why would he 
seek to encourage them to be moulded to their previous society again? The 
designation πάροικος and παρεπίδημος in 2.11 suggests he is not doing so.  
A better answer for how good conduct can bear witness is found in the idea of 
participating in Christ’s suffering because of allegiance to God. The believers do 
                                                     
529
 Cf. Schlückler, 'Wandel,' 292-4. Schückler recognises the need for the nonbeliever to be opened 
to a new reality. However, I do not conclude with Schückler that the recognition of ‘good’ and of the 
true reality depends solely on God’s gracious visitation, i.e. only via God’s agency in an elective 
sense.   
530
 See Williams, Good Works, 167-84 for arguments against this misconception of the social function 
of good works in 1 Peter. Though I agree with the majority of Williams’ argument, I would not want 
to remove all trace of optimism that good works might influence the audience’s social situation, but 
I agree that it is not through accommodation and conformity. Again, I will return to the social 
strategy of 1 Peter in the conclusion.  
531
 See De Waal Dryden, Theology, 91-5, 114-5 who argues that no middle ground is left by 1 Peter. 
532
 Cf. Goppelt, I Peter, 158. 
533
 Bechtler, Following, 93; contra Brox, Petrusbrief, 113, though Brox is aware of the paradox, which 
he thinks does not trouble the author, that on the one hand the Christian can be defamed for their 
Christian life, but on the other hand, their life can also be a witness. 
534
 Goppelt, I Peter, 158 ; cf. Brox, Petrusbrief, 113; Williams, Good Works, 173-4. 
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good because of an awareness of God and live in accordance with his norms 
revealed in Christ.535 Thus, their good conduct is interpreted as ‘good’ only within a 
defined scheme of reality.536 It is this meta-narrative that is the basis for their 
identity and subsequent conduct.537 As Achtemeier rightly comments, within this 
schema they can aim to cause as little offence to the other as possible but, 
… where their Christian calling collides with social custom or political 
expectation, they must defy that custom and be ready to suffer, as was 
Christ, rather than abandon their calling to follow God.538 
 
Thus, at points the Christian will defy the norms and expectations of surrounding 
society. Consequently, Christian behaviour may seem odd to and conflict with the 
surrounding society (cf. ξενίζω 4.4).539 It is at the point of confusion and conflict that 
one questions meaning, trying to make sense of the other’s behaviour. One usually 
does this by recourse to one’s understanding of reality. However, when something 
does not fit with the established worldview, or challenges it, the worldview itself 
comes into question.540 Therefore, the ‘strangeness’ of the believers’ behaviour 
challenges the other’s accepted worldview and points towards another reality. In 
this regard, it is the basis of the believer’s different behaviour that is important for 
witness, not simply its degree.541 This strange behaviour may leave the other in 
confusion, or, it may cause the bewildered to question the believer’s conduct and 
therefore afford the believer the chance to profess God in both word and deed.542   
                                                     
535
 In this I agree with Schückler that their good behaviour is not primarily aimed at affecting the 
believer; it is orientated around God’s will. It only has the ability to witness so long as it points to the 
faith and God; Schlückler, 'Wandel,' 294. 
536
 Cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 466 who comments that  καλός in both LXX and NT ‘designates behaviour that 
is honourable in the sight of God’. Cf. Deut 6.18; 12.28.  
537
 De Waal Dryden, Theology, 118. 
538
 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 194. 
539
 As Schückler comments, ‘Der Wandel im Glauben wird von den Nichtgläubigen als fremd, 
befremdlich und als beunruhigend empfunden. Sie haben keine plausible Erklärung für diesen 
christlichen Wandel, der sich exponiert, aussetzt und distanziert von dem „überlieferten“ Wandel; 
Schlückler, 'Wandel,' 291. 
540
 Berger and Luckmann, Social, 104-8. 
541
 De Waal Dryden, Theology, 135 (following Volf). 
542
 As De Waal Dryden comments, ‘difference and mission come together in identity … In 
maintaining their virtuous conduct ‘as aliens and strangers’, the Christians reveal their distinction 
from outsiders; but inherent in this distinction is an invitation. Because their identity is constructed 
positively, it does not exclude outsiders’; De Waal Dryden, Theology, 137-8. 
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At this point of curiosity there is an opportunity for the other to encounter a new 
reality which centres on Christ and if accepted may lead to conversion.543 As 
mentioned above, the believers participate in Christ’s suffering because they 
continue to do good in solidarity with God and Christ. Thus, doing good is what 
displays allegiance, causes suffering, and can be a witness. It is perhaps an even 
greater witness to another reality that someone would choose to suffer, 
maintaining loyalty to God, rather than change behaviour. Such strange behaviour 
and strange suffering has the potential to bear witness to God and therefore can be 
evaluated as good and a reason to rejoice. 
If we allow that participating in the sufferings of Christ means aligning oneself to 
the truth demonstrated in the narrative of God’s action in Christ, then we can see 
further implications for the believer in the imitatio Christi sections of 1 Peter. As we 
approach these sections of the letter, we need to retain what we have just 
established: that doing good, especially suffering for it, can be a witness to another 
reality. 
5.2.2 Suffering for Others 
The first significant comparison between the suffering believer and the suffering of 
Christ is in 2.18-25. This passage evidences the line of thought we have been 
working with; it shows the relationship between acting because of a consciousness 
of God (2.19), doing good (2.20), and suffering unjustly for it (2.19).544  Such 
behaviour is commendable before God. More than this, suffering on account of 
doing good is what they are called to (2.21).545 The reasoning is then given:  
ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἔπαθεν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν,  
ὑμῖν ὑπολιμπάνων ὑπογραμμόν  
ἵνα ἐπακολουθήσητε τοῖς ἴχνεσιν αὐτοῦ, 
                                                     
543
 Michaels notes that ἐποπτεύω (2.12) ‘suggests an act of observing that leads to a change of mind 
or outlook, like having one’s eyes opened to something not seen before.’ For Michaels this indicates 
the cause of conversion, not necessarily the moment of conversion; Michaels, 1 Peter, 118. 
544
 Here συνείδησις θεοῦ is an awareness of God rather than conscience. It still contains a moral 
element through being conscious of God and his will; See Michaels, 1 Peter, 140; cf. Goppelt, I Peter, 
197-8; Elliott, 1 Peter, 519.  
545
 This is not a call to suffering, but a call to a life that is ‘in Christ’ and demonstrates allegiance to 
God in doing good. Michaels supports this when he says that in 2.21-25 Christ is given as an 
‘example of doing good, not as an example of patient endurance’; Michaels, 1 Peter, 141; contra 
Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 118. 
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because Christ suffered on your behalf,  
leaving a pattern for you,  
so that you might follow in his steps (2.21). 
 
Thus, there are two things highlighted for the audience: that Christ suffered for 
them and that they should follow in his steps. Many scholars recognise the call to 
imitate Christ, and this is indeed present.546 But what should be made of the first 
clause: that Christ suffered on behalf of them? Scholars take different approaches. 
Kelly does not think that it intended to emphasise the vicarious nature of Christ’s 
suffering, but is simply ‘an integral part of the creedal sentence quoted.’ 547 
Feldmeier reads it as another encouragement to imitate Christ’s suffering.548 
Goppelt agrees, but emphasises the discipleship element of following Christ and as 
such Jesus’ suffering for them becomes ‘encounter and obligation.’549 But 
encounter and obligation is already present in the idea of calling. In Goppelt’s 
reading nothing is added by the reminder that Christ suffered for them. So, what is 
the author doing here? Is he simply drawing lines of reciprocal allegiance? 
Achtemeier comes close to this: Christ suffered for them, therefore, because of 
their devotion, they are called to suffer for Christ.550 Or is the motive supposed to 
be one of gratitude? 551 All these views miss a more obvious implication of this 
phrase which is shown by the parallelism between the believers’ innocent suffering 
and Christ’s that runs through 2.21-25. 
The majority of commentators acknowledge the correspondence between the 
believer and Christ here, but think this finishes at 2.23. Thus, 2.24-5 speaks about 
the atoning work of Christ’s death which has consequences for the believer but 
                                                     
546
 It is no doubt right that the parallelism between the believers and Christ is based on the theme of 
innocent suffering and that the example of Christ is used to encourage a non-retaliatory response to 
persecution; Elliott, 1 Peter, 523, 25-32; Feldmeier, Peter, 169-70, 74. 
547
 Here Kelly, like others, notes the liturgical quality of 2.21-25; Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 119. 
548
 Christ’s death is read as leaving an ethical imperative for the believer; Feldmeier, Peter, 173-4. 
549
 Goppelt, I Peter, 202-6; Achtemeier, likewise, emphasises discipleship rather than imitation; 
Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 199 ; cf. Thurén who also sees obligation as a motivating factor here; Thurén, 
Argument, 144. 
550
 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 198-9. 
551
 See Selwyn, St. Peter, 92, 179. 
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exhibits no parallelism.552 However, in terms of composition, as Michaels posits, 
there is ‘no sharp distinction in vv 21-25 between Christ as an example to Christian 
believers of nonretaliation … and Christ as redeemer of Christian believers’.553 
Perhaps, continuity between 2.23 and 24 indicates that the audience should see the 
pattern of Christ as relevant for them from verse 22 to 25. This is supported by the 
fact that each successive idea is introduced by a repeated relative pronoun. This 
pattern runs through 2.22-24 and suggests that following in Christ’s steps goes 
beyond 2.22-23’s nonviolent suffering.  Moreover, the verses appear in a chiastic 
structure: Christ suffered for you (2.21); sinless example (2.22); non-retaliation 
example (2.23); Christ bore our sins (2.24). Therefore, framing verses 22-23, which 
are pulled out as imitation elements, are two reminders that Christ’s death was for 
them. What this does is frame Christ’s historical suffering in the larger narrative of 
God’s work of salvation. In asking the audience to follow in Christ’s footsteps and 
then bringing in this larger reality, the author also draws their everyday suffering 
into this larger framework. 
The outcome for the believer of Christ’s suffering is four things: being separated 
from sin, living for righteousness, being healed, and their returning to the shepherd 
and overseer of their souls. It could be that these verses (2.24-25) detail how the 
believer has been enabled by Christ to live a righteous life.554 Yet, as mentioned, by 
listing these outcomes, the author is emphasising the larger narrative of God’s 
redemptive work through Christ in which the believer participates.555 This is 
particularly highlighted in the second imitatio Christi section (3.17-18). After 
associating suffering for doing good with the will of God, the author gives the 
reason:  
                                                     
552
 Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 147; who holds the same position concerning 3.18; cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 525-
7; W. J. Dalton, Christ's Proclamation to the Spirits: A Study of 1 Peter 3:18-4:6 (Analecta Biblica 23; 
2nd ed.; Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1989), 126. Thurén is an exception. He thinks that 
‘22-24a explains what these footsteps are’; Thurén, Argument, 143. Jobes also lists 2.21-25 as 
example, but does not relate 24-25 to the believers specifically; Jobes, 1 Peter, 196-200. 
553
 Michaels does not pull out the full implications of this, but again follows the majority in 
separating off 2.21-23 as example from 2.24-5 as significance; Michaels, 1 Peter, 136, 43. 
554
 Elliott, 1 Peter, 523, 8; cf. Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 203. 
555
 If ἐπεστράφητε (2.25) is passive rather than middle, then it implies the activity of God in the 
redemptive process; cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 539. 
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ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαθεν,556  
δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων, 
ἵνα ὑμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ θεῷ,  
because, also, Christ once for sins suffered, 
a righteous man on behalf of unrighteous people, 
so that he might bring you to God (2.18). 557 
 
In both 2.21-25 and 3.17-18 the end point is the reminder that through Christ’s 
righteous suffering they have been brought to God.558 Thus, in both contexts the 
larger plan of salvation is accentuated.559 Selwyn, who does ask how far the 
believer’s suffering should be paralleled with the atoning death of Christ, comments 
that it is the motive and principles underlying Jesus’ innocent suffering and atoning 
death that can be copied. He then clarifies: ‘the motive on which St. Peter dwells is 
that of winning people for God’ which is shown in both imitatio Christi passages.560 
Thus, for the above compositional reasons, I think it is perfectly plausible, given the 
audience have been asked to see their suffering as parallel to Christ’s in every other 
respect, that the parallel with Christ’s suffering can also encompass the place of the 
believers’ suffering in the larger redemptive plan of God.561 This is not to say that 
                                                     
556
 That the death of Jesus is expressed as suffering rather than dying for sins demonstrates a desire 
to bring the Christ event into direct comparison with the believer’s suffering. Cf. 2.21; Feldmeier, 
Peter, 201; also Elliott, 1 Peter, 525. 
557
 Like with 2.22-25, some see traditional hymnic material underlying this passage; Kelly, Epistles of 
Peter, 146; However, this does not have to be so; as Feldmeier asserts, it simply recounts in a dense 
form common Christian confessional material; Feldmeier, Peter, 198; cf. Selwyn, St. Peter, 195. For 
arguments against underlying hymnic material in 2.21-25 see Michaels, 1 Peter, 136-7.  
558
 Thurén recognises the emphasis the author places on the consequences of Christ’s suffering in 
3.18. However, he simply concludes that the author wants to give value to unjust suffering by 
indicating that it can lead to a good result; Thurén, Argument, 160. Jobes also sees 3.18 as relevant 
to the believer only in as much as it demonstrates ‘the way to follow Christ to victory’; Jobes, 1 
Peter, 237-8. 
559
 Indeed, Elliott notes how 3.18-22 goes further than 2.21-25 in displaying the ‘once-for-all nature 
of Christ’s suffering’ and in detailing the ‘cosmic scope of Christ’s action’; Elliott, 1 Peter, 640; cf. 
Selwyn, St. Peter, 195; Goppelt, I Peter, 254-5. 
560
 Selwyn, St. Peter, 97-8, 195; Bigg argues similarly, though he allows more parallelism in 
atonement than I think 1 Peter allows: ‘He [Christ] died as the innocent sin-offering, and our 
sufferings have in their degree a similar value; He bought us near to God, and we may bring others. 
But these lessons are allusively conveyed, and do not lie on the surface’; Bigg, Epistles of St. Peter, 
161. 
561
 De Waal Dryden does think that ‘Christ’s work on the ‘tree’’ can be ‘both vicarious and 
exemplary’ because Christ’s death is an ‘active obedience to God’s will’ and demonstrates 
‘continuing to do good in the face of unjust suffering’. However, for De Waal Dryden, this parallel 
stops at the moral sphere; De Waal Dryden, Theology, 187-88. 
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the believer’s suffering is like Christ’s in atoning for them or others, but it shares 
similarity in its motivation and potential outcome.562 
We have argued that doing good has the ability to witness by signalling to the 
norms of another reality. If we draw this together with the concept of righteous 
suffering for the other, demonstrated in Christ, we can understand that the 
audience can, like Christ, see that their suffering might be used to bring people to 
God. In their righteous suffering the unrighteous other can be made aware of the 
consciousness of God that motivates them and be brought into a new reality. Thus, 
the believer can appreciate the value of their suffering not only for themselves, but 
for the potential salvation of the other. By participating in Christ’s suffering, their 
proclamatory suffering can play a part in God’s redemptive plan. 563 If this is true, it 
is remarkable, because it means that in 2.18-25 not only are slaves given moral 
responsibility, but they are also made key agents in ministering God’s salvation to 
others.564 I do not think the potential impact on the other would be lost on an 
audience who themselves have been converted to Christ. They could easily 
understand that God’s redemptive plan stretches wider than them alone and that 
others too can be brought into God’s community. As they participate in the 
sufferings of Christ they can share in this.565 This makes sense of why the author 
consistently moves beyond the pattern of Christ’s death to its larger significance. 
Consequently, both 2.24-25 and 3.17-18, like 2.9, are reminders to the audience of 
their previous state and way of life: a way that was marked with ignorance and 
                                                     
562
 I agree with the majority of scholars who hold to the uniqueness of Christ’s vicarious death; 
Michaels, 1 Peter, 201-2; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 246-7; Elliott, 1 Peter, 525. 
563
 That 2.15 says that those speaking against the Christians will be shamed might seem to argue 
against any indication of witness in 2.19-25. However, shaming does not have to refer to 
eschatological judgement which would condemn the persecutor (see Feldmeier, Peter, 197). If it 
refers to shaming in the present then that shaming, which would occur because of a realisation of 
the falseness of their accusations, would concurrently prove the validity of the Christian way of life 
and so could be a mode by which the persecutor comes to recognise the other reality that good 
conduct points to. 
564
 Elliott, 1 Peter, 513; cf. Feldmeier who links 2.20 with 2.12 and 3.1-2 to draw the conclusion that 
the ‘slaves who are outwardly powerless can give a not insignificant contribution to the Christian 
mission’; Feldmeier, Peter, 172. 
565
 Cf. Mark 13.9-10 where suffering for Christ is a witness to others and is linked to the need for the 
gospel to be preached to all nations. Moreover, the idea of personal suffering being for others as 
part of the extension of the gospel can be seen in Col 1.24-25. 
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wrongdoing like that of their abusers (cf. 1.18; 4.3). As Michaels notes, in 3.18 ‘[f]or 
a moment, the readers of the epistle are themselves put in the position of the 
“unjust” who afflict them unjustly;’ they were previously ‘alienated from God and 
needing to be reconciled.’566  They were unrighteous sinners who have been 
recipients of grace and mercy. All this is God’s doing, not their own. Because of this, 
the believers can have confidence in their salvation and demonstrate moral 
strength in doing good, but they cannot have an arrogant or superior attitude 
toward their accusers. Such a perspective could help the sufferer to respond to 
their persecutors confidently, yet gently and with respect (2.17; 3.16). We noted 
earlier that joy seeks to outline the importance of their solidarity with Christ and 
displaced the significance of the hostile other. If taken to the extreme, this could 
result in the complete devaluing of the other. However, a reminder of the 
audience’s place before conversion and the indication that they could be used to 
extend salvation to others could provide a corrective to this negative attitude so 
that the other remains valuable, just not the most significant. Thus, we can 
conclude that one good of suffering innocently, i.e. sharing in Christ’s sufferings, is 
that it points to Christ and an alternate system of reality and therefore could draw 
others towards salvation. This participation in God’s redemptive plan is a good 
worth rejoicing in. 
This leads us to a second, interlinked good: the transformative value of righteous 
suffering. It logically follows that if nonbelievers are won to Christianity by the 
witness of the sufferer then the accusers’ actions towards the believer are likely to 
be transformed and persecution will cease.567 In 3.13 the author indicates that 
doing good has potential to change the situation when he asks: Καὶ τίς ὁ κακώσων 
ὑμᾶς ἐὰν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ζηλωταὶ γένησθε; This question begs the response, ‘No one’, 
and thus encourages a positive perspective on the impact of doing good.568 
                                                     
566
 Michaels, 1 Peter, 202. 
567
 Cf. 2.12, 15; 3.14, 16. As argued above, humiliation of the abuser in these verses might lead to a 
change of attitude on the part of the accuser. Some of these verses do not necessarily indicate 
conversion but instead correction of the nonbeliever. 
568
 Admittedly, this could be read eschatologically, meaning that the abuser cannot ultimately harm 
the believer ( de Villiers, 'Joy,' 77), so does not necessarily warrant an expectation of present change 
of circumstances. 
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However, the author concedes that this may not always be the outcome (3.14). The 
most overt allowance for transformation of the social situation is the winning 
conduct of the wife (3.2). Thus, there is a positive expectation that doing good 
because of solidarity with Christ has the potential to alleviate persecution. Yet, the 
reality appears that doing good will, in most cases, lead to suffering. However, 
because they can rejoice in sharing in Christ’s sufferings, even when doing good 
does not alter the social situation, they do not need to be despondent, but can 
continue to do good regardless.  
5.2.3 Suffering and Sin-free Living 
We can now turn to the last imitatio Christi portion of 1 Peter. At 4.1-3 the 
implication of sharing in Christ’s suffering for the believer’s ethical life is 
revealed.569  After a brief diversion, the author returns to the topic of Christ’s 
suffering by saying Χριστοῦ οὖν παθόντος σαρκί which recalls the θανατωθεὶς μὲν 
σαρκί of 3.18.570 The audience are then exhorted: καὶ ὑμεῖς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν 
ὁπλίσασθε. Thus, the audience are asked to imitate Christ’s way of thinking i.e. his 
perspective on suffering. The reason is given: ὅτι ὁ παθὼν σαρκὶ πέπαυται 
ἁμαρτίας.571 Here ὁ παθών refers to the suffering Christian not Christ.572 It speaks of 
the persecution they are undergoing, not figurative suffering (or death) in 
baptism.573 The perfect tense of παύω means that the effect of having such an 
attitude is ongoing.574 Here the word ἁμαρτία refers to ‘active wrongdoing contrary 
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 Elliott, 1 Peter, 711. 
570
 Michaels, 1 Peter, 224-5; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 276; Feldmeier, Peter, 212. This has the effect of 
making 3.19-22 seem like an excursus. 
571
 Contra Achtmeier and Martin, I read  ὅτι as explanatory rather than outlining the content of 
ἔννοια; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 278; Martin, Metaphor, 227-9. For support for reading ὅτι as 
explanatory see Michaels, 1 Peter, 226; Elliott, 1 Peter, 714; Dalton, Christ's Proclamation, 221; The 
designation of ‘in the flesh’, like with Christ, means the suffering the believer experiences whilst in 
their physical body, i.e. in the present human existence. Thus suffering can include psychological 
suffering also; cf. Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 280-1. 
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 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 278-9; Schlosser, Pierre, 235; Contra Michaels, 1 Peter, 226-9. 
573
 Contra Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 168-9; Schlosser, Pierre, 235; Schlekle affirms the baptismal 
interpretation, though very tentatively; Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 114; A comparison with Romans 6 is 
usually the basis for this interpretation.  
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Dalton, Christ's Proclamation, 222. 
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to the will of God,’ rather than any particular power.575 Thus, the resulting 
translation is ‘because the one who suffers in the flesh has ceased from sinning.’ 
The direct link between having the same thinking as Christ with regard to suffering 
and the ability to constantly live a morally upright life is apparent. This is 
underscored by the author in 4.2 where the εἰς shows the goal of the new state: εἰς 
τὸ μηκέτι ἀνθρώπων ἐπιθυμίαις ἀλλὰ θελήματι θεοῦ τὸν ἐπίλοιπον ἐν σαρκὶ βιῶσαι 
χρόνον.576 
There is a danger that, if we do not read these verses carefully, we interpret 1 Peter 
as saying that suffering is necessary to overcome sin.577 This has led some to the 
conclusion that suffering is purificatory, or even atoning.578 Yet, 1 Peter is clear that 
only Christ’s vicarious suffering is atoning (1.18-19; 2.24; 3.18), and that the 
believer has already been purified by obedience to the gospel (1.22). Goppelt offers 
an alternative, commenting that ‘suffering leads to doing right’ because suffering 
‘destroys and judges the flesh.’579 Goppelt relies on an anthropological 
understanding of flesh which is opposed to spirit so that the battle becomes with 
one’s own flesh.580 Goppelt does not go so far as to say that suffering frees from 
sin, he reserves this for Christ, but that flesh is ‘handed over to suffering unto death 
in discipleship.’ Flesh and sin belong together. Therefore, one has to die to be free 
from sin.581 Though 1 Peter does say that Christ was put to death in the flesh and 
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 So, can be translated as the active ‘sinning’ as Elliott suggests; Elliott, 1 Peter, 715; cf. Bigg, 
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 Cf. Thurén who says that εἰς τό indicates the intended result: 4.1 gives the means, 4.2 the 
purpose; Thurén, Argument, 82. 
577
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made alive in the spirit (3.18), the Pauline opposition of flesh and spirit is not 
operational here. As Elliott comments, the audience is not released from the power 
of sin, but ceases sinful behaviour.582 Furthermore, Goppelt’s reading makes 
awkward the following phrase in which the author says that the remaining time in 
the flesh (τὸν ἐπίλοιπον ἐν σαρκὶ βιῶσαι χρόνον) should be lived in the will of God. 
More problematically, Goppelt’s reading infers that the audience is expected to 
emulate Christ’s death, and thus positively encourages martyrdom. However, 
nowhere does 1 Peter say that suffering ‘in itself is a good thing.’ Suffering is always 
because of doing good.583 Additionally, there is no need to see suffering here as 
indicating death; it evokes instead the audience’s present persecution. Elliott’s 
position shares similarities with Goppelt’s. For Elliott, this passage reveals the 
‘disciplining function’ that suffering can have, in that it ‘assists in the control of the 
flesh, which is prone to sinning.’ Elliott uses Israelite wisdom tradition (e.g. Prov 
3.11-12; 23.13-14; Sir 22.6; 30.1) and Hebrews 12.7-11 to argue that one learns 
obedience from suffering. He concludes that suffering ‘disciplines the physical body 
(sarx) by which sinning is carried out and thereby trains one to cease from 
sinning.’584 However, though Hebrews does depict the disciplining function of 
suffering, I do not think 1 Peter supports this. In 1 Peter, suffering is a consequence 
of their solidarity to Christ in doing good. Thus, suffering is a result of their 
obedience to God, not productive of it.585 
In our interpretation we need to start where the author does. His primary point of 
departure is Christ’s thinking. The word ἔννοια indicates ‘understanding’, ‘thinking’, 
even ‘mind-set’ which leads to a particular resolve; it refers to the cognitive aspect 
of behaviour.586 The point is one’s perspective on suffering and its relation to 
                                                                                                                                                      
these verses indicate that suffering strikes the flesh and thus effects judgement and purification; 
Millauer, Leiden, 128-33. 
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 Elliott, 1 Peter, 716. 
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 Michaels, 1 Peter, 225. 
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 Elliott, 1 Peter, 716-7. 
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 As Holloway discusses, 1 Peter does follow the Jewish idea that a person may suffer because he is 
righteous, but he argues that ‘1 Peter moves beyond the broader consolatory theme of suffering as 
a form of testing that perfects the sufferer, to the related but much more narrowly focused theme 
of suffering because one is in some significant sense already righteous’. However, Holloway does go 
on to conclude that such ‘suffering can still perfect the sufferer’; Holloway, Coping, 198. 
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ethical behaviour, not the necessity of physical suffering for moral purity.587 
Moreover, a certain kind of suffering is in view, which has already been established: 
innocent suffering which is a consequence of doing good because of a 
consciousness of God.588 We must also understand ‘sin’ as disobedience to God. 
Thus, here the example of Christ is found in his conviction to continue to act 
righteously and endure unjust suffering in obedience to God’s will.589 Here, the 
believer is asked to imitate Christ’s resolve. Therefore, to be free from sin does not 
require suffering, but instead, those who have already suffered, because of 
unbending obedience to God, have proven that they have ceased from sin i.e. 
disobedience.590 Consequently, as De Waal Dryden highlights, Christ’s example is in 
his disposition not his specific activity.591 As such, the author is addressing the 
audience’s perspective rather than prescribing suffering, because it is their 
perspective that governs how they act. This reading is supported by the following 
εἰς clause in which the author sets in contrast the desires of humans and the will of 
God. Thus, the purpose of having the same resolve as Christ is to be able to live 
continually in God’s will. A life oriented in this manner represents the Christian 
ethical norm.592 Thus, again, the Christian worldview centred on Christ is to define 
their actions. Therefore, we can understand 4.1 to say that those who have the 
same mind-set as Christ, in that they have chosen unbending obedience to God in 
doing good and are suffering on account of it, have shown that they have ceased 
from sin, i.e. from active disobedience to God’s will. 
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 Achtemeier’s comment that ‘ἔννοια is also found in the LXX, primarily in Proverbs, and refers, to 
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The above reading of 4.1 is strengthened when we take into account the wider 
matrix of thought present in 4.1-3. In 4.1-3 a number of ideas converge: attitude 
(cognition; ἔννοια), human desire (ἐπιθυμία), God’s will (θέλημα), bodily suffering, 
and sinful action. If we compare these ideas with Greco-Roman philosophical 
understandings of the self and of the root of ethical behaviour we find that a better 
understanding of the rationale of this passage emerges.593  
ἐπιθυμία is used in two ways in 1 Peter: as a specific type of wrongdoing (4.3), and 
more generally for desire as a wider concept.594 The second usage is evident in 4.2 
(cf. 2.11). These desires are categorised as of humanity (ἀνθρώπων) and of the flesh 
(σαρκικῶν). Such descriptions refer to general human motivations which are 
contrasted with the will of God. For the author these human desires are obvious in 
the surrounding Greco-Roman culture (cf. 4.3-4),595and they are a marker of the 
believers’ previous, ignorant (ἄγνοια) way of life before Christ  (1.14). Thus, we can 
see the link between cognition and desires. The former desires are ones that come 
out of a mistaken perspective – ignorance.596 This is why it is important that in the 
current situation they have the right way of thinking, because right perspective will 
bring the right desires.597 These desires in turn influence goals and behaviour. 
Human desires as a category could infer a number of things. In Greco-Roman 
philosophy ἐπιθυμίαι are often associated with basic bodily drives such as for food, 
drink and sex. In all ancient philosophies these ‘unfiltered animalistic impulses 
abolish the freedom of people for a self-determined life.’598 Therefore, they must 
be controlled. Yet, desires as a category can also be extended to cover a want for 
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 Very few scholars utilise Greco-Roman philosophy here, with the exceptions of Feldmeier and 
Achtemeier. Achtemeier cursorily notes that ἐπιθυμία is an important Stoic term; Achtemeier, 1 
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more abstract items such as wealth, status, and honour. In philosophy, natural 
desires are not always negative as they encourage the person towards a state of 
well-being. However, the good life is generally perceived as one that has control 
over desires, particularly unhelpful ones. As we have seen with Stoicism, unhelpful 
desires are due to wrong perspective, or a wrong system of value, and lead to 
misguided behaviour. It is perhaps when confronted with pain that these values are 
most tested. For many humans the desire for health, well-being, status, and 
acceptance are high on the agenda and so will motivate actions. However, if 
something is of higher value than these or other goods, then one will be motivated 
toward the higher good and will be willing to forgo other seeming goods (see 
Seneca, Ep. 71.2-5). Perspective influences what is seen as good, which in turn 
influences priorities. In fact in Ep. 71.24 Seneca clearly states ‘[i]t matters not only 
what you see, but with what eyes you see it;’ in the context this is to do with what 
to value and what course to pursue (cf. Ep. 71.13-14, 18). For Stoicism, this 
ultimately ends in the acceptance of whatever befalls. The wise man has yielded up 
all things to god including his body and possessions and is focused instead on his 
moral purpose.599 Thus, one should not try to avoid suffering, if that is what nature 
wills (Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.17; 4.25-27; cf. Seneca, Ep. 71.16; 107.12). In 1 Peter 
the higher system of value is bracketed under the label of God’s will. It is this 
consciousness of God that sets perspective and prioritises goods. 
Thus, in 4.2-3 we have two schemes at work. Feldmeier describes it as an 
‘antagonism between two spheres of power.’600 However, it is really an antagonism 
between two perspectives on reality, two systems of value which carry different 
priorities reflected in differing behaviour.601 The believers are to have end goals 
that are different to the desires of humans i.e. those of surrounding culture. These 
goals are beyond the present physical situation of the audience and are 
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eschatological, eternal, and spiritual.602 This orientation was established in 1.3-9 
and throughout the letter it has been linked to solidarity with Christ. Consequently, 
their previous goals and behaviour are no longer compatible with their new 
understanding of being in allegiance with Christ.603 The author desires the audience 
to have the right ἔννοια because if they do they will set the course of their life and 
action aright. If Christ’s resolve is the pattern of this ἔννοια, then doing good in 
accordance with God’s will will be evaluated as of more importance than other 
goods such as physical well-being or status, which explains why the believer will be 
willing to suffer for doing good.  
We can now return to our original topic, that those who have suffered righteously 
have ceased from sin. From an appreciation of the wider matrix of thought, we can 
expand this to say, they have set God’s will as a priority and learned continuously to 
do good in the face of other competing priorities. It is a priority on God’s will that 
allows one to suffer in the flesh with the right attitude, not conversely, (contra 
Elliott) suffering in the flesh which gives one control over the flesh and 
consequently allows one to choose God’s will.604 Perspective and priorities come 
first; action second. Hence, the author starts with the thinking of Christ. Therefore, 
4.1 reveals that participating in Christ’s suffering results in the good of a sin-free 
life. This ethical benefit is a good that can occasion joy. 
So, having looked at the imitatio Christi sections of 1 Peter we have been able to 
discover four more goods that come from sharing in Christ’s suffering: the 
witnessing potential of righteous suffering; that such proclamatory suffering can, 
potentially, bring others towards salvation; that it may through impacting the other 
lead to the transformation of their situation; and, lastly, that suffering for doing 
good demonstrates obedience to God, and, therefore, also reveals a sin-free life. 
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 This does not mean that the audience’s physical distress is not important. The letter does show 
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We can now turn to the last goods of participating in the suffering of Christ: 
blessing and glory. 
5.2.4 Blessing and Glory 
In 2.19-20 the author declares that to bear unjust suffering because of a 
consciousness of God is commendable before God (χάρις παρὰ θεοῷ).  χάρις here 
carries the sense of ‘favourableness’ rather than referring to God’s graciousness (cf. 
parallel use of κλέος 2.20).605 Thus, it indicates honour and reward. Consequently, 
again, the author presents a re-evaluation of suffering.  As Bechtler comments, 
‘[t]he behaviors for which the readers are being reviled are precisely the behaviors 
that God enjoins and calls good, and the vilification such behaviors evoke in the 
larger society results not in loss of honour … but God’s approval.’ Moreoever, 
Bechtler rightly notes that this approval is a present reality for the suffering 
believer.606 Thus by participating in Christ’s suffering they are obtaining a present 
good which one could rejoice in – God’s commendation.  In fact, in 3.14, 1 Peter 
goes beyond commendation to say that if the audience should suffer for 
righteousness they are blessed (μακάριος).607 It does not give the reason for this, or 
what blessing means, but we can infer from the preceding use of Psalm 34 that 
blessedness refers to one’s standing with God. Thus, to be blessed means that the 
believer has God’s favour: his eyes are towards the righteous and his ears attentive 
to their prayers (3.12). The idea of blessing is repeated in 4.14 where the audience 
are blessed when they are reproached for the name of Christ. This iteration might 
indicate that suffering for righteousness in 3.14 is equivalent to suffering on 
account of Christ. However, in 4.14, reasoning for counting oneself blessed is given: 
because the spirit of glory and of God rests on them.608 This is the divine Spirit who 
raised Christ from the dead (3.18). Furthermore, the glory that has previously been 
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attributed to God and Christ in the letter is now said to rest on them.609 
Consequently, they do not receive glory because they suffer, but they suffer 
because God’s glory is already on them, and as such they can see themselves as 
blessed in their suffering.610 So, not only does continuing to do good in the face of 
suffering reveal a consciousness of God, their suffering also affirms their identity by 
demonstrating God’s glorious presence in their lives. These things are goods in 
which the believer can rejoice.  
Now we have explored the range of good that participating in Christ suffering brings 
in the present, we can return to the final good presented in 4.13. Here it reveals 
that sharing in Christ’s suffering now means that one will also be able to rejoice at 
the revelation of his glory (4.13). Though it is not outrightly stated, there is an 
inference that, as the believers participate in Christ’s suffering, they will share in his 
glory (cf. 1.7; 5.1, 10).611 Christ’s example, which they follow, sets their expectation. 
Thus, choosing allegiance to Christ now means that they will share Christ’s 
vindication and glorification in the future (cf.5.10).612 Solidarity now equals the 
benefits of solidarity later. With this future glorification of Christ in view, the 
emotion of joy is intensified. They will not just rejoice, but χαρῆτε ἀγαλλιώμενοι.613 
Whatever joy the believer can have now in suffering is nothing in comparison to the 
joy that is to come.  Though the Christian may have to suffer for a short time, God 
will eventually restore, support, strengthen and establish them (5.10; NRSV).  
Christ’s narrative of suffering and then consequent glory (1.11) is the proof that 
secures their own future and gives the believers as his followers their self-
understanding.614 Furthermore, their cosmic understanding of God as the faithful 
creator and the one who has all dominion through the ages (5.11) enables them to 
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believe that God has the desire and power to reward the faithful. The inseparable 
link between righteous suffering and glory provides a positive valence to suffering. 
Thus, to share in Christ’s righteous suffering, along with all the above goods, means 
sharing in the enduring eternal good of his glory too. The incomparable nature of 
the good of sharing in Christ’s glory is emphasised by the use of two rejoicing terms 
that are attached to it (4.13). As Elliott notes, the emphasis on the glory, salvation, 
and blessing which the believer anticipates, means that the letter ends with ‘an 
intensified eschatological assurance that the innocent suffering of the faithful will 
ultimately be vindicated by a faithful Creator.’615 Once again, joy is used to bring the 
eschatological dimension to bear on the present experience and reminds the 
audience of their place in the cosmic narrative. 
5.3 Conclusion 
To ask the audience to rejoice in suffering is to encourage them to re-evaluate 
suffering, or more specifically to evaluate participating in Christ’s suffering as a 
good. From a comparison with Christ’s suffering the believers can see that there are 
a number of goods that their suffering both reveals and may effect. Firstly, because 
it arises due to solidarity with Christ on account of doing good, suffering can be 
seen as a positive identity marker; it confirms allegiance to God, which 1.3-9 has 
revealed is a good in itself and secures the good. Once again, joy is being used to 
reinforce the value of the believer’s relationship with God and Christ. We have also 
discovered, through examining suffering for doing good in the rest of the 1 Peter, 
that Christian suffering has the potential to bear witness to another reality, thus to 
impact the other, and perhaps to transform their current situation. The author also 
affirms that such suffering will result in both blessing now and glory to come. All of 
these are goods in which the believer can rejoice. 
Through his presentation of suffering, the author has worked hard to present what 
is valuable, which is continuing to do good as proof of allegiance to God. Thus, 
fidelity to God is the highest goal. The setting of this as the primary goal changes 
the landscape in which suffering is evaluated. This goal, when raised above others, 
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for example public honour, or personal safety, means that, when faced with a 
situation in which suffering may be the outcome of doing good, the primary goal of 
obedience to God is what determines the believers’ actions. Consequently, to 
rejoice in sharing in Christ’s suffering indicates that the believers have internalised 
this system of value, and consequently will not shrink back from situations in which 
suffering might occur on account of their faith. Instead, spurred on by the end goal, 
reinforced by the emotion, one will continue to do good and remain faithful to God 
despite difficulties. Thus, the suffering believers can understand that they are 
actively choosing to live in line with God’s will and can look towards eternal reward.  
The secondary effect is the disempowering of the abusers. This does not mean that 
in society they are not powerful, but it does mean that, for the believer, the hostile 
other loses significance and power. Subsequently, their ability to affect the 
audience’s emotions and behaviour is diminished. In this sense, with a particular 
perspective of reality, the recipients, who are mostly subordinates, are actually 
empowered to have control over the destiny of their lives. They can appreciate, as 
they align themselves with the narrative of Christ and choose fidelity to God, that 
they are setting themselves on the path to flourishing. Thus, the author’s call to 
rejoice in suffering not only impacts identity and behaviour but, at the deepest 
level, challenges what it means to flourish as a human. Joy in participating in 
Christ’s suffering envisages a new way of being in the world.616 Successful human 
existence means to be in line with the Father’s will, and to show trust in him and 
fidelity to the covenant relationship by living a Christian life of doing good. This can, 
and may very well, include suffering on account of it. Thus, rejoicing in suffering is 
no longer paradoxical, but, within this scheme of reality, is a perfectly appropriate 
response to being persecuted on account of Christ.  
Having looked at the present experience of the believer, which is one of joy despite 
distress, and joy in suffering, we can turn to the future expectations of the 
audience. In the next two chapters we will explore fear, hope, and shame in 1 
Peter. 
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Part 3: Future Expectation 
173 
6. Fearful Hope 
This chapter will investigate fear and hope in 1 Peter. These emotions have been 
grouped together because of their shared future orientation, because of their 
associations with power and because they are linked in biblical tradition and 1 
Peter. Initially, we will investigate fear and hope separately. However, in examining 
the implications of the author’s use of fear and hope, the two emotions will be 
brought together. As with the previous chapters, we will use Greco-Roman 
philosophy, notably Stoic theory, to outline the key components of each emotion. 
We will then explore the use of fear and hope in the LXX before turning to 1 Peter. 
The LXX will be particularly illuminative for understanding 1 Peter’s emotional 
rationale. In our exegesis of 1 Peter, key questions will remain: what is the object of 
the emotion? What evaluation of the object does the emotion present? What does 
this have to say to the audience about their value system and goals? Lastly, how 
does all this impinge on behaviour and identity? 
6.1 Locating Fear 
First it is necessary to outline the key components of fear (φόβος) and what 
emotional experiences it can encompass. 
6.1.1 φόβος in Stoicism  
Fear (φόβος) is one of Stoicism’s four primary πάθη (Stobaeus 2.88.10 = SVF 
3.378).617 As such, it is an irrational, excessive movement of the soul which is to be 
extirpated. This is not to say that Stoicism classed every inhibitory emotion 
negatively. They did have a counterpart εὐπάθεια to φόβος: εὐλάβεια (well-reasoned 
caution / discretion) (see Diogenes Laertius 7.115 = SVF 3.431). 
The Stoics defined fear as follows: 
φόβος δὲ ἄλογος ἔκκλισις· ἢ φυγὴ ἀπὸ προσδοκωμένου δεινοῦ. 
Fear is an irrational shrinking [aversion], or avoidance of an expected 
danger’ (Andronicus, [Pass.] I = SVF 3.391, trans. Long and Sedley; cf. 
Aristotle, Rhet. 2.5, 1382a).  
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In Tusculan Disputations 4.7.14-15, Cicero confirms this description of fear (metus) 
and adds that fear results ‘in a kind of withdrawal and flight of the soul’ (metus 
recessum quendam animi et fugam  [King, LCL]; cf. Tusc. 3.11.25; 4.6.11). Thus, we 
can outline the key elements of fear: fear is irrational and future orientated. More 
specifically, it looks towards something threatening and so has in view the bad or 
harmful.618  Therefore, it evaluates the object negatively as detrimental to one’s 
goals. Words such as ἔκκλισις and φυγή along with recessus (retreat) and fuga 
(fleeing / flight) reveal that fear’s action-tendency is avoidance. 
Having outlined fear, we can now determine which emotional experiences φόβος 
covers. According to Andronicus Rhodius: 
Φόβου εἴδη ιγʹ. 
 Ὄκνος· αἰσχύνη· δεῖμα· δέος· ἔκπληξις· κατάπληξις· [δειλία·] ψοφοδέεια· 
ἀγωνία· μέλλησις· ὀῤῥωδία· θόρυβος· δεισιδαιμονία. 
There are 13 kinds of fear: 
Hesitation, shame, terror, alarm, consternation, amazement, (timidity), fear 
at every noise, anguish of mind/anguish, unfulfilled intention, terror, 
clamour, fear of the gods/superstition ([Pass.] 3 cf. Stobaeus 2.90 = SVF 
3.394).619 
Andronicus’ listing shows that φόβος can encompass numerous experiences such as 
fear of knowing what to do (μέλλησις); fear of noise or crowds (ψοφοδέεια; θόρυβος); 
alarm that paralyzes (δέος); anguish over failure (ἀγωνία); excessive fear of the gods 
(δεισιδαιμονία); fear of ill repute (αἰσχύνη), and even shock at impressive objects 
(κατάπληξις). However, for Stoicism, every variation of fear listed, regardless of its 
quality, is viewed negatively and is contrary to successful living. In comparison, the 
emotional experiences grouped under εὐλάβεια are two: αἰδώς (respect for the 
opinion of others / honour / self-respect) and ἁγνεία (purity) (See Andronicus 
[Pass.] 6.4 = SVF 3.432; Diogenes Laertius 7.115 = SVF 3.431). The former is caution 
about rightly considered faults; the latter is caution about sinful action before the 
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 The future orientation of fear distinguishes it from distress (see Cicero, Tusc. 3.11.25). 
619
 Andronicus goes on to define each of these kinds of fear (see [Pass.] 3 = SVF 3.409); cf. Diogenes 
Laertius 7.112 = SVF 3.407; Stobaeus 2.92 = SVF 3.408; Cicero, Tusc. 4.8.19. 
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gods. Thus, εὐλάβεια is primarily concerned with right actions and moves one 
towards virtue.620 
From the above definition of φόβος we can conclude that the object of fear must be 
perceived to have the potential to harm the person. This requires an assessment of 
the object. Moreover, it involves a relative evaluation of the object in comparison 
with the person, particularly in relation to power. However, power in itself is not 
enough; there also has to be an indication that the powerful object is likely to 
harm.621 Thus, fear arises when one appraises the object as equally, or more, 
powerful than oneself and therefore able, and likely, to impinge on one’s 
attainment of goals. For the clearest discussion of this in the ancient world we have 
to move from the Stoics to Aristotle.  
In On Rhetoric 2.5 Aristotle says that people ‘do not fear all evils … only such as 
involve pain or destruction’ (Rhet. 2.5, 1382a22-24 [Freese, LCL]). Thus, Aristotle 
confirms that fear’s chief concern is harm.622 Aristotle reasons:  
εἰ δὲ ὁ φόβος τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερὰ εἶναι ὅσα φαίνεται 
δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην τοῦ φθείρειν ἢ βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην 
συντεινούσας· 
If then this is fear, all things must be fearful that appear to have great power 
of destroying or inflicting injuries that tend to produce great pain (Rhet. 2.5, 
1382a27-30, [Freese, LCL]). 
Here power (δύναμις) is highlighted as the essential content of the judgement. In On 
Rhetoric the objects of fear are generally people who are perceived to be stronger 
than the fearful person (Rhet. 2.5, 1328b14-18; cf. Epictetus, Diatr. 1.24.59-63).623  
However, one can also fear a rival because of competition for goods; the rival’s 
acquisition of goods necessarily means one’s lack (Rhet. 2.5, 1328b12-14; cf. 
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 Cf. Epictetus Diatr. 2.1.-7. 
621
 In social situations this may involve an advanced social judgement such as assessing the enmity of 
the other; Konstan, Emotions, 132-3. 
622
 For Cicero, fear can be on account of an individual’s or universal perils (De or. 2.51.209). For 
Aristotle, harm has to appear near to inspire fear (Rhet. 2.5, 1382a24-26). 
623
 Whereas, for Stoicism, fear of death is the chief fear to overcome; see Seneca, Ep. 4; 80.5-6; 
Epictetus, Diatr.2.1.13-14; 3.26.38-9. 
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Seneca, Ep. 13.12). These comments affirm that fear is concerned with the object’s 
relationship to one’s goods and goals. Epictetus comments: 
Why, look you, no one is afraid of Caesar himself, but he is afraid of death, 
exile, loss of property, prison, disfranchisement. Nor does anyone love 
Caesar himself, unless in some way Caesar is a person of great merit; but we 
love wealth, a tribuneship, a praetorship, a consulship. When we love and 
hate and fear these things it needs must be that those who control them are 
masters over us (Diatr. 4.1.60 [Oldfather, LCL]). 
Fear, by evaluating the object as having control over one’s good, gives the object 
power (mastery) over the fearer (cf. Diatr. 2.2.25-26 ; 4.1.85). Conversely, one will 
not be afraid if one sees oneself as stronger or superior to the other (Rhet. 2.5, 
1383a31-1383b1) on account of having wealth, strength, friends and power, or if 
one has nothing left to lose (Rhet. 2.5, 1382b34-1383a5). These statements enforce 
the relationship between fear, power, and the attainment of goods. By 
repositioning these elements, the Stoics were able, theoretically, to extirpate fear.  
If the good is removed from the hands of the other, then the other’s fearsome 
mastery is nullified. Thus, when the Stoic labels virtue the only true good and makes 
it integral to the person (see Seneca, Ep. 74.1, 5-6; cf. Epictetus, Diatr. 2.2.1-4) he 
severs the link between the other and the good (cf. Seneca, Ep. 74.23-26; cf. 
Epictetus, Diatr. 4.7.8-10) which removes the other’s power and destroys fear (cf. 
Epictetus, Diatr. 4.1.81-90; 4.7.1-5). 
Therefore, we can summarise that fear is future orientated, evaluates the object as 
potentially harmful, and has an action-tendency of avoidance.  φόβος can cover a 
range of emotional experiences from fear of personal failure to fear of the gods. 
Lastly, fear as an emotion highlights power dynamics: it reveals the perceived 
relative positioning of the subject and object in relation to the attainment or 
maintenance of goods. We can now turn to the use of φόβος in the LXX. 
6.1.2 Fear in the LXX 
As noted in §4.1.2, 4 Maccabees 1.23 echoes the Stoic mapping of the passions and 
thus φόβος is listed alongside λύπη and ἐπιθυμία (cf. Philo, Abr. 41.236; Ios. 14.79). 4 
Maccabees does not define φόβος except to say:  
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πρὸ δὲ τοῦ πόνου ἐστὶν φόβος, μετὰ δὲ τὸν πόνον λύπη.  
Before pain is fear, after pain is distress.  
‘Before’ suggests anticipation and therefore that φόβος has a future orientation, 
and the use of πόνος infers anticipation of harm. Philo gives a fuller account: 
ἐπίλυπον μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος καὶ περιδεές, ἢ παρόντων κακῶν ἢ 
προσδοκωμένων, ὡς ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐν χερσὶν ἀβουλήτοις ἀνιᾶσθαι ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς 
μέλλουσι ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ κραδαίνεσθαι· 
For mankind is subject to grief and very fearful of evils either present or 
expected, so that men are either distressed by disagreeables close at hand 
or are agitated by troublous fear of those which are still to come (Abr. 
36.202 [Colson, LCL]). 
Thus, again, fear looks to future harm (cf. Praem. 12.71). Philo also blames fear for 
‘diverting and distorting the straight course to which his [one’s] face was set’ (Mos. 
2.139 [Colson, LCL]; cf. Leg.2.2.8; Prob 22.159). These comments show an 
understanding that fear motivates avoidance.624 For both 4 Maccabees and Philo 
fear is a passion and therefore negative (Leg. 2.4.11). Hence, for Philo, the virtuous 
man is not subject to fear (Prob. 21); he is independent (cf. Ios. 14.68-71) and takes 
no account of death, poverty, disrepute or pain and so is free from slavery, 
including slavery to fear.625 Thus, once again, the Jewish philosophical texts exhibit 
affinity with Stoic ideas. 
We now turn to the LXX. Like with joy, we discover, on account of a different 
worldview, the LXX departs from Stoic ideas. Fear (φόβος/φοβέω) can be used, 
particularly in historical texts, in the above outlined way, occurring in situations 
where there is danger to life or the nation. The objects of fear can be leaders (Josh 
4.14; 1 Sam 12.18), kings (1 Kings 3.28; 2 King 1.15; Isa 7.10), tyrants (Dan 5.17-19), 
other nations (Isa 10.24; Jer 49.11 (42.11 MT)), one’s enemies (Judges 7.3; 1 Sam 
7.7; 17.11; 1 Macc 9.6), even the nation of Israel (Esth 9.2-3; Josh 10.1-2). However, 
the customary object of fear is God. Here we find the most striking difference with 
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 Cf. Fug. 1.3 where fear is listed alongside hate and shame as one of the three reasons for flight. 
625
 This is achieved through philosophical training (Prob. 3.18-4.23; 17.111; cf. Prov. 2.7-8); cf. 4 
Macc 8.15. 
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Stoicism: fear of God is actively encouraged. Moreover, it is commanded of Israel 
(Ps  21.24) and expected of all people (1 Chr 16.30; 2 Chr 6.33; Ps 101.16). 
Fearing God can infer reverence or worship (Ps 5.8; Dan 4.37a), but it is a richer 
concept than this and sits within a network of ideas. One strong trope is that the 
fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom (Ps 110.10; Prov 1.7; Sir 1) – wisdom  
being not just knowledge but the practice of right actions and as such is the biblical 
equivalent of Greco-Roman virtue (see Sirach 1.11-13 below). It naturally follows 
that fearing God means obeying his commands. Ecclesiastes 12.13-14 states: 
Τέλος λόγου τὸ πᾶν ἀκούεται 
Τὸν θεὸν φοβοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ φύλασσε, 
ὅτι τοῦτο πᾶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος. 
ὅτι σὺν πᾶν τὸ ποίημα ὁ θεὸς ἄξει ἐν κρίσει 
ἐν παντὶ παρεωραμένῳ, 
ἐὰν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐὰν πονηρόν 
The end of the matter; all has been heard.  
Fear God, and keep his commandments;  
for that is the whole duty of everyone.  
For God will bring every deed into judgement, 
including every secret thing,  
whether good or evil (NRSVA).626 
Thus, fearing God must be demonstrated in behaviour.627 To fear God is to conduct 
one’s life aright (1 Sam 12.23-24). Consequently, one can be taught to fear the Lord 
through behavioural norms (Ps 33.12-15). The rationale for fearing God is multi-
layered. It is because of his goodness, love and mercy (Ps 117.4; Sirach 2.8-9) but 
also his judgement and wrath (Ps 89.11-12; Isa 59.18-19). These dual aspects 
encourage the people towards good behaviour and guard the people from 
undertaking sinful actions (Ex 20.20; Jer 39.40).628 As such, fearing God leads to 
obedience and, subsequently, righteousness and reward (Ps 18.8-12; Prov 8.13; 
15.27a; Pss. Sol. 18.7-9). Conversely, those with no fear of God deny his ways and 
behave badly (Ps. 35.2; Isa 63.17). Thus, fear of God defines the dimensions within 
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 See also Ex 20.20; Deut 10.12-21; 17.19; 31.12; Lev 19.14, 32; 25.17, 36, 43. 
627
 This is also because obedience reveals the attitude of the heart (Isa 63.17; Sir 2.15-17). 
628
 Fear of punishment can also prove preventative in a community context (Deut 13.12; 19.20; 
21.21). 
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which one should live. Whether one fears God or not, demonstrated in behaviour, 
becomes a boundary marker between persons. Therefore, the righteous can be 
categorised as ‘the fearing’, i.e. those who fear God. Isaiah 8.12-13 makes it clear 
that one’s emotional orientation can provide a line of division: 
τὸν δὲ φόβον αὐτοῦ οὐ μὴ φοβηθῆτε οὐδὲ μὴ ταραχθῆτε· κύριον αὐτὸν 
ἁγιάσατε, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔσται σου φόβος. 
Do not fear what they fear nor be troubled; reverence the Lord himself, he is 
your fear. 
The declaration that the Lord alone is their fear demands that the person orientate 
herself around this relationship (cf. 4 Macc 13.14-15). All other figures of power 
must be assessed in light of one’s emotional perception of God. 
As a result, fearing God nullifies other fears: his people are not to fear other gods 
(Judges 6.10; 2 Kings 17.35-39)629 or other nations (Deut 1.29; 7.17-18; 31.6, 8; Num 
14.9; 21.33-35; Josh 10.8, 25; 2 Chr 20.15-17). For Jeremiah 10.5, this is because the 
gods of the nations have no ability to do good or evil. So, again, we see that the link 
between fear, power, and the presence or absence of goods emerges. For the LXX, 
it is only fear of God that is beneficial. In fact, those who fear God will live in 
absence of turbulent fear (Ps 3.7; 90.1-6; 111; Isa 54.14; Jer 17.7-8), unlike the 
ungodly or disobedient (Deut 28.58-59, 66-67; Ps 52.6; Micah 7.17; Zech 9.1-5; Isa 
19.16-17; 51.13). The righteous person’s lack of fear is rooted in her relationship 
with God. As those who fear God and are therefore obedient, they position 
themselves within God’s favour and subsequently his power is on their side. 
Consequently, they do not fear others because God, the supreme power, is with 
them (Deut 20.3-4; Josh 1.9; Ps 22.4; 26.1; Isa 12.2; 41.10, 13; Jer 26.28; Dan 
3.17).630 Thus, the psalmists’ declaration that they will not fear is a statement of 
allegiance to and trust in God (Ps 26.3; 55.4-5, 12; 117.6-7). 
The above reveals that fear of God is different to the Stoic negative delineation of 
fear in that it is depicted as having a positive outcome, and therefore becomes 
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 Here, fear can convey a sense of reverence and worship (cf. 2 Kings 17.7-8, 25), but also relates to 
active serving. 
630
 This also seems to be linked to the people being God’s possession (Isa 43.1-4). 
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important to the attainment of one’s goals (see Sirach 1.11-13). Sirach 40.26 says: 
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν φόβῳ κυρίου ἐλάττωσις (there is no lack in the fear of the Lord; cf. Ps. 
33.10). Thus, fearing God is the route to the good. Put differently, those who fear 
God are those that depend on him for the good (see Prov 22.4; Sir 2.7-11; cf.; Pss. 
Sol.6.18, 17.34).631 Therefore, in the LXX, fear of and hope in God are two sides of 
the same coin. Moreover, the causal link between fearing God and attaining the 
good demonstrates the underlying belief in God’s power to provide.632  
Having said that fear of God looks to the good, this is not to say that for such a fear 
all the components of φόβος outlined above are necessarily altered. God is still 
feared because of his power, and also his potential to harm. If he has power over 
the good, he can bestow it, but he can also withhold it. There are plenty of 
instances where God inspires dread in people (Ex 23.27; Deut 5.5; Isa 2.10; 19.16-
17; 24.17-23). It is this very real fear of God’s wrath and judgement that causes 
people to assess their behaviour in light of his commands (cf. Eccl 12.13-14). The 
recognition of judgement along with the future orientation of fear pushes one’s 
emotional life onto an eschatological stage. It is not just a present orientation, but 
speaks of an awareness of an eschatological reality. 
From our discussion we have established that the use of fear in Jewish philosophical 
texts has affinity with Stoic philosophy. However, we have also seen that fearing 
God the in LXX departs from Stoic ideas but that the use of φόβος is not altered 
beyond recognition because God still remains the powerful object who is able to 
impinge upon one’s attainment of goals. Instead, φόβος is reframed in relation to 
God so that it can be seen as a positive emotion with positive outcomes. Fear, 
which is aware of God’s capacity to harm but also his ability to provide the good, 
motivates the person to keep God’s commands. By linking fear via obedience to 
flourishing, fear of God demarcates the boundary lines within which one should 
live. With our understanding of fear from Stoicism and its modification in the LXX 
we can progress to our exegesis of 1 Peter. 
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 Cf. Ps 60.6; Prov 10.27; Eccl 8.12-13; Tobit 4.21. 
632
 Thus, for the biblical authors, fear of God can be coexistent with other positive emotions such as 
gladness (Ps 85.11). 
Future Expectation: Fearful Hope 
   
 
181 
 
6.2 Fear in 1 Peter 
Terms that indicate fear occur in virtually every chapter of 1 Peter which suggests 
that this emotion is particularly pertinent for the audience. The primary emotion 
terms of interest are φόβος (fear; 1.17; 2.18; 3.2, 14, 16) and φοβέω (to fear; 2.17; 
3.6, 14), but πτόησις (intimidation633; 3.6); ταράσσω (to trouble / disturb; 3.14); and 
μέριμνα (anxiety / worry; 5.7) will also be commented upon when relevant. Fear 
terms appear in 1 Peter in a positive and negative manner. The first two sections of 
our exegesis will focus on where fear is encouraged; the third section will unpack 
the author’s negation of fear. We will leave discussing some of the implications of 
the author’s presentation of fear until after we have explored his use of hope. 
6.2.1 Establishing the Boundaries – 1 Peter 1.17 
The first use of φόβος is in 1.17 which says: 
καὶ εἰ πατέρα ἐπικαλεῖσθε τὸν ἀπροσωπολήμπτως κρίνοντα κατὰ τὸ ἑκάστου 
ἔργον, ἐν φόβῳ τὸν τῆς παροικίας ὑμῶν χρόνον ἀναστράφητε … 
And if you call on as father the one who impartially judges according to each 
person’s work, conduct yourselves in fear during the time of your exile … 
The prepositional phrase ἐν φόβῳ, or a slight modification, is used elsewhere in the 
letter (2.18 (ἐν παντὶ φόβῳ); 3.2).634 This first use of ἐν φόβῳ establishes the 
framework for the later uses. 
6.2.1.1 Fear of the Eschatological Judge 
The first task is to determine the object of φόβος. Even though the object is not 
explicit, commentators agree that the object is God. This is unsurprising, given the 
influence of the LXX evident in this section (cf. 1.16 and Lev 19.2). Thus, as in the 
LXX, fear of God is actively encouraged: the believers are to conduct their lives ‘in 
fear.’ So, why, for the author, is fear the appropriate emotional response to God in 
this context? To understand this contextualisation we must look at how God is 
portrayed.  
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 πτόησις can be either the ‘act of causing someone to be intimidated, terrifying, intimidation’ or 
the ‘experience of being intimidated, fear, terror’; see BDAG (895). 
634
 μετὰ ... φόβου in 3.16 functions similarly. 
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God is presented as Father (πατήρ) and as the one who judges (ὁ κρινῶν).635 
However, scholars disagree about which of these characteristics inspires fear. For 
Selwyn, their ‘in fear’ holy conduct ‘rests upon the revelation of God’s Fatherhood 
revealed in Christ.’636 According to Selwyn, the weight of the sentence falls on 
πατήρ, so that the clause should read ‘if you invoke the impartial Judge as Father.’ 
He argues that the ‘ground of Christian piety is less that God is the impartial Judge 
than that He is known as Father.’637 Thus, God’s mercy and forgiveness provide the 
reason for the Christian’s reverence.638 Achtemeier similarly downplays the link 
between φόβος and judgement. He argues that ἐν φόβῳ indicates holy reverence 
toward God because of his actions in Christ for the believer.639 Elliott combines 
God’s two characteristics by suggesting that ‘[p]aternal authority includes the right 
and responsibility of judging and disciplining the behavior of family members.’ 
However, Elliott later links φόβος with God’s holiness rather than his judgements.640 
Evident in these readings is a tendency to render φόβος as ‘reverence.’641 Michaels, 
who also prefers ‘reverence’ for φόβος, thinks that φόβος is appropriate because 
God is the ‘final Judge of every human being.’642 However, for Michaels, the full 
argument is based on understanding God as both Father of the believers and judge 
of all, but in 1.17 his role as judge is primary. 643 As Thurén comments, the nuance 
of the two alternatives becomes either: ‘God is an impartial judge but you can 
appeal to him as father’, or ‘You call him Father but he is an impartial judge.’ The 
                                                     
635
 For Michaels, to use ἐπικαλεῖσθε in conjunction with πατήρ suggests that the prayers of Jesus  
(Luke 11.2 cf. Rom 8.15; Gal 4.6) are the background to 1 Peter here. Therefore, 1 Peter is identifying 
the Christian community by the manner of their prayerful address; Michaels, 1 Peter, 60-1. Cf. 
Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 124; Elliott, 1 Peter, 364-5. 
636
 Selwyn, St. Peter, 142. 
637
 For Selwyn, ‘reverence for father and mother was one of the primary principles of the tōrah.’ He 
adds, the Father in Jewish society would have ranked higher than a judge; Selwyn, St. Peter, 141-3. 
Others (Martin, Holloway) interpret the emphasis here as respect for the father. The background is 
the common idea of the pater familias who had absolute power over the household; Martin, 
Metaphor, 169-71; Holloway, Coping, 163-5. 
638
 Selwyn cites Ps 130.4 in support of this view. However, the LXX (Ps 129) does not have the same 
emphasis, in fact φόβος is absent from the psalm; See Selwyn, St. Peter, 143. 
639
 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 125. 
640
 Elliott, 1 Peter, 365-6. 
641
 See also Martin, Metaphor, 171. 
642
 Michaels, 1 Peter, 60-2; cf. Windisch, katholischen Briefe, 56; Brox, Petrusbrief, 79-80. 
643
 Michaels, 1 Peter, 60. 
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first sounds a note of assurance, the latter warning.644 We noted above that fear 
arises in contexts where the power dynamic between subject and object becomes 
pertinent, particularly in relation to goods and goals. Both the presentation of God 
as Father and judge reveal God’s superiority over the believer, so, in terms of 
power, both could be appropriate objects of φόβος. Furthermore, both a father and 
a judge have the capacity to affect a person’s goals. However, it seems more readily 
fitting, if φόβος is to retain the sense of fear that anticipates harm, which I want to 
argue is rhetorically necessary, that a judge is more commonly associated with 
potentially detrimental consequences than a father. Thus, in what follows I will take 
God’s status as judge to be the reason for the author’s use of φόβος at this point. 
God’s status as judge is clear, but the time frame of his judgement is ambiguous. 
The present participle κρίνοντα with the present verb ἐπικαλεῖσθε could suggest that 
the act of judging is happening in the present. However, φόβος, which is future 
orientated and the eschatological tone set by 1.13 point towards a future time of 
judgement. However, both present and future could be relevant here: God is 
presently assessing their current deeds, but his ultimate judgement will occur at a 
future date. That 1.13 mentions hope for grace at Christ’s revelation suggests that 
an eschatological judgement is in view. At this time of judgement, God will judge 
everyone (ἕκαστος)645 impartially (ἀπροσωπολήμπτως) according to their work 
(ἔργον).646 Thus, the use of fear in 1.17 by its future orientation and association with 
God’s judgement is seeking to orient the audience emotionally towards an 
eschatological reality. By using fear specifically, it colours this reality with a level of 
warning.647 As Michaels comments, ‘divine election (v1) and calling (v15) are not 
                                                     
644
 Thurén, Argument, 111; cf. Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 47; Goppelt, I Peter, 111-2; Schlosser, Pierre, 
96. 
645
 Including the ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς (4.5). The idea of God as universal judge is present in both the 
LXX and other NT texts; cf. Ps 61.13; Prov 24.12; Matt 16.27; Rom 2.6; 2 Tim 4.14; Michaels, 1 Peter, 
61.  
646
 NT parallels to 1.17’s impartial judgement according to works include Rom 2.11; Eph 6.9; Col 
3.25; cf. Selwyn, St. Peter, 143; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 124-5. 
647
 Though, as Thurén notes, the ‘negative aspect of the Judgement always remains implicit’; Thurén, 
Argument, 206. 
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the same as favoritism. Christians are not exempt from judgement just because 
they address God as Father.’ In fact, they will be judged first (4.17).648  
6.2.1.2 Fear, Goals, and Action 
We have seen that fear highlights the relationship between the powerful object and 
one’s attainment of goals. Thus, to say that God is to be feared is not to say in 
theological terms that God is the source of evil, but instead that God has power 
over desired goods: he can bestow or withhold the good (the absence of good 
equalling harm). Our discussion on joy in chapter 4 revealed that the author has 
presented God as the source of inheritance, protection, salvation, praise, glory and 
honour (1.3-9) at the outset. Now, 1.17 adds redemption.649 Furthermore, God 
alone is able to extend grace to the believer at Christ’s revelation (1.13).650 Thus, 
fear, by reminding the believers of God’s power over their flourishing, encourages 
the recipients to give import to their standing with God.651 The fact that fear adds 
an element of risk to this relationship allows a different emotional dynamic not 
brought by joy and hope. Fear, because the outcome of events is not settled, 
encourages one to deliberate about one’s behaviour in light of the powerful object 
and the end goal.652 Thus, fear puts the spotlight on one’s current standing and 
behaviour. Interestingly, if there is no hope of deliverance then one will not even 
deliberate but will become resigned to one’s fate.653  
With this in mind, we can understand the link the author makes in 1.17 between 
fear of God, judgement, and conduct. The emphasis on obedience, holiness, and 
conduct runs through 1.14-17.654 However, the believer’s conduct (ἀναστρέφω, 
ἀναστροφή; 1.17, 18) is not only to be holy and good (cf.3.16) but also ἐν φόβῳ.655 
                                                     
648
 Michaels, 1 Peter, 61. 
649
 ‘God is the decisive actor in all key redemptive events that run through 1 Peter’; Michaels, 1 
Peter, lxviii 
650
 The use of φέρω emphasises that God’s agency is needed for the believers to experience grace; 
Michaels, 1 Peter, 56. 
651
 As Michaels comments, ‘[a]lthough Christian existence centers on Jesus, God … is the ultimate 
source and its ultimate goal’; Michaels, 1 Peter, 70. 
652
 See Aristotle, Rhet. 2.5.14, 1383a5-10. 
653
 See Aristotle, Rhet. 2.5.14, 1383a5-10. 
654
 A number of scholars note that 1.16 relies on Lev 19.2 (LXX) which is part of the holiness code of 
Lev 17-26; Michaels, 1 Peter, 59; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 122.  
655
ἀναστροφή means ‘behaviour’, ‘conduct’, but more broadly ‘way of life’; see Elliott, 1 Peter, 362-3. 
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Thus, the believers’ emotional stance towards God is prescriptive for their mode of 
living. The LXX understanding of the fear of God helps us to see why φόβος in 1 
Peter is related to conduct in this way. Ιn the LXX fearing God is synonymous with 
obeying his commands. Those who acknowledge God’s authority demonstrate it by 
their emotional posture and their subsequent ‘in fear’ behaviour. Therefore, 
reflexively, their behaviour reveals their perspective and allegiance.  Consequently, 
on these grounds their works can be judged as representative of their life 
orientation.656 Their ‘in fear’ behaviour, to be judged favourably, must accord with 
God’s standard of holiness (1.15). As such, their emotional stance gives boundaries 
to their behaviour.657  This works at an individual and community level.658  That God 
impartially judges reminds the audience that other human categories of status are 
of no value; what matters is holy obedience.659 Thus, those who fear God recognise 
his role as judge and his power over the good, and moderate their behaviour 
accordingly. Thus, fear is rhetorically useful because it causes the audience to 
assess their present behaviour in view of these new standards (cf. 1.14, 19) and the 
future reality of judgement. 660 Consequently, those who fear God and live 
obediently are expressing their faith in God and agreement with his norms.661 
Therefore, using φόβος, because it forces deliberation about current behaviour in 
light of future expectation, is performing an important rhetorical function in 
upholding boundary markers and motivating certain behaviour. 
                                                     
656
 Scholars note the singular ἔργον (rather than ἔργα). As Michaels recognises, ἔργον signifies their 
ἀναστροφή. It is their mode of life as a whole that is the issue not a list of deeds; Michaels, 1 Peter, 
61; cf. Goppelt, I Peter, 113; Elliott, 1 Peter, 365. 
657
 Cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 360-2. This recognition leads scholars like Achtemeier to see ἐν φόβῳ as short 
hand for ‘in accordance with the will of … God’; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 125. 
658
 Of course, their holiness and identity is rooted in God’s holiness and his calling of them; cf. 
Michaels, 1 Peter, 59; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 120-1. 
659
 Cf. the designation τέκνα ὑποκοῆς (1.14). Though the genitive ὑποκοῆς may simply be a Semitism, 
it could be a genitive of quality and thus indicate that the children’s primary characteristic is 
obedience;  Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 119; cf. Selwyn, St. Peter, 141; Elliott, 1 Peter, 357. 
660
 This is more than encouraging the believers to ‘break … with former allegiances and alliances and 
the immorality that these associations entail’; Elliott, 1 Peter, 359. It is not simply refraining from 
certain things, but about allowing the truth about God to transform one’s whole way of seeing, 
which ultimately affects allegiances and behaviour. 
661
 Cf. Achtemeier, who sees obedience as ‘a virtual equivalent of “faith”’; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 119-
20. 
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This leads us to the delicate topic of whether, if the above is correct, 1 Peter 
presents the believers’ behaviour as salvific, because it is their obedience in the 
present that will be judged. For Michaels, this is a Pauline question that 1 Peter is 
not concerned with. Michaels sees salvation in 1 Peter as following Jesus which 
includes imitating his conduct.662 But, perhaps this is an over simplification. 1.13, 
which opens the paragraph, has already established that the believer must hope 
solely in the grace that will be brought to them at Christ’s revelation i.e. at the point 
of judgement. The letter also details that the precious blood of Christ has rescued 
them from their former vain, ignorant life (1.19). Consequently, it is evident that 
the believer’s hope for salvation is their faith in what God has done in Christ (cf. 
1.7-9, 21).663 So, why is the author so concerned about their behaviour? Firstly, for 
the author, the primary act of obedience is to accept Christ (see 1.22; 2.4-8).664 But 
secondly, we can understand that, as with the LXX, fear of God and hope in God are 
co-existent stances. To fear God is to recognise his power over your good; to hope 
in him is to expect that his power will bring the good to you. We can now make 
sense of why God is presented as both Father and judge. The latter emphasises that 
all will be judged according to one definite standard and therefore fear is 
appropriate, but the former reminds the believers of the relationship they have 
with God through Christ and so encourages them that they can, as obedient 
Children, hope on God’s grace at the very same time of judgement.665 But, to follow 
De Waal Dryden, ‘hope [or fear] is not simply an attitude of heart, but a 
commitment to see the appropriation of salvation in the present through personal 
and corporate transformation in the moral sphere.’666  Thus, both fearing God and 
hoping in him are visible outwardly by behaviour, because behaviour reveals not 
only the norms one lives by, but also who one is looking to for the good. As such 
                                                     
662
 Michaels, 1 Peter, lxxiii-iv. 
663
 Thus, Thurén rightly recognises the tension in the letter between the apparent certainty of 
salvation and the indication that good behaviour is a condition for final salvation; Thurén, Argument, 
202-3; cf. Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 47. 
664
 Cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 56-7. 
665
 Thus, I agree with Selwyn that God’s mercy provides motivation for the Christian. However, I 
would differ from him in that I see this as linked with hope, rather than fear; Selwyn, St. Peter, 143; 
cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 356. 
666
  De Waal Dryden, Theology, 100. 
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one’s behaviour demonstrates faith in God and can be judged.667 It is only via 
depending thoroughly on God that one will secure the good: salvation.668 Verses 
1.18-21 go on to emphasise this by retelling the grounding narrative which enforces 
the value of Christ and God for the believer.669  That this wider rationale starts with 
εἰδότες suggests that this is a view of reality the believers have already accepted. 670 
Thus, in view of this understanding of their redemption through Christ’s blood, it 
makes sense to the audience why, with this perspective, they should conduct their 
life in fear of (obedience to) God: because God is the sole instigator and only source 
of eternal good.671 Therefore, we can also say that those who fear God are those 
that recognise his, and Christ’s, value to them.672 Again, we see that the author is 
trying to shape the audience’s value system and consequently their goals. 
                                                     
667
 Cf. Michaels who affirms that 1 Peter sits next to James in affirming that ‘faith validates itself in 
action, to the extent that faith and action are indistinguishable’; Michaels, 1 Peter, lxxiv; cf. 
Achtemeier, who comments that though the Christian lives by God’s grace they are not to ‘presume 
on God’s grace’ and they are to recognise that the same grace requires a transformed life of 
obedience to God; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 125. 
668
 Williams has recently argued that good works as obedience ‘plays an important role at the final 
judgement. This is because ultimate salvation still lies in the future (1.5; 2.2) when the genuineness 
of each person’s faith will be discovered (1.7). At that time demonstrating that one has lived a life of 
good works will be crucial for avoiding the wrath of God and achieving eternal life. Consequently, in 
the soteriology of 1 Peter it would appear that the grace of God and the efforts of humans are held 
in tension – both are necessary requirements for eschatological salvation, but neither is sufficient to 
achieve final salvation by itself’; Williams, Good Works, 253-4. Though, I find Williams’ argument 
quite convincing, I think he has put too much soteriological weight on the believers’ behaviour. Their 
behaviour shows their allegiance and their dependency, thus is a demonstration of faith. It does not 
in itself position the believer, but instead good works come out of their present relationship with 
God and their emotional orientation. As Jobes comments, ‘the indicative of God’s grace precedes 
the imperative of God’s commands’;  Jobes, 1 Peter, 116. 
669
 Michaels sees 1.18 and following as providing not just the reason for fear, but for the whole 
thrust of 1.13-17; Michaels, 1 Peter, 63. We see a cluster of value terms at this point. The futility 
(μάταιος) of their former way of life handed down by their forefathers is compared to the great 
worth of Christ, whose blood is more precious (τιμίος) to their (δι’ ὑμᾶς) redemption than perishable 
(φθαρτός) silver or gold. φθαρτός and χρυσίον echo of 1.4-7’s depiction of what should be valued. 
670
 Cf. Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 123; Elliott, 1 Peter, 369. Achtemeier comments that the passage as a 
whole (1.17-21) ‘reflects much of the common Christian tradition found throughout the NT.’ Others 
have seen hymnic or confessional material here. Cf. De Waal Dryden, Theology, 85 who remind us 
that ‘[t]o give credence to a narrative is to adopt its system of values.’ 
671
 The passive participles in 1.20 (προεγνωσμένου, φανερωθέντος) indicate that everything that has 
occurred for the believer is because of God’s action; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 131. 
672
 My statement follows the logic of 2.3-8, that those who believe are those that see Christ as 
precious because they accept the word. This is assumed by the opposite, that those who do not 
accept the word are those that reject Christ (do not value him). Cf. 1 Clem 7.4; Michaels, 1 Peter, 65. 
There is also the added dimension, which Jobes highlights, that the believers’ conversion is the thing 
that ‘has brought them into relationship with God’, but also ‘brings them knowledge of sin and God’s 
wrath upon it’; Jobes, 1 Peter, 116. 
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With this in mind we can address the action-tendency of fear. Michaels comments: 
The imperatives of hope and of godly fear have more to do with 
eschatological expectations than with ethics, and more to do with the 
reader’s relationship to God than with their relationships to each other or to 
their pagan neighbours. The only word that bears on their social 
relationships is “conduct,” and nothing specific is said about their conduct 
except that it is to be “holy,” a quality traditionally defined in religious or 
cultic rather than ethical terms.673 
Though I agree with Michaels that fear causes the audience to have an 
eschatological orientation, I disagree that the use of fear has little bearing on ethics. 
A primary function of an emotion is that it motivates action, and therefore 
emotions cannot be separated from ethics. As noted above, the action-tendency of 
fear is avoidance, specifically, evasion of harm. How are we to understand this 
action-tendency with regard to fearing God? Fear of God does not mean that God 
as the object of fear is to be avoided. Instead, because φόβος, in the positive sense, 
values God as the source of good, paradoxically, though one fears God, what one 
wants to avoid is isolation from God. To be a recipient of God’s negative judgement 
would bring separation; thus, the consequences of negative judgement are to be 
avoided. It is important to see that fear of God motivates action by a very real sense 
of potential harm. In the LXX this would be stated quite clearly as fearing the wrath 
/ anger of God. We do not have a wrathful image of God in 1 Peter. But the 
highlighting of God’s mercy in Christ (1.3), that the believers have to hope on grace 
(1.13), and that God is judge (1.17) infers that without Christ one is in an 
trepidatious position. Thus, to align oneself with God through Christ is the way to 
avoid the feared negative outcome of judgement. 674  Therefore, by emphasising 
the presence of potential harm, fear drives the recipients towards aligning 
themselves with God. Moreover, by indicating that works will be judged as 
evidence of allegiance, it motivates particular ethical conduct.675 
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 Michaels, 1 Peter, 71. 
674
 Cf. Thurén who rightly comments that, though the judgement serves as a warning,  ‘[t[he 
addressees are not persuaded with a reward, since the point of departure in the motivation is that 
they already are on the right side’; Thurén, Argument, 206. Thus, the motivation is towards fidelity 
not new reward.  
675
 Cf. Brox, Petrusbrief, 79 who notes that the image of judgement impels appropriate caution. 
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6.2.1.3 ‘Fear’ or ‘Reverence’? 
Modern exegetes seem to be averse to seeing God as a terrible figure, and 
downplay his fearsomeness by changing ‘fear’ which is aware of danger, to 
‘reverence.’676 Whereas reverence does recognise the unique place of God, it 
reduces the sense of God’s power over one’s attainment of goals. Achtemeier is 
paradigmatic: ‘Christians are to live in an attitude of holy reverence … rather than 
to live in terror at the thought of divine judgement.’677 But in 1.14-17 the author 
chooses to focus on God as holy judge. The ancients would not have had a problem 
with understanding the gods as fearsome (cf. Ps. 2.11-12).678 The divine is powerful, 
and therefore terrible. My problem with ‘reverence’ is that not only does it import 
our modern tendencies into the text, but it also diminishes the motivating function 
of φόβος which is required in the context of addressing the audience’s conduct. For 
the use of φόβος to be rhetorically successful, there has to be a real sense of 
potential harm.679 Otherwise, as discussed above, one would not deliberate about 
one’s conduct in light of the powerful object nor plot a course of action that would 
avoid the projected negative consequences. You may respect a person, but unless 
you think that she has some mastery over your good, you will not modify your 
conduct in respect of her. However, to allow φόβος to maintain a note of warning 
does not mean that the believers are in a state of paralysed terror, but it does allow 
it to have the motivating force required by bringing an eschatological reality before 
the believers’ eyes.680 Furthermore, it does not mean that the believers now live in 
fear when they did not before. They previously had values and goals, and therefore 
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 Cf. Selwyn, St. Peter, 142-3; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 123, 5. Though Selwyn does note if εἰ is to be 
taken concessively, then the first clause of 1.17 would be ‘a warning against allowing God’s fatherly 
love to obscure the truth of His awful majesty and righteousness,’ and that if the judge were the 
focus then fear rather than reverence would be apt; Selwyn, St. Peter, 142-3. Exceptions include 
Elliott and Goppelt. Elliott, though he prefers to translate φόβος as reverence in acknowledgement of 
its positive function, does allow that in the biblical tradition it denotes awe-dread-reverence which is 
a ‘motive for keeping his [God’s] commandments’; Elliott, 1 Peter, 365-6. Goppelt sees fear as 
‘trepidation in light of accountability before God’; Goppelt, I Peter, 113.  
677
 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 125. 
678
 To say that God should be feared does not mean that God is temperamental and unpredictable as 
the Greco-Roman gods. His character is stable, and thus his judgement is sure and just. 
679
 Cf. Thurén, Argument, 112-3. 
680
 See Goppelt, I Peter, 111-3. 
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fears that motivated them and shaped their behaviour (cf. 1.14).681  The difference 
is that now these have been reoriented, with God becoming their primary fear. 
For a Stoic, φόβος meant an irrational turbulent state. Perhaps as modern exegetes 
we have absorbed this conception and therefore dislike that a biblical author could 
encourage fear of any kind. However, even the Stoics, who promote ἀπάθεια, 
cannot envisage a wise life without some kind of fear; they simply rename it 
εὐλάβεια (caution). But ‘caution’ still recognises the potential for one’s actions to 
lead to harm, and asks the person to direct behaviour in light of this. The difference 
is that εὐλάβεια is well-reasoned, so that the harm to be avoided is a true evil. 
Consequently, the Stoics recognise that this type of emotion has value in helping 
the wise man lead a virtuous life. The underlying problem, which the Stoics were 
aware of, is that one constantly has to select right actions. Yet, how does one 
decide which to choose? Fear (or for the Stoics, caution) is one emotion that assists 
in navigating the decision making process by providing information about what to 
avoid. As such, in light of one’s goals, fear cuts off certain avenues of behaviour. 
Thus, fear, as the LXX also shows, is necessary for providing boundaries to action. 
Boundaries are an essential part of human existence which bring not only stability 
to a group, but also help the individual to locate herself within reality. Given a 
particular worldview, they reassure the person about how they can attain the good. 
Fear of God in 1 Peter is performing this boundary marking function. Therefore, 
instead of being turbulent and irrational, fear of God is stabilising because it 
deliberately positions the believers in their new Christian reality and gives them 
information about what are the appropriate actions to take. In this way, like in the 
LXX, fear of God becomes a life-directing dispositional outlook.682 
Having examined the groundwork of 1.17, we can progress to investigating how 
fear of God impacts upon the audience’s evaluation of the other and the self. 
                                                     
681
 Michaels reads ἐπιθυμίαι in 1.14 as a neutral term meaning ‘impulses’ rather than specifically ‘evil 
desires.’ Therefore, for Michaels, these desires represent a wide range of goals, such as for ‘wealth, 
power, or pleasure’; Michaels, 1 Peter, 57. The fact that they are categorised as ignorant, i.e. based 
on not knowing God, means that these desires are presented negatively and characteristic of both 
their former life and the way of their previous society; see Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 120. 
682
 This dispositional reading is inadvertently recognised by scholars. For example Michaels says that 
the Christians are asked ‘to maintain an attitude of godly fear’; Michaels, 1 Peter, 62. 
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6.2.2 Locating Other Figures of Power – 1 Peter 2.17-18; 3.1-2, 16 
The next use of fear terminology (φοβέω) occurs in 2.17 which explains how the 
believers should relate to various groups: 
πάντας τιμήσατε, τὴν ἀδελφότητα ἀγαπᾶτε, τὸν θεὸν φοβεῖσθε, τὸν βασιλέα 
τιμᾶτε. 
Honour all people, love the brotherhood, fear God, honour the Emperor. 
Again, God is the object of fear and fear is actively encouraged. Thus, we must 
expect that 1.17 undergirds 2.17’s exhortation. Once more, fear reappears in a 
context where the believers’ behaviour is addressed; though they are free, they are 
not to do evil because they are God’s slaves (2.16).683  This subordination brings 
back to the foreground via different imagery the relative power dynamic between 
the believers and God, highlighting the need for obedient service. It is of note that 
this relational dynamic directly precedes the horizontal and vertical relationships 
addressed in 2.17. 
6.2.2.1 Creating an Emotional Regime 
2.17 begins with the stance that the believers should have towards all people, 
which is one of honour. Next, the mutual relationship of the Christian believers to 
one another should exhibit the quality of love. Then, the author lists two 
relationships in which a powerful figure is mentioned: firstly God, then the 
Emperor. Only God is to be feared, whereas the Emperor, like all other people, is to 
be honoured.684 Consequently, in 2.17 the author establishes what Riis and 
Woodhead have termed an ‘emotional regime.’685 Such regimes shape ‘the forms of 
social relationships and course of action that are open’ to someone. As such, 
regimes ‘play an important role in shaping and reproducing structures of power.’686 
                                                     
683
 2.11-12 has spoken about their conduct more generally, whereas 2.13-3.7 gives specific 
exhortations.  
684
 Scholars note the similarity between 2.17 and Prov 24.21. However, 1 Peter downgrades 
Proverbs command from fearing the king to honouring the Emperor; see Windisch, katholischen 
Briefe, 64;Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 77; Michaels, 1 Peter, 131-2. Contra Selwyn, this change of verb 
seems more deliberate than simply stylistic; Selwyn, St. Peter, 174-5. 
685
 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 10. Cf. Holloway, Coping, 182 who acknowledges ‘a clear 
prioritizing of commitments.’ The prioritising of God over the Emperor is not altered by 
disagreements about how the four commands are structurally related to each other; see Jobes, 1 
Peter, 177; E. Bammel, 'The Commands in I Peter II.17,'  NTS 11 (1965): 279-81. 
686
 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 10. 
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It is his application of φόβος to God alone that enables the author to present God as 
the highest authority. For fear indicates mastery. Even the command to submit to 
ruling bodies, e.g. the Emperor, is based on one’s acknowledgment of God (διὰ τὸν 
κύριον)687 not on account of the Emperor’s own position (2.13).688 Rhetorically, in 
view of the background of 1.17, by applying fear to God alone, the author reminds 
the audience that God has ultimate power over their good and warns them that he 
is the object of primary importance in their worldview. It also brings to bear on the 
current situation the boundaries which ‘fear of God’ creates, therefore limiting the 
scope of submission required in 2.13.689  Furthermore, the Emperor is to be 
honoured, like all other humans, which minimises his unique power and places him 
on the same plane as the rest of humanity.690 Thus, to agree with Achtemeier, 2.17 
‘establishes a hierarchy of values and allegiances.’691 But, we must acknowledge 
that this is effected through the use of emotion language due to the emotion’s 
evaluative judgement and propositional content. The brief mention of φόβος carries 
into this new context the outlook and assumptions apparent in 1.17-21.  This 
emotional structuring of reality continues into the household codes. 
6.2.2.2 Acting ‘in Fear’ 
Immediately, in 2.18, which is addressed to οἱ οἰκέται (the household slaves), the 
author commands: 
                                                     
687
 Whether κύριος refers to God or Christ  (cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 124) here makes little difference to 
our argument; either way, the believers’ response to ruling bodies comes from their Christian faith 
(cf. ἐν κυρίῳ Eph 6.1; Col 3.18,20 and ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ Eph 5.22; Col 3.23). The whole phrase does not, as 
Selwyn suggests, refer to an inward loyalty to the State; Selwyn, St. Peter, 172. 
688
 Cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 124; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 182-3.  
689
 For Schlosser, this evidences both loyalty and resistance; Schlosser, Pierre, 159. The nature of the 
obligations towards powerful figures may be subtly indicated by the terminology used by the author. 
For (apart from 3.6) ὑπακοή is reserved for God and Christ (1.2, 14, 22) but ὑποτάσσω is used for 
human relationships. Thus, ‘“obedience” (ὑπακοή) is a primary and radical commitment while 
ὑποτάσσειν represents a secondary and more limited one.’ Michaels suggests that the chiastic 
arrangement of 2.17 emphasises that obligations to  wider society are secondary to those toward 
God and the brotherhood; Michaels, 1 Peter, 123-4. Thus, we must disagree with Selwyn that 1 
Peter’s comments endorse moral allegiance to the State; Selwyn, St. Peter, 87. 
690
 According to Achtemeier, this manoeuvre aims to combat the cult of the Emperor that was 
growing in Asia Minor; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 180. 
691
 Further, it is adherence to this hierarchy that ‘made negative social pressure inevitable’; 
Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 188. 
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Οἱ οἰκέται ὑποτασσόμενοι ἐν παντὶ φόβῳ τοῖς δεσπόταις, οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς 
καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς σκολιοῖς. 
Slaves, be subordinate in all fear to your masters, not only to the good and 
fair ones but also to the harsh ones. 692 
In this new relational scenario the author repeats the command to act ‘in fear’ (ἐν 
(παντὶ) φόβῳ). There is disagreement about whether the object(s) of fear are the 
masters or God. If the verse were read on its own it would be plausible to conclude 
that the slaves are being asked to act in fear of their masters.693 However, given the 
emotional regime of 2.17 and the use of ἐν φόβῳ in 1.17, God as the object is 
preferable.694  This is supported by the next phrase in which the slaves are 
commended for bearing unjust suffering precisely because of a consciousness of 
God (συνείδησις θεοῦ, 2.19).695 Therefore, in 2.18 and 19 the slave’s behaviour arises 
from an awareness of God rather than because of fear of their masters. Thus, even 
in this new context, in which another power dynamic is in view, fear of God is the 
driving factor for behaviour.696 If our reading is correct, the phrase ἐν φόβῳ changes 
the tenor of the exhortation. It is not a negative fear of another human (cf. 3.14) 
that colours the action of subordination, but the positive fear of God in which the 
slaves actively choose to align themselves with a certain reality in doing good. 
We can infer the same for the use of ἐν φόβῳ in 3.2 where the wives (αἱ γυναῖκες) 
are being asked to be subordinate to their husbands (τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν, 3.1). The 
phrase ἐν φόβῳ is used to refer to their (ἀγνὴ) ἀνατροφή which has the potential to 
win over an unbelieving husband. The fact that fear has no obvious referent in 3.2, 
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 Here I am following Achtemeier who notes that ὑποτάσσω ‘is closer to “subordinate” than to 
“submit” or “obey”, and advocates finding one’s proper place and acting accordingly, rather than 
calling upon one to give unquestioning obedience to whatever anyone … may command’; 
Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 182. 
693
 It appears that Selwyn reads 2.18 this way, perhaps with the double sense that fearing the master 
is part of fearing God. However, his comment is so brief that it is hard to determine his position; 
Selwyn, St. Peter, 175-6. Martin, following Bammel, takes a different position, reading submission 
here and in 3.1-6 as a ‘conferment of honour’; Martin, Metaphor, 204-5. 
694
 Contra Brox, Petrusbrief, 131; Holloway, Coping, 183-5, in agreement with Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 
80; Goppelt, I Peter, 194; Michaels, 1 Peter, 138; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 193-5; Schlosser, Pierre, 166 . 
695
 The use of ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ (3.4) ‘suggests a similar orientation’ for the wives’ conduct; D. G. 
Horrell, 'Fear, Hope, and Doing Good: Wives as a Paradigm of Mission in 1 Peter,'  Estudios Bíblicos 
73 (2015): 409-29, 413.  
696
 Cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 138; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 193; De Waal Dryden, Theology, 157. 
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and that conduct driven by fear is named holy (ἁγνός) further supports the 
argument that 1.14-17 is the framework for the use of ἐν φόβῳ here and in 2.18. 
Consequently, ἐν φόβῳ is shorthand for fear of God. This is bolstered by 3.7 which 
discourages fear of the husband.697 Again, the motivating factor is the wife’s 
relationship toward God and not the husband’s position. This is the same for μετὰ 
φόβου in 3.16. This time, the behaviour in question is the believers’ response to 
their accusers. We can note that sandwiching the exhortation to respond ‘with fear’ 
is the appeal to set Christ as Lord in their heart (3.15), and that to respond in fear 
coexists with having a good conscience (συνείδησιν ἔχοντες ἀγαθήν, 3.16). Both these 
indicate that an awareness of one’s allegiance to God and the norms that partner 
this are to influence behaviour. 
In each of these three cases of persecution, the reference to acting in (or with) fear 
brings God into the scenario and consequently gives the situation a new 
configuration. The believer-God relationship usurps the subordinate-
master/husband or persecuted-abuser relationship with the consequence that the 
master, husband, and defamer are side-lined. Instead, God remains the emotional 
focus. Furthermore, because emotions highlight objects salient to personal goals, to 
make God the emotional focus in these scenarios is to present the believers’ 
relationship with, and obligation toward, God as more significant to their flourishing 
than their relationship with the master/husband/hostile other.698  By using the 
phrase ἐν φόβῳ to recall 1.17’s fear of God, the author reminds the audience of 
their life orientation that is to direct their behaviour. This is not to say that the 
believers’ relationships with their masters, husbands, or hostile other have no 
value, but their value is relativized. The other figures of power, though in human 
terms they may have dominance and influence the present well-being of the 
believer, from the Christian perspective, have lessened importance because, in 
comparison to God, they do not have power over primary eternal goods. To use 
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 Those who interpret ἐν φόβῳ in 2.18 as fear of God tend to apply the same interpretation to 3.2 
for similar reasons; see Michaels, 1 Peter, 158; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 210. Cf. Brox, Petrusbrief, 143-4. 
698
 Perhaps this desire to recognise the difference in value between the believer’s different 
relationships is shown by 1 Peter’s terminology. The normal word for master κύριος is reserved for 
Christ and δεσπότης is used instead. Likewise, δοῦλος is only used of the Christian-God relationship 
and οἰκέτης is used for the slave-master paradigm; cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 138. 
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fear in this way widens the audience’s perspective beyond the present toward 
seeing their present in light of a larger reality. By both ‘side-lining’ dominant figures 
and by recalling a larger reality over which the dominant figures have no power, we 
can see how through using fear, the author is able to reposition the powerful 
figures within the audience’s worldview. 
On the surface, it looks like fear of God is being used to bolster the norms of the 
surrounding society. Some scholars have read the household codes this way. For 
them, 1 Peter does not advocate a change in the stratification of society. Instead, 
the hierarchy and power structures are maintained. In fact, the Christians are being 
encouraged to win the favour of the powerful other by their good submissive 
behaviour within these structures. This, for some, adds weight to the assertion that 
the letter pushes people towards assimilation to surrounding culture.699 However, 
what this line of reasoning fails to see is that there is a change to both ethical 
norms and social structure, even if at present it is only within the perspective of the 
Christian. The believers’ behaviour towards those in authority over them is no 
longer driven by the mastery of that person, but is motivated by their fear of 
God.700 It is God’s holiness and standards that drive their behaviour. This may, as 
previously stated, allow some cross over with the norms of society, but it is not 
driven by the norms of society to the extent that it seeks its approval. It is driven by 
duty toward God as συνείδησις θεοῦ (2.19) and ἀγνὴ ἀναστροφή (3.2) reveal.701 In 
such a way the believers’ conduct is freed from being tied to their relationship with 
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 See Balch, who has argued that the household codes serve an apologetic function. Though he 
says that the wife would have been unwilling to conform as far as giving up her Christian faith, the 
Christian would have ‘had to conform to the expectations of Hellenistic-Roman society’ in order to 
remove accusations. Therefore the slaves’ and wives’ submission is aiming to exhibit what the 
surrounding culture expected; D. L. Balch, Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter 
(SBLMS 26; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1981), 85-8, 92, 109. See also Brox, Petrusbrief, 126-7; 
Jobes, 1 Peter, 183. For Bird, this upholding of kyriarchal structures is problematically abusive to the 
weaker party; J. G. Bird, Abuse, Power and Fearful Obedience: Reconsidering 1 Peter's Commands to 
Wives (LNTS 442; London: T & T Clark, 2011). I will return to the author’s social strategy in the 
conclusion. 
700
 This is where Bird’s reading is a misrepresentation of the author’s intention. She reads ‘fear’ as 
fear of the masters, and therefore that it necessarily upholds kyriarchal structures and shows the 
author’s collusion with such a system. Bird therefore misses the displacement of the fearsome 
other; Bird, Abuse, 91-6, 107. 
701
 As Achtemeier discusses, this approach may seek to give the least offence possible to surrounding 
society, but not at the cost of their faith. Their obligation to God takes priority and therefore may 
cause offense to outsiders and lead to suffering; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 194-5.  
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the master/husband because the believers’ behaviour is fundamentally not a 
reaction to the human power.702 This is why the author can logically ask the slaves 
to submit to their masters regardless of the masters’ behaviour (1.18). It matters 
not how the master acts, because it is the slaves’ internal orientation towards God 
that determines their behaviour.703 In this way, the power structure for the believer 
has changed. If one is looking to the human for honour, security, protection, or any 
good, then they retain their mastery. But to fear God, and in doing so, to recognise 
him as the source of good, negates the mastery of the other. The human structures 
of society have not outwardly changed.704 What has changed is the believer’s 
perception of figures within those structures. This psychological and emotional 
stance paves the way for potential deviance rather than assimilation.705 For, when 
the mastery of the other is negated, one is able to behave in ways considered 
deviant to the other because one is less concerned about one’s relationship to the 
powerful figure for achieving one’s own goals. The fact that they seem to be 
encountering difficulty for their Christian behaviour (cf. 2.19) would suggest that 
such ‘deviance’ is already occurring. As Michaels notes, that wives have adopted 
the Christian faith, most likely against the religion of their husband, is already a 
subversive act.706 Thus, to fear God shows that the believer has internalised a 
different scheme of reality with its own norms, values, and structures. 
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 Cf. Achtemeier who offers a similar reading; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 196; also Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 
80. As Schlosser comments, the author preserves the internal liberty of his audience, who can refuse 
to be intimidated; Schlosser, Pierre, 185. 
703
 For the wife, living in fear of God would undoubtedly involve no longer worshipping the 
household gods, which would cause her problems within the household. Thus, the wife, like other 
believers faces the problem of competing solidarities; see Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 208, 11. 
704
 Having said this, the author does hold out the hope that a wife’s ‘in fear’ behaviour might win 
over the husband (3.1-2) and therefore affect the household. But, this is not the same as expecting a 
large scale change of the entire structure of society. 
705
 Michaels acknowledges the psychological element here, noting that the believers have a ‘firm 
commitment of heart and mind to God’ (128). This mental perspective is based on a spiritual reality: 
the audience are free people who have been liberated from subjugation to their ancestral ways 
(1.18) and have a new master (2.16). Michaels further asserts that by presenting the believers as 
‘free people’ (2.16) the author indicates that they have a choice over their actions, whether to 
comply or not; Michaels, 1 Peter, 124, 128-9; see also Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 186-7. Horrell notes that 
refusing fear of the other shows that the author does not require wholesale assimilation and 
conformity; Horrell, 'Fear,' 421-2. 
706
 Michaels, 1 Peter, 157. 
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We have examined the instances where fear is positively encouraged. What 
remains is to assess the occurrences where φόβος/φοβέω are used negatively and 
therefore discouraged. 
6.2.3 Positioning the Believer – 1 Peter 3.6, 14-15 
For the author fear of God is encouraged; however, other fears are inappropriate. 
The first negation of fear occurs in 3.6 where the wives are exhorted to do good 
and not to fear any intimidation (ἀγαθοποιοῦσαι καὶ μὴ φοβούμεναι μηδεμίαν 
πτόησιν). Commentators disagree on whether the participles should be read as 
imperatival, conditional, or explanatory.707 I take them to be conditional. However, 
their force makes little difference to my argument. What is clear is that the 
believing wives, who do (or are to do) good, are to be without negative fear. Put 
differently, fear is not fitting for this category of person.708 There is no obvious 
object of fear. From the context it could be the unbelieving husband who is the 
source of intimidation and therefore the object of fear. Or, perhaps, the μηδείς 
gives the absence of fear a universal scope: they are not to fear intimidation from 
anyone. In this negative, and more standard, presentation of fear, φοβέω can be 
understood to carry the elements outlined in the Stoic definition: it focuses on a 
powerful (intimidating) object, expects harm, and most likely encourages 
avoidance. However, that fear is presented as inappropriate means that the wives 
are being discouraged from having the perspective that fear presents.709 
The only other negative presentation of fear is in 3.14 which says: τὸν δὲ φόβον 
αὐτῶν μὴ φοβηθῆτε μηδὲ ταραχθῆτε (literally, ‘the fear of them do not fear nor be 
troubled’). These verses (3.14-15) depend on Isaiah 8.12-13, with the above phrase 
being nearly an exact citation.710 There is discussion around how this phrase should 
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 See Michaels, 1 Peter, 166-7. 
708
 Though, as Holloway notes, this indicates that, for some wives, living with their non-Christian 
husband was a terrifying prospect; Holloway, Coping, 190. 
709
 The fact that the author discourages fear does not mean, contra Bird, that he is ‘disregarding the 
various dynamics of the daily reality of those to whom he speaks’ by ‘offering universal directives.’ 
Instead, it shows the opposite: he is acutely aware that the wives are experiencing intimidation on 
account of their Christian faith.  Bird later comments that the author does not try to diminish the 
fear of his audience, and finds this problematic. This comment shows she has missed the intention of 
the author altogether, which is precisely to remove fear of the other; Bird, Abuse, 97, 112.  
710
 The only difference is that 1 Peter has αὐτῶν, the LXX αὐτοῦ. 
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be translated: either as 1) ‘do not be afraid of them or be troubled’, or 2) ‘do not be 
afraid of what they are afraid of nor be troubled?’ 711 How this verse is read does 
make a difference to our investigation. In the first option, the objects of fear are the 
people that seek to harm the Christians on account of their righteous behaviour (cf. 
3.13). With the second option, the whole worldview of the other is held in question: 
one should not fear what they hold to be fearsome. The first option is preferable 
due to the surrounding context (though the second is not unhelpful).712 The verse 
before mentions ὁ κακώσων ὑμᾶς (the ones who will harm you, 3.13) and then 
verses 3.15-16 highlight ὁ αἰτῶν ὑμᾶς (the one asking you, 3.15) and οἱ ἐπηρεάζοντες 
(those mistreating (you), 3.16). Thus, at the forefront of this passage is the hostile 
other. Given that this other is the focus throughout 3.13-16, then it seems most 
plausible that they are the intended object in 3.14. So, we can conclude that the 
author is exhorting his audience not to fear the potentially harmful other.713 
Therefore, as with 3.6, the author is asking the audience not to subscribe to the 
evaluation that fear grants. 
6.2.3.1 Why No Fear is Appropriate 
But what is the author’s rationale for why fear is inappropriate in either scenario? 
In 3.6 and 3.14 the immediate context is the believers’ behaviour: 3.6’s command 
follows the exhortation to do good (ἀγαθοποιέω); in 3.14 the believers are suffering 
on account of righteousness (διὰ δικαιοσύνην). Behaving righteously and ‘doing 
good’ are synonymous terms, both of which are parallel to the ἐν φόβῳ holy 
conduct previously stated (1.14-17; 3.2). The believer’s good ‘in Christ’ conduct is 
further emphasised in 3.16-17. From this, we can understand that the believers’ 
behaviour detailed in the context of the command not to fear is conduct which 
accords with God’s holiness and demonstrates allegiance to him. Thus, it is only the 
obedient, holy, righteous believer who should not fear the intimidating other. Here, 
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 The NIV takes the former, the NRSVA the latter. 
712
 Cf. Jobes, 1 Peter, 228-9. 
713
 For Holloway, such a regulation of one’s emotional involuntary response is the first step to 
‘readying oneself to cope with prejudice.’ However, as we shall see, it is not about halting a 
response, but changing one’s worldview so that such fear is no longer fitting to one’s dispositional 
outlook; Holloway, Coping, 200. 
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the LXX background is present, in which, paradoxically, those that fear God will 
have no fear of the other. We need to unpack this negation of fear further. 
We have become familiar with the idea that fear attributes to the object greater 
relative power, particularly power to harm. Consequently, to deny fear of 
something is to strip the object of these qualities. Thus, in 1 Peter, the audience is 
being asked no longer to see the abusive other as a powerful person with the 
capacity to harm. The secondary consequence is that the other’s value is 
reinterpreted. To ask the audience to see the other as not harmful is to say that the 
other has no power over the person’s good. Therefore, in terms of the believers’ 
goals the other is devalued, even irrelevant. However, we must recognise that the 
negation of fear is only logical when considered concurrently with fear of God. In 
both 3.6 and 3.14 fear of God is either explicitly or implicitly present. The wives ἐν 
φόβῳ ἁγνὴ ἀναστροφή (3.2) provides the umbrella term for 3.3-4’s specific conduct 
and is prescriptive for ἀγαθοποιέω in 3.6. In 3.14 the author’s use of Isaiah 8.13 gives 
the alternative to fearing the other: κύριον δὲ τὸν Χριστὸν ἁγιάσατε ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις 
ὑμῶν (but in your hearts sanctify Christ as Lord; 3.15). In the original context the 
κύριος would be understood to be the God of Israel. However, here it is Christ that 
is Lord. For those who knew the scriptural reference, they would understand that 
Isaiah 8.13-14 reads: κύριον αὐτὸν ἁγιάσατε, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔσται σου φόβος. Thus, in 
Isaiah, having God as their sole fear is the basis for not fearing the other. Though 
the latter part of the verse is not present in 1 Peter, it is not implausible that this is 
the foundation of the author’s negation of fear. Consequently, two fears are being 
opposed to each other, one negative and one positive. The positive fear of God, like 
in the LXX, nullifies the negative fear of the other. To understand this abrogation of 
negative fear, we must recall what is within the concept of fearing God: that God 
has ultimate power over the good and is therefore the only one able truly to harm, 
and the only one of import to one’s flourishing. With this perspective, the other’s 
power to harm is negated and as a result they can no longer be an object of fear.  
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6.2.3.2 Secondary Implications of Negating Fear 
The secondary implication is that, from the believers’ perspective, the relative 
standing of the hostile other is altered. The believers now no longer necessarily 
view themselves as at the mercy of the other. Instead, because the power dynamic 
that matters is between humans and God, all humans are in the same position. In 
fact, the righteous believer is in a better position than the unbeliever because they 
have chosen allegiance to God. This is not to say that the believer is superior, rather 
the status of one human over another is irrelevant because no person holds power 
over eternal goods. Perhaps this is why it is possible for the audience to honour all 
people, without competitive concern for their own honour. It is also why they can 
give an account to their questioners with gentleness (3.16). 
Lastly, we can also note that if the evaluation of the other has been altered so that 
the other is no longer fearsome, then fear’s action-tendency will also be removed. 
It is this that the author is aiming at. The action-tendency of fear is avoidance of 
harm. As mentioned in the last chapter, this means either separating oneself from 
the harmful other or changing the nature of one’s relationship with the other. For 
slaves and wives separation is not a realistic option.714 The second option could be 
achieved by increasing one’s power, which, again, is unlikely for the subordinate, or 
by making the powerful figure favourable towards you. This last option is the only 
one available to the audience. If they are being persecuted because of their 
Christian identity and conduct, then the easiest way to remove persecution is to 
change these aspects. Thus, fear of the other motivates the Christian to abandon 
their faith, or at least behave contrary to it via conforming to the accepted norms of 
the powerful. Such ‘avoidance’ would ease their social situation and remove the 
threat of harm. But, this conformity ‘would mean in effect the dissolution of the 
Christian community as a distinct entity within Roman culture.’715 Thus, it is vital 
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 Further as Achtemeier rightly comments, ‘there is no idea here [the wider section of 2.11-4.11] of 
withdrawing from the hostile world, and forming a conventicle of the righteous in the midst of the 
massa perditionis. It is clear from the tone of this portion of the letter, as of the letter as a whole, 
that the author fully expects Christians to continue to participate in the life of their societies’; 
Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 170. 
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 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 186. 
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that the author presents a reality in which such fear is absent so that all tendency 
towards this behaviour is nullified. 
Having surveyed the author’s use of fear, and noted some of the implications of his 
usage, we can proceed to investigating hope in 1 Peter. We will leave plotting the 
sociological and therapeutic consequences of the above until we have explored the 
interrelated emotion of hope. I mentioned briefly above that fear and hope are two 
sides of the same coin. However, at that point, I left much of what could have been 
said about hope untouched. Therefore, it is now necessary to complete the picture 
by providing a detailed exegesis of the role of hope in 1 Peter. We will start, as is 
now our custom, by locating hope within the repertoire of emotions. 
6.3 Locating Hope 
The first thing that has to be established is whether hope is an emotion. Recent 
studies on emotion have categorised it as such. For Cavanaugh et al. hope is a 
positive emotion ‘associated with common achievement scenarios.’716 They then 
assign to hope a number of key features that we have come to recognise as 
constituent parts of an emotion such as an appraisal and behavioural tendencies.717 
Lazarus is particularly adamant that ‘hope is a response to goal outcomes’ like other 
emotions such as anger and shame, and therefore ‘it should be treated as an 
emotion.’718 Further, he adds that it exhibits other phenomena associated with 
emotions such as ‘a change in the intensity of one’s mental state,’ which is often 
present in subjective affect.719 Thus, current theorists categorise hope as an 
emotion, but did the ancients? 
6.3.1 Is Hope an Emotion for the Ancients? 
The Greek emotion terms of interest to us are ἐλπίς and ἐλπίζω, which are generally 
considered to carry the sense of hope or expectation. Whereas φόβος, χαρά and 
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 L. A. Cavanaugh et al., 'Hope, Pride, and Processing During Optimal and Nonoptimal Times of 
Day,'  Emotion 11  1 (2011): 38-46, 38; cf. E. M. W. Tong, 'Differentiation of 13 Positive Emotions by 
Appraisals,'  Cognition and Emotion 29 (2015): 484-503, 485-6 which lists hope as one of 13 positive 
emotions investigated. 
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 Cavanaugh, et al., 'Hope,' 38. 
718
 R. S. Lazarus, 'Hope: An Emotion and a Vital Coping Resource Against Despair,'  Social Research 66 
(1999): 653-78, 663. 
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 Lazarus, 'Hope: An Emotion,' 663. 
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λύπη appear in the Stoic lists of the πάθη and εὐπαθεῖαι, ἐλπίς does not. This could 
suggest that ἐλπίς is not considered an emotion for the Stoics or the ancient world 
generally. However, this is not necessarily so. There is other evidence that reveals 
that hope was placed among the emotions and was not considered an altogether 
different psychological phenomenon. Hope appears in discussion as a point of 
comparison. For example, Andronicus, when defining ἀγωνία (anguish/trepidation) 
which is a type of φόβος, says: 
 Ἀγωνία δὲ φόβος διαπτώσεως· ἢ φόβος ἥττης· ἢ φόβος ἐμποιητικὸς τῶν 
ἐναντίων ἐλπίδων, περὶ ὧν ὄρεξιν σφοδρὰν ἔχομεν. 
Anguish is fear of failure; or fear of defeat; or fear productive of the 
opposite of hope about that which we have great desire ([Pass.] 3 = SVF 
3.409).720 
Thus, hope is placed as the opposite of fear. Moreover, it is done so in the context 
of attainment, indicating that hope is related to some sort of goal. His comments 
also infer that hope and fear both look to the desired goal but with opposite 
evaluations. Cicero is the most helpful. He lists fear and hope as opposites and 
provides a definition:  
… si spes est exspectatio boni, mali exspectationem esse necesse est metum. 
… if hope is expectation of good, fear must be expectation of evil (Tusc. 
4.37.80 [King, LCL]). 
Thus, hope looks towards a future good.721 Such a brief excerpt is perhaps too scant 
evidence for arguing that hope was viewed as an emotion. However, in De oratore 
Cicero comments: 
Nihil est enim in dicendo, Catule, maius quam ut faveat oratori is qui audiet, 
utique ipse sic moveatur, ut impetu quodam animi et perturbatione … Plura 
enim multo homines iudicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia 
aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe aut timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione 
mentis, quam veritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii 
formula aut legibus. 
For nothing in oratory, Catulus, is more important than to win for the orator 
the favour of his hearer, and to have the latter so affected as to be swayed 
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 This is the only occurrence of ἐλπίς in Andronicus’ Περὶ Παθῶν book 1 or 2. 
721
 Cf. Aristotle Mem. rem. 449b27-28; Rhet. 2.12.8, 1389a21. 
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by something resembling a mental impulse or emotion … for men decide far 
more problems by hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, 
or fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or 
authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent or statute [De. or. 
2.42.178 [Sutton and Rackham, LCL]. 
Hope is clearly listed in the same category as other emotions. Cicero repeats this in 
De. or. 2.50.206 in which he also infers that hope is inspired in the audience when 
some future benefit is held before them (si proponitur spes utilitatis futurae).722 
That one can be swayed by hope suggests that, like other emotions, hope 
influences behaviour.723 Aristotle links hope to ethical action by commenting that 
one may endure pain in the present because of the hope that one’s actions will end 
in good (Eth. eud. 2.8.12, 1224b15-20; cf. Cicero Tusc. 3.25.61).724 Seneca too 
recognises that hope motivates one towards attaining valued goods (Ep. 82.18).725 
We can also reference Philo who in De mutatione nominum 30.161-4 discusses the 
relationship between hope (ἐλπίς), joy (χαρά), grief (λύπη), and fear (φόβος). Philo, 
as we have seen, uses Stoic conceptions about the emotions, but sometimes 
modifies them. He reveals a Stoic understanding of distress and fear – distress 
arises when evil is present; fear when it is expected – and explains hope and joy 
along similar lines – hope is the expectation of good; joy occurs when good is 
present.726 Philo draws a sequential link between hope and joy. Hope via its 
anticipation comes before joy, just like fear comes before distress. Thus, Philo 
describes hope as ‘joy before joy’ (ἐλπὶς χαρὰ πρὸ χαρᾶς) because it tastes the good 
beforehand.727 In doing so, hope recommends the object to the soul, which sounds 
like the Stoic movements of the soul towards good. Thus, Philo places hope (ἐλπίς) 
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 Aristotle likewise links hope to the good. For Aristotle this type of hope produces confidence, 
particularly in the young; see Rhet.2.12.8-9, 1389a18-31. 
723
 Aritsotle’s Rhet. 2.5.14, 1383a5-8 indicates that hope is motivational, for where there is no hope 
for the distressed person there is no deliberation or action.  
724
 For Aristotle this expectation is accompanied by pleasure, which shows that hope matches 
Aristotle’s definition of emotions which are accompanied by pleasure and pain and affect 
judgements (Rhet. 2.1, 1378a19-21). 
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 However, Seneca does not present this as a positive state of affairs.  
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 Here we would expect βούλησις alongside χαρά, not ἐλπίς.  
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 Cf. Aristotle Rhet. 1.11.9, 1370b. 
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firmly on the emotional map alongside Stoic primary emotions: χαρά, φόβος, and 
λύπη.728  
The above proves that we can be reasonably confident that hope was classed 
among the emotions in the ancient world.729 We can also come to a simple 
demarcation of hope: hope has as its object a future good which is evaluated as 
beneficial to the person, and, given its association with desire and benefits, it 
encourages pursuit of the object.  
In general, the Stoics do not talk positively about hope.730 The main issue is that 
hope causes one to look outside of oneself for something. As such, it is an 
acknowledgement that one is in lack and signals discontentment. Both of these 
aspects, reliance on external goods and discontentment, are not appropriate to a 
life lived according to nature in which one should accept all that befalls and seek to 
cultivate only virtue which is within the control of the person (cf. Seneca Ep. 72.7-9; 
Cicero Tusc. 5.12.36; Epictetus Fragment 30-1). The most outspoken is Seneca who 
prefers living in the present. For Seneca, if you cease to hope you will cease to fear, 
because fear follows on the heels of hope.731 A mind that looks towards the future 
is unsettled, but ‘the present alone can make no man wretched’ (Ep. 5.7-9 
[Gummere, LCL]; cf. 101.9-10).  In fact, to have real joy one must avoid hope which 
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 Strictly speaking, as Graver points out, Philo makes ἐλπίς a προπάθεια (a pre-emotion which 
occurs before the full emotion). However, there is no evidence that Stoicism made such a move. As 
we have seen in Cicero, hope is treated as a full emotion. The reason the concept of a προπάθεια was 
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then determine whether the full emotion occurred. However, what this tells us, if Philo wants to 
treat ἐλπίς as a προπάθεια, is that hope was a psychological phenomenon that to the ordinary person 
resembled an emotion. For more on Philo’s use of προπάθεια see M. R. Graver, 'Philo of Alexandria 
and the Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι,'  Phronesis 44 (1999): 300-25, note particularly 312-6 for 
discussion on joy and hope.  
729
 This is not to say that they did not recognise that it requires sophisticated cognitive abilities. For 
example, Aristotle comments that humans are the only animals that have hope or expectation of the 
future (Part. an. 3.6, 669a18-20). 
730
 Aristotle presents hope as more suited to the young who have less experience of life 
(Rhet.2.12.8-9, 1389a18-31) which might suggest that he thinks it more foolhardy. However, it could 
be that the young think themselves to have more ‘future’ and therefore tend towards hope unlike 
the old (Rhet. 2.13.12, 1390a6-9). 
731
 In Ep. 82.18 Seneca depicts hope and fear pulling a man in in different directions and causing him 
to be in turmoil. Such emotions cannot lead to virtue, because virtue comes from the actions of a 
soul at harmony with itself. 
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makes one troubled through goading one towards something (Ep. 23.2-3; cf. 59.14). 
We find a marked difference to the Stoic perspective on hope when we turn to the 
use of hope in the LXX. 
6.3.2 Hope in the LXX 
The terms ἐλπίς and ἐλπίζω occur frequently in the LXX, particularly in the Psalms. 
Therefore, the following is an adumbrated picture which highlights the salient 
points. Firstly, as with fear, God is the primary object of hope (Ps 9.10-11; 13.6; 15.1 
etc.) and God’s people (the righteous) are marked as those who hope in him. 
Hence, hope signals trust in God over trust in any other power (Ps 117.8-9; Pss. Sol. 
17.33-4). Consequently, hoping in God means declaring him to be your god (see Ps 
30.15).732 Furthermore, hoping in God is presented as the permanent posture of the 
righteous (Ps 70.14). The positioning of the righteous person through unwavering 
hope provides the grounds for her confidence that she will be helped by God and 
experience the good, often vindication (Ps 25.1-3). Psalm 33.9-10, a psalm evidently 
known by the author of 1 Peter (cf. 2.3), provides a good example of how hope is 
related to fear of God and his goodness: 
γεύσασθε καὶ ἴδετε ὅτι χρηστὸς ὁ κύριος· 
μακάριος ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐλπίζει ἐπ’ αὐτόν. 
φοβήθητε τὸν κύριον, οἱ ἅγιοι αὐτοῦ, 
ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὑστέρημα τοῖς φοβουμένοις αὐτόν. 
Taste and see that the Lord is good; 
blessed is the man who hopes in him. 
Fear the Lord, his holy ones 
because there is no lack for those who fear him. 
With an acceptance of God’s goodness it makes sense for the psalmist to exhort 
others to hope in God, because hope looks to the good.733 But, likewise, they are to 
fear God, because there is no lack in God. Thus, both fear and hope orientate one 
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 Cf. Ps 15.1-2; 85.2; 90.2; Isa 25.9. 
733
 Cf. Pss. Sol. 5.8-11 where God’s ability to provide is the reason the poor can hope in him; see also 
Ps 35.8-10; 144.15.  
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towards God in anticipation that one’s positioning in relation to him will result in 
one’s benefit.734 Sirach 2.9 provides a parallel, saying: 
οἱ φοβούμενοι κύριον, ἐλπίσατε εἰς ἀγαθὰ καὶ εἰς εὐφροσύνην αἰῶνος καὶ ἔλεος. 
Those who fear God, hope for good things, and for eternal gladness and 
mercy. 
In the context, the reason for their hope is that God has proved himself faithful to 
previous generations, he is compassionate, merciful, and saves in times of trouble 
(Sir 2.10-11). Therefore, hoping in God is rooted in an understanding of God’s 
character and actions (cf. Ps 12.6; 20.1-8; 32.22; 129.6-8; 142.8; 146.11). Those who 
fear God and hope in him stand in assurance that he is for them (Ps 32.18.22). 
In both Ps 33 and Sirach 2 the close association of fearing God and hoping in him is 
demonstrated. This is a common link.735 From our exploration of fear we can 
appreciate why. Fearing God recognises his power and that he has control over the 
good. These are the very same attributes that make hope in God appropriate. If 
God has mastery over the good then he is the only one in whom one can hope, 
because hope seeks the good. Thus fear of God and hope in him are necessarily 
interrelated, but they have slightly different valences: though both result in the 
good, hope is more noticeably positive and motivates towards something. 
Furthermore, hope, more than fear, reveals a person’s dependence on something 
outside of himself, in this instance God. Moreover, hope’s dependence reveals 
power differences, with God being the able party. Consequently, hoping in God is a 
recognition of his power to help, particularly when his people hope in him for their 
salvation (Ps 7.2; 16.7; 21.4-6; 61.8-9; 85.1-3; Isa 51.5-6; Pss. Sol. 15.1).736 When 
this salvation is from other powers, hope shows an evaluative perception that 
God’s power is greater than one’s foes (Ps 26.1-3; 55.5, 11; 60.4; 2 Macc 15.6-8). As 
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 A number of texts promise benefits and success for those who hope in God; see Ps 20.6-8; 39.5; 
145.5-10; Jer 17.7-8; Pss. Sol. 17.38-9. Sometimes hope versus lack of hope in God is given as the 
reason for why one group is successful over against another (2 Chr 13.18). 
735
 See Ps 32.18; 39.4; 146.11; Prov 14.26; Sir 34.13-15. 
736
 In these passages we also frequently see God depicted as their refuge and help; Ps 36.40 declares 
that God saves the righteous precisely because they hope in him; cf. Ps 90.14; Dan 3.95. 
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such, those who hope in God, because he delivers them, trust that they will not be 
shamed (Ps. 21.6; 24.20; 30.2; 70.1).737 
Sirach 2.9 (quoted above) reveals that hoping in God results in other positive 
emotional states such as gladness and rejoicing (cf. Ps 30.7-8; 63.11; Bar 4.22).738 
Furthermore, because their hope causes them to expect God’s goodness they have 
no fear of evil (Ps 55.4-5, 12; Jer 17.7-8; cf. Pss. Sol. 8.31-33). In fact, Psalm 90.9-10 
declares that it is precisely because the psalmist has made God his hope that no 
harm will come to him. Thus, hope is paralleled to having confidence (πέποιθα), and 
is linked to security and safety (Ps 15.9; 31.10; 56.2; 72.27-8; 90.1-5; Ezek 28.26-27). 
Because the righteous person’s hope is based on an eternal stable and powerful 
God, her hope takes on an eternal enduring quality (Ps 51.10; 130.3; Isa 26.4; Wis 
3.1-4; Pss. Sol. 17.1-3). But, in this type of hope there is an implicit requirement that 
the person exhibit fidelity: enduring hope is demonstrated in enduring faithfulness. 
Thus, there is an indication that hope should be followed by certain behaviour. For 
example Psalm 36.3 asks the people to hope in God and do good (ἔλπισον ἐπ’ αὐτόν 
καὶ ποίει χρηστότητα).739 Such behaviour, conditioned by hope, promises blessings 
(Ps 36.3-5). However, these happen because of God’s agency. The person simply 
hopes in God and acts in line with God’s ways, but God is the one who brings what 
is hoped for (ἔλπισον ἐπ’ αὐτόν, καὶ αὐτὸς ποιήσει). 
Conversely, the hope of the ungodly – those who hope in someone or something 
other than God (cf. Ps 30.7) – will be destroyed (Prov 10.28; 11.23).740 The fact that 
the ungodly’s hopes can be destroyed shows that they are vain (cf. Ps 39.5), fragile, 
and temporary (Wis 5.14; Sir 34.1). Those who have such empty hopes can expect 
that harm will come to them (Isa 30.12-14; 31.10; 47.10; Jer 13.25-27; 17.5-6; Wis 
13.10). Here the LXX shows the faultiness of the ungodly person’s perspective: the 
ungodly put their hope in something because they expect it to bring them good, 
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 Again, frequently, the foundation for their hope is God’s mercy.  
738
 That Ps 41.6, 12 suggests hoping in God as a remedy for a disquieted soul indicates that hope is 
considered a tranquil state.  
739
 Cf. Sir 2.6; There are also instances where hoping in God is linked to keeping his commandments; 
see Ps 77.5-8; Prov 22.17-19. Conversely, those who despise instruction have vain hopes and 
unprofitable labours (Wis 3.11). 
740
 Cf. Prov 11.7 which declares that the hope of a righteous man will not be destroyed.  
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when, in reality, their misplaced hope will result in the opposite, harm. Lying 
beneath this is a rhetoric of power. The unrighteous person’s hopes are futile and 
can be easily damaged because she is trusting in something that does not have the 
power to provide what she seeks.741 This is not true of those that hope in God, who 
has ultimate power to provide all that is required. 
Thus, for the LXX, hope is not just a positive emotion but a necessary state of being. 
Hoping in God is a declaration that you are aligning yourself with him and that he is 
the one you seek, knowing that he is the sole source of the good. Hope is certainly 
not turbulent or problematic; it is a sure emotional posture towards God based on 
his unchanging attributes, particularly his ultimate power and his mercy towards his 
people. With this understanding, we can turn to the author’s use of hope in 1 Peter.  
6.4 Hope in 1 Peter 
Terms for hope (ἐλπίς/ἐλπίζω) appear only five times in the letter (1.3, 13, 21; 3.5, 
15). However, to say that hope is used infrequently is not to say that is has a limited 
function. In the opening sections of the letter it arises at significant points: it occurs 
in the opening verse of the letter body (1.3) and then forms an inclusio for the 
second paragraph (1.13-21). One gets the impression by this placement that, like 
joy, hope is important for the outlook of the letter.742 We will address the author’s 
use of hope in two sections. Firstly we will investigate the perspective set in 1.3-21, 
and then, secondly, we will look at 3.5 and 3.15 in which hope is linked to praxis 
and witness. 
6.4.1 A Living Hope that Expects God’s Favour – 1.3, 13, 21 
 After the epistolary prescript, 1 Peter opens with (1.3): 
Εὐλογητὸς ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁ κατὰ τὸ πολὺ 
αὐτοῦ ἔλεος ἀναγεννήσας ἡμᾶς εἰς ἐλπίδα ζῶσαν δι’ ἀναστάσεως  Ἰησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ ἐκ νεκρῶν, 
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 Cf. Jer 2.37 which draws out the connection between hope and attainment of goods. However, 
because God has rejected Egypt and Assyria (those in whom Israel hoped) Israel will not prosper 
through them; cf. Ezek 29.13-16. 
742
 Brox, Petrusbrief, 61; E. Cothenet, 'Le realisme de l'esperance chrétienne selon 1 Pierre,'  NTS 27 
(1981): 564-72, 564. 
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Blessed be the God and father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the one who 
according to his great mercy has begotten us anew into a living hope 
through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead,  
This first contextualisation of ἐλπίς is foundational for our understanding of hope in 
the rest of the letter as it provides the framework in which Christian hope is to be 
understood.743 Firstly, the verse starts with the action of God. It is God who, 
because of his great mercy, has brought the believer into a new state of being 
which is characterised by living hope (εἰς ἐλπίδα ζῶσαν).744 Secondly, God has done 
this through the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Therefore, Christian hope, as 
presented by the author, cannot be separated from God’s merciful act in Christ; it is 
tied to Christ’s death and resurrection.745 
It is obvious that the believer is the subject who has hope, but who is the object and 
what are they hoping for? 1.3 does not answer these questions explicitly. Is the 
object God, Christ or something else? The fact that 1.3-5 is particularly theocentric 
(see chapter 4) suggests that God is the intended object. This would follow LXX 
usage. In the LXX God was the object of hope because of his attributes and actions. 
Therefore, it is fitting that our author introduces hope into a context in which God’s 
characteristic of mercy, his role as Father, and his powerful action of raising Christ 
and begetting the believer anew are in view. It is not clear from the noun ἀνάστασις 
that God is the agent in Christ’s resurrection. However, our queries about hope’s 
object and whether God raised Christ are resolved in 1.21 when the author declares 
that the audience, through Christ, believe … 
                                                     
743
 Here I see hope as an active emotional stance (Schlosser, Pierre, 62), not, against Goppelt, ‘that 
which is hoped for’; Goppelt, I Peter, 83; see also Cothenet, 'Le realisme,' 565. 
744
 Scholars disagree about why 1 Peter describes hope as living. It could be to contrast Christian 
hope with the vain hopes of the non-believer, or the ‘dead hope’ of their previous life; see 
Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 92, 5; cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 19; Jobes, 1 Peter, 84. However, contra Michaels, it 
is more likely that their hope is ‘living’ because it has been effected through Christ’s resurrection. 
Thus, their hope has in view and shares in Christ’s resurrection life, hence its animated character; 
see Feldmeier, Peter, 69-70. For Schlosser, due to being linked with the act of regeneration, ‘living 
hope’ moves towards meaning simply ‘eternal life’; Schlosser, Pierre, 63. It is not, against Holloway, 
because of a parallel with the ‘better hope’ or ‘sweeter hope’ of the mystery cults; see Holloway, 
Coping, 143-4.  
745
 Achtemeier comments that the link between hope as living and the resurrection of Christ is 
unique to 1 Peter; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 95. 
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... εἰς θεὸν τὸν ἐγείραντα αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ δόξαν αὐτῷ δόντα, ὥστε τὴν 
πίστιν ὑμῶν καὶ ἐλπίδα εἶναι εἰς θεόν. 
… in God the one who raised him [Christ] from the dead and gave him glory, 
so that your faith and hope might be in God.746 
Thus, in 1.21 God is explicitly the object of the believers’ hope (cf. 3.5) and the 
reason given for this is that God raised Christ from the dead and gave him glory.747 
Therefore, in 1.3 we see the same contextualisation of hope as in 1.21: God is the 
object of hope due to his action in Christ.748 To display God as the object of hope 
tells the audience, through hope’s evaluative content, to look to God for some good 
or fulfilment of need and to recognise their own deficiency. Secondarily, it infers 
that God has the capacity to provide the good needed. With this emotion, the 
author again reminds the audience of God’s role in their flourishing. Moreover, in 
1.13 the author commands the audience to hope entirely on God (1.13).749 In doing 
so, every other object of hope is negated and the believers’ dependence on God is 
emphasised.  
So, what good is the audience expectant that God will provide for them? Put 
differently, what are the believers to hope for? It could be that 1.4-5 provides the 
content of their hope.750 In which case, the audience hope for an unfading 
inheritance, God’s protection, and their ultimate salvation. However, the problem 
with this is that each benefit is introduced by the preposition εἰς which also 
precedes ἐλπίδα ζῶσαν and thus, stylistically, the benefits and the living hope are 
put on the same plane: all are consequences of being begotten anew.751 Further, 
our discussion on joy has revealed that these benefits are perceived to be, at least 
                                                     
746
 With Achtemeier, contra Elliott, I do not take the absence of the article before ἐλπίδα to indicate 
that it should be viewed as the predicate, which would result in the translation ‘your faith is hope in 
God,’ but rather it is stylistic, ‘with the τήν before πίστιν understood also to apply to ἐλπίδα’; 
Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 133; Elliott, 1 Peter, 379.   
747
 Cf. Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 133. 
748
 Cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 19-20 who supports God’s agency in 1.3; see also Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 92; 
Elliott, 1 Peter, 330, 3. 
749
 Cf. Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 44-5 who comments that hope must be entire, there can be nothing 
undecided in their hope. 
750
 Michaels reads it this way when he sees ‘hope’ as indicating the content (objective) rather than 
the state of anticipation (subjective); thus 1.4-5 further expands the content of the objective hope; 
Michaels, 1 Peter, 19; cf. Goppelt, I Peter, 85. 
751
 See Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 92; Schlosser, Pierre, 62. Even if new birth is only into hope and 
inheritance, my argument stands; see Jobes, 1 Peter, 84. 
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in part, a present reality, so, they cannot be hoped for because hope looks towards 
a future good. Thus, 1.3 does not express clearly the content of the believers’ living 
hope. However, 1.13 is illuminative. It commands: 
... τελείως ἐλπίσατε ἐπὶ τὴν φερομένην ὑμῖν χάριν ἐν ἀποκαλύψει Ἰησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ. 
… hope completely on the grace which will be brought to you at the 
revelation of Jesus Christ.752 
The believers are to hope for grace (χάρις). The preposition ἐπί could suggest that 
grace is the object of hope.753 However, the fact that χάρις is described as ‘being 
brought to you’ (φερομένην ὑμῖν) means that an additional agent is required. 
Therefore, it makes more sense to see God as the object of hope and as the agent 
who brings grace.754 This also fits with hope’s future orientation. Grace is hoped for 
because it is yet to be revealed at Christ’s coming revelation.755 Receiving this grace 
will result in the fulfilment of the believers’ salvation and inheritance, and given the 
example of Christ, their vindication (cf. 1.5, 9).756 
Now we can see how hope in God and fear of God provide two parts of the same 
picture. The revelation of Christ in 1.13 points towards God’s final judgement, and 
1.17 reminds the audience that they are to fear God as judge in expectation of that 
day. It is at this point of judgement that the believer stands before God in both fear 
and hope because God is the only one that can bestow or withhold his favour, 
favour with which their flourishing is bound. They can depend on nothing else. Yet, 
the weight falls on hope, with fear of God being sandwiched between two strong 
references to hoping in God (1.13, 21). 
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 With Achtemeier, Elliott ,and Feldmeier, against Windisch and Michaels I read τελείως as referring 
to ἐλπίσατε not νήφοντες; Windisch, katholischen Briefe, 55; Michaels, 1 Peter, 55. See Achtemeier, 1 
Peter, 118-9; Elliott, 1 Peter, 356; Feldmeier, Peter, 99; I also take φερομένην though a present 
participle to have future force due to the reference to the future event of Christ’s revelation. 
753
 See Michaels, 1 Peter, 56. 
754
 Cf. Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 119. 
755
 Cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 56; De Waal Dryden, Theology, 100; Thurén, Argument, 106-7. This is not to 
say that all references to grace in 1 Peter are future (cf. 1.2; 5.12). 
756
 Thus, Michaels is right to say that ‘Peter’s “living hope” is more comprehensive than simply being 
raised individually as Jesus was raised. It includes that but encompasses everything that the Christian 
community expects as its future divine vindication’; Michaels, 1 Peter, 20; cf. Goppelt, I Peter, 107. 
For some grace becomes equivalent to salvation; Cothenet, 'Le realisme,' 89; Schlosser, Pierre, 89. 
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But what is the basis for the believers’ hope? For Achtemeier, ἐπὶ τὴν φερομένην 
ὑμῖν χάριν gives the grounds of hope.757 But, grace cannot be what is hoped for and 
the basis of hope. Instead, we need to come full circle back to 1.3. It is God’s mercy 
towards the believer demonstrated in the Christ-event that is the basis for hope.758 
As Feldmeier succinctly comments concerning biblical hope: 
Such a hope is not founded upon the unstable foundation of human 
expectation and fears but on the certainty of the trustworthiness of God; it 
bases itself not on something that one wishes to obtain or avoid but on God, 
the basis and content of hope.759 
God’s character – his mercy and justice – and past action support their future 
expectation. Through Christ, God’s mercy has begotten them anew, and now they 
understand themselves to be God’s people, marked by his mercy (2.10). If they 
remain faithful to God they can expect that he will act favourably towards them at 
the point of judgement.760 Then, they will experience the goodness of his grace in 
full.761 This is striking, because it means that the basis of the believers’ hope is 
God’s own affection towards them.762 Yet, it is also God’s power that enables 
hope.763 The resurrection and glorification of Christ demonstrate God’s power and 
authority and therefore the Christ-event becomes a grounding rationale for why 
hope in God is fitting (1.21).764 This attribute of power is important, as hope 
depends on God having the capacity to act for the believer to bring about their 
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 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 119; cf. Elliott who reads 1.13 similarly; Elliott, 1 Peter, 356. 
758
 Because Elliott interprets 1.13 as indicating Christ’s historical appearance, he sees the believer’s 
present experience of grace, rather than God’s mercy, as the basis of hope, and therefore hope 
looks towards the final consummation of that grace; Elliott, 1 Peter, 357. For Schelkle ἔλεος is God’s 
salvation deed in Christ; Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 27. But this is the action that results from God’s 
mercy. Like in the LXX ἔλεος indicates his steadfast covenant love and faithfulness; see Jobes, 1 Peter, 
82. 
759
 Feldmeier, Peter, 67. 
760
 Cf. Jobes, 1 Peter, 110. 
761
 In this understanding sits the background that in biblical tradition God’s mercy ‘is a prominent 
characteristic of God’s goodness towards His people.’ It expresses an ‘intimate relationship’ 
between God and his people; Elliott, 1 Peter, 331. 
762
 Cf. Feldmeier, Peter, 64-5 for the uniqueness of this in the ancient world. 
763
 Elliott emphasises confidence in God’s power as a key component of hope in 1 Peter; Elliott, 1 
Peter, 334-5.  
764
 Cf. Michaels who notes that the tone of 1.3-5 in comparison to 1.2 is that of God’s power; 
Michaels, 1 Peter, 24. For Cothenet, the Christian can hope because they can already celebrate 
God’s victory. Everything is done in principle, it is just waiting for consummation; Cothenet, 'Le 
realisme,' 565. 
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good.765 Thus, the powerful resurrection of Christ becomes the guarantee of the 
believers’ future.766 
Furthermore, there is an expectation that those who align themselves with Christ 
through faith will share in Christ’s glorification (4.13; 5.1). As Feldmeier comments, 
‘God has revealed himself in the fate of Christ as the one who can and will 
transform the lowness, suffering, and death of those who belong to him into 
triumph, glory and eternal life.’767 Thus, as God acted for Christ, so he will act for 
the faithful believer.768  We see this relationship between God’s grace and the 
believer’s glorification clearly stated in 5.10: 
ὁ δὲ θεὸς πάσης χάριτος, ὁ καλέσας ὑμᾶς εἰς τὴν αἰώνιον αὐτοῦ δόξαν ἐν Χριστῷ 
ὀλίγον παθόντας αὐτὸς καταρτίσει, στηρίξει, σθενώσει, θεμελιώσει. 
The God of all grace, the one having called you into his eternal glory in 
Christ, after you have suffered a little while, he will restore, secure, 
strengthen, and firmly establish you. 
This glorification is ‘in Christ’ and therefore requires the believers’ association with 
him. What is notable here is the wealth of securing terms that are used. Their hope 
in God for his grace will lead to their glorification and future security. Notably, it is 
God’s agency that brings about the goods. Here, we must remember that hope, by 
looking to another for the good, recognises one’s own lack. Therefore, the author’s 
statement that they should hope completely on God for his grace (1.13) divests the 
audience of any power over their own situation. 769 For their eternal security, their 
only hope is God and Christ (1.9). Thus, they are required to live a life of utter 
dependence.  
Before moving on to discuss the next occurrences of hope in 1 Peter, there are still 
two matters to explore. Firstly, how does hoping in God relate to the mind (διάνοια) 
and being sober (νήφω)? Lastly, can hope and faith be differentiated? 
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 It is therefore not surprising that in 3.15 the believers’ hope comes after their acceptance of 
Christ as their Lord. 
766
 Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 28; Jobes, 1 Peter, 109. 
767
 Feldmeier, Peter, 120. 
768
 Cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 379. 
769
 Likewise, it cuts ‘all cords of security to false gods’; De Waal Dryden, Theology, 100. 
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In 1.13 the exhortation to hope (ἐλπίσατε) is the main verb after two other actions: 
girding up the loins of the mind (ἀναζωσάμενοι τὰς ὀσφύας τῆς διανοίας ὑμῶν) and 
being sober (νήφοντες). Sequentially, the aorist participle ἀναζωσάμενοι occurs 
before ἐλπίζω, and the present participle νήφοντες happens concurrently.770 Thus, 
the audience has to prepare their minds; then, in a state of soberness they can 
hope fully.771 This reveals that, for the author, hope is not a fleeting fancy but 
occurs when one has clear thinking. True hope is based on having the right 
perspective on reality.772 From hope’s future orientation, object, and content, we 
can appreciate that their outlook is to be eschatologically orientated, centred on 
God, anticipating God’s coming grace because of Christ.773 This perspective sets the 
tone for the following paraenesis (1.14-17).774 It is the emotion of hope that directs 
the reader to what should be valued in their sober judgements.775 Consequently, 
hope is necessary for conditioning the believer’s behaviour.776 As Piper comments, 
behaviour springs from hope that sees the value of the coming grace, for ‘we 
inevitably conform our behaviour to the future we desire most of all to enjoy.’777 
This orienting aspect of hope helps us see how it relates to faith: hope sets the 
destination, but faith (or faithfulness) provides the map and the means. How we 
read πίστις and πιστεύω, whether as faith or faithfulness, determines how we 
interpret its interrelationship with hope. It appears that in 1 Peter both senses are 
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 See Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 118. 
771
 Therefore, I read the participles as imperatival rather than indicating that the audience are 
already in a state of readiness ; see Thurén, Argument, 106-7. However, this sequential reading is 
not affected if, as Achtemeier (following Daube) suggests, the participles are not strictly imperatival 
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Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 117-8.  
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 Cf. Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 95; Feldmeier, Peter, 100-1. Michaels argues that διάνοια ‘has in view not 
the natural human intellect but a capacity that is theirs by virtue of their redemption in Jesus Christ’, 
as opposed to the ignorance of their former way of life. Thus, it means their new Christian 
understanding; Michaels, 1 Peter, 54. 
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 Cf. Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 44; Jobes, 1 Peter, 110. 
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 For Michaels, 1.16-17 makes explicit the ‘ethical content’ of hope which is holiness and fear of 
God; Michaels, 1 Peter, 52. 
775
 Thus, Holloway correctly recognises that the author aims to reorient the believer’s hope ‘away 
from the present age … toward an apocalyptic future’ and in doing so to make the values of the 
future world central. According to Holloway, this perspective enables the audience to emotionally 
distance themselves from a problematic domain to a new apocalyptic one. This is an instance of 
‘psychological disidentification’ which is a recognised coping strategy; Holloway, Coping, 156-9.  
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 Cf. Feldmeier, Peter, 96. 
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 J. Piper, 'Hope as the Motivation of Love: 1 Peter 3.9-12,'  NTS 26 (1980): 212-30, 216. 
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meant, as belief is always turned into action.778 Therefore, hope tells the audience 
what goal to have and who is significant for the attainment of that goal. Faith, as 
belief in the gospel about Christ, provides the worldview in which this 
contextualisation of hope makes sense.779 Faithfulness – the action of fidelity to 
God in Christ – provides the means to attain the goal hoped for. In terms of what it 
looks like in real life, active hope is essentially the same as active faith i.e. 
faithfulness.780 Both have to be enduring to reach the desired eternal outcome. 
This link between hope, faith, and faithfulness leads us to the remaining two 
instances of hope in 1 Peter. 
6.4.2 Hope as a Declaration of Allegiance – 1 Peter 3.5, 15 
The next reference to hope comes in the household code material addressed to the 
wives (3.1-6). The holy ancient female exemplars are held up as those who hoped in 
God (αἱ ἐλπίζουσαι εἰς θεόν, 3.5). In this usage hoping in God becomes a defining 
marker along with holiness.781 This intimates two further things: firstly, that such 
people are pleasing to God (cf. 3.4) and, secondly, that hoping in God distinguishes 
you from others that do not. As such, hoping in God defines his people. Here we 
see echoes of the LXX idea that hoping in God is declaring God to be your god. 
Another similarity with LXX usage is that hoping in God is directly linked to 
behaviour. The holy wives hope in God and therefore adorn themselves with an 
attitude of heart which results in submissive behaviour.782 From the context this is 
paralleled with doing good (ἀγαθοποιέω; 3.6). If this is the case, this use of ἐλπίζω 
reveals that hoping in God is an emotional stance that shows allegiance 
(faithfulness) and is worked out in behaviour.  
The last occurrence of hope terminology appears in 3.15, where the author says: 
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 Cf. Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 132 who interprets πιστὸς εἰς in 1.21 as active trust. 
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 Cothenet thinks that faith and hope should be kept distinct. Faith relates to the past action of the 
resurrection of Christ, whereas hope looks to future glory; Cothenet, 'Le realisme,' 567. 
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 Cf. Goppelt, I Peter, 108. 
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 It could be that the author wants us to understand hoping in God a dimension of their holiness; 
Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 215. 
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... ἕτοιμοι ἀεὶ πρὸς ἀπολογίαν παντὶ τῷ αἰτοῦντι ὑμᾶς λόγον περὶ τῆς ἐν ὑμῖν 
ἐλπίδος, 
… be ready always to answer anyone who asks you for an account 
concerning the hope within you, 
Here, ἐλπίς covers the whole content of the believers’ defence. We know from our 
previous discussion that what is causing conflict is the believers’ association with 
Christ and their resultant Christian behaviour (3.16).783 Therefore, for the author, 
the believers’ ‘hope’ is a full explanation of why they have such an allegiance and 
conduct.784 As Achtemeier comments, one might expect the author to say ‘faith’ 
here. Achtemeier concludes, 1 Peter uses hope, because ‘“hope” describes for our 
author the characteristic element of the Christian life.’785 This is true, but there is 
more to it than this. The use of hope makes sense when we understand what is 
contained in hoping in God. Hope provides the orientation toward a particular 
object (God) and looks towards particular goods (grace) and desired ends 
(salvation, inheritance, establishing). This gives information about what should be 
valued (one’s relationship with God) and in turn promotes particular behaviour 
(belief in and fidelity to God demonstrated in obedient behaviour). Thus, as 
Achtemeier comments concerning 1.3, ‘hope … functions as the content of the 
Christian life.’786 Thus, to explain their hope is not only to confess Christ as Lord (cf. 
3.15a) but is to open up for the accuser a whole way of seeing the world. This 
emotional orientation distinguishes them from the rest of society.787 As noted in 
chapter 5, this confrontation of worldviews is the cause of persecution but also a 
window for witness. The explanation of their hope is a significant part of such 
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 Due to space, I will not enter the debate about whether a courtroom situation is in view here. The 
general position has been against this; however, more recently, others have argued in favour of it 
being a likely possibility; see Holloway, Coping, 202-5; Williams, Persecution, 275-97; Horrell, 'Fear,' 
425-8. 
784
 Cf. Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 232-3; Achtemeier confirms that explaining their hope is a declaration of 
allegiance when he says that 3.15b defines how the Christian is to acknowledge the Lordship of 
Christ. 
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 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 233. 
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 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 95; cf. Windisch, katholischen Briefe, 70. 
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witness.788 Thus, in both 3.5 and 3.15 hope is a declaration of allegiance. As such, it 
produces and makes sense of particular behaviour. Because of this, hope becomes 
important for the maintenance of Christian praxis and the possibility of Christian 
witness.  
In the course of exploring fear and hope, we have pulled out some implications of 
the author’s use of these emotions. However, we are yet to outline the sociological 
and therapeutic outcomes of his rhetoric. To this we can now turn. 
6.5 Implications for the Believer 
Both fear and hope direct the audience towards God. Furthermore, both fear and 
hope emphasise God’s power over the good. Fear warns that God has the power to 
harm, and hope gives assurance that because of Christ he is willing to act mercifully. 
Because both emotions are future orientated they anticipate outcomes that have 
not occurred yet and so cause the believers to consider their present actions in light 
of future expectations. Fear seeks avoidance of harm, and hope encourages pursuit 
of the object that promises the good.789 The net effect of both is that hope and fear 
spur the believers toward seeking allegiance to God. All this sits within an 
understanding of a cosmic reality in which God is the ultimate power, judge, and 
final arbiter of the fate of the believer. But, at the same time he is the God who has 
demonstrated his mercy through Christ and begotten the believers into a new 
existence. 
Recognising God as the most significant power and the only hope shapes the 
believers’ perspective on other figures of power in their lives. By revaluing the 
power dynamics with the other and by disregarding the goods that the other has 
mastery over, the author is radically changing the audience’s perspective of the 
structuring of reality, including its value systems.790 Consequently, the norms that 
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 Piper even argues that such hope can give the reason for going one stage further in being able to 
bless their persecutors; Piper, 'Hope,' 217. 
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 As Feldmeier recognises, hope moves one ‘to imagine the future and so to plan’; Feldmeier, 
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uphold these structures can also be questioned. As such, encouraging fear of God 
and hope in him alone, whilst negating fear of the other, psychologically releases 
the believers to behave in ways considered deviant to Greco-Roman society. 
Negating fear asks the believers to see their relationship to society differently. 
Whereas previously they were subordinate members who acted out of fear of their 
persecutors, now they live by different norms – those aligned with fear of and hope 
in God. Thus, through encouraging this emotional stance, the author creates space 
for the believers to have a new group identity: they are those that fear and hope in 
God. 791 Consequently, the author’s use of fear and hope has the potential to 
reshape the audience’s allegiances and sense of identity. 
We have also become aware that fearing God places boundaries on the believers’ 
lives and that hoping in God is a declaration of aligning oneself with him. Both are 
demonstrated in behaviour that conforms to God’s holiness. In such a way, these 
emotional stances draw a dividing line between the believer and the other which is 
made obvious in conduct (ἀναστροφὴ ἐν φόβῳ versus ματαία ἀναστροφή, 1.17-18).792 
However, from the believers’ perspective, despite being defamed for their 
Christianity, they can recognise that in fact the non-believer is deviant and that the 
believer is on the right path. Because they have chosen to align themselves with 
God, they can expect that he is on their side and will act favourably towards them. 
This is explicitly put forward in 3.12 which quotes Psalm 33.16: 
ὅτι ὀφθαλμοὶ κυρίου ἐπὶ δικαίους 
καὶ ὦτα αὐτοῦ εἰς δέησιν αὐτῶν, 
πρόσωπον δὲ κυρίου ἐπὶ ποιοῦντας κακά. 
because the eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous 
and his ears [open] to their prayer 
but the face of the Lord is against those who do evil. 
This is why the author can also say to the audience πᾶσαν τὴν μέριμναν ὑμῶν 
ἐπιρίψαντες ἐπ’αὐτόν, ὅτι αὐτῷ μέλει περὶ ὑμῶν (5.7). With this perspective, fear and 
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 Achtemeier supports this division when he comments that holiness ‘is separation from former 
culture for God that entails certain behavior appropriate for this situation’; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 121, 
3-4; cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 361-2. 
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hope produce confidence and absence of turmoil (see ταραχθῆτε; 3.14).793 The 
believers, who were no doubt some of the weakest in society, do not have to 
perceive of themselves as downtrodden or at the mercy of the fearsome oppressor. 
If, as argued, living in fear of and hope in God displaces the mastery of the other 
and affirms that one’s flourishing is dependent on one’s relationship with God, then 
the believer can have psychological fortitude in the face of abuse.794 The believers 
know that they are deliberately choosing their behaviour in line with eternal reality, 
not because they are dominated by an oppressive human power, but because they 
are aligning themselves with God, in the trust that such faith/faithfulness will end in 
good. These are not disempowered, anxious individuals. True, they are 
subordinates in human society and will remain so, but they are active players in 
their own eternal destinies.795 Having said that the believers have agency over their 
present orientation and action, hope reminds the believers of their deficiency and 
that, when it comes to eternal outcomes, they are utterly dependent on God.796  
Whereas for the Stoics hope was unstable and a misplaced longing, for the believer 
their hope in God’s mercy and justice is secure.797 This is because, like in the LXX, 
hope is made secure by its object – God – and is grounded in events that have 
already happened.798 As such, dependency is not unstable but an anchor. The goods 
to which the believer looks are in part already present, but are still yet to be 
fulfilled. However, the fact that they have been initiated gives the believers 
assurance that their hope is not vain.799 Again, that fact that their hope and fear are 
reactions to an eternal reality means that they can become consistent dispositions 
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 As Aristotle noted, confidence can be produce by our own strength against the foe, or if a 
powerful figure is on our side (Rhet. 2.5.17, 1383a20-25). 
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 For Brox, the letter’s presentation of lack of fear in the face of abuse displays the early phase of 
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regardless of circumstance. Moreover, fearing God as a just judge will also help 
them trust that he will reward their faithfulness and call their abusers to account. 
Thus, they do not need to repay evil for evil (2.23; 3.12; 4.19).800  
6.6 Conclusion 
It is clear from the above discussion that 1 Peter’s use of fear and hope is closer to 
the LXX contextualisation of emotions than the Stoic idealisation. Whereas for the 
Stoic both fear and hope are problematic emotions because they allow another to 
have mastery and look outside of the self for the good, for the author of 1 Peter 
they are necessary states. This is because fear and hope have been affected by 
having God as their object. Instead of being turbulent, fear of God is positive, sets 
necessary boundaries, and provides vital information about how to live in such a 
way as to avoid harm. Likewise, hope orientates the person, displays where the 
good lies, and who has power to bestow it. Both fear and hope aim to shape the 
recipients’ goals and as such are directive of their behaviour, encouraging fidelity to 
God. This emotional stance goes hand in hand with negating fear of the other. By 
discounting negative fear the believers are released from assessing their current 
position in relation to the other. Via this rhetorical manoeuvre the author shifts the 
believers’ view of themselves and the structures of power within their worldview. 
The consequence is that the link between the self, the other, and necessary goods 
is severed, and subsequently, a way is paved for potential deviance. The believers’ 
present situation is not radically altered, but fear and hope in God do give the 
believer confidence that they are on the path to flourishing, even in the face of 
oppression. With conformity and deviance in mind, we can turn to the final 
emotion under investigation: shame.
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7. Appropriate and Inappropriate Shame 
In this final exegetical chapter we will explore the last emotion: shame. It is not new 
to recognise that honour and shame language appears in 1 Peter. Two works have 
addressed this directly: firstly, John Elliott’s short article, ‘Disgraced Yet Graced’, 
and secondly Barth Campbell’s monograph, Honor, Shame, and the Rhetoric of 1 
Peter.801 Elliott takes as his starting point sociological work on honour and shame 
cultures, whereas Campbell opts for a rhetorical approach but includes sociological 
theory throughout. However, neither adequately details the importance of shame 
language in the letter. Campbell, in particular, focuses on honour, and so, for 
example, in 4.16 where the author says ‘but if you suffer as a Christian, do not be 
ashamed,’ the shame terminology is read by Campbell in the positive as a bestowal 
of honour.802 I agree that honour terms are important in the letter for affirming, 
theologically and rhetorically, the positive identity of the audience. However, the 
shame terminology functions in its own right, and, therefore, warrants its own 
investigation.803  
Elliott highlights various terms that relate to honour and shame in 1 Peter. Three 
terms are placed within the ‘shame’ family: καταισχύνω (2.6; 3.16), αἰσχύνω (4.16), 
and αἰσχροκερδῶς (5.2).804 The latter adverb refers to shameful greed, and therefore 
highlights a quality of behaviour rather than an emotion per se.  Thus, καταισχύνω 
and αἰσχύνω will be the focus of our investigation.805 We will start by locating 
shame within the emotional terrain, first using Stoic theory and then moving to the 
LXX. In order to do this, we need to include the cognate noun αἰσχύνη to our list of 
terms. 
                                                     
801
 J. H. Elliott, 'Disgraced Yet Graced: The Gospel according to 1 Peter in the Key of Honor and 
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 There has been much scholarship on honour and shame as a socio-cultural phenomenon in the 
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7.1 Locating Shame 
7.1.1 αἰσχύνη in Stoicism 
As noted in 6.1.1, αἰσχύνη is grouped under fear. Thus, we can expect shame to 
carry the components of fear outlined in the previous chapter. Andronicus defines 
shame as follows: 
Αἰσχύνη δὲ φόβος ἀδοξίας. 
Shame is fear of ill repute / dishonour ([Pass.] 3 = SVF 3.409).806 
As a type of fear, shame relates to an expected harm; in this instance, dishonour. 
Thus, shame evaluates dishonour negatively and as detrimental. From fear’s action-
tendency, we can infer that shame presents dishonour as something to avoid. In 
ancient honour-shame cultures honour was the highest commodity and one did not 
want to be without it, i.e. dishonoured.807 By grouping αἰσχύνη under the πάθος 
fear, Stoicism labels αἰσχύνη irrational and excessive. Presumably, like all passions, 
it is possible for shame to be based on a faulty judgement which wrongly assesses 
what is honourable and dishonourable and thus motivates the person 
incorrectly.808 Lastly, whereas fear has an obvious future orientation, the temporal 
aspect of shame is less clear. We can see this from Aristotle’s definition: 
ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν 
κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, 
Let shame [aiskhynē] be [defined as] a sort of pain and agitation concerning 
the class of evils, whether present or past or future, that seem to bring a 
person into disrespect (Rhet. 2.6, 1383b12-14, trans. Kennedy).809 
Aristotle’s definition is fuller than Andronicus’ and highlights aspects of shame not 
obvious in the Stoic delineation. Firstly, shame is concerned with certain evils (τῶν 
κακῶν). It is not clear what τῶν κακῶν refers to. Freese [LCL] translates τῶν κακῶν 
as ‘misdeeds.’ This is supported by Aristotle’s use of ἔργα to introduce the type of 
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 Cf. Diogenes Laertius  7.112 = SVF 3.407;  Stobaeus 2.92 = SVF 3.408.  
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 Cf. Cicero Tusc. 2.24.58-9; Elliott, 'Disgraced,' 168-9. 
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vice-ridden actions indicated by τῶν κακῶν (Rhet. 2.6; 1383b). Furthermore, 
Aristotle goes on to list behaviour that would be so categorised.810 Therefore, we 
can conclude that wrong actions are what bring someone into disrepute, and thus 
are productive of shame.811 Subsequently, a virtuous person would not feel shame 
because he would not exhibit behaviour that would instigate it (Eth. nic. 4.9, 
1128b21-22). Misdeeds that cause shame can be one’s own or the wrongful actions 
of one’s associates (cf. Rhet. 2.6; 1383b15-18; 1384a9-11; 1385a37-39). However, 
the actions which reveal a person’s deficiency are considered most shameful (Rhet. 
2.6, 1384a13-15; cf. Ep. 95.9). In both of these cases the object of shame is the self, 
either as an individual or as a member of a group. If Aristotle is correct, then shame, 
more clearly than any emotion investigated thus far, highlights a person’s 
behaviour, categorising it negatively.812 
If we follow this reasoning, shame is deeply tied to the norms of a given cultural 
group. For, how can one assess that behaviour is deviant without having some 
standard to evaluate it by? The culture in which one lives, and more importantly, to 
which one subscribes, provides the framework for categorisation. Thus, shame 
views the self from this socio-cultural perspective.813 As Taylor comments: 
… in experiencing one of these emotions [pride, humiliation, shame, and 
guilt] the person concerned believes of herself that she has deviated from 
some norm and that in doing so she has altered her standing in the world. 
The self is the ‘object’ of these emotions, and what is believed amounts to 
an assessment of that self.814 
Even though the self is shame’s object, the other is significant for the occurrence of 
shame. Taylor explains that shame requires an audience, ‘for feeling shame is 
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 For Aristotle, the wrongful actions are due to faults of character such as cowardice, injustice, and 
licentiousness; cf. Epcitetus, Diatr. 3.26.1. 
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 See Konstan, Emotions, 100-1; cf. Nemesius De Natura Hominis 20 (SVF 3.416) who links shame 
with shameful deeds. Though Nemesius is 4
th
 century he follows Stoic groupings, placing shame 
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interchangeably. For Nemesius, αἰδώς is concerned with loss of reputation, αἰσχύνη focuses on 
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 For Epictetus, one can be ashamed on account of both thinking (ἐνθυμούμενος) and doing (ποιῶν) 
(Diatr. 2.8.14). 
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connected with the thought that eyes are upon one.’815 She also highlights that how 
one is seen is important. It is not enough that there is a ‘seeing’ audience, there has 
to be a ‘judging’ one.816 Only through seeing oneself from the other’s critical 
viewpoint does the person recognise the deviant nature of her behaviour.817 The 
other’s reproach (or expected reproach) produces a sense of shame (cf. Seneca, Ep. 
94.44). Of course, one has to value the audience for shame to occur. Aristotle 
recognises this when he comments that one only feels ashamed before those one 
esteems and therefore whose opinion one cares about (Rhet. 2.6, 1384a21-25 cf. 
2.6, 1384b23-26; Eth. eud.3.7.3, 1233b26-29; Epictetus, Diatr. 3.9.7).818 The 
individual may care about the other’s judgement purely for the sake of status, or 
she may desire to appear honourable because she needs the esteem of the other to 
secure necessary goods (Rhet. 2.6, 1384b27-31). Therefore, honour can be the good 
in itself, or it can be the route to other benefits. Shame fears losing either of these 
goods, and thus, like fear, gives power to the other.819 Furthermore, if honour is 
esteem in the eyes of the other and to be dishonoured is an evil, then the other has 
the capacity to harm the person. 
Exposure is also a key aspect of shame. Aristotle comments: 
καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ μᾶλλον  ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία τὸ ἐν 
ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ· διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ 
τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα. 
They are also more ashamed of things that are done before their eyes and in 
broad daylight; whence the proverb, ‘The eyes are the abode of shame’. 
That is why they feel more ashamed before those who are likely to be 
always with them or who keep watch upon them, because in both cases 
they are under the eyes of others (Rhet. 2.6, 1384a33-1384b1, [Freese, 
LCL]). 
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For shame to occur one’s faults being revealed for what they are is crucial.820 The 
miscreant action alone does not necessarily produce shame, but shame is 
generated when the fault is exposed.821 Having said this, the fear that they will be 
exposed to one’s detriment can lead to anticipatory shame.  
Modern theorists, such as Taylor, have demonstrated the complex relationship 
between the self and the other evidenced in feeling shame. For Taylor, shame is an 
emotion of self-assessment which makes one aware of one’s standing in the 
world.822 For an honour-shame culture it is not so easy to distinguish between self-
esteem and public esteem. If honour is the only way to know one’s value then loss 
of honour inevitably means loss of self-value and identity. In such a culture ‘a 
person can assess himself only in terms of what the public thinks of him.’823 Put 
differently, shame sees the self with the eyes of the other.824 The other here is 
specifically the ‘honour-group’ to which one subscribes and whose norms one 
judges oneself by.825 Moreover, to feel shame one has to accept the judgement of 
the self from the viewpoint of the other.826 This means seeing oneself as deviant 
and devalued. Thus, shame does not just evaluate one’s actions, it makes a 
judgement on the self.  
In Greco-Roman thought feeling shame can have a positive function because it 
guides someone towards correct conduct (Seneca, Ep. 10.2; Cicero, Tusc. 4.20.45). 
Shame itself is not good, but an ability to feel shame is, because it shows a regard 
for norms and an understanding of norm transgression.827 Consequently, shame 
performs both an ethical and a social function because desiring to avoid dishonour 
motivates one to live within the norms of the community.828 However, Seneca does 
                                                     
820
 Conversely, shamelessness does not care about exposure. One is willing to parade before people 
actions or attitudes that others might consider faults; see Cicero De or. 2.62.233. 
821
 For Epictetus, the examining eyes can be internal, for the god who lives within watches 
everything, even one’s thinking (Diatr. 2.8.9-14). 
822
 Taylor, Pride, 1, 53. 
823
 Taylor, Pride, 55; cf. Elliott, 'Disgraced,' 168. 
824
 Taylor, Pride, 57. 
825
 Taylor, Pride, 55. 
826
 Taylor, Pride, 56-7.  
827
 Cf. De or. 1.28.130. 
828
 Cf. Seneca Ep. 25.2-3; Aristotle Eth .eud.3.1, 1229a13-14; 1230a16-21. 
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temper such compliance by recognising that one may choose to endure shame if 
the goods obtained by the disgraceful action are valuable enough (Ep. 81.27-29).829 
Thus, we can conclude that shame is fear of dishonour. It evaluates dishonour as 
detrimental to flourishing, and encourages avoidance of ill-repute. Dishonour is 
brought about by the person’s own misdeeds, and therefore shame discourages the 
person from pursuing deviant actions and promotes adhesion to defined norms. 
Shame has the self as the object but assesses the self through the norms of the 
critical ‘seeing’ other. Therefore, shame not only evaluates one’s actions, but also 
judges the self and therefore shapes one’s self-perception and identity. Moreover, 
to feel shame shows the value placed on the opinion of the other. As such, the 
other, in both establishing norms and providing honour (and goods dependent on 
honour), is given power over the flourishing of the individual. With this in mind, we 
can turn to the LXX use of shame. 
7.1.2 Shame in the LXX 
The use of shame in the LXX shows similarities with what we have discovered from 
Greco-Roman material thus far. Firstly, shame is fitting when someone (or a select 
group) has acted badly (Sir 5.13-14; 20.26; 41.17-42.18).830 However, the primary 
action that causes shame is disobedience to God. Baruch 1.15-18 says: 
Τῷ κυρίῳ θεῷ ἡμῶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἡμῖν δὲ αἰσχύνη τῶν προσώπων ὡς ἡ ἡμέρα 
αὕτη, ἀνθρώπῳ Ιουδα καὶ τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν Ιερουσαλημ καὶ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν 
ἡμῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἡμῶν καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἡμῶν καὶ τοῖς προφήταις ἡμῶν 
καὶ τοῖς πατράσιν ἡμῶν, ὧν ἡμάρτομεν ἔναντι κυρίου καὶ ἠπειθήσαμεν αὐτῷ καὶ 
οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν τῆς φωνῆς κυρίου θεοῦ ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι τοῖς προστάγμασιν 
κυρίου, οἷς ἔδωκεν κατὰ πρόσωπον ἡμῶν. 
And you shall say: The Lord our God is in the right, but there is open shame 
on us today, on the people of Judah, on the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and on 
our kings, our rulers, our priests, our prophets, and our ancestors, because 
we have sinned before the Lord. We have disobeyed him, and have not 
heeded the voice of the Lord our God, to walk in the statutes of the Lord 
that he set before us (NRSV).831 
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 For Seneca, such behaviour indicates misplaced values. 
830
 See Sir 41.17-42.18 for a list of which actions someone should and should not be ashamed of. 
831
 Cf. Gen 2.25; Pss. Sol. 9.6; Jer 3.25; 22.22; Ezek 36.32; Dan 9.7-8. 
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Theses verses highlight communal shame and that shame occurs when wrong 
actions are seen by another.832  Here, it is the Lord before whom (ἔνατι κυρίου), i.e. 
in whose sight, they have sinned (cf. Jer 2.26). In the LXX, other humans can also 
take the place of the observing other. For example, Sirach 41.17-19 lists father, 
mother, ruler, judge, friend, even the whole assembly (συναγωγή) as people before 
whom one can be ashamed. Thus, as Aristotle recognised, Sirach highlights figures 
who are esteemed or close associates. Sirach 41.17-19 also reveals that actions 
deemed shameful can be specific, e.g. sexual immorality (πορνεία), or general, e.g. 
lawlessness (ἀνομία) or unrighteousness (ἀδικία). Moreover, like in Greco-Roman 
thought, shame can occur because of the reproach of another (Ps 43.14-16; 68.7-8).  
The idiom ‘shame of the faces’ (αἰσχύνη τῶν προσώπων) in Baruch 1.15 (cf.2 Chr 
32.21; 2 Esd 9.7; Ps 43.16; Dan 9.8) suggests the conspicuity of their fault.833 The 
open demonstration of shame is often graphically described through its correlation 
with bodily exposure (Jdt 9.2; Nah 3.5-7; Isa 20.4; 47.3; Ezek 16.37; 22.10). 
However, shame can also be depicted as covering or clothing the person (1 Macc 
1.28; 3 Macc 6.34; Ps 34.26; 70.13; 108.29; 131.18; Jer 3.25). Such language 
indicates, in symbolic terms, that shame alters the person’s identity: she wears it 
like a garment before all (including herself). 
It is clear from Baruch 1.15-18 and Sir 41.17-19 that particular norms are operating. 
In both Baruch and Sirach (cf. Sir 42.2) these norms are God’s statutes. In the 
Baruch citation there is an added emphasis on God’s righteousness (δικαιοσύνη). 
God’s inherent righteousness means his judgements are correct and therefore 
where he apportions shame it is fitting. From this it naturally follows that for the 
obedient there is the promise that they will not be shamed (Sir 24.22; cf. Isa 29.22; 
45-16-17; 49.23; 54.4-5). Thus, freedom from shame becomes part of the identity 
of God’s people. 
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 See 1 Kgdms 20.30; 3 Kgdms 18.19; Prov 19.13; Sir 22.3-5; Hab 2.10 for shame by association. 
833
 It could be that something like blushing is meant here; cf. Cicero’s definition of shame in 
Tusc.4.8.19. 
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At points, God’s people appear to be shamed on account of belonging to God (Ps 
69.6-8; Dan 3.33). But, those who experience shame because of such allegiance 
maintain trust in God’s righteousness and hope that their accusers will instead be 
shamed (Dan 3.40; 1 Macc 4.31-32; cf. Ps 34; 68; 88; 118.30-31). It is their 
righteousness and God’s justice that provides the basis for their expectation that 
they should be shame-free (Ps 118.80; Sir 51.18). The LXX also shows occasions 
when a godly individual will adhere to God’s ways despite public shame. For 
example, the Suffering Servant of Isaiah refuses to turn away from shame (Isa 50.6). 
Yet, again, this is turned into a promise that because God is his help he will not be 
disgraced (Isa 50.7). Thus, we have two perspectives in Isaiah 50: one is the human 
view; the other is God’s truthful reality. In the former the Servant is shamed, but in 
the latter he is not. What sets the two perspectives apart are the norms the Servant 
is assessed by. Isaiah 50.8-9 makes this clear when the Servant asks who is able to 
judge him when the Lord is his help. 
Conversely, those who oppose God and his people will be shamed (Ps 118.78; 
131.18; 128.5; Isa 41.11; Mic 7.10; Nah 3.4-7; 3 Macc 6.34), as will those who trust 
in idols (Ps 96.7; Isa 42.17; 44.9-11; 45) or someone other than God (Isa 30.1-5; cf. 
Prov 29.25; Isa 20.5-6). Again, those who follow God can plead with him to maintain 
his righteous judgements by requesting that those who revel in evil are shamed (Ps 
24.1-3; 34.4, 24-28; 39.14-17; 70.13; 108.28-29). Subsequently, shaming can be 
seen as part of God’s judgement on both Israel and her enemies due to 
disobedience (Ps 82.14-19; Isa 47.3-4; Ezek 7.10-19).834 Therefore, shame is 
generally presented negatively in the LXX. However, we do see, as in the Greco-
Roman discussion, that to be without a sense of shame is problematic (cf. Prov 
9.13; Sir 29.14). Sirach 29.14 even suggests that a person without a sense of shame 
cannot be a good man (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός). It must be presumed that this is for the same 
reason outlined above: a sense of shame shows the ability to recognise norms and 
deviant behaviour. 
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 In Ps 82.18 the shaming is eternal; cf. Isa 45.17; Dan 12.2. 
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Therefore, shame in the LXX shows similarities to the Greco-Roman philosophical 
understanding. The primary difference is that the most significant observing other 
is God. It is God who sets the norms and it is his judging eye that determines 
whether shame is fitting.835 For both the LXX and Greco-Roman philosophers, a life 
aligned with correct norms – for the philosophers this is virtue, for the LXX it is 
God’s statutes – can expect to be without shame. For the LXX audience, the 
expectation of no shame can have an eschatological dimension: they will not be 
shamed even into eternity. With this foundation laid, we can turn to the use of 
shame in 1 Peter. 
7.2 Shame in 1 Peter 
The use of shame language in 1 Peter will be addressed in two sections: firstly, its 
application to the believer, secondly, to the non-believer.  
7.2.1 No Shame in Associating with Christ - 1 Peter 2.4-8; 4.14-16 
The first occurrence of a shame term comes in 2.6: 
διότι περιέχει ἐν γραφῇ, 
Ἰδοὺ τίθημι ἐν Σιὼν λίθον 
ἐκλεκτὸν ἀκρογωνιαῖον ἔντιμον, 
καὶ ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ’ αὐτῷ οὐ μὴ καταισχυνθῇ. 
For it stands in scripture, 
See, I am laying a stone in Zion 
a chosen and honoured cornerstone, 
and the one believing in him with certainly never be (a)shamed. 
2.6 derives from Isaiah 28.16 (LXX), acting as a bridge between 2.4-5 and 2.7-8. 836 
The quotation follows the stone imagery in 2.4-5.837  It repeats the value ascribed to 
the stone in 2.4 but also develops the thought by making central the role of belief. 
To agree with Michaels, the ‘thrust of the quotation … comes in the last clause’ and 
                                                     
835
 Cf. Elliott, 'Disgraced,' 167. 
836
 Scholars are uncertain about which LXX manuscript form is used by the author; see Michaels, 1 
Peter, 103; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 150-2, 9; Elliott, 1 Peter, 424. Commentators note that ὁ πιστεύων 
ἐπ’ αὐτῷ οὐ μὴ καταισχυνθῇ is similar to καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα ὑμῶν οὐ μὴ καταισχυνθῇ in Psalm 33 which 
has just been quoted (2.3) and will be referenced again in 3.10-12; Selwyn, St. Peter, 157-8; 
Michaels, 1 Peter, 98, 103; Jobes, 1 Peter, 145. 
837
 The stone imagery links the three scripture quotations used by the author (Isaiah 28.16; Ps 
117.22; Isa 8.14). Though other NT passages also use these ‘stone’ citations as messianic (Matt 
21.42; Mark 12.10; Luke 20.17; Rom 9.33), 1 Peter’s combination is unique; Michaels, 1 Peter, 94; 
see also Goppelt, I Peter, 138-9.  
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thus the weight is on the negation of shame.838 From 2.3-4 we know that the stone 
is Christ. Consequently, the phrase ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ’ αὐτῷ identifies the Christian 
believer.839 Subsequently, we can determine that the object of shame here is the 
believer. Therefore, the believers are being asked to appropriate the promise that 
they will certainly not be (a)shamed (οὐ μὴ καταισχυνθῇ). The double negation οὐ μή 
makes this emphatic. As Brox recognises, this quotation is intended to encourage 
the audience, but, as we shall see, it does more than this.840 At this point, it is also 
necessary to identify three key elements brought together in this quotation: 1) two 
persons - Christ and the believer; 2) the act of believing; and, 3) the final outcome - 
not being shamed. We will explore the relationship between these aspects. 
However, first, we need to decide how to understand καταισχύνω.  
I have translated καταισχυνθῇ as (a)shamed. I have opted for this open translation 
to show that the strict dichotomy between shame as a social status and shame as 
an emotional experience is misleading; καταισχύνω can cover both objective 
categorisation and subjective feeling.841 Furthermore, as discussed above, with 
shame, the identity and emotions of the individual are closely bound to their group 
identity and group status. It is problematic to isolate completely being shamed by 
the community (a passive act and social status) from the loss of identity that the 
person would experience and therefore from the subsequent emotional response 
of being ashamed.842 Thus, if an individual identifies with a group and is shamed by 
that group, then they will both be shamed and feel ashamed. This is not the case if 
the individual does not identify with the group or accept their judgements. In this 
instance, it is possible that the person could be shamed socially, i.e. in the eyes of 
the other, but have no internal emotional sense of shame. Thus, in order to 
                                                     
838
 Michaels, 1 Peter, 103; Achtemeier agrees, but does not go on to discuss the negation of shame 
here, save to say that the people built through trust in God will be honoured; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 
160. 
839
 The ὑμῖν οὖν in 2.7 emphasises this; cf. Michaels, 1 Peter, 94-5. 
840
 Brox, Petrusbrief, 101. 
841
 Cf. Goppelt, I Peter, 145. BDAG (517) highlights the subjective emotional aspect of καταισχύνω 
when it lists 1 Peter 2.6 as an instance when shame includes disappointment. 
842
 See Jobes, 1 Peter, 231 for an example of applying this false dichotomy. 
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recognise both the objective status and the emotional experience, I have translated 
καταισχυνθῇ as ‘be (a)shamed’. 
Having established that the believers are promised that they will not be (a)shamed, 
we have to ask the question, who is doing the shaming? Put differently, whose are 
the critical eyes? There are three options: 1) a human group; 2) God; or, 3) a 
combination of the two. The first category could encompass humanity as a whole or 
be a specific socio-cultural group. Given that the reference to shame occurs via a 
scriptural quotation, it is likely that the LXX conceptual framework, in which God’s 
viewpoint is the primary concern, has been absorbed by the author. This would 
follow παρὰ θεῷ in 2.4 because παρά ‘followed by the dative denotes “in the sight or 
judgement of someone.”’843 Thus καταισχυνθῇ is another divine passive (see 
οἰκοδομεῖσθε (2.5); ἐγενήθη (2.7); ἐτέθησαν (2.8)), 844 which indicates that God’s 
critical judgement is intended.845 Our exploration of fear revealed that God is the 
primary judge of action. It is therefore sensible that God should be the judge of 
whether the believers’ actions should result in shame or honour.846 From this 
perspective, 2.6 likely refers to the future judgement suggested in 1.13, 17, and, 
hence, the negation of shame becomes an eschatological outlook.847 This is 
supported by Michaels’ comments that not being (a)shamed is equivalent to the 
positive expectation that the believers will experience vindication when Christ 
appears (cf. 1.7).848 
7.2.1.1 Framing Expectations 
But what is the reason for the author’s confident declaration that the believers will 
be without shame before God?  We have seen that shame is appropriate where 
there is a transgressing of norms, and thus that, in the LXX, where there is 
obedience there will be no shame. 1 Peter follows this reasoning. However, in 2.6 
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 Elliott, 1 Peter, 410. 
844
 Cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 413, 27. 
845
 Cf. Jobes, 1 Peter, 152-3. 
846
 This is in accordance with standard Israelite and early Christian theology; Elliott, 1 Peter, 427. 
847
 Cf. Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 60. 
848
 Michaels, 1 Peter, 104; cf. Schlosser, Pierre, 125. 
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the believers’ lack of shame is on account of their believing in the stone, Christ.849 
On this one act of belief alone the emphatic declaration of 2.6 rests. Logically, this 
infers that the audience’s obedience to God, which negates shame, is their belief in 
Christ. This is emphasised by the adjoining positive statement that to them, the 
ones believing, belongs honour (ὑμῖν οὖν ἡ τιμὴ τοῖς πιστεύουσιν).850 This supports 
our statement in the previous chapter that, for 1 Peter, the primary act of 
obedience is putting one’s faith in Christ.851 In 2.7-8 the author shows that the non-
believer is judged by the same framework.852 Thus, Elliott is right in asserting that 
‘the author declares … one’s relations to Jesus Christ to be the ultimate 
determinant of honor and shame.’853 The non-Christians are categorised as the 
unbelieving (ἀπιστοῦσιν, 2.7) who are disobedient (ἀπειθοῦντες, 2.8).854 Thus, the 
unbelieving are deviant specifically because of their disregard for the word (ὁ λόγος, 
2.8) which, for 1 Peter, is the gospel about Christ (cf. 1.25).855 The result for the 
non-believer is stumbling and falling over the stone. Such stumbling may infer 
shaming. Campbell certainly reads it this way, because of its obvious comparison 
with the honour of the believer.856 Furthermore, Campbell notes that honour and 
shame themes here are not ‘just about eternal destinies’ but present 
                                                     
849
 Thus, with Michaels, ἐπ’ αὐτῷ should be translated ‘in him’ not ‘in it’ because it refers  to Jesus 
Christ not only a metaphorical foundation; Michaels, 1 Peter, 104. Thus, in 2.6, the object of 
trust/belief is Christ rather than God; see Elliott, 1 Peter, 426.   
850
 I read τιμή as the subject of the clause rather than an adjective referring to the value of Christ 
(see NRSV, NIV). Thus, τιμή applies to the believers (cf. 1.7). For agreement see Campbell, Honor, 85-
7; Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 93; Michaels, 1 Peter, 104; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 160-1; Feldmeier, Peter, 
133; contra Brox, Petrusbrief, 101 . 
851
 Where πιστεύω means not just cognitive assent but active trusting followed by faithful behaviour. 
852
 See Kelly, Epistles of Peter, 93; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 160. 
853
 Elliott, 'Disgraced,' 173. 
854
 According to Selwyn unbelief is more than the ‘suspense or refusal of intellectual assent; it 
connotes a revolt of the will’; Selwyn, St. Peter, 164. That ἀπιστέω appears only here in 1 Peter 
suggests that the act of belief or unbelief is central to the author’s argument at this point. This type 
of contrast between two groups where the stigmatized can compare themselves favourably to the 
other is a type of emotion-focused coping strategy; see Holloway, Coping, 122-3. 
855
 In 1 Peter ἀπειθέω ‘exclusively describes refusal of the proclamation of salvation’. See 4.17:  τί τὸ 
τέλος τῶν ἀπειθούντων τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ εὐαγγελίῳ; cf. 3.1, 20; Feldmeier, Peter, 134; cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 
433. Thus, the unbelieving denotes anyone who rejects the gospel; it does not designate the Jews; 
contra Windisch, katholischen Briefe, 61. 
856
 Cf. Campbell, Honor, 84, 94-5 who lists προσκόμματος, σκανδάλου, προσκόπτουσιν under shame 
terminology; see also De Waal Dryden, Theology, 121, 5. For Elliott the rock causes offence rather 
than shame, because Christ violates the social or moral code; Elliott, 1 Peter, 432. 
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honourable/dishonourable status.857 However, though the believers do appear to 
have a present honoured status before God, the framework established seems to 
be emphasising eternal realities, particularly if we hold God to be the ultimate 
judge. Thus, in 2.6-8 the author has established a framework that enables the 
believer to understand the consequences of their response to Christ: faith equals 
no shame but rather honour; disobedience means disaster.858 This framework is 
God ordained (εἰς ὃ καὶ ἐτέθησαν; 2.8).859 Thus, Brox is probably right that the 
purpose of 2.7-8 is not to threaten the unbeliever, but to confirm for the believers 
that they are on the right path.860 Like in the LXX, the recipients can see themselves 
as obedient and therefore expect that God, in his justice, will not allow them to be 
shamed. Moreover, if shame anticipates the harm of dishonour, then we can 
understand that, by negating shame, the author is promoting trusting in Christ as 
something that will certainly not bring harm to the believer. This statement in the 
negative reinforces the positive assertions of hope and joy that allegiance to God 
brings the good. 861 
This line of argument is bolstered by the value language that pervades 2.4-8. There 
are a number of terms in this passage that ascribe honour to both Christ and the 
believer. Christ is chosen (ἐκλεκτός) and honoured (ἔντιμος) by God (2.4, 6).862 This 
reality is to be determinative for the believer’s own value system. In fact, it is 
specifically recognising Christ’s value that distinguishes the believers from others.863 
Those that do not believe reject (ἀποδοκιμάζω, 2.4, 7) Christ.864 Here we can see, as 
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 Campbell, Honor, 95. 
858
 These outcomes should be read  soteriologically; see Jobes, 1 Peter, 153-4. 
859
 To agree with Elliott the ‘Petrine formulation is no reference to divine predestination of 
nonbelievers to condemnation (and of believers to salvation). That which is “set” or established by 
God is the stumbling … resulting from not heeding the word, rather than disobedience itself. … Or to 
express it differently, it is the result of disobedience that is foreordained, not the decision itself’; 
Elliott, 1 Peter, 434; cf. Schlosser, Pierre, 126-8; Campbell, Honor, 93. 
860
 Brox, Petrusbrief, 102. However, this also means that the negative counterpoint outcome of 
disobedience provides a warning to the believer; Thurén, Argument, 127-8. 
861
 Brox, Petrusbrief, 95; Michaels, 1 Peter, 98; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 153. In fact, 2.3 has already 
shown that the believer has tasted that the Lord (Christ) is good. 
862
 For support for translating ἔντιμος as honoured rather than precious see Selwyn, St. Peter, 159; 
Goppelt, I Peter, 137; Elliott, 1 Peter, 411, 26. 
863
 Cf. Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 160. 
864
 Here, to agree with Achtemeier, those who reject Christ are the author’s ‘contemporaries … who 
reject the gospel, rather than the rejection Christ suffered at the time of his crucifixion.’  In Christ’s 
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Elliott acknowledges, the contrast between the ‘human and divine assessments of 
the “stone”.’865 On account of accepting the value of Christ, the believers become 
God’s people and find themselves similarly chosen and honoured.866 Moreover, the 
believers can understand that by uniting with Christ, who is the living stone, they 
are able to become living stones and therefore partake in Christ’s identity and 
life.867 Evidently, the absence of shame sits in a larger matrix of value. If the 
believers have the right perspective and the right values they will have the correct 
response to objects within their reality. In this instance, they will value Christ and 
association with him. Thus, they will choose to tie themselves to Christ by 
obediently believing in him.868 On account of their alignment with God’s values and 
norms, like the righteous person of the LXX, they can trust that they will not be 
shamed. Instead, the climax of 2.9-10 triumphantly affirms their honour and special 
status.869 Consequently, the author establishes that belief in and allegiance to Christ 
means agreement with God’s norms but unbelief and rejection reveals deviance. 
This foundation is important for interpreting the occurrence of shame language in 
4.16. 
7.2.1.2 Shaping Self-assessment 
In 4.14-16 the author says: 
εἰ ὀνειδίζεσθε ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ, μακάριοι, ὅτι τὸ τῆς δόξης καὶ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ 
πνεῦμα ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς ἀναπαύεται. μὴ γάρ τις ὑμῶν πασχέτω ὡς φονεὺς ἢ κλέπτης ἢ 
κακοποιὸς ἢ ὡς ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος· εἰ δὲ ὡς Χριστιανός, μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω, 
δοξαζέτω δὲ τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ.870 
                                                                                                                                                      
rejection the believers may also see their own experience; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 154-5; Elliott, 1 
Peter, 410; Jobes, 1 Peter, 146. 
865
 Elliott, 1 Peter, 410; cf. Selwyn, St. Peter, 158-9; Brox, Petrusbrief, 97. 
866
 See Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 152; The τιμή of 2.7 is expanded in 2.9; see Michaels, 1 Peter, 107-10 
who notes the present and future aspects of the believers’ honour. 
867
 Elliott, 1 Peter, 413; Feldmeier, Peter, 135. 
868
 The binding of the believer to Christ is emphasised by the incorporation of the believers into a 
new body: a spiritual house which offers spiritual sacrifices to God through Christ (2.4-5). As 
Michaels rightly comments, in 2.4-10 the author is teaching the Gentile audience about ‘their new 
identity in relation to Christ’; Michaels, 1 Peter, 94-5; cf. Feldmeier, Peter, 134; Jobes, 1 Peter, 148-9. 
The use of ἅγιος (2.5) to describe the new community confirms that it is marked by obedience. 
869
 Feldmeier, Peter, 132. 
870
 See Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 303; Elliott, 1 Peter, 796; D. G. Horrell, 'The Label Χριστιανός (1 Pet. 
4.16): Suffering, Conflict, and the Making of Christian Identity,' in Becoming Christian: Essays on 1 
Peter and the Making of Christian Identity (LNTS 394; London: T&T Clark, 2013), 164-210, 179-81 for 
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If you are reproached for the name of Christ, you are blessed, because the 
spirit of glory and of God rests on you. But do not let anyone among you 
suffer as a murderer, thief, wrongdoer, or as a meddler; but if as a Christian, 
do not be ashamed, but glorify God in this name. 
Here the author directly addresses the audience’s own subjective emotional 
stance.871 The use of αἰσχύνω in the passive can mean to be dishonoured, but more 
commonly refers to the feeling of shame.872 1 Peter 4.16 explicitly links this sense of 
shame to suffering as a Christian (ὡς Χριστιανός).873 Thus, here, the author 
addresses the believers’ emotional understanding of their current persecution. 
From outlining what his negation of shame tells us, we can unfold some of the 
rhetorical advantages of his manoeuvre. 
Firstly, we know that the object of shame is the self. Thus, through using this 
emotion, the author is primarily seeking to shape the audience’s self-perception. It 
has been established above that shame is occasioned by the awareness that one 
has deviated from an accepted norm, and that this deviance has been (or will be) 
exposed to a judging other(s) whose opinion one cares about because of the other’s 
ability to affect one’s attainment of goals. We can now unpack these ideas with 
regard to the audience. 
In 4.14-16 both actions and associations are in view. The Christians are suffering on 
account of their connection with Christ as the phrases ὀνειδίζεσθε ἐν ὀνόματι 
Χριστοῦ, (4.14) and ὡς Χριστιανός (4.16) highlight.874 Moreover, their suffering as a 
                                                                                                                                                      
why, due to manuscript evidence and context, ὀνόματι is to be preferred over μέρει (NA
28
). Contra 
Michaels, 1 Peter, 269-70. 
871
 Cf. Mark 8.38; Phil 1.20; 2 Tim 1.12; Michaels, 1 Peter, 269; cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 794-5; Contra 
Achtemeier who sees αἰσχύνω as referring to denying one’s faith rather than a subjective feeling; cf. 
Brox, Petrusbrief, 221-2. Here, Achtemeier misses the connection that it is the subjective feeling of 
shame that leads towards the actions of denial (see discussion below); Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 314. 
872
 See ‘αἰσχύνω’ in BDAG (30) which lists 1 Peter 4.16 under ‘to have a sense of shame, be ashamed’.  
873
 It is commonly recognised that this verse provides one of the oldest references to the term 
‘Christian’ (cf. Acts 11.26; 26.28). According to Feldmeier, it provides the earliest reference to the 
‘stigmatization and criminalization … connected to this designation’;  Feldmeier, Peter, 227. For Brox, 
this criminalization is one of the chief causes of the believer’s shame; Brox, Petrusbrief, 221. See 
Horrell, 'Χριστιανός,' 165-76 for the origins of the term. 
874
 Cf. Matt 10.22 (and parallels: Mark 13.13; Luke 21.17); Luke 6.22; Michaels, 1 Peter, 264. I see 
πάσχω rather than ὀνειδίζω as the implied verb in  4.16a. See Elliott who argues that ἐν ὀνόματι 
Χριστοῦ means ‘because you belong to, are affiliated with, Christ’; Elliott, 1 Peter, 780-1. Horrell’s 
comments on the etymology of Χριστιανός suggest that the designation specifically indicates 
dependence on or allegiance to Christ; Horrell, 'Χριστιανός,' 165-6. 
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Christian is contrasted with suffering as a murderer (φονεύς), thief (κλέπτης), 
wrongdoer (κακοποιός), and meddler (ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος). It is notable that these 
terms attribute an identity to the person.875 It does not say, on account of murder, 
theft, doing evil, meddling, but as a murderer, thief, meddler, or wrongdoer. But, 
this is not to divorce identity from action; out of these identities flow actions: a 
murderer kills; a thief steals; and, a Christian believes in Christ and demonstrates 
her allegiance by doing good (cf. 2.6-7; 3.16; 4.19). For the author, the criminal 
identities and actions should rightly warrant shame, but not being a Christian.876 
Thus far, we can simply conclude that the author is exhorting the audience not to 
be ashamed of their Christian name or identity.877 However, there are further 
implications to this. Firstly, shame categorises the believers’ behaviour as a 
deviation from accepted norms.878 Thus, by denying shame, the author is declaring 
that being associated with Christ is appropriate, not miscreant behaviour. To be 
ashamed of their Christian identity would be to agree that there is something 
wrong in their allegiance and that reproach is fitting. However, the author refutes 
this. Furthermore, by removing shame, the author also negates the harm that 
shame would fear, whether this is the harm of dishonour or the loss of goods that 
dishonour might bring. From the author’s perspective, there is no true negative 
outcome of being associated with Christ. Thus, in refusing shame the author is 
again asserting the value of Christ for the believer. 
In addition, we saw above that shame requires a critical other. But, who is the 
judging other in 4.16? The idea of reproach (4.14) and suffering (4.13, 15) in this 
context emphasises the relationship between the believer and the hostile human 
other. Therefore, the observing others are the members of the believers’ 
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 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 309.  
876
 According to Holloway, shaming was both a ‘component of social stigma,’ but also ‘an important 
and well-developed part of the Roman penal system’; thus shaming drew a line between acceptable 
and unacceptable behaviour; Holloway, Coping, 225. 
877
 However, Horrell has shown that this is not such a simple point after all, for 1 Peter 4.16 
‘represents the earliest witness to the crucial process whereby the term [χριστιανός] was 
transformed from a hostile label applied by outsiders to a self-designation borne with honour’; 
Horrell, 'Χριστιανός,' 165. 
878
 If Horrell is right that Χριστιανός was a form of stigma, then the label itself discredits the person 
‘in terms of the wider society’s values and assumptions’; Horrell, 'Χριστιανός,' 198. 
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surrounding society.879 Consequently, it is this society’s critical assessments that are 
being scrutinised by the author’s use of shame language. Moreover, because the 
others’ evaluations are based on the norms and values of their culture (norms and 
values to which the believers previously subscribed), the author, by denying shame, 
is also refusing to allow this cultural framework to provide the standards for the 
believers’ behaviour and identity. The result is that the negative opinion of the 
hostile other is devalued and the supporting norms are torn down.880 From the 
other’s perspective, the Christians’ behaviour contradicts established norms and 
thus they should rightly be (a)shamed.881 Phrases such as ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ and ὡς 
Χριστιανός suggest that merely being associated with Christ was enough to warrant 
shaming.882 As Elliott comments; ‘the derogatory label [Χριστιανός] was … a tool in 
the arsenal of nonbelievers for demeaning the honour and impugning the moral 
character and reputation’ of the Christians.883 Such reproach was likely intended to 
correct the believers’ wayward behaviour. However, in negating shame, the author 
counters the other’s viewpoint and assessment. In fact, he declares the exact 
opposite: suffering on account of Christ reveals that they are blessed and that the 
glory and spirit of God is upon them.884 Thus, here, like in 2.4-8, an alternate system 
of value is promoted. From God’s perspective, because of their obedient trust in 
Christ, Christians are chosen, have glory, and are blessed. Shame is certainly not 
fitting for the believers. Instead, they should glorify God with their name, 
Christian.885 Thus, the system of worth established in 2.4-8 is at work here too. The 
                                                     
879
 This is supported by Michaels’ observation that where χριστιανός is used in the NT (Acts 11.26; 
26.28) it appears ‘to reflect the viewpoint of the Jewish and pagan outsiders toward those who 
followed and worshipped Jesus’; Michaels, 1 Peter, 268; cf. Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 313; Horrell, 
'Χριστιανός,' 167-9. Moreover, ὀνειδίζω ‘is the standard term for abuse and public shaming’ and 
therefore fits with reproach by other humans; Elliott, 1 Peter, 775, 8-9. 
880
 Cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 795. Thus, there is more taking place here than simply breaking with the social 
principle of syncretism; see Goppelt, I Peter, 328. 
881
 Areas of perceived deviance could include disrespect for civil or domestic order, marital norms, 
even criminal behaviour; Elliott, 'Disgraced,' 170. 
882
 Cf. Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 125. 
883
 Elliott, 1 Peter, 791-2. 
884
 For Holloway this is a clear example of an ‘emotion-focussed’ coping strategy, where the author 
seeks ‘to regulate the internal psychological effects of stigma and stigma-related outcomes.’ One 
way of doing this is restructuring one’s self-concept; Holloway, Coping, 122, 226. 
885
 There is disagreement about what ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ refers to. Here I agree with Goppelt that 
the phrase refers to the name Christian, rather than Christ; see also Brox, Petrusbrief, 222; Horrell, 
'Χριστιανός,' 181-2. However, such a sharp distinction is perhaps unnecessary if we recognise that 
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author is actively highlighting contrasting perspectives: God’s and the hostile 
other’s. The latter sees Christ and those associated with him as worthy of shame, 
the former see Christ and the believers as honoured.886 
7.2.2 Implications for the Believer 
We are now in a position to discuss the implications of the author’s negation of 
shame. The most important sociological consequence is the change in the relative 
importance of the critical other. The believers were previously part of their 
surrounding society, and would have understood their identity in relation to it. 
Furthermore, they would have shared the view of reality and adopted the 
standards of the socio-cultural group into which they had been socialised. However, 
the Christ-event has caused them to have a radically new view of reality and has 
brought a new framework of norms centred on God’s will. Through denying shame, 
the believer is being asked to see the world, including their behaviour and their 
status, no longer through the critical eyes of their previous society. As such, the 
importance of the hostile other’s opinion is denied. Instead, negating shame 
suggests that another viewpoint (God’s) provides truth and is of greater 
significance. Subsequently, God’s critical eyes usurp the assessments of the 
other.887  
This displacement of the other also affects the believers’ sense of group belonging. 
Instead of evaluating themselves from the perspective of their previous group, they 
now have a new ‘honour-group’ which is God and his people (2.10). Such a 
revaluing of the others’ opinion is seeking to affect the believers’ desire to be 
associated with the other. If the outsiders’ judgements and their supporting norms 
are misguided, and subsequently their behaviour deviant and leads to calamity, 
why would one want to be part of this group? Thus, in denying shame, the author is 
encouraging an emotional detachment from their previous society and 
relationships. This is particularly the case given that the label Χριστιανός represents 
‘a label associated not with a facet of person identity … but with a feature of social 
                                                                                                                                                      
their Christian identity comes precisely through their association with Christ; see Goppelt, I Peter, 
328. 
886
 Cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 781. 
887
 Thus, 4.17 immediately reminds the audience of God’s judgement. 
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identity arriving from group membership.’ 888 Thus, in denying shame, the believer 
is encouraged to value attachment to this membership. Furthermore, as we have 
recognised previously, where the other is revalued, the emotional response to 
them is altered. Here negating shame asks the believer not to care so strongly 
about the opinion of the other and therefore the other becomes less important to 
the believer.889 One can assume that over time this will reduce the strength of 
bonds between the believer and their society and will strengthen new in-group 
bonds.890 Subsequently, a new desire for belonging based on a different view of 
reality is fostered. Thus, it is precisely because of their desire to associate with God 
through Christ that the believers stand alienated from their previous socio-cultural 
groups.891 Horrell comments: 
An ironic and surely unintended consequence … of the outsiders’ hostile 
labelling of believers as Χριστιανοί is that it confirms and increases the 
salience of this aspect of the insiders’ shared social identity, increases the 
extent to which this facet of their identity defines their commonality and 
sense of belonging together, increases, indeed, their sense that this badge is 
the one they must own or deny in the face of hostility.892 
Thus, once again, allegiance to Christ is promoted, but this time, through negating 
shame, the author asks the audience to internalise a reality in which such allegiance 
is considered the only right route to flourishing. 
This is supported by the fact that denying shame removes the other’s power to 
harm. If dishonour is an evil in itself, and can lead to other negative consequences, 
then to care about the evaluation of others and to seek to be honoured in their 
eyes gives the other power. If one looks to humans for the good (e.g. honour) then 
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 Horrell, 'Χριστιανός,' 199. 
889
 Such disidentification is typical when one’s value domain has been replaced; see Holloway, 
Coping, 126-7. 
890
 Awareness of their communal identity is ‘an essential element in their coping with the abuse of 
outsiders and presenting a collective front of resistance’; Elliott, 1 Peter, 444. This corporate 
belonging is particularly notable in 2.4-10; see Goppelt, I Peter, 139-40; Feldmeier, Peter, 132; 
Campbell, Honor, 91.   
891
 Feldmeier recognises the believers’ sociological detachment when he comments that ‘[e]lection 
connects with God, but at the same time separates one from the world around and so creates a 
distance, indeed, a tension with fellow human beings’; Feldmeier, Peter, 132. That 2.4-10 polarises 
the believer and unbeliever (see Brox, Petrusbrief, 95; Schlosser, Pierre, 126), is likely to lead to 
social and eventually emotional detachment. 
892
 Horrell, 'Χριστιανός,' 202. 
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shame and reproach become a hindrance to one’s attainment of goals. Thus, shame 
becomes a means of social control.893 So, in order to reduce this, presumably 
detrimental, social conditioning, the author needs to remove the audience’s sense 
of shame. Instead, he must foster allegiance to Christ. For, if one’s allegiance to 
Christ is most important, then reproach from other humans on account of him is 
insignificant and one is psychologically distanced from the influence of the other. In 
the framework of 2.4-8 and 4.14-16, the author reminds the audience that the only 
judgement that counts is God’s, because he has final control over the good and 
bestows lasting honour.894  That the believers are able to glorify God through their 
Christianity (4.16), infers that in their response to persecution God’s honour is also 
at stake. 
If, by denying shame, the author is asking the audience to see reality differently and 
to live by new norms and goals, then there will be ethical consequences. When the 
believers value too highly the opinion of the other, and allow themselves to feel 
shame, then shame will shape their behaviour. This is because shame’s action-
tendency drives a person towards avoidance of dishonour.895 Elliott acknowledges 
this, commenting that public shaming was ‘designed to demean and discredit the 
believers in the court of public opinion with the ultimate aim of forcing their 
conformity to prevailing norms and values.’896 Such an emotional stance is likely to 
encourage cultural assimilation, even defection from the faith.897 However, by 
nullifying shame, the author is also eliminating its action-tendency and any 
associated behaviour. Consequently, through denying shame, which shows a 
reordering of values and a revaluation of the importance of the other for obtaining 
goals, the ethical behaviour of the believer is also influenced, and adhesion to 
Christian norms is promoted.  Shame, as an emotion which focuses on the 
believers’ behaviour, is particularly useful for achieving this ethical end. 
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 Elliott, 'Disgraced,' 173. 
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 Cf. Elliott, 1 Peter, 782. 
895
 Achtemeier sees desire for avoidance intimated in this passage, but links avoidance with the pain 
of suffering rather than the specific harm of dishonour; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 314. 
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 Elliott, 'Disgraced,' 170. 
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 Cf. Windisch, katholischen Briefe, 78; Schelkle, Petrusbriefe, 125; Schlosser, Pierre, 263. 
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Finally, we move to the therapeutic consequences of negating shame. For someone 
to feel ashamed they have to accept the judgement of the critical observer about 
their behaviour and identity. Thus, to deny shame is to tell the audience not to 
accept this self-assessment. They are not to see themselves as disobedient and 
deviant, and therefore neither as shameful nor devalued.898 Horrell has argued, 
using Lipp’s work on stigmatisation, that the bold wearing of the label Christian 
could be a type of self-stigmatisation which ‘stands as a challenge to the wider 
society to change its negative judgement towards the stigma.’899 Though this may 
be a secondary social outcome, the bold wearing of the label Christian can only 
occur if the believers’ own assessment of their Christian identity is correctly 
formed. It is the emotional refusal of shame that establishes an inner challenge to 
the pressure of societal norms. The shame language focuses on the believers’ own 
assessment and seeks to effect within them a new self-perception which is based 
on God’s perspective on account of Christ, not the views of society. The believers 
are not to accept the miscreant label, but are to see themselves as obedient 
children (1.14). We can see a parallel here with the perspective of Christ in Hebrews 
12.2 where Christ despises the shame of the cross and is ultimately honoured by 
God. Therefore, likewise, in the face of persecution, by refusing shame, the author 
gives the audience a positive, godly, self-assessment of their identity and 
behaviour.  
Thus, the two uses of shame language (2.6; 4.16) play an important role in the 
discourse of the letter. Through this emotion language, the author asks the 
audience to hold to a different system of value and to judge themselves by different 
norms. He promises that trusting in and association with Christ will end in the good 
and downplays membership of their former community. The audience is 
encouraged to adopt God’s perspective and to recognise that his observing eyes are 
the most important. Subsequently, the opinion of the other is revalued, and the 
believers are released from conforming their behaviour to the other’s expectations. 
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Consequently, the believers are able to form new group bonds and live out their 
Christian behaviour with a positive sense of self. 
We can now move to the last use of shame in 1 Peter. However, this time it applies 
to the non-believer. 
7.2.3 The Shame of the Non-believer - 1 Peter 3.16 
We have seen that the author makes the fate of the individual dependent on their 
response to Christ, where belief and trust in Christ demonstrate obedience and lead 
to honour, but rejection of Christ is disobedience and results in shame. In 1 Peter 
2.8 this was conveyed in the metaphor of stumbling over the stone. However in 
3.15b-16 the accuser’s shame is made explicit:  
... ἕτοιμοι ἀεὶ πρὸς ἀπολογίαν παντὶ τῷ αἰτοῦντι ὑμᾶς λόγον περὶ τῆς ἐν ὑμῖν 
ἐλπίδος, ἀλλὰ μετὰ πραΰτητος καὶ φόβου, συνείδησιν ἔχοντες ἀγαθὴν, ἵνα ἐν ᾧ 
καταλαλεῖσθε καταισχυνθῶσιν οἱ ἐπηρεάζοντες ὑμῶν τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐν Χριστῷ 
ἀναστροφήν. 
.. be ready always to answer anyone who asks you for an account 
concerning the hope within you, but do so with gentleness and fear, having 
a good conscience, so that those who denounce your good manner of life in 
Christ may be ashamed by that for which you are spoken against. 900 
What is striking is that it is the accusers’ response to and treatment of the believers 
that is the cause of their shame, not their direct response to Christ. In these verses 
two contrasting patterns of behaviour are highlighted: the unbeliever is depicted as 
speaking against (καταλαλέω) and threatening/abusing (ἐπηρεάζω) the believer, but 
the believer has good ‘in Christ’ conduct. The author then declares that the cause of 
the believers’ denunciation – their good in Christ behaviour – is the very thing that 
will cause the abuser to be (a)shamed.901 Thus, we see a clear reversal: the ‘shamer’ 
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 The phrase ἐν ᾧ καταλαλεῖθε is awkward, specifically the 2
nd
 person plural καταλαλεῖσθε. A 
number of manuscripts (א A C) show the variant καταλαλουσιν υμων ως κακοποιων which makes more 
obvious sense and conforms to 2.12. However, see Michaels, 1 Peter, 183-4 for why καταλαλεῖσθε is 
to be preferred. Explanation of my translation is below. 
901
 That P
72 
has αἰσχυνθωσιν instead of καταισχυνθῶσιν reminds us of the joint subjective and 
objective experience of shame. Selwyn and Bigg argue that κατασχυνθῶσιν could take the accusative 
ἀναστροφήν. Therefore, the believers’ conduct would be what shames the accusers; Selwyn, St. 
Peter, 194; Bigg, Epistles of St. Peter, 159. However, Michaels provides a counter argument, noting 
that there is only one parallel text that uses the passive of καταισχύνω with an accusative, and no 
text that uses οἱ ἐπηρεαζόντες without an object. Instead Michaels asserts that that we should read 
ἐπηρεάζω in 3.16 as related to ἀναστροφήν (cf. Luke 6.20) and therefore the accusers denounce the 
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will in fact be shamed by the same actions they denounce. Subsequently, these 
conflicting ‘shames’ – the shaming of the Christians versus the accusers’ shame – 
reveal that there are not just two patterns of behaviour, but two competing 
systems of reality. The non-believers are assessing the believers’ actions by their 
worldview and judging it deviant. However, the author, by saying that the 
opposition will be shamed, presents a different perspective with different 
standards. In attributing shame, the author categorises the non-believers’ 
behaviour as divergent, whereas he labels Christians conduct as good (ἀγαθός). It is 
clear by the phrase συνείδησιν ἔχοντες ἀγαθήν (3.16), which recalls συνείδησιν θεοῦ in 
2.19, that the framework relied upon to categorise behaviour is God’s will.902 Thus, 
again, we see that norms based on an understanding of God are juxtaposed with 
society’s values. 
Moreover, that a consciousness of God (3.16) and God’s will (3.17) bookmark the 
use of shame language recommends that the critical eyes in 3.16 are God’s. Elliott 
comments that ‘conscience’ should be understood as ‘sensitivity to and 
mindfulness of the evaluation of significant others that guided moral behaviour’ in a 
group-orientated society. He goes on to say: ‘For the early Christians, it was God 
who represented the most “significant other.”’903 Elliott’s comments support my 
position that God is the critical other whose judgement determines who should be 
(a)shamed. However, it is not clear whether shame is a present outcome or if it is 
                                                                                                                                                      
believers’ good conduct; Michaels, 1 Peter, 183, 90. Michaels, with Brox, Achtemeier, and Elliott, 
reads ἐν ᾧ as temporal meaning ‘when’; Brox, Petrusbrief, 161; Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 236; Elliott, 1 
Peter, 630. Feldmeier offers a different translation: ‘so that those who insult your good lifestyle in 
Christ will become ashamed through just that by which you are slandered.’ Feldmeier gives no 
explanation of his translation, but it appears that Feldmeier agrees with Michaels in taking 
ἀναστροφήν as the accusative of ἐπηρεάζω but reads ἐν ᾧ not as temporal but as indicating the cause 
for slander, which is symmetrically their Christian conduct; Feldmeier, Peter, 192; cf. Bigg, Epistles of 
St. Peter, 159; Dubis, 1 Peter: A Handbook, 62, 104-5; Goppelt, I Peter, 239, 46; Schlosser, Pierre, 
207. Dubis likewise argues that ἐν ᾧ in 3.6 ‘connotes reference’. BDAG (725-6.1.b.α) supports this, 
listing 1 Peter 2.12 and 3.16 as examples of a concealed demonstrative, so that ἐν ᾧ should be 
rendered ‘in that in which.’ The variant reading supports the outcome of Feldmeier’s and Dubis’ 
position as καταλαλουσιν υμων ως κακοποιων smooths καταλαλεῖθε by supplying the content (‘they 
speak against you as evil doers’). This could indicate that the copyists read ἐν ᾧ as referring to that 
for which they are spoken against rather than being temporal. Thus, the result is that what the non-
believers are shamed by is the very same focus of their accusation. I find Feldmeier’s and Dubis’ 
translation persuasive and therefore follow their reading. 
902
 See Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 236. 
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 Elliott, 1 Peter, 630. 
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eschatological. A number of scholars take the latter (cf. 2.12): if the non-believers 
persist in their slander they will ultimately be shamed. Thus, slander is read as not 
just a rejection of the believers, but more importantly as a rejection of God.904 
However, Achtemeier thinks that shaming could be an ‘immediate matter’ that 
occurs when the accusers become aware of the truth of the Christians’ behaviour. 
This, for Achtemeier, is occasioned by the Christians’ explanation of their actions.905 
The verbal account may provide an opportunity for truth to be communicated, but 
in 3.16, 2.12 and 2.15 it appears to be the good conduct itself that is efficacious.906 
It could be, as I argued in 5.2.1, that the believers’ continued good conduct in the 
face of persecution points towards a different worldview and thus confronts the 
non-believer with a new reality. A present aspect to ‘shaming’ would fit with this 
reading as it would allow shame to have the useful corrective function that the 
ancient philosophers acknowledged. On this occasion, the ‘exposure’ of shame 
would be experienced by the nonbeliever. Such an awareness of their deviance 
could cause the non-believers to re-think the basis for their own assessments. If the 
non-believers were to be ashamed of their behaviour, then they would be 
accepting the judgement that they in fact are deviant, which in turn would require 
an acceptance of the Christian reality. Thus, to be (a)shamed could emotionally 
move the other from opposition towards acceptance of Christ.907 
The implications for the believers of 3.16 align with those of the shame language in 
2.4-8 and 4.14-16 (see 6.2.2). However, 3.16 goes beyond 4.16. In 4.16 the opinion 
of the other is dismissed but no mention is made of the opposition’s behaviour. In 
3.16 the abuser’s viewpoint and subsequent treatment of the believer is, by the 
application of shame, firmly displayed as wrong. 3.16 also suggests that the 
believers’ obedience to Christ not only affects their own fate but has the potential 
to communicate to the other. 4.16 encouraged the believers to be distanced 
emotionally from their previous society and to have a positive view of their 
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 Michaels, 1 Peter, 190-1; Elliott, 1 Peter, 632-3. 
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 Achtemeier, 1 Peter, 236-7; See also Brox, Petrusbrief, 162; Feldmeier, Peter, 197. 
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 Cf. Feldmeier, Peter, 196; Schlosser, Pierre, 205. 
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Christian identity, but 3.16 suggests that this emotional stance is not to remove 
interaction with their society. In fact, quite the opposite, when they are questioned 
about their hope (3.15) they are to give a lived response that engages the accuser. 
Their lack of shame allows this confident response. 
7.3 Conclusion 
We have seen that the author of 1 Peter uses shame language in two ways. Firstly, 
when applied to the believers, it is negated and thus declared ill-fitting. However, 
when it comes to those who reject Christ and abuse the believers on account of 
their Christianity, shame is indeed appropriate. From having a better understanding 
of shame we have discovered that the shame language is being used to categorise 
behaviour negatively or positively. In doing so it is also exposing the judgements of 
the critical other and the norms that the others’ assessments are based on. 
Whether shame is affirmed or negated by the author gives credence to or removes 
the validity of the others’ judgement. This also secondarily makes a statement 
about the value of the worldview the judgement relies on with the effect that the 
Christian reality is presented as truth. Furthermore, the affirmation and negation of 
shame has been used to promote being concerned about God’s opinion instead of 
the assessment of the other. This also, by implication, removes the power of the 
other over one’s attainment of goals. All this sits within the understanding that 
obedience, which is acceptance of Christ, will lead to the good, but rejection of 
Christ results in calamity, including shame. In this framework the believer is seen as 
obedient and the non-believer deviant. Thus the believers can see their association 
with Christ positively, rather than accepting shame’s assertion that they are 
devalued and miscreant. All of this requires an inner emotional transformation. To 
reject shame, the believer has to be internally shaped by the Christian worldview so 
that they can evaluate themselves and the other differently. Their new perspective 
on reality should breed a positive sense of self and give an affirmation that they are 
on the path to flourishing. As we have seen, this emotional outlook leads to other 
sociological and ethical outcomes. Most notably, the action-tendency of shame 
(avoidance of dishonour) is also negated; thus, Christian behaviour and cohesion is 
maintained. 
Future Expectation: Appropriate and Inappropriate Shame 
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Having now explored each emotion, we can turn to the synthetic task of 
determining what our investigation means for 1 Peter’s rhetorical and social 
strategy. 
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8. Conclusion 
This thesis has aimed to demonstrate what can be gained by taking a more 
informed look at the role of emotions in 1 Peter’s rhetorical discourse. Such a full-
scale exploration of emotions in a New Testament epistle has not been attempted 
before. Therefore, it was necessary to establish a theoretical and methodological 
framework for the investigation. This involved two key elements: 1) being 
theoretically informed about emotions, and 2) being historically and culturally 
sensitive in the application of emotion theory. The first required engaging with 
recent developments in emotion studies which have advanced (or corrected) our 
modern assumptions about emotions. The second meant exploring ancient Greco-
Roman philosophical and rhetorical theory on emotions along with LXX material. 
8.1 A Working Methodology 
My theoretical position on emotions, which provided the foundational assumptions 
for the following exegesis, was outlined in the introduction. It acknowledged that 
emotions are composite affective processes. However, because this investigation 
was interested in emotion terms in an ancient text, only the aspects of stimulus 
(object), cognitive appraisal (evaluation), and action-tendency were deemed 
relevant. Consequently, we established that, firstly, emotions have an intentional 
object (‘intentional’ means as interpreted by the person). Secondly, emotions are 
evaluative judgements that highlight an object’s goal relevance. Moreover, each 
emotion has a characteristic appraisal, which, when applied to an object, says 
something about that object. Furthermore, because emotions are concerned with 
goals, they are dependent on one’s values which are in turn shaped by worldview. 
Thus, to understand the occurrence of an emotion in a given context we need to 
appreciate the wider value system in which the emotion’s rationale makes sense. 
Lastly, an emotion’s judgement produces an action-tendency. Consequently, 
emotions are drivers for action. Thus, we arrived at a set of questions to ask when 
encountering an emotion term in 1 Peter: What is the emotion’s object? What 
evaluation does the emotion communicate? What does the emotion’s 
contextualisation reveal about how the author is presenting reality? What does this 
indicate about the values and worldview of the author? Lastly, how does the use of 
Conclusion 
 
248 
 
this emotion influence action? In addition, because the use of emotions is occurring 
in a rhetorical context we had to recognise that 1 Peter’s presentation of emotion is 
both idealised and intended to influence its audience. Thus, it was considered 
pertinent to question the implications for the audience of the author’s use of 
emotion. 
We also acknowledged the cultural boundedness of emotions, and that we cannot 
assume to understand automatically an emotion in an ancient text. Instead, we 
must be historically and culturally sensitive. Furthermore, we delineated that 
emotions can be approached at three levels: 1) general theory of emotion; 2) 
definition of each emotion; and 3) contextualisation of and rationale given to each 
emotion. Thus, in order to be culturally sensitive at every level of discussion the 
thesis proceeded as follows: Chapters 2-3 focused on level one and revealed that 
there is in fact a close fit between ancient theories of emotion and recent 
developments in emotion studies, thus underlining that the above exploratory 
questions are not anachronistic but are useful heuristic tools. In the exegetical 
chapters (4-7) levels 2 and 3 were operative. Before investigating emotions in 1 
Peter, we defined each emotion using Greco-Roman, mostly Stoic, philosophical 
theory; this provided the basic characteristics of each emotion. However, in using 
the philosophical literature we were also aware of the third level of discourse, 
appreciating that philosophical discussion is nuanced and affected by its own 
worldview. Such awareness was necessary for two reasons: firstly, it made sure that 
the Stoic philosophical worldview was not accidently imposed on 1 Peter; secondly, 
it provided a useful point of comparison that allowed the contours of 1 Peter’s own 
position to be further illuminated. For the latter, the LXX material was also helpful. 
We discovered that the LXX used terms conventionally, i.e. they followed the basic 
definitions as we came to understand them, but the contextualisation of emotions 
and the rationale underlying their use was different to Stoic theory. It became 
evident that 1 Peter’s use of emotion is closer to the LXX than to Stoic usage. 
Consequently, this thesis has provided a working methodology for investigating 
emotions in any New Testament text that is both theoretically informed and 
historically sensitive. 
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8.2 A Composite Picture 
Emotions not only depend on worldview for their evaluative judgement, but, 
dynamically, they can be used by a given culture to build a worldview. This happens 
through ‘feeling rules’ (‘emotional regimes’). The emotions allowed/encouraged or 
disallowed/discouraged in given contexts and of particular objects build up a 
picture of reality, and in doing so position the person and tell her what is 
behaviourally expected. Using emotions to build or enforce a worldview is precisely 
what 1 Peter is doing. As an authoritative communication, it aims to shape 
rhetorically the recipients’ interpretation of their world through applying emotion 
terms in particular contexts. The positive or negative presentation of each emotion 
creates an emotional regime for the believers which subsequently produces the 
boundaries for their understanding of self and other. We have looked at each 
emotion individually. It is now necessary to pull the findings together into a 
composite whole.  
The emotions of joy (χαρά), distress (λύπη), fear (φόβος), hope (ἐλπίς), and shame 
(αἰσχύνη) were found to highlight only a few figures within the audience’s world: 
God, Christ, the hostile other, and the self. This is unsurprising given that the letter 
is to a Christian community undergoing persecution for their faith. Thus, these 
persons are those significant to this occasion. Therefore, by highlighting these 
characters and applying (or denying) certain emotions to them the author is 
ensuring that the figures are placed correctly within the audience’s worldview. 
Furthermore, by using certain emotions he is saying something specific about that 
object, and, importantly, highlighting that figure’s relevance to the audience’s 
flourishing. In doing so, he is attempting to shape the believers’ value system and 
affect their goals, which should then influence their behaviour. 
8.2.1 God and Christ 
We discovered that joy (1.6), hope (1.3, 13, 21; 3.5, 15), and fear (1.17; 2.17-18; 3.2, 
16) are all shown to be appropriate responses to God. Both joy and hope relate to 
the good. Joy is appropriate when the good is present, hope anticipates a future 
benefit. Thus, by applying these emotions to God, the author is explicitly 
highlighting the value of God for the audience’s present and future flourishing. In 
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1.3-6 God is the good to be rejoiced in and is the author of other present goods to 
which the believers have access through Christ’s resurrection. That God is the 
object of rejoicing and that these goods (inheritance, protection, salvation) are 
described in eternal terms lifts the believers’ perspective beyond their current 
circumstances. Through the contextualisation of the emotion, the author 
encourages the audience that the good found in God is not dependent on, nor can 
be affected by, their present persecution. Whereas joy tells the audience of their 
present position, hope reminds the audience of their dependence on God for the 
future. 1.3-21 exhorts the audience to hope on God’s grace at the time of Christ’s 
revelation. Thus, hope reminds the audience that the story has not finished yet. If 
they are to secure their eternal future, God is their only hope. He is the sole person 
to whom they should look. This is because, as joy reveals, he is the source of all 
good. Hope, more than joy, speaks of the power of God in relation to the believers. 
Hope acknowledges the believers’ lack of ability to provide the good for themselves 
and looks to another agent. In doing so it invests God with power. Moreover, to ask 
the audience to hope completely in God removes all other possible agents and 
makes God the sole concern. Therefore, through the use of hope and joy, the 
author has highlighted God as the primary figure of importance for securing the 
good, both in the present and future. 
I have discussed joy and hope with minimal reference to Christ. However, this is not 
truly representative of the outlook of the letter. Christ likewise can be rejoiced in 
(1.8) and is central to the believer’s present hope. In 1.3-5 the position in which the 
believers now stand, which includes having hope, has occurred through the 
resurrection of Christ, and 1.8 affirms that they can rejoice in Christ because their 
faith in / faithfulness to him assures them that they are obtaining their salvation. 
Moreover, in 1.21 the author roots the believers’ hope in God’s action of raising 
Christ from the dead. Thus, it is important to remember that the author’s 
presentation of God as the one to be rejoiced and hoped in sits in the narrative 
context of God’s deed in Christ. Subsequently, Christ is also presented as valuable 
and made central to the believers’ flourishing. 
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Lastly, in 1.17 the believers are exhorted to fear God. Fear anticipates future harm, 
and thus is used by the author to sound a note of warning. The context in which 
fear of God is fitting is his role as judge. Consequently, the author uses fear to focus 
the audience towards a future anticipated event, God’s eschatological judgement, 
but, through fear’s evaluation, colours that event with uncertainty. The uncertainty 
of outcome pushes the audience to deliberate about their present conduct, 
knowing that choices in the present will affect the final outcome. As with hope, fear 
highlights power dynamics and reminds the audience that God has control over 
their good; not only can he bestow it, but he can withhold it. Therefore, once again, 
being in favourable standing with God is presented as necessary for an assured 
future.  
Joy, hope, and fear therefore seek to shape the believers’ goals by presenting God 
as the route to and determiner of their present and future flourishing. God stands 
alone in this category, and therefore the believers’ relationship to God through 
Christ becomes of highest importance. The result is that allegiance to God is 
fostered. We see the value placed on faithful allegiance to God and Christ most 
markedly in the exhortation to rejoice in sharing in Christ’s sufferings. Only when 
one sees aligning oneself with God through doing good as of highest value can one 
appreciate that to suffer on account of this allegiance can be rejoiced in because it 
reveals one’s faithfulness to God and Christ.  
8.2.2 The Hostile Other 
The other is not to be a cause of distress (1.6), nor to be feared (3.6, 14). Moreover, 
the hostile believer is presented as someone for whom shame is fitting (2.7-8; 
3.16). Through the author’s application of these emotions, he is asking the audience 
to revalue the importance of the other and also (re)positioning the other within the 
believers’ worldview. In 1.6-7 the author works hard to give the audience a new 
interpretation of their present trials. By showing that such trials can only prove the 
genuineness of faith, the author removes the evaluation that trials are harmful and 
therefore seeks to minimise the audience’s distress. In showing that persecution 
does not cause the believers any lasting harm he also negates the power of the 
hostile other. To be distressed by the trials means that the believers are 
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emotionally internalising the reality that the other’s actions are detrimental to their 
flourishing and therefore the believers’ behaviour will be influenced by the other. 
However, the author militates against this by highlighting that trials cannot really 
harm if they serve to prove faith in / faithfulness towards God. Instead, when trials 
do so, they result in praise, glory, and honour. Thus, where distress wants to make 
the hostile others prominent for the audience’s interpretation of events, reducing 
distress serves to side-line them. Consequently, the hostile other becomes a less 
powerful and less significant figure in the audience’s worldview. The negation of 
fear is a more explicit attack in the same vein. As noted above, fear recognises the 
power of the other to harm and makes the other master over one’s flourishing. 
However, by negating fear of the other, the author pulls down this evaluation. In 
doing so he makes a statement about the relative power of the other. No longer is 
the hostile other, whether that be a master or husband, to be seen as pre-
eminently powerful over the believer. The other cannot be, because he cannot truly 
harm. Instead, fear of God requires that all other powers, and therefore all other 
fears, be re-evaluated. 
Furthermore, by revealing the unbelievers’ shame, the author goes one stage 
further: the hostile other is shown to be not only less significant, but deviant. The 
non-believers’ rejection of Christ and abuse of the Christian is deemed a violation of 
norms and therefore worthy of shame. The use of this emotion tells the audience 
that the non-believers’ behaviour is miscreant, and presents the believers’ 
surrounding society as collectively devalued. Thus, by shaming the ‘shamers’ the 
author also questions the validity of the norms on which the other’s rejection of 
Christ and behaviour towards the believers are based. As such, through his 
application of shame, the author challenges the worldview that sees the reproach 
of believers as justified. 
8.2.3 The Believer 
Because the majority of emotions in 1 Peter are presented as the audience’s 
emotions, each emotion, whilst saying something about the object, has also, as we 
have noted, communicated something to the audience about their positioning in 
relation to the object. The last emotion, shame, which has the self as the object, 
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completes the picture. Through the negation of shame the author categorises the 
believers as obedient and acceptable. Their obedience is evident in their belief in 
Christ; this act alone shows alignment with God’s norms. Furthermore, the 
audience is promised that because they have chosen to join themselves to Christ by 
believing in him, they will be honoured. Moreover, the author, through his use of 
shame, asks the believers to value God’s opinion rather than the hostile other’s, 
and to see themselves from God’s perspective. For it is only by this true 
understanding of reality that they will perceive their own identity and place in the 
world. To deny shame is to affirm the positive identity and secure positioning of the 
believer.  
I have not yet recounted the implications of the above presentation of reality. 
However, we must now turn to this, and as we do so, we will be able to reveal what 
the exploration of emotions in 1 Peter suggests about the author’s rhetorical and 
social strategy. 
8.3 Implications for the Believer and 1 Peter’s Social Strategy 
After working through the author’s use of each emotion in 1 Peter a number of 
implications for the audience have been suggested. These can be broadly grouped 
into three areas: ethical, sociological, and therapeutic.  
Emotions and ethics cannot be separated because emotions, through their 
evaluation of an object’s goal congruence, drive action. This is the most significant 
reason for engaging emotions. The author will struggle to move his audience 
towards behavioural ends unless he shapes their emotional orientation. Thus, as 
the ancient rhetoricians recognised, because each emotion has an associated 
action-tendency, emotions have to be selected and used carefully to achieve the 
desired outcome. Therefore, by using joy to present God as the source of good, the 
author can encourage conduct that maintains relationship with God. Hope, 
likewise, motivates behaviour that pursues God’s favour. But, how does one know 
which behaviour is appropriate to achieve this end? Firstly, throughout the letter 
the author reveals norms of Christian behaviour, either specifically in directive 
commands and negative vice lists, or more generally in the call to do good. 
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Secondly, and more importantly, doing good is modelled on an understanding of 
God’s holiness. At this point, fear of God becomes useful, because it sets the 
boundaries for behaviour and helps the believer to determine which actions in the 
present will lead to future good. Concurrent with the promotion of emotions like 
joy, hope and fear of God, is the negation of other emotions which, likewise, aims 
to influence conduct. By reducing the distress of trials the author also diminishes 
the associated action-tendency of avoidance, and so conditions his audience’s 
behaviour. Similarly, fear seeks to avoid harm. But if the harm of the other is 
negated, then the believers will no longer deliberate about their behaviour in 
response to the other. Instead, their fear and awareness of God alone will drive 
their conduct. Lastly, the author’s use of shame pushes the audience in the same 
ethical direction. It categories the believers’ Christian behaviour as good and 
honourable, and therefore encourages the maintenance of this behaviour. The 
declaration that the non-believers’ actions warrant shame has the same end result 
but functions through a note of warning. Thus, we can see that if we are to 
understand how the author is positioning the audience to act, we have to 
understand his use of emotions. It appears quite clearly that the author is 
encouraging the audience towards exclusive allegiance to Christ and God, and away 
from having behaviour that is determined by other human relationships. 
This leads us to the sociological consequences of the author’s use of emotions. If 
the author, through his contextualisation of emotions, has presented the hostile 
other in a revalued capacity where the other has become less significant to the 
audience, then this is likely to reconfigure the believers’ emotional ties to their 
surrounding society. If they accept reality as presented by the author, then they 
necessarily absorb a different value system and different norms. In doing so, they 
move away from their previous worldview and into a new one. This brings, as we 
have seen, a new positioning of objects in their worldview, and therefore starts to 
affect the believers’ perception of the society from which they have come. In the 
case of shame, it actively marks outside society as misguided and deviant. In the 
case of fear and hope, the author challenges previous conceptions of worth, but 
also perceptions of power and therefore, subsequently, societal structure. Previous 
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figures of power are repositioned, and the audience, who are mostly subordinates, 
are given a positive assessment of their positioning in the world. That they are 
those who should rejoice in God and not be ashamed of their Christian identity tells 
the audience that they are in a privileged, honoured position. As the audience live 
out their new worldview, it will inevitably lead to clashes with their previous 
society. In fact, it is their emotional orientation toward God that differentiates the 
believers from those around them. It is thus likely that ties to previous society will 
weaken, and new in-group bonds will be strengthened. However, the points of 
conflict between the believer and non-believer can, though perhaps not often, 
provide an opportunity for the hostile other to encounter the new reality of the 
believer and be won over to the faith. As the believers explain their hope they open 
up for the other a whole way of seeing the world. Thus, the letter hints towards the 
promise that as they live in accordance with Christian reality they may even be able 
to transform aspects of their social world. 
Therapeutically, the author moves the audience towards a positive and stable 
outlook on their present situation. Joy, because its focus is the eternal (both God 
and the goods he bestows on the believer through Christ), allows the believers’ 
emotional life to be stable. None of this reality – the reality which is producing the 
believers’ joy – can be altered by their present persecution. Because the good to 
which joy looks is enduring, so is their joy. In fact, their joy is depicted as glorified 
and effervescent (1.8). Furthermore, they will be able to rejoice exceedingly at the 
revelation of Christ (4.13). It is this overarching reality, to which joy points, that is 
able to temper their present distress. The audience can be assured that to choose 
faithfulness to God is the best course of action. In addition, hope, which is based on 
God’s deed in Christ, assures the believers that their faithful allegiance has a set 
trajectory towards vindication. Consequently, despite persecution, the author 
encourages the believers to be confident in their Christian position and behaviour. 
Moreover, through the author’s use of joy in conjunction with his presentation of 
Christ, the believers can adopt a perspective whereby they can even rejoice in their 
suffering when it is on account of their allegiance to Christ. As such, suffering for 
being a Christian no longer becomes a demoralising event, but is affirmative of 
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one’s true identity and purpose. Furthermore, that the believers have actively 
chosen to align themselves with Christ invests the recipients with the capacity to 
actively choose their own destiny. Therefore, overall it appears that the author’s 
use of emotion aims to give the audience confidence and to reduce the inner 
turmoil cause by persecution. 
Why is it important for the author’s rhetorical strategy that he endeavours to shape 
the audience’s emotional life? The answer is that using emotions enables the 
author to move beyond issuing prescriptive commands. Through seeking to shape 
the emotions he is working at a deeper formative level that, though it includes 
cognitive aspects and is not devoid of reasoning, involves a more fundamental 
shaping and orientation of the self. This internal orientation is more than accepting 
certain statements as facts; it is an internalisation of a new way of seeing the world 
and an acceptance of one’s place within it. In this way, the author’s use of emotion 
comes closer to encouraging the believers’ to assume dispositional states. This is, in 
fact, more effective than issuing individual commands, because it means that the 
disposition to act in a certain way can be carried into numerous, varied situations. 
To learn to rejoice and hope in or fear God prepares the person to prefer particular 
ends and therefore to select the right course of action accordingly. By shaping the 
believers’ emotional life he can make sure that this formation of the person is deep 
and long-lasting. Moreover, this does not just happen at an individual level, but, by 
establishing an emotional regime for his audience as a whole, he can determine 
community expectations and shape the collective response to circumstances. If the 
audience adopts this emotional regime collectively it leads to a shared group 
perspective. As such, everyday experiences can take on new meaning and new 
prototypical scenarios for emotions are created, for example suffering becomes an 
occasion for joy when it would previously not have been. Subsequently, a new 
corporate understanding of the Christian life is produced, and as the individual 
aligns with this emotional regime she finds herself firmly placed within the 
community and discovers more about both her identity and how to behave. This 
emotional regime becomes distinctive of the group and, through fostering a 
different evaluation of objects within the world, it demarcates this community from 
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others. Their distinctive identity is shown both in their emotional response to 
events and by the behaviour that their emotional dispositions produce, both of 
which may appear obtuse to outsiders who do not share the same way of seeing 
the world. Thus, if the author wants to orientate and shape the individual and the 
community so that they consistently pursue a certain course and have a distinctive 
identity, he has to engage the believers’ emotions. 
So, what does this have to say to 1 Peter’s social strategy? Well, it may now be 
obvious to those aware of the Balch-Elliott debate that my investigation into the 
function of emotions in 1 Peter cannot lead me towards agreement with those who 
side with Balch in seeing 1 Peter as advocating acculturation to Hellenistic society as 
a means of apology which aims to reduce hostility by conforming to social 
expectations.908 It is of note that in the discussion that ensues between the various 
positions, little attention has been given to the emotions. This is problematic, 
because emotions are both deeply tied to cultural norms and prescriptive for 
behaviour. Thus, through understanding them we can see how the author is 
orientating his audience i.e. towards what values and symbols, and also what 
behaviour is being promoted. These are the very points on which the Balch-Elliott 
debate hinges. In our investigation it is apparent that the author’s use of emotion is 
seeking to establish a different framework of values based on God’s character and 
his action in Christ. Moreover, time and time again, the emotions direct the 
audience towards God, and position God and Christ as of primary importance in the 
audience’s worldview, presumably in order to mould the believers’ behavioural 
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 The now classic debate between Balch and Elliott was initiated by the publication of their 
individual monographs which appeared in the same year and reached opposite conclusions with 
regard to 1 Peter’s social strategy. Balch considered 1 Peter’s household code to urge acculturation 
to Hellenistic social norms as a means of lessening abuse received by outsiders. Elliott, however, 
looking at the whole letter and with special interest in the terms πάροικοι and παρεπίδημοι, thought 
1 Peter promoted the internal cohesion of the Christian community and nonconformity to external 
pressures. See Balch, Let Wives be Submissive; J. H. Elliott, A Home for the Homeless: A Sociological 
Exegesis of 1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981). The debate was 
continued in a 1982 SBL seminar. The papers were then subsequently revised and published; See J. 
H. Elliott, '1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy: A Discussion with David Balch,' in Perspectives on First 
Peter (ed. Charles H. Talbert; NABPR Special Studies Series 9; Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 
1986), 61-78; D. L. Balch, 'Hellenization / Acculturation in 1 Peter,' in Perspectives on First Peter (ed. 
Charles H. Talbert; NABPR Special Studies Series 9; Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1986), 79-
101. 
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response.909 The other, conversely, is continually displaced and either devalued or 
revalued. Furthermore, the author’s use of shame language poses a frontal attack 
on society’s assessments of the believers and as such he challenges the norms and 
assumptions of surrounding society. The suggestion that the author wants the 
audience to acculturate to surrounding society cannot be reconciled with this 
evidence. Thus, this investigation finds more sympathy with Elliott’s position who 
sees the letter’s aim as ‘to counteract the demoralizing and disintegrating impact 
that … social tension and suffering had upon the Christian’ and  that the letter 
provides ‘a persuasive sustaining rationale for continued faith, commitment and 
hope.’910 However, I find that, in fact, Torrey Seland’s position is the most 
compelling. Seland challenges the Balch-Elliott debate, and suggests that the 
discussion starts from the wrong point. For, in reality, the believers were already 
acculturated to their previous society, but what they are in need of is socialisation 
into the new Christian community, including its ideologies and symbols.911 In 
agreement with Seland, my investigation into emotions has convinced me that this 
is what the letter is aiming at. The emotional rhetoric of 1 Peter asks the audience 
to move towards internalising a new view of reality, a reality which has a new set of 
values, norms, narrative, and symbols. The believers’ emotional internalisation of 
this reality is a necessary stage in the socialisation process if the believers are to 
fully accept and identify with their new Christian worldview and community. 
Through their internal acceptance of this reality the believers will be able to carry 
an outlook that consistently informs their priorities and consequently their 
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 Thus, I agree with Elliott that it is important when assessing 1 Peter’s stance towards external 
society to consider the letter as a whole, not simply the household codes; Elliott, 'Situation,' 64-6. 
910
 Elliott, 'Situation,' 65-6. However, it is also necessary at this point to note the advances of 
scholars like Horrell, who have shown that the tensions between conformity and resistance are 
more complex and varied than the Balch-Elliott debate allows, particularly when aspects such as the 
dominance of the Empire are taken into consideration. Horrell suggests, instead, that the letter’s 
stance is one of polite resistance; see Horrell, 'Between,' . See also M. Volf, 'Soft Difference: 
Theological Reflections on the Relationship between Church and Culture in 1 Peter,'  Ex Auditu 10 
(1994): 15-30. 
911
 T. Seland, Strangers in the Light: Philonic Perspectives on Christian Identity in 1 Peter (BInS 76; 
Leiden: Brill, 2005), 168-72. Therefore, any alienation is a result of their conversion, not, contra 
Elliott, a specific displaced status they had before conversion; see Horrell, 'Between,' 226; cf. Volf, 
'Soft Difference,' 17-9. 
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ethics.912 Put differently, through a new emotional regime, the author enables the 
audience to be fully incorporated into the reality revealed in Christ. As Horrell 
comments, the audience are located within a new ‘identity-defining narrative which 
offers a fundamentally different perspective on their existence.’913 Of course, the 
second question of how they are to relate to their previous community does 
inevitably follow, but this is a secondary question.914 If the socialisation process has 
been effected successfully, then aspects of this process such as one’s new 
emotional orientation will necessarily put boundaries on behaviour and 
interaction.915 Consequently, our investigation into emotions has revealed that 1 
Peter’s worldview aims to produce a desire to be in allegiance with God through 
Christ because of a belief that such allegiance is the only way to flourish as a 
human, even if it leads to suffering.916 In reasserting this worldview through his use 
of emotions the author can make sure that the audience are equipped to navigate 
their world correctly. This may at points mean that the audience exhibits behaviour 
also considered ‘good’ by external society, but on other occasions it may require 
outright deviance. Their Christian outlook and its associated goals and values are 
what determine behaviour, and this will secondarily impact upon their 
relationships. Therefore, it is allegiance to God that is most important, not 
(non)conformity or assimilation/separation as social principles in themselves. 
8.4 Moving Forward 
Thus, it is evident that taking an informed look at the use of emotions in 1 Peter has 
enabled us to look at the rhetoric of the author in a fresh light. It has helped us to 
see new links between objects, values, goals and ethics which were not previously 
obvious.  This has secondarily allowed further comment on the direction that the 
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 See Elliott, contra Balch, who argues that the Christian mythos should not be separated from the 
Christian ethos; Elliott, 'Situation,' 76-7; Balch, 'Hellenization,' 98-101. 
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 Horrell, 'Between,' 229. 
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society; Horrell, 'Between,' 226-9. 
916
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author is moving his audience towards and what impact this may have on his 
audience’s social and therapeutic life. It has been able to demonstrate how the 
author has moved beyond using emotions to ‘moralize’ or ‘judge’ events to using 
emotions to place an entire eschatological worldview before his audience’s eyes by 
applying familiar emotions to new scenarios.917 Furthermore, it has extended and 
given greater depth to work previously done on 1 Peter’s rhetoric. Thurén’s 
Argument and Theology in 1 Peter does acknowledge that emotions are motivating 
and his analysis implicitly recognises the logic of emotions. However, this thesis has 
moved beyond Thurén’s limited analysis by revealing why emotions are 
motivational. It has also demonstrated with more clarity and penetration than 
Thurén how the emotions function as part of the persuasion of the letter by 
exploring their relation to specific objects, values, goals, and, consequently, the 
letter’s ethical persuasion. More than simply forming part of a ‘warrant’ or ‘claim’ 
for a particular paraenetic statement, as Thurén argues, this thesis has revealed 
that the author’s use of emotion is in fact presenting an entire worldview and 
seeking to internally shape the audience. Furthermore, by looking at a number of 
emotions, this investigation has taken a broader approach to pathetic persuasion 
than Campbell’s work, Honor, Shame and the Rhetoric of 1 Peter. It has also 
rejected the importing of ancient rhetorical categories onto the text exhibited in 
Campbell’s work, and has sought to understand how emotions work through the 
discourse of the letter as a whole rather than in isolated pericope. In such a way, is 
has been possible to highlight the thoroughgoing importance of emotions in 
persuasion across the letter, drawing parallels between and collating the evidence 
from emotions that occur in different sections of the letter’s argument. This wider 
approach can more readily lead into larger scale discussion about, for example, 
what the author thinks it means to flourish as a human, or how the early Christian 
communities sought to use emotions to establish a distinctive Christian culture. 
In terms of previous readings of 1 Peter, the above exegesis has shown how being 
more aware of emotions can pinpoint where a cursory reading of emotion terms 
has led to errors, such as what the author is encouraging the audience to rejoice in, 
                                                     
917
 See Lutz, Unnatural, 10. 
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or the place of trials and suffering in the life of the Christian. In the case of fear, a 
better understanding of emotions has highlighted where our modern sensibilities 
regarding emotions may cause us to dampen the intended force of 1 Peter’s 
language. Furthermore, with the emotion of shame, it has shown how the 
assessment of a person’s social status without recourse to her internal emotional 
understanding of her identity is problematic. Thus, this thesis has demonstrated 
that investigating emotions in the New Testament epistles opens up new avenues 
for discussion, and can even provide corrective tools. Moreover, it has shown that if 
we really want to understand an author’s worldview and/or his ethics we must take 
account of the emotions. 
This thesis has only started to scratch the surface of exploring emotions in the New 
Testament. It has not even covered every emotion in 1 Peter, leaving love and the 
absence of anger untouched. Thus, there is much more scope for investigating 
emotions, whether that be in other New Testament texts individually or 
comparatively across texts. My hope is that this thesis has provided both a working 
methodology by which this can be accomplished, and evidence of the value of such 
an investigation.
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Appendix 1: Chronology of the Leading Stoics 
The following information is taken from Tiziano Dorandi, ‘Chronology’ in The 
Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (eds. Keimpe Algra, et al.; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 31-54, 50-54; F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics, 7; D. 
Sedley, ‘The School from Zeno to Arius Didymus’ in The Cambridge Companion to 
The Stoics (ed. Brad Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7-32; 
and C. Gill, ‘The School in the Roman Imperial Period’ in The Cambridge Companion 
to The Stoics, 33-58, 33-38. Those listed in bold indicate the heads of the Stoic 
school in Athens. Where there is disagreement in dating the below follows Dorandi 
and Gill. 
The Founder: 
Zeno of Citium (born 334/3, died 262/1 BCE) 
Early Stoicism: 
Aristo of Chios (contemporaneous with Zeno) 
Dionysius of Heraclea (born 330-325 BCE) 
Cleanthes of Assos (born 331/0, becomes Scholarch 262/1 BCE, died 230/29 BCE,) 
Persaeus of Citium (born 307/6, flourished 260-256 BCE, died 243 BCE) 
Sphaerus of Borysthenes (born c.285) 
Chrysippus of Soli (born 280-276 BCE, becomes Scholarch 230/29, died 208-204 
BCE) 
Zeno of Tarsus (Scholarch c.208-205 BCE) 
Diogenes of Seleucia/ Babylon (born c.230 BCE, died c.150-140 BCE) 
Middle Stoicism: 
Antipater of Tarsus (becomes Scholarch c.150-140 BCE, died 130/29 BCE) 
Panaetius of Rhodes (born 185-180 BCE, becomes Scholarch 129/8 BCE, died 
110/09 BCE) 
Hecato of Rhodes 
Mnesarchus and Dardanus (born c. 170 BCE, joint heads c. 110/09 BCE) 
Posidonius of Apamea (born c.135-130 BCE, died 55-50 BCE) 
Athenodorus (late 1st Century BCE) 
Arius Dydimus (late 1st Century BCE) 
Roman Stoicism: 
Seneca the Younger (1 BCE-65 CE) 
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Musonius Rufus (c. 30-100 CE) 
Epictetus (c. 50-130 CE) 
Hierocles (active around 120 CE) 
Marcus Aurelius (b.121 CE, Emperor 161-180 CE) 
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